Danielle N. (Hashey) Cashman v. Jaison W. (Hashey) Robertson ( 2019 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2019 ME 5 Docket: Wal-18-204
Submitted
On Briefs: November 28, 2018
Decided: January 15, 2019
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
DANIELLE N. (HASHEY) CASHMAN
v.
JAISON W. (HASHEY) ROBERTSON
HUMPHREY, J.
[¶1] Jaison W. (Hashey) Robertson appeals from a judgment of divorce
entered by the District Court (Belfast, Worth, J.). Jaison contends that the court
erred by adopting Danielle N. (Hashey) Cashman’s proposed judgment and
erred in its classification of marital property and the determination of his
income. We affirm the judgment.
I. INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDGMENT
[¶2] We begin by addressing Jaison’s challenge to the legitimacy of the
court’s judgment. He argues that the court erred in adopting Danielle’s
proposed judgement without exercising its independent judgment.
[¶3] “[A] trial court's verbatim adoption of findings or orders proposed
by one party in a case is disfavored, as such an approach suggests that the court
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has not carefully reviewed the evidence or applied its independent judgment in
making its findings and conclusions." Yap v. Vinton, 2016 ME 58, ¶ 10, 137 A.3d
194; see also Jarvis v. Jarvis, 2003 ME 53, ¶ 14, 832 A.2d 775. When a court
adopts a proposed order without material change, we consider “whether the
findings and order reflect the application of judgment by the court and not
simply one of the parties.” See Yap, 2016 ME 58, ¶ 10, 137 A.3d 194.
[¶4] Contrary to Jaison’s argument that the court improperly adopted
Danielle’s proposed judgment verbatim, the divorce order, when read in its
entirety, reflects the fair and independent judgment of the court. See id. While
it is clear that the court drew substantially from portions of Danielle’s proposed
judgment and imported some language directly, the final divorce order differed
substantially from Danielle’s proposal in several key areas. The court clearly
exercised its independent judgment by departing from Danielle’s proposed
judgment in its underlying factual findings, allocation of parental rights and
responsibilities, discussion of spousal support, award of attorney fees, and
allocation of the guardian ad litem costs. The court did not, as Jaison suggests,
take Danielle’s versions of the facts without basis. Rather, the court exercised
its independent judgment and made factual findings that are supported by
competent evidence, much of which Jaison himself submitted or, at the very
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least, did not dispute. Further, the trial court was best positioned to review the
testimony and credibility of all witnesses and give weight to the evidence
submitted. See Sloan v. Christianson, 2012 ME 72, ¶ 29, 43 A.3d 978. Jaison’s
challenge to the integrity of the judgment is therefore unpersuasive and we
next consider his challenges to the financial aspects of the court’s order.
II. BACKGROUND
[¶5] The following facts, which are supported by the evidence, are drawn
from the divorce judgment. See Sullivan v. George, 2018 ME 115, ¶ 2, 191 A.3d
1168.
[¶6] Danielle and Jaison were married in Maine on September 13, 2003,
and separated in July 2016. The parties’ two minor daughters reside with
Danielle, who has always been their primary caretaker. For much of their
marriage, Jaison behaved violently toward Danielle and “intentionally exposed
the children to his angry and threatening style.” Both children have expressed
hesitation and fear about visiting with him because of his frequent angry
outbursts.1
1 Jaison’s violence has been primarily directed at Danielle. He has threatened to smash her truck
and take the children away. He has thrown items—including knives—in the home, struck Danielle
with a gallon-size bottle of water, pointed a gun at her, and threatened her life while he was
intoxicated. On June 22, 2017, after receiving angry threats from Jaison, Danielle fled the marital
home with the children. When she returned two days later to gather clothing for herself and the
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[¶7] Both parties have six-figure incomes. Danielle earns approximately
$144,000 per year and pays for the family’s health insurance and childcare
expenses. Jaison owns and operates a construction business that generated
gross revenues of $492,453 in 2016. Although Jaison maintains that in 2016 he
had no personal income and suffered a loss of $6,328, the court determined,
based on information he provided in two loan applications, his business
practices, and his lifestyle choices, that his net personal income was actually
$150,000 that year.
[¶8] The parties own a marital home in Swanville, Maine, with a
mortgage of $143,000 and an additional home equity line of credit of $7,600.
The District Court (Belfast, Worth, J.) awarded the home to Danielle, but
ordered that the home be sold. Danielle spent approximately $42,000 to
prepare the home for sale and is responsible for the costs of maintaining the
home until it is sold.
[¶9] During the pendency of the divorce, Jaison purchased a camp in
Orrington, Maine, worth $74,900, from his father. While no evidence of a deed
or payment was presented at trial, evidence of Jaison’s social media posts
children, she discovered that Jaison had thrown most of her belongings in a dumpster outside the
residence and doused them in gasoline.
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announcing his purchase of the property, his interrogatory responses listing
the Orrington address as one of his residences, and his efforts to make
improvements to the land, including obtaining a demolition permit, was
admitted. The court ultimately concluded that the camp was a marital asset
and awarded it to Jaison.
[¶10] The court divided the couple’s household effects based on the
parties’ respective possession of those items at the time of trial. In addition,
Danielle and Jaison each retained their own bank accounts, credit card debt,
and business/retirement accounts. In total, Danielle was awarded property
worth $60,000, including her 401(k),2 and Jaison retained property3 worth
approximately $176,900, including the Orrington camp. Finally, the court
ordered Jaison to pay Danielle $20,000 to achieve a more equitable division of
the marital estate, an additional $5,556 to reimburse her for the clothing and
2 Danielle’s 401(k) has a face value of approximately $97,000 and a net value of $57, 219. She
borrowed $10,000 from the principal of her 401(k) to lend to Jaison, $20,000 to make repairs on the
home, and $10,000 to replace the items Jaison destroyed.
