Estate of Miller c/o Miller Wendy v. State of Maryland ( 2023 )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, * ESTATE OF MILLER, WENDY-MILLER, BENEFICIARY/HEIR, * . Plaintiff * v. * CIVIL NO. JKB-21-3165 CARRIE M. WARD, et al., . Defendants. * # * x & * x * kok, MEMORANDUM Plaintiff, “Estate of Miller, Wendy-Miller, beneficiary/heir,”' filed a pro se? complaint alleging fraud against several individual and organizational defendants. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Upon review of the initial complaint, the Court found that it failed to comply with federal pleading requirements and directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 4.) After Plaintiff amended the complaint, (see Am. Compl., ECF No. 6), Defendant Penny Mac Mortgage Inc. - (“Penny Mac”) filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). (See Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 7.) The Motion has been fully | Aside from the “Estate of Miller,” Plaintiff's Amended Complaint lists three additional plaintiffs, apparently in error: the United States of America, the “Office of the Secretary,” and the Department of Housing & Urban Development. (Am. Compl. at 2, ECF No. 6.) There is no indication that these entities are indeed co-plaintiffs based upon a review of the record and the appearances entered in this case. As such, the Court understands the “Estate of Miller” to be the sole plaintiff in this matter. □ 2. Ordinarily, an “estate” cannot bring an action pro se, any more than can a corporation or other legal entity that is not a living person. Such entities must be represented by attorneys who have been admitted to practice before this Court. See Local Rule 101.1(a) (D. Md. 2021) (“All parties other than individuals must be represented by counsel.”); McFeeley v. Jackson St. Ent, LLC, Civ. No. DKC 12-1019, 2014 WL 4182231, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 2014) (noting that an estate “must be represented by counsel because all parties other than individuals can only appear through counsel.”). In this case, after a careful reading of the convoluted Amended Complaint, the Court infers that the true plaintiff here is a live person: Wendy Miller. Accordingly, despite the case caption, and stretching to accommodate an-unsophisticated and unrepresented litigant, the Court permits Plaintiff to proceed pro se. briefed (ECF Nos. 10,3 1), and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons that follow, Penny Mac’s Motion will be GRANTED. I. Background . Plaintiff's Amended Complaint names four Defendants: (1) Penny Mac, a mortgage lender; (2) Melvin High, Sheriff of Prince George’s County, Maryland; (3) Carrie M. Ward, an attorney; and (4) BWW Law Group LLC, a Maryland law firm. (Am. Compl. at 2.) Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is difficult to follow and at times incomprehensible. It primarily focuses upon allegations that Plaintiff's property located in Bowie, Maryland has “received several unwarranted foreclosure and writs of ejectment under court registry investment docket number’s CAEI'/9- 07143 ....” Ud.) The docket number cited by Plaintiff corresponds to a foreclosure action filed against Plaintiff in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on March 13, 2019. See WBGLMC y. Miller, No. CAEF19-07143 (Cir. Ct. Prince George’s Cty.). In that case, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County awarded possession of Plaintiff's property to Penny Mac on January 27, 2022, and issued a Writ of Possession on February 16, 2022, to be executed by the Prince George’s County Sheriffs Department. (Mot. Dismiss Ex. 1, ECF 7-2.) □ In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Circuit Court’s decision constituted a “Void Judgment” and triggered an “Unauthorized Sheriff Sale.” (Am. Compl. at 5.) Plaintiff also alleges that the Circuit Court’s decision violated due process, constituted a “[f]raudulent transfer,” and ‘was an “unlawful conversion clouting [sic] (t)he rights to title... .” (Ud) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant High “violated” his oath of office by taking possession of PlaintifP s property following its foreclosure. (id at 6.) In addition to challenging the Circuit Plaintiffs response to Penny Mac’s Motion is styled as an “Affidavit of Adverse Claim Against registered Lands.” (ECF No. 10.) While the filing does not respond to any arguments raised in Penny Mac’s Motion, the Court constres Plaintiff's filing as constituting her response for purposes of resolving the pending Motion. 2 Court’s decision, Plaintiff also seeks relief “against all defendant(s) for certain violations of” the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “FCPA”) and the Racketeer Influenced and Conrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) as well as for claims related to “Trafficking of Persons; Identify (heft ithe] False Claims Act, White Collar Crime, Tax Fraud inclusive without Limitation to, similar provisions with respect to similar fraud; anti-bribery Provisions of (t)he FCPA, □ □ . casuistry, Money laundering; [and] general abuse.” (Id at 7-8.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants “have conspired and deluded [her] securities . . . for pecuniary gain.” (/d.at6.) Penny-Mac filed Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, arguing that the Court lacks subj ect-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because “an adjudication of [Plaintiff's claims] would require this federal court to determine that the state courts final judgment in the Foreclosure Case was somehow erroneous.” (ECF 7-1 at 4) Penny Mac also contends that dismissal of this case is warranted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because “ijhere are no specific allegations against PennyMac (nor any other party),” and the Amended Complaint “falls well short of the pleading requirements of Rule 8.” Cd. at 3.) II. Legal Standards □ "Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. “A defendant may raise a Rule 12(b)(1) issue in one of two ways.” Equal Rights Ctr. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co, 767 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 (D. Md, 2010). First, a defendant may dispute the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint, in which case the district court may “90 beyond the allegations of the complaint’ and hold an evidentiary hearing 10 ‘determine if there are facts to support the jurisdictional allegations.’” 24th Senatorial Dist, Republican Comm. y, Alcorn, 820 F.3d 624, 629 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Second, a defendant may contend that the complaint fails to allege facts upon which subject-matter oy : nie bl Jb - - . : - eee * PEs ye hen jurisdiction can be based. Id. In this second scenario, the Court must grant the plaintiff the same protection to which she would be entitled undet Rule 12(b)(6)—that is to say, the court takes □□□ well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Kerns vy. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2009). ven 50, the court is not obligated to asstime that the plaintifi’s legal conclusions or arguments are also true. Stephenson y Panera Bread, LLC, Civ, No. PJM 14-700, 2014 WL 2436133, at*2 ©: Ma. May 29, 2014). : . oe While Raul 12¢6)(1 i concerned with threshold jurisdictional defects, Rule 12(b)(6) 8 implicated when a plaintiff fails to. state a plausible claim for relief In analyzing a Rule 12(b)66) motion, the court must view all well-pleaded allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). “[A] well-pleaded complaint may oceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable[.]” ‘Bell All Corp. v. Twombly. 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). Bven 50, “r£Jactual allegations must be enough to a right to relief above the speculative level.” id at 555. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does complaint ‘suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion{s} devoid of ‘further factual enhancement. Asheroft-v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In “addition, pro se plaintiffs are held to a “less. stringent standard[]” than lawyers, and cout construe their pleadings liberally, no matter how “inartfully pled.” Erickson vy. Pardus, 351 US. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Nonetheless, a pro se complaint must still meet the “minimum threshold of plausibility” under Twombly and igh Mwabira-Simera y. Thompson Hospitality Servs. LLP, Civ. No. WMN-11- 2989, 2012 WL 959383 at 3 (D. Ma. Mar. 20, 2012). while pro se complaints “represent the work of an untutored hand requiring special judicial solicitude,” district courts are not required to “conjure up guestions never squarely presented to them” orto “construct full blown claims from fragments.”. Beaudet v. City of Hampton, 115 F.2d 1274, 1277-78 (4th Cir, 1985). ot . a I Analysis: . / . □ oo For the reasons explained below, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not deprive the Court of subject-matter jutisdietion over Plaintif? 5 claims. However the Amended Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief. As such, ‘the Court will grant Penny Mac's Motion to Dismiss." As an initial matter, Penny, Mac's argument that Court lacks subject-matter juisdiction pursuant to thé Rooker-Feldman doctrine is unavailing. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction to sit in-appellate review of “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries. caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings. commenced and inviting district. court review anid rejection of those “udgments.” ExxonMobil Corp v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544. US. 280, 284 (2005). In Exxon.Mobil, the United States Supreme Court slatified that the doctrine occupies only a “narrow ground,” □□□ stated that “twJhen there is parailel state and federal litigation, Rooker-Feldman is not ttiggered ‘sinply by the entry of judgment in state court.” Id “at 992..'Indeed, “neither Rooker nor F eldman supports the riotion that properly invoked concurrent jurisdiction. vanishes if a state court reaches judgment on the same or related question while the case remains sub judice ina federal court.” Id. “While Plaintifr S ‘Amended Complaint appears to invite this Coutt’s review of a Circuit Court foreclosure decision in which Plaintiff did not prevail, Rooker-F eldman is inapplicable to this ‘case. Plaintiff commenced this action on December 13, 2021, at which time the underlying Circuit Court case was still pending and the Circuit Court had not vet awarded possession of Plaintiff's property to Penny Mac. (See Compl., ECF No. 1: Mot. Dismiss Ex. 1.) As such: the TE a Peo, □□□ □□ Circuit Court’ January 27 . 2022 judgment not “rendered before the district court proceedings commenced,” see Exxon Mobil Cotp, 544 US. at ‘284, and therefore, this Court does not Jack subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff sforeclosure-related claims. □ Plains allegations regarding the Cireit Cout’s judgment were first sein het Amended! Complaint, which was ied afer ie Cirout Cour goed ts desion. (Amn Compl 6, see generally Compl. Nonetheless, cours have recognized that “ifa federal court has propel invoked subject matter jurisdiction at the time of the initial federal complaint, the Rooker-F éldmen doctrine cannot spring into action and eliminate jurisdiction merely because an amended complaint ig filed.” Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach; 713 F.3d 1066, 1072 n.3 (11th Cir. 2013): accord Anderson v. Herbert, 745 F. App'x 63, 68 (10th Cir. 2018). As such, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine not bar this Court from exerdising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's foteciosure-related claims: ees B. Failure to State a Claim □□ □□ Ns me = While RookereF? eldman does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction over this case. thé Couit niust nonetheless dismiss the ‘amended Complaint for failure toistate a claim pursuant to: □□□□ 1206506). Because Plaintiff proceeds: pro “ses: the. Court: affords her. pleading a: liberal construction, see Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. ‘Nonetheless, a district court cannot ignore a cleat éhiture da ihe pleading to allege. facts which set forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep't of Soe. Servs., 901 F 24 387 (4th Ciz. 1990). EE Plaintifr s pro se pleading, even when afforded a generous reading, fails to satisty the plausibility standard of Rule 12(6N(6). For example, the Amended Complaint contains no reference to Penny Mac except to name it as Defendant. (Am. Compl. at 2.) As such, the Court ig unable to ascertain what factual allegations or claims pertain to Penny Mae, let alone whether Plaintiff has plausibly ‘alleged any such claims, Plaintitt also alleges that Defendant ‘High . “violated” his oath of office. (/d. at 6.) But, because no details are provided as to how or when Defendant High allegedly violated this oath, this claim is also not plausibly alleged. The rest of the allegations in the Amended Complaint appear to be directed at all named Defendants and pertain to either: (1) the allegedly unlawful foreclosure of Plaintiff's home; or (2) a number of itis claims for which Plaintiff provides no factual context. (/d. at 2-11.) With respect to Plaintiff's foreclosure-related claims, Plaintiff fails to allege how, if at all, any named Defendant was involved in the foreclosure. Similarly, Plaintiff does not provide even a scintilla of factual detail connecting any Defendant to any of her other claims. As such, the Court cannot determine whether any cognizable claims are set forth in the Amended Complaint. This Court previously warned Plaintiff that failure to amend her complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would result in the dismissal of her case. (ECF No. 4.) Because the Court is unable to decipher any plausible claims within the Amended Complaint, it must therefore dismiss this case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).* IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, an Order shall issue granting Penny Mac’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) and directing the Clerk to close this case. DATED this i. day of January, 2023. BY THE COURT: Cia) aoe Mo Leen James K. Bredar Chief Judge 4 The Court notes that Defendants Ward and High have not joined Penny Mac’s Motion. Nonetheless, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for the reasons stated herein. See 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2020) (“Even if a party does not make a formal motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court judge on his or her own initiative may note the inadequacy of the complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a claim as long as the procedure employed is fair to the parties.”).