Jane Doe v. Timothy Tierney , 2018 ME 101 ( 2018 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 101 Docket: Sag-17-486
Argued: June 14, 2018
Decided: July 17, 2018
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
JANE DOE1
v.
TIMOTHY TIERNEY
ALEXANDER, J.
[¶1] Timothy Tierney appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(West Bath, Dobson, J.) finding that the plaintiff, Jane Doe, “was abused by the
defendant” and granting a two-year extension of a protection from abuse order
to her. 19-A M.R.S. § 4007 (2017). Tierney contends that the trial court erred
or abused its discretion because it (1) considered evidence of events that
preceded the issuance of the original protection from abuse order in deciding
to extend that original order; and (2) did not give him sufficient notice of the
issues to be addressed in the hearing on extension of the original order. He also
1 To comply with federal law, we do not identify the plaintiff in this protection from abuse action
and limit our description of events and locations to avoid revealing “the identity or location of the
party protected under [a protection] order” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2265(d)(3) (LEXIS through
Pub. L. No. 115-196); see J.C. v. J.H., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 224, 84 N.E.3d 26 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017).
2
argues that there was not sufficient evidence to justify extension of the
protection from abuse order for two years, with the addition of prohibitions
that, by federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-196),2
have the effect of prohibiting him from possessing firearms and that include an
express directive prohibiting his possession of firearms. We affirm.
2 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-196) states:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—
. . . .
(8) who is subject to a court order that—
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual
notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an
intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or
person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner
in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and
(C)
(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to
the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child
that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury
. . . .
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
3
I. CASE HISTORY
[¶2] The record establishes the following facts and procedural history.
The plaintiff ended a several year relationship with the defendant in
October 2016.
[¶3] Stating that she was afraid of Tierney and that she was concerned
by his continuing attempts to contact her, the plaintiff first filed a complaint for
protection from abuse against Tierney on February 21, 2017. That same day,
the District Court (Dobson, J.) entered a temporary order for protection from
abuse, 19-A M.R.S. § 4006(2) (2017), that included a provision explicitly
prohibiting Tierney from possessing firearms or dangerous weapons. 19-A
M.R.S. § 4006 (2-A)(B) (2017). The prohibition on possession of firearms in the
temporary order would have put Tierney on notice that firearms prohibitions
can be at issue in protection from abuse proceedings.
[¶4] In March 2017, the parties appeared in court for a final hearing on
the complaint. At the courthouse, the parties agreed to the entry of a six-month
protective order without a finding of abuse. See 19-A M.R.S. § 4007(1). The
agreed-to order, which was set to expire in September 2017, did not contain a
finding that the defendant had abused the plaintiff, did not prohibit him from
4
possessing firearms, and did not contain provisions that would result in such a
prohibition by operation of federal law.
[¶5] The plaintiff filed a motion to extend the original protection from
abuse order on August 18, 2017. Her motion asserted that the extension was
necessary because “the defendant ha[d] been stalking [her].” The plaintiff
included an affidavit with her motion that further described that she was
seeking the extension based on the defendant’s continued efforts to learn
where she lived, who she was dating, and where she worked.
[¶6] On October 6, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion to modify the original
protection order to change the reference in that order to her place of
employment—from which Tierney was barred during her work hours—to a
different location in a different county. The court granted the motion to modify
that same day, prohibiting the defendant from being at the plaintiff’s new place
of employment. The defendant was served with the amended protection from
abuse order on October 17, 2017.
[¶7] The court held a contested hearing on the motion to extend the
protection from abuse order on November 3, 2017. The plaintiff testified and
called four witnesses. The defendant testified and called one witness.
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[¶8] After considering the evidence, the court found that the plaintiff was
“credible, fearful, and intimidated” by the actions of the defendant, which
included “controlling behavior” and “obsessive texts and calls.” In addition, the
court specifically found that the defendant had previously abused the plaintiff
by threatening to kill any boyfriend she had. Based on its finding of abuse, the
court entered an order extending the protection order for two years and
entered an order prohibiting the defendant from possessing firearms. See 19-A
M.R.S. § 4007(1)(A-1). The order also prohibited Tierney from, among other
things, threatening or harassing the plaintiff and “us[ing], attempt[ing] to use
or threaten[ing to] use physical force that would reasonably be expected to
cause bodily injury” to her. The defendant did not file a motion for further
findings of fact. See M.R. Civ. P. 52. He filed this appeal the same day.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Consideration of Events Supporting the Original Order
[¶9] The defendant argues that the court’s finding of abuse was
improperly based solely on evidence of his behavior prior to the original
protection order. Specifically, he argues that the court relied on the statements
he made regarding killing the plaintiff’s boyfriends and his obsessive texts,
calls, and controlling behavior—behavior that occurred prior to the issuance of
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the original protection order—to support the two-year extension of the
protection from abuse order.
[¶10] A court may extend a protection order by agreement of the parties
or upon a finding that an extension is “necessary to protect the plaintiff or
minor child from abuse.” 19-A M.R.S. § 4007(2); Gehrke v. Gehrke, 2015 ME 58,
¶18, 115 A.3d 1252.
[¶11] When, as here, an extension of an original protection order entered
by agreement and without a finding of abuse is sought prior to the expiration
date of that original order, the court can grant the extension only when the
court finds that, at some point, before or after the original order, there was, in
fact, abuse. Dyer v. Dyer, 2010 ME 105, ¶ 11, 5 A.3d 1049 (explaining that a
court may only extend a protection order by agreement of the parties or upon
a finding of abuse). That abuse may have occurred before the time of the entry
of the agreed-to order when the court specifically determines that, either
because of the nature of the abuse or because of additional threats, concerns,
or actions, the plaintiff has established that “additional time [is] necessary to
protect the plaintiff or minor child from abuse.” 19-A M.R.S. § 4007(2); Dyer,
2010 ME 105, ¶¶ 3-5, 11, 5 A.3d 1049 (holding that it is proper for a court to
consider evidence of earlier abuse and the threat of continuing harm arising out
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of earlier abuse in extending a protection order); see also Gehrke, 2015 ME 58,
¶19, 115 A.3d 1252.
Evidence demonstrating a history of abuse, as defined by statute to
include actual or attempted infliction of bodily injury or offensive
physical contact, see 19-A M.R.S. § 4002(1)(A), and threats of such
conduct made in an attempt to place another in fear of bodily
injury, see id. § 4002(1)(B), is relevant and admissible to
demonstrate that an extended order of protection is “necessary,”
id. § 4007(2). Gehrke, 2015 ME 58, ¶ 19, 115 A.3d 1252.
[¶12] In Gehrke, the defendant challenged the court’s finding that an
extension of a contested protection order was necessary to protect the plaintiff
from abuse when there was little evidence of new abusive conduct since the last
modification of the order. Id. ¶ 16. We held that a plaintiff seeking an extension
need not allege or prove new abuse but must demonstrate that additional time
is necessary to protect him or her from abuse. Id. ¶ 18. We noted, in that case,
that the evidence of the abuse that supported the original order was essential
to understand whether an extension of that order was necessary to protect the
plaintiff from abuse. Id. ¶ 20; see also Dyer, 2010 ME 105, ¶ 11, 5 A.3d 1049.
[¶13] Here, the plaintiff filed for an extension prior to the expiration of
the initial six-month protection order. Therefore, it was proper for the court to
consider evidence of the conduct that supported the original order.
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[¶14] Based on evidence that the court found to be credible of the
defendant’s statements about threatening to kill any boyfriend the plaintiff may
have and “his obsessive calls, texts and controlling behavior,” the court found
abuse. The court further found that the plaintiff was “fearful and intimated,”
based, in part, on evidence of the defendant’s conduct and inquiries to the
plaintiff’s friend subsequent to issuance of the original order. That finding
supported the determination that the two-year extension was necessary.
[¶15] Although the court did not make other specific findings, in the
absence of a motion for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), we will infer that the trial court made any
necessary findings that would be supported by evidence in the record to
support its ultimate conclusion. See Gehrke, 2015 ME 58, ¶ 8, 115 A.3d 1252.
The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in finding abuse and extending
the protection from abuse order.
B. Notice of Issues to be Addressed
[¶16] The defendant argues that he did not receive proper notice of the
issues to be addressed at the extension hearing, because he did not know that
the court could consider his conduct that led to the original protection order,
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or that he could be deprived of his right to possess firearms should the court
make a finding of abuse against him.3
[¶17] “In a procedural due process challenge, we must first determine
whether the governmental action has resulted in a deprivation of life, liberty,
or property.” Guardianship of Hughes, 1998 ME 186, ¶ 9, 715 A.2d 919. If a
deprivation has occurred, we must next determine what process is due under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The two essential elements of procedural due
process are notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Kirkpatrick v. City of
Bangor, 1999 ME 73, ¶ 15, 728 A.2d 1268.
[¶18] Here, the defendant was notified of, present at, and participated in
the hearing on the motion to extend the protection from abuse order. He had
the opportunity to present evidence concerning the abuse alleged by the
plaintiff, and the court found that the evidence he presented in the form of
witness testimony “didn’t really contradict the plaintiff’s witnesses’ testimony.”
Further, the defendant did not object to the nature or scope of the evidence
presented against him, and he did not assert to the court that the hearing and
3 To the extent the defendant argues that he was without knowledge of the law that allows the
court to issue an order prohibiting his right to possess firearms upon a finding of abuse, see 19-A
M.R.S. § 4007(1)(A-1) (2017), this argument is without merit. See State v. Goodenow, 65 Me. 30, 33
(1876) (“Ignorance of the law excuses no one.”). In addition, the temporary protection order that
included a firearms prohibition put the defendant on notice that a firearms prohibition may be at
issue in this matter.
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any resulting order should be limited. Thus, his right to procedural due process
was not violated. The plaintiff’s motion to extend and her accompanying
affidavit, the statute, and the initial temporary order gave the defendant
sufficient notice of what he needed to defend against at the hearing.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Extension
[¶19] The appeal appears to challenge whether there was sufficient
evidence to support the court’s extension of the protection order for two years
and the order prohibiting the defendant from possessing firearms. We do not
find these arguments persuasive. The evidence discussed above is more than
sufficient to support the extension of the order for an additional two years,
including the prohibition on the possession of firearms. See Walton v. Ireland,
2014 ME 130, ¶ 22, 104 A.3d 883 (“We review a trial court’s finding of abuse
for clear error and will affirm a trial court’s findings if they are supported by
competent evidence in the record, even if the evidence might support
alternative findings of fact.”).
[¶20] Even if the extended protection order had not included an explicit
prohibition against the possession of firearms, that prohibition would have
arisen by operation of federal law as a result of the provisions of the order that
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prohibited the defendant from threatening, harassing, or stalking the plaintiff,4
and that prohibited him from using, attempting to use, or threatening to use
physical force against the plaintiff that would reasonably be expected to cause
bodily injury. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-196).
The evidence presented to the court warranted issuance of an order containing
these prohibitions. Consequently, the inclusion of an explicit firearms
prohibition did not prejudice the defendant, because application of federal law
would have had the same effect as a direct result of the other provisions of the
order.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Misha C. Pride, Esq. (orally), Drummond & Drummond, LLP, Portland, for
appellant Timothy Tierney
Caroline Y. Jova, Esq. (orally), Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Portland, for appellee
Jane Doe
4
The original order prohibited the defendant from stalking the plaintiff. The additional
prohibitions described in the text were new in the extended order.