In re Child of Nuradin A. , 2018 ME 36 ( 2018 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 36Docket: Cum-17-447
Submitted
On Briefs: February 26, 2018
Decided: March 15, 2018
Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE CHILD OF NURADIN A.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] The father of a child appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(Portland, Eggert, J.) terminating his parental rights to the child pursuant to
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i), (ii), (iv) (2017).1 The father
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment and the
court’s discretionary determination that termination is in the child’s best
interest. Because the evidence supports the court’s findings and discretionary
determination, we affirm the judgment.
[¶2] Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found, by clear
and convincing evidence, that (1) the father was unwilling or unable to protect
the child from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within
a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, (2) the father was
1 The mother’s parental rights were terminated in September 2017. The mother did not appeal
that decision.
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unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within a time which is
reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, (3) the father failed to make a
good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child, and (4) termination
of the father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. See 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2); In re Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶ 27, 159 A.3d 345. We review the
factual findings supporting the determination of parental unfitness for clear
error. See In re Logan M., 2017 ME 23, ¶ 3, 155 A.3d 430. The court based these
determinations on the following findings of fact.
[¶3] When the father’s identity was established, the father
was homeless and was living a lifestyle in which he had little
responsibility and mainly consisted of moving around and partying
involving use of drugs and alcohol. When he worked it was through
[a program] doing temporary assignments. . . . [When the Jeopardy
Order was entered in November 2016,] he had not yet become
involved in [the child’s] life and had not visited with him, but had
dropped off some clothes for [the child] with [the Department of
Health and Human Services].
. . . .
At the time of the [termination] hearing [the father] had not
made significant progress in fulfilling the requirements of the
Jeopardy Order or the rehabilitation and reunification plan. He has
visited [the child] from time to time but has not been regularly
doing so and has not had a visit since August 7, 2017. His visits
have been suspended by [the service provider] for missing three
visits and he has not taken the steps necessary to reestablish those
visits. During the visits he has participated in he had been
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developing a bond with his son and had learned some basic skills
for caring for him in a visitation setting. . . .
[The father] completed a substance abuse evaluation at [a
service provider]. . . . He was diagnosed with both alcohol use
disorder and cannabis use disorder. . . . [The father] declined to
take part in any treatment with the excuse that he was too busy.
[The father] explains his refusal by stating that he will deal with the
issue by himself and that he would not do group sessions with
other drug addicts. . . .
[The father] has not . . . engaged in any [mental health]
treatment. The reason for the requirement was some explosive
behavior on his part, with assaultive behavior toward the mother.
Since the Jeopardy Order was entered [the father] has been
involved in a fight . . . in which he broke his hand after attacking a
man who was showing a picture of [the child] in a bar where he was
having a couple of beers. . . . [The father] has also acted in an
explosive fashion at the time of [the child’s] first birthday when
DHHS granted his request for additional time with [the child], but
not the full amount of his request. His response was to get very
angry and then to not even see his son on that birthday. . . .
[The father] has made some progress toward getting housing
assistance, but when this will actually come to fruition is not known
with certainty, perhaps in a month or so. In the meantime he
continues to live in an apartment which is not considered
habitable. He has also done no parenting education and is not
enrolled in any program to provide that education.
. . . In the year that [the father] has known that he is [the
child’s] parent he has taken some small steps toward
rehabilitation, but he is still woefully short of success. He is still
without a stable home, drinks and smokes marijuana when it is
inappropriate, has not dealt with his explosiveness, and has not
enrolled in any parenting programs. In short, he is still not capable
of taking on the responsibility of being a single parent who has to
provide for a child every day, all day.
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[¶4] These findings are sufficient to support the court’s conclusion that
the father is unable to protect the child from jeopardy, is unable to take
responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the
child’s needs, and did not make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify
with the child. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), (iv). The court did not
abuse its discretion by concluding that termination of the father’s parental
rights is in the best interest of the child. See In re Logan M., 2017 ME 23, ¶ 5,
155 A.3d 430. As the court found, the child’s “father is not now capable of caring
for [the child] on a full time basis, and there is no indication that he will be
available to do so in the near future. [The child] needs to have a permanent
placement at this time.”
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Cory R. McKenna, Esq., Fairfield & Associates, P.A., Portland, for appellant father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Portland District Court docket number PC-2016-60
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY