State of Maine v. Douglas E. Belhumeur , 2015 Me. LEXIS 163 ( 2015 )


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  • MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                        Reporter of Decisions
    Decision: 
    2015 ME 150
    Docket:   Pen-14-484
    Argued:   October 6, 2015
    Decided:  November 24, 2015
    Panel:       SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and
    HUMPHREY, JJ.
    STATE OF MAINE
    v.
    DOUGLAS E. BELHUMEUR
    GORMAN, J.
    [¶1] Douglas E. Belhumeur appeals from a judgment of conviction for
    operating under the influence (Class D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(A), (C)(1)
    (2014), entered in the Unified Criminal Docket (Bangor) after a jury trial.
    Belhumeur challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.
    We affirm the judgment.
    I. BACKGROUND
    [¶2] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the jury
    could rationally have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt.
    See State v. Lowden, 
    2014 ME 29
    , ¶ 3, 
    87 A.3d 694
    . For at least two hours on the
    evening of November 17, 2013, Belhumeur’s car was stationary on a side street
    near the casino in Bangor. Throughout that period of time, Belhumeur was alone
    2
    inside the car, the car engine was running, and the headlights were on.
    During those hours, the engine of the car “revved” almost continuously.
    The officer who responded to a complaint about the revving car saw Belhumeur
    asleep or unconscious in the driver’s seat, slouching toward the center of the
    vehicle. Belhumeur’s left hand rested on a half-full can of “Natty Daddy” beer
    between his legs; his right hand rested on his right leg. A second, empty beer can
    was on the floor behind the front seats.
    [¶3] By yelling and knocking on the car window, the officer was able to
    rouse Belhumeur, who responded by reaching for the steering wheel. Fearing that
    Belhumeur would try to drive away, the officer asked him to get out of the car.
    When Belhumeur did not respond, the officer opened the door and, noticing a
    strong odor of alcohol, again asked Belhumeur to get out. Belhumeur did not
    respond, so the officer reached in and turned off the ignition. The officer then
    asked Belhumeur a third time to get out of the car. Belhumeur instead reached for
    the keys, which were still in the ignition. Believing that Belhumeur was trying to
    restart the engine, the officer took the keys out of the ignition.
    [¶4] When he finally got out of the car, Belhumeur nearly fell and, when he
    attempted several field sobriety tests, he was unable to follow the officer’s
    instructions.   At trial, the State introduced into evidence a video depicting
    Belhumeur’s performance on the field sobriety tests.          In addition, the officer
    3
    testified that Belhumeur had admitted to having drunk “two beers,” and
    acknowledged that he was somewhat impaired by the alcohol.
    [¶5] The State charged Belhumeur by complaint with operating under the
    influence (Class D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(A), (C)(1). He pleaded not guilty
    to the charge.    At trial, the parties stipulated that Belhumeur was under the
    influence of alcohol when he was arrested and that he refused to submit to a
    blood-alcohol-content test at the request of a law enforcement officer. After the
    jury returned a guilty verdict, the court (Lucy, J.) entered a judgment on the verdict
    and sentenced Belhumeur to four days in jail, an $800 fine, and a ninety-day
    license suspension. Belhumeur appeals.
    II. DISCUSSION
    [¶6] Belhumeur argues that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to
    support his conviction for operating under the influence.          When a criminal
    defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, “we view the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the State in determining whether the fact-finder could
    rationally have found each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    State v. Jones, 
    2012 ME 88
    , ¶ 7, 
    46 A.3d 1125
    . “As the fact-finder, the jury is
    permitted to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial.”
    State v. Haag, 
    2012 ME 94
    , ¶ 17, 
    48 A.3d 207
    . The same standard applies whether
    4
    that evidence is direct or circumstantial. State v. Kenney, 
    534 A.2d 681
    , 682
    (Me. 1987).
    [¶7] For the jury to find Belhumeur guilty of operating under the influence
    as charged, the State had the burden to prove that he “[o]perate[d] a motor vehicle
    . . . [w]hile under the influence of intoxicants” and that he “failed to submit to a
    test at the request of a law enforcement officer.” 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(A),
    (C)(1). As defined by statute, “‘[o]perating,’ in any form, means operating or
    attempting to operate a motor vehicle.”1 29-A M.R.S. § 2401(6) (2014). To prove
    attempted operation, “the State must prove that the defendant took a substantial
    step toward the operation of a motor vehicle with the intent to operate that
    vehicle.” State v. Deschenes, 
    2001 ME 136
    , ¶ 9, 
    780 A.2d 295
    .
    [¶8] Belhumeur’s sole contention on appeal is that no rational jury could
    find that he operated or attempted to operate his vehicle. We disagree. Viewing
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as we must, we cannot
    conclude that no rational jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
    Belhumeur, while impaired, either drove his car to its resting place or attempted to
    1
    Pursuant to the Criminal Code, a person commits attempt when, “acting with the kind of culpability
    required for the commission of the crime, and with the intent to complete the commission of the crime,
    the person engages in conduct that in fact constitutes a substantial step toward its commission.”
    17-A M.R.S. § 152(1) (2014). “The provisions of [the Criminal Code defining attempt apply] to crimes
    defined outside [the Criminal Code], unless the context of the statute defining the crime clearly requires
    otherwise.” 17-A M.R.S. § 6(1) (2014).
    5
    drive his car after the officer woke him up. See Deschenes, 
    2001 ME 136
    , ¶ 10,
    
    780 A.2d 295
    ; State v. Rossignol, 
    654 A.2d 1297
    , 1299 (Me. 1995); Kenney,
    
    534 A.2d at 682
    .
    The entry is:
    Judgment affirmed.
    On the briefs:
    Jeffrey C. Toothaker, Esq., Ellsworth, for appellant Douglas E.
    Belhumeur
    R. Christopher Almy, District Attorney, and Susan J. Pope,
    Asst. Dist. Atty., Prosecutorial District V, Bangor, for appellee
    State of Maine
    At oral argument:
    Jeffrey C. Toothaker, Esq., for appellant Douglas E. Belhumeur
    Susan J. Pope, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee State of Maine
    Penobscot Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-13-4423
    FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Docket Pen-14-484

Citation Numbers: 2015 ME 150, 128 A.3d 646, 2015 Me. LEXIS 163

Judges: Saufley, Alexander, Mead, Gorman, Jabar, Hjelm, Humphrey

Filed Date: 11/24/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/26/2024