In re Dominic B. , 2017 Me. LEXIS 160 ( 2017 )


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  • MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT	                                          Reporter	of	Decisions
    Decision:	    
    2017 ME 149
    Docket:	      And-17-83
    Submitted
    On	Briefs:	 June	29,	2017
    Decided:	     July	11,	2017
    Panel:	       SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.
    IN	RE	DOMINIC	B.	et	al.
    HUMPHREY,	J.
    [¶1]	 	 The	 mother	 of	 Dominic	 B.	 and	 Channing	 T.	 appeals	 from	 a
    judgment	 of	 the	 District	 Court	 (Lewiston,	 Dow,	 J.)	 terminating	 her	 parental
    rights	to	her	children.1		See	22	M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(A),	(B)	(2016).
    [¶2]		The	mother	does	not	challenge	the	court’s	findings	that	she	is	unfit
    to	 parent	 the	 children	 because	 (1)	 she	 has	 abandoned	 them,	 (2)	 she	 is
    unwilling	and	unable	to	protect	them	from	jeopardy	and	these	circumstances
    are	 unlikely	 to	 change	 within	 a	 time	 reasonably	 calculated	 to	 meet	 their
    needs,	 and	 (3)	 she	 has	 failed	 to	 make	 a	 good	 faith	 effort	 to	 rehabilitate	 and
    reunify	 with	 them.2	 	 See	 22	 M.R.S.	 §	 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i),	 (iii),	 (iv).	 	 She
    contends	 only	 that	 the	 court	 committed	 clear	 error	 or	 abused	 its	 discretion
    1		The	court	also	terminated	the	parental	rights	of	the	father	of	each	child.
    2		 In	 any	 event,	 these	 findings	 are	 supported	 by	 competent	 evidence	 in	 the	 record.
    See	In	re	Daniel	H.,	
    2017 ME 89
    ,	¶	17,	---	A.3d	---.
    2
    when	it	determined	that	termination	of	her	parental	rights	is	in	the	children’s
    best	interests.		See	22	M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B)(2)(a).
    [¶3]	 	 The	 mother’s	 primary	 concern	 is	 that	 the	 children’s	 current
    placement,	with	their	maternal	grandparents,	is	unsafe,	and	she	contends	that
    permanent	placement	there	would	not	be	in	the	children’s	best	interests.		The
    court’s	best	interests	determination	in	connection	with	the	termination	of	the
    mother’s	parental	rights,	however,	was	not	a	determination	of	who	will	adopt
    the	 children	 or	 that	 any	 particular	 placement	 is	 in	 their	 best	 interests.
    See	In	re	 Kenneth	 S.,	 
    2017 ME 45
    ,	 ¶¶	 6,	 8,	 
    157 A.3d 244
    .	 	 It	 was	 a
    determination	that	terminating	the	mother’s	parental	rights	is	in	the	children’s
    best	interests.3		
    Id. [¶4] In
     support	 of	 that	 determination,	 the	 court	 made	 the	 following
    findings	of	fact:
    [The	mother]	has	inexcusably	failed,	for	a	period	of	more	than	six
    months,	 to	 communicate	 meaningfully	 or	 maintain	 regular
    visitation	with	either	Channing	or	Dominic.		She	has	also	failed	to
    participate	in	a	plan	or	program	of	reunification.
    .	 .	 .	 [The	 mother]	 missed	 every	 drug	 screen	 arranged	 by
    DHHS,	 roughly	 15-20	 drug	 screens,	 offering	 the	 excuses	 of
    transportation	problems	or	work	conflicts.
    3		To	the	extent	that	the	mother	seeks	to	challenge	the	court’s	order	identifying	adoption	as	the
    permanency	plan,	see	22	M.R.S.	§	4038-B(3)	(2016),	that	order	is	interlocutory	and	not	appealable,
    see	22	M.R.S.	§	4006	(2016);	In	re	Johnna	M.,	
    2006 ME 46
    ,	¶	7	&	n.1,	
    903 A.2d 331
    .
    3
    .	.	.	.
    [The	 mother]	 has	 repeatedly	 exposed	 the	 children	 to
    domestic	 violence	 in	 her	 relationships	 with	 men,	 and	 she	 has
    undertaken	no	services	aimed	at	improving	her	insight	or	building
    her	skills	for	preventing	that	in	the	future.
    .	.	.	.
    .	 .	 .	 [F]or	 much	 of	 the	 period	 of	 reunification,	 [the	 mother]
    chose	an	abusive	boyfriend	.	.	.	over	the	children.
    .	 .	 .	 [The	 mother]	 testified	 that	 her	 lack	 of	 contact	 with	 the
    children	 was	 the	 fault	 of	 DHHS	 and	 her	 mother	 and	 stepfather.
    The	[c]ourt	does	not	believe	her.
    .	.	.	The	children	have	been	placed	in	the	care	of	the	maternal
    grandmother	 and	 her	 husband	 .	 .	 .	 since	 April	 of	 2014.	 .	 .	 .	 [The
    grandparents]	 meet	 all	 of	 the	 children’s	 needs.	 	 They	 provide
    safety	 and	 stability	 for	 the	 children.	 	 They	 are	 willing	 to	 provide
    permanency	for	the	children.
    Both	boys	have	medical	issues	that	require	medications	and
    appointments.	.	.	.	[The	grandparents]	do	a	good	job	managing	the
    boys’	 medications	 and	 appointments	 and	 communicating	 with
    their	providers.
    Dominic	 has	 expressed	 a	 clear	 preference	 for	 permanency
    with	the	[grandparents].		[He]	is	very	angry	with	his	mother.		He
    refuses	to	see	her,	at	this	point.		He	is	exhausted	with	her	lies	and
    her	inconsistency.		Channing	is	too	young	to	express	a	meaningful
    preference,	but	he	has	been	placed	with	the	[grandparents]	since
    he	 was	 less	 than	 a	 year	 old.	 .	 .	 .	 [T]he	 children	 have	 been	 in	 the
    care	 of	 the	 [grandparents]	 for	 close[]	 to	 three	 years.	 	 They
    absolutely	need	this	permanency.
    4
    [¶5]		Given	these	findings,	which	are	supported	by	competent	evidence
    in	 the	 record,	 the	 court	 did	 not	 commit	 clear	 error	 or	 abuse	 its	 discretion
    when	it	determined	that	termination	of	the	mother’s	parental	rights	is	in	the
    children’s	best	interests.		See	In	re	Caleb	M.,	
    2017 ME 66
    ,	¶	33,	
    159 A.3d 345
    ;
    In	re	Kenneth	 S.,	 
    2017 ME 45
    ,	 ¶¶	 6-8,	 
    157 A.3d 244
    ;	 In	 re	 Ashley	 A.,
    
    679 A.2d 86
    ,	89	(Me.	1996).
    The	entry	is:
    Judgment	affirmed.
    Richard	Charest,	Esq.,	Lewiston,	for	appellant	mother
    Janet	T.	Mills,	Attorney	General,	and	Meghan	Szylvian,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	of
    the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	Department	of	Health	and	Human
    Services
    Lewiston	District	Court	docket	numbers	PC-2014-33	and	-34
    FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY
    

Document Info

Citation Numbers: 2017 ME 149, 167 A.3d 555, 2017 WL 2951678, 2017 Me. LEXIS 160

Filed Date: 7/11/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/11/2017