3 This property included a 2017 Victory motorcycle, worth $10,000, at issue in this case. Although
Jaison and his girlfriend testified that the motorcycle was a birthday gift from her to him, the court
concluded that the motorcycle was marital property because Jaison asked Danielle for a $10,000 loan
within a week of obtaining the motorcycle and “more likely than not” used that money to repay his
girlfriend for the purchase of the motorcycle, and because Jaison did not identify the motorcycle as
nonmarital property on his financial statements.
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other items he intentionally destroyed, and $15,000 to offset Danielle’s
attorney fees.
III. DISCUSSION
[¶11] Jaison primarily argues that the court erred in determining that
both the motorcycle and the family camp were marital property, and that his
income was $150,000 in 2016.
A. Marital Property
[¶12] We review the District Court’s findings of fact as to whether
property is marital for clear error. Bonville v. Bonville, 2006 ME 3, ¶ 9, 890 A.2d
263; see also Sloan, 2012 ME 72, ¶ 2, 43 A.3d 978. Because Jaison did not
request further findings of fact, “we will infer that the trial court found all the
facts necessary to support its judgment, if those findings are supported by
competent evidence in the record.” Adoption of Paisley, 2018 ME 19, ¶ 27, 178
A.3d 1228. Contrary to Jaison’s arguments, there was competent record
evidence to support the court’s finding that he purchased the motorcycle and
the camp and that these assets were marital property. See Sloan, 2012 ME 72,
¶ 25, 43 A.3d 978. Although Jaison and his girlfriend testified that he did not
purchase the motorcycle or the camp, the court was not required to find this
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testimony credible, as it clearly did not.4 See Sloan, 2012 ME 72, ¶ 29, 43 A.3d
978 (“[T]he trial court is not required to accept any testimony or evidence as
fact.”). “[B]ecause of the trial court's superior vantage point to hear and assess
the evidence, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court as
to the weight or credibility of the evidence if there is evidence in the record to
rationally support the court's result.” Id. The court’s allocation of the parties’
marital assets is without error.
B. Determination of Income
[¶13] “A court’s determination of a party’s income in a divorce
proceeding is a factual finding that we review for clear error.” Payne v. Payne,
2006 ME 73, ¶ 7, 899 A.2d 793. We will vacate a trial court’s determination of
income only if it is not supported by sufficient, competent record evidence. See
id. In this case, the court heard testimony from Jaison that in 2016 he incurred
a personal loss of approximately $6,000, the same amount reflected on his child
support affidavits. The court, however, also heard testimony from Jaison
regarding two credit loan applications from 2015 and 2017 on which he
reported his annual income as $150,000, and the documents were admitted
4 As to the camp, for example, the court explicitly found that Jaison’s “testimony that he has not
purchased the property was not believable.”
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into evidence. “[I]t is the trial court's province to make credibility
determinations between competing evidence.” Violette v. Violette, 2015 ME 97,
¶ 16, 120 A.3d 667. Therefore, the court did not clearly err when it relied on
Jaison’s business tax returns, two loan applications, and testimony regarding
his multiple recreation vehicles, trips, and other lifestyle choices that all
suggested that his income far exceeded the $6,000 loss he claimed in that year.5
See Sloan, 2012 ME 72, ¶ 29, 43 A.3d 978.
[¶14] Contrary to Jaison’s arguments, the court’s order clearly reflects
its independent judgment and is fully supported by competent evidence in the
record. The court did not err in its characterization of the parties’ relationship,
nor did it abuse its discretion in its classification and division of marital
5 Although the court stated that it “assigns and imputes an income” to Jaison, it actually made a
factual finding, based on a reasonable extrapolation from the evidence, that his income was $150,000,
an amount substantially higher than his claimed $6,000 loss. In general, “[i]f a divorce court finds
that a party is voluntarily underemployed, the court may impute income to that party for the purpose
of calculating that party's child or spousal support obligations.” Ehret v. Ehret, 2016 ME 43, ¶ 14, 135
A.3d 101 (citations omitted); see also 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(D) (2017). In this case there was no
evidence presented, nor did the court find, that Jaison was voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed. Instead, the court simply reviewed all of the evidence pertaining to Jaison’s income
in 2016—including his business practices, lifestyle choices, tax returns, and loan applications—and
determined that the overall weight of this evidence supported the conclusion that his income was, in
fact, $150,000 and not the substantially lesser amount he claimed. The court’s determination of
Jaison’s income amounts to an issue of evidentiary weight and credibility rather than the outright
imputation of income typical in many child and spousal support cases where the court assigns a
higher income to a party based on that person’s income-earning capacity. See Sloan v. Christianson,
2012 ME 72, ¶ 29, 43 A.3d 978; see also, e.g., Ehret, 2016 ME 43, ¶ 14, 135 A.3d 101; Wrenn v. Lewis,
2003 ME 29, ¶ 18, 818 A.2d 1005. The court did not clearly err in reaching this finding. See Payne v.
Payne, 2006 ME 73, ¶ 7, 899 A.2d 793.
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property. The court is best situated to evaluate the credibility of the parties’
testimony and the weight of the evidence introduced at trial, and did so without
error in this case.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Joseph W. Baiungo, Esq., Belfast, for appellant Jaison (Hashey) Robertson
Christopher K. MacLean, Esq., and Laura P. Shaw, Esq., Camden Law LLP,
Camden, for appellee Danielle N. (Hashey) Cashman
Belfast District Court docket number FM-2017-139
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY