In re Joseph V. ( 2017 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 172 Docket: And-17-148
Submitted
On Briefs: July 19, 2017
Decided: August 1, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.
IN RE JOSEPH V.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] The parents of Joseph V. appeal from a judgment of the District
Court (Lewiston, Dow, J.) terminating their parental rights to the child
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii) (2016).
Specifically, they allege that there is insufficient evidence in the record to
support the court’s finding of parental unfitness by clear and convincing
evidence. See id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii). They also argue that the court
abused its discretion in concluding that termination of their parental rights
was in the child’s best interest. See id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a). We affirm the
judgment.
[¶2] After a two-day hearing, the court issued a judgment terminating
the parents’ rights to the child upon finding, inter alia, that the parents are
unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child or protect him from
jeopardy within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet his needs. See
2
id § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii). In its written judgment, the court found the
following facts, which are supported by competent record evidence. See In re
Charles G., 2001 ME 3, ¶ 5, 763 A.2d 1163.
The parents’ unwillingness or inability to follow through
with things they acknowledge they need to do was a recurring
theme across the spectrum of evidence presented by the
Department and the [guardian ad litem]. The Court finds that the
parents each failed to attend two CODE evaluation sessions.
. . . The parents usually failed to bring diapers and wipes to the
visits. They often failed to bring toys and activities to the visits.
They failed to get [the child] evaluated by CDS when he was still in
their home.
. . . .
[The child] spent his first 26 months, prior to his removal in
April, 2015, without much opportunity to walk. Due in large part
to the squalor and dangerous conditions in the parents’ home,
[the child] spent most of his time in a Pack & Play playpen, then in
the gated living room, where there was a mattress and a
television.
[The child] needs [physical therapy] due to his foot-ankle
musculoskeletal alignment, poor muscle tone, and poor core
strength. He favors his left side. The physical therapy helps him
to build both his stationary and locomotion skills as well as his
strength. He sees [a physical therapist] at Rumford Hospital once
per week. For many months, the reunification effort has included
the expectation that the parents ‘attend appointments and or
meet with providers’ . . . . There have been 34 [physical therapy]
sessions since then. The father has attended 17 sessions; the
mother has attended 7 sessions. . . .
Beyond mere showing up, there is a lack of follow-through
that is well-established. . . .
3
[¶3] The court’s findings detailed above illustrate the parents’
unwillingness or inability to follow through with the services the child
requires to meet his most basic needs. See In re Jeffrey E., 557 A.2d 954, 956
(Me. 1989) (“In order for a court to take into account the special medical
needs of a child, a present medical emergency need not exist, nor does such a
medical emergency have to be imminent or even certain to recur.”). Given
these and other factual findings, the court could reasonably have been
persuaded that the factual bases supporting its finding of parental unfitness as
to both parents were proved to be highly probable. See In re Michaela C.,
2002 ME 159, ¶ 17, 809 A.2d 1245.
[¶4] The parents also contend that the court abused its discretion in
concluding that termination of their parental rights was in the child’s best
interest. 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (2) (2016); In re Thomas H., 2005 ME
123, ¶ 16, 889 A.2d 297. Regarding his best interest, the court noted that:
. . . In addition, [the child] is well-bonded and attached with
his foster parents . . . with whom he has lived for his entire stay in
foster care. . . . [The child] has made tremendous strides in their
care. [The child] benefits from the attention and support of the
foster parents’ extended families, who live in and around
Rumford. The [foster parents] are very good at requiring [the
child] to do his physical therapy exercises, at treating his asthma,
and meeting all of his needs. They are good advocates for him.
4
Viewing these facts “and the weight to be given them[] through the trial
court’s lens,” it cannot be said that the court’s conclusion that termination of
the parents’ rights to the child constituted an abuse of discretion. In re M.B.,
2013 ME 46, ¶ 37, 65 A.3d 1260 (quotation marks omitted); see In re Jacob B.,
2008 ME 168, ¶ 18, 959 A.2d 734 (“Many factors can combine to support a
best interest determination . . . .”).
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Erika Bristol, Esq., Lewiston, for appellant mother
Jason R. Ranger, Esq, Lewiston, for appellant father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Lewiston District Court docket number PC-2014-50
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY