Meade v. Saul ( 2020 )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND ORLANDO CORNELL M., * Plaintiff, . vs. * Civil Action No. ADC-19-3188 COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY * ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. to uAENENEHMND EMAAR AERE MEMORANDUM OPINION On November 4, 2019, Orlando M. (‘Plaintiff’) petitioned this Court to review the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) final decision to deny his claim for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). See ECF No. 1 (“the Complaint”). After consideration of the Complaint and the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 15 and 16), as well as al responses (ECF No. 17), the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). In addition, for the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15) and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) are DENIED, and the case is REMANDED to the SSA for further analysis in accordance with this opinion. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On May 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Title XVI application for supplemental security income alleging that he was unable to work beginning on May 19, 2016. His claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration on August 15, 2016 and October 21 2016, respectively. Subsequently, on October 28, 2016, Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing, and, on October 1, 2018, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). On November 15, 2018, the ALJ rendered a decision denying Plaintiff's claims for SSI. See ECCF No. 11 at 20. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an appeal of the ALJ’s disability determination, and, on December 19, 2019, the Appeals Council dented Plaintiff's request for review. ECF No. 11 at 5. Thus, the decision rendered by the ALJ became the final decision of the Commissioner. See CFR. § 416.1481; see also Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000). On November 4, 2019, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this Court seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of Plaintiffs social security application.’ On July 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 15. On September 8, 2020, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 16. Plaintiff filed a response on September 18, 2020. ECF No. 17. This matter is now fully briefed, and the Court has reviewed all motions and responses thereto. STANDARD OF REVIEW “This Court is authorized to review the Commissioner's denial of benefits under 42 US.C.A. § 405(g).” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the Court does not conduct a de novo review of the evidence. Instead, the Court’s review of an SSA decision is deferential, as “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 □□ Cir. 1996) (“The duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence rests with the ALJ, not with a reviewing court.”); see also Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4% Cir. 1986) (“We do not conduct a de novo review of the evidence, and the Secretary's finding of non-disability is to be upheld, even if the court disagrees, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.”). Therefore, the issue before the 1 On October 14, 2020, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rules 301 and 302 of the United States Court for the District of Maryland and upon consent of the parties, this case was transferred to United States Magistrate Judge A. David Copperthite for all proceedings. reviewing court “is not whether [Plaintiff] is disabled, but whether the ALJ’s finding that [Plaintiff] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4" Cir. 1996) (“Under the Social Security Act, [a reviewing court] must uphold the factual findings of the [ALJ] if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard.”). Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Hancock vy. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (2012). It “consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance.” Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d at 638. “In reviewing for substantial evidence, we do not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute our judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d at 653 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [ALJ].” Jd. (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, in conducting the “substantial evidence” inquiry, the court shall determine whether the ALJ has considered all relevant evidence and sufficiently explained the weight accorded to that evidence. Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 439-40 (4th Cir. 1997). DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF In order to be eligible for SSI, a claimant must establish that he is under disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The term “disability,” for purposes of the Social Security Act, is defined as the “[iJnability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to. result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905. A claimant shall be determined to be under disability where “his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such a severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy[.]” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). In determining whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the ALJ, acting on behalf of the Commissioner, follows the five-step evaluation process outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003). The evaluation process is sequential, meaning that, “[ijf at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the [Commissioner] will not review the claim further.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. at 24; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). At step one, the ALJ considers the claimant’s work activity to determine if the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)q), 404.1520(b), 416.920(a)(4)(i), 416.920(b). At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment [or combination of impairments] that meets the duration requirement[.]” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments meeting the durational requirement of 12 months, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)Gi), 404.1520(c), 416.920(a)(4)Gi), 416.920(c), 416.909. At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairments, either individually or in combination, meet or medically equal one of the presumptively disabling impairments listed in the Code of Federal Regulations. 20 C.F.R. $§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4) (iii). If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, then the claimant is considered disabled, regardless of the claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)Gii), 404.1520(d), 416.920(a)(4)Gii), 416.920(d); see Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 291 (4" Cir. 2013). Prior to advancing to step four of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ must assess the claimant's “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”), which is then used at the fourth and fifth steps of the analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). RFC is an assessment of an individual's ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis. Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p. The ALJ must consider even those impairments that are not “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2). In determining RFC, the ALJ evaluates the claimant's subjective symptoms (e.g., allegations of pain) using a two-part test. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 594 (4th Cir.1996); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. First, the ALJ must determine whether objective evidence shows the existence of a medical impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the actual alleged symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). Once the claimant makes that threshold showing, the ALJ must evaluate the extent to which the symptoms limit the claimant's capacity to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). At this second stage, the ALJ must consider all the available evidence, including medical history, objective medical evidence, and statements by the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). The ALJ must assess the credibility of the claimant's statements, as symptoms can sometimes manifest at a greater level of severity of impairment than is shown by solely objective medical evidence. SSR 96-7p. To assess credibility, the ALJ should consider factors such as the claimant's daily activities, treatments she has received for her symptoms, medications, and any other factors contributing to functional limitations. Jd. At step four, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has the ability to perform past relevant work based on the determined RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still perform past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)civ), 404.1520(e), 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(e). Where the claimant is unable to resume past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step of the sequential analysis. At steps one through four of the evaluation, the claimant has the burden of proof. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920: see Bowen y. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987); see also Radford, 734 F.3d at 291. At step five, however, the burden of proof shifts to the ALJ to prove: (1) that there is other work that the claimant can do, given the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and RFC (as determined at step four), and; (2) that such alternative work exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404,1520(a\(4(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); See Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472-73 (4% Cir. 2012); See also Walls v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 287, 290 (4 Cir. 2002). If the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(2)(1), 404.1560(c), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant cannot perform other work, then the claimant is disabled. Jd. ALJ DETERMINATION In the instant matter, the ALJ performed the sequential evaluation and found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application date of May 11, 2016. ECF No. 11 at 25. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of status post, right knee arthroscopy; major depressive disorder/bipolar disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; and posttraumatic stress disorder. Jd. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had the non-severe impairment of headaches. /d. At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Jd. at 26. At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff □□□ the residual functional capacity to: perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except: requires no more than occasional crawling and climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; requires no stooping; is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks that are low-stressed in nature, which is defined as having only occasional decision making, occasional changes in the work setting, and no strict production quotas; and requires no contact with the public and no more than occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors and once work is assigned it should be able to be performed primarily without working in coordination with other employees. id. at 27. The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. Jd. at 31. Finally, at step five, the ALJ found that, “[clonsidering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” Jd. at 32. Thus, the ALJ concluded that, “[T]he claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from May 11, 2016, through the date of this decision.” Jd at 33. DISCUSSION Plaintiff raises two allegations of error on appeal: (1) that the ALJ set forth an inadequate hypothetical, which infected the ALJ’s RFC determination, rendering the entire decision unsupported by substantial evidence; and (2) that at the fifth step in the sequential evaluation the ALJ failed to identify and resolve apparent conflicts between the vocational expert’s (“VE”) testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles “ □□ in A. David Copperthite United States Magistrate Judge 14