Adam P. Paul v. Town of Liberty , 2016 Me. LEXIS 198 ( 2016 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2016 ME 173Docket: Wal-15-529
Submitted
On Briefs: September 29, 2016
Decided: December 1, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
ADAM P. PAUL et al.
v.
TOWN OF LIBERTY
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Adam P. Paul, Debra M. Paul, and George E. Paul (the Pauls) appeal
from a judgment of the Superior Court (Waldo County, R. Murray, J.) denying
their motion for leave to amend their complaint and granting the Town of
Liberty’s motion to dismiss. The Pauls contend that the court erred by not
permitting them to amend Count I of their complaint to assert a declaratory
judgment claim rather than seek review of governmental action pursuant to
M.R. Civ. P. 80B. They also contend that the court erred by determining that
they are not entitled to damages, which they sought pursuant to 23 M.R.S.
§ 3029 (2015) in Count II of the complaint based on a determination by the
Town of Liberty Select Board that a road abutting their property had been
2
abandoned pursuant to 23 M.R.S. § 3028 (2015).1 We vacate the court’s denial
of the motion for leave to amend and remand for the court to readdress it in
accordance with the principles set forth herein; we affirm the dismissal of
Counts I and II of the complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Because our review involves the trial court’s dismissal of a claim
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “we view the facts alleged in the complaint as
if they were admitted.” Ramsey v. Baxter Title Co., 2012 ME 113, ¶ 2,
54 A.3d 710. The Pauls own parcels of real estate in Liberty that are accessed
by a public road called Bolin Hill Road. The Town has failed to repair or
maintain the road to keep it safe for motor vehicle travel. In August 2014,
Debra Paul requested in writing that the Town repair the road, and she and
George Paul subsequently petitioned the Waldo County Commissioners to
order the Town to repair the road. They voluntarily withdrew their petition in
November 2014 based on the Town’s stated intention to determine whether
Bolin Hill Road had been abandoned or discontinued and its belief that the
County Commissioners did not have jurisdiction to address that issue. On
1 Title 23 M.R.S. § 3028 (2015) has since been amended, though not in any way that affects the
present case. See P.L. 2015, ch. 464, § 7 (effective July 29, 2016) (to be codified at 23 M.R.S.
§ 3028(5)).
3
December 29, 2014, the Town held a public meeting where the Town Select
Board voted, without later issuing a written order, that the “upper portion” of
Bolin Hill Road had been abandoned pursuant to 23 M.R.S. § 3028(2), and that
a public easement was retained over the abandoned portion. The Pauls assert
that the abandonment determination conflicts with evidence indicating the
Town’s intent to use Bolin Hill Road as a public way, and that the Town’s failure
to maintain the road has resulted in a reduction of the fair market value of their
property.
[¶3] On February 27, 2015, the Pauls filed a two-count complaint in the
Superior Court. Count I sought relief pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B, challenging
the Town’s determination that the road has been abandoned, and Count II
sought an award of damages pursuant to 23 M.R.S. § 3029. The Town moved to
dismiss the complaint on March 18, 2015, asserting that the Rule 80B complaint
was not timely filed and the Pauls could not recover damages.
[¶4] On April 8, 2015, two other property owners filed a motion to
intervene, which the court granted on June 4, 2015. The complaint was
amended accordingly, and the Town resubmitted an answer and again moved
to dismiss on June 11, 2015. The Pauls moved for leave to amend their
complaint a second time on July 2, 2015. The second amended complaint
4
sought to change Count I from a Rule 80B action to an action for a declaratory
judgment as to the parties’ rights and obligations with regard to the road.
[¶5] On September 28, 2015, the Superior Court granted the Town’s
motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), finding that
the Pauls’ Rule 80B complaint was untimely and determining that they could
not recover damages pursuant to 23 M.R.S. § 3029. In the same order, the court
denied the Pauls’ motion for leave to amend after concluding that a Rule 80B
action—not a declaratory judgment action—was the proper means to
challenge the Town’s decision, and that they could not use a declaratory
judgment action to circumvent the time limits of Rule 80B. The Pauls timely
appealed.2
II. DISCUSSION
[¶6] We turn our attention first to the sequence in which the court denied
the Pauls’ motion to amend and granted the Town’s motion to dismiss. The
sequence is significant because a full and final dismissal of all counts of a
complaint arguably leaves nothing remaining to amend.
[¶7] Ordinarily, a trial court should rule on a motion for leave to amend
before acting on another motion, such as a motion to dismiss, that could be
2 The two plaintiffs added pursuant to the motion to intervene dismissed their appeals to the Law
Court in January 2016.
5
dispositive of the original complaint. Sherbert v. Remmel, 2006 ME 116, ¶ 8,
908 A.2d 622; see also Jones v. Suhre, 345 A.2d 515, 517-18 (Me. 1975). In this
case, both the Pauls’ motion for leave to amend and the Town’s motion to
dismiss were pending and in order for action by the court at the time of the
September 2015 order. The order discusses the motion to dismiss before
addressing the motion for leave to amend, thus suggesting that the motion to
dismiss was granted prior to the consideration and denial of the motion to
amend. However, the order provides a separate analysis for each motion and
notes the effect of the denial for leave to amend on the motion to dismiss.3
Accordingly, the sequence in which the court addressed the parties’ motions is
of no significance and we discern no error in the court’s order. Cf. Sherbert,
2006 ME 116, ¶¶ 9-10, 908 A.2d 622 (holding that when it was unclear whether
the court had acted on a pending motion for leave to amend before acting on a
motion to dismiss, the ruling on the motion to dismiss was in error).
[¶8] We turn to a discussion of the court’s rulings on the motions.
A. Motion for Leave to Amend
[¶9] We review the denial of a motion for leave to amend for an abuse of
3 The court explained that “[b]ecause [it] denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend, the [c]ourt
has not considered Plaintiffs’ proposed Second Amended Complaint in its evaluation of Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss.”
6
discretion. America v. Sunspray Condo. Ass’n, 2013 ME 19, ¶ 7, 61 A.3d 1249.
Once a responsive pleading is served, a party may amend the pleading “by leave
of court,” which “shall be freely given when justice so requires.”
M.R. Civ. P. 15(a). On appeal, a party who was denied leave to amend “must
demonstrate (1) that the court clearly and manifestly abused its discretion and
(2) that the amendment was necessary to prevent injustice.” Sunspray Condo.
Ass’n, 2013 ME 19, ¶ 7, 61 A.3d 1249 (alteration and quotation marks omitted).
“[U]ndue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice, or futility of amendment” are
grounds for denying a motion to amend. Montgomery v. Eaton Peabody, LLP,
2016 ME 44, ¶ 13, 135 A.3d 106.
[¶10] The court predicated its denial of the Pauls’ motion for leave to
amend their complaint upon its conclusion that the Pauls could not maintain a
declaratory judgment action because 23 M.R.S. § 3029 prescribes a Rule 80B
action as the exclusive means to challenge a municipal board’s decision.
Section 3029 provides that “[a]ny person aggrieved by the action or nonaction
of municipal officers . . . in proceedings under [chapter 304], other than a
determination of damages, may appeal to the Superior Court . . . pursuant to
Rule 80B of the Rules of Civil Procedure.” 23 M.R.S. § 3029.
[¶11] In contrast, the specific statute in chapter 304 governing road
7
abandonment provides, in relevant part:
It is prima facie evidence that a town or county way not kept
passable for the use of motor vehicles at the expense of the
municipality or county for a period of 30 or more consecutive years
has been discontinued by abandonment. . . . Any person affected by
a presumption of abandonment . . . may seek declaratory relief to
finally resolve the status of such ways.
23 M.R.S. § 3028(1) (emphasis added). The statute further provides that “[t]he
determination of the municipal officers regarding the status of a town way . . .
is binding on all persons until a final determination of that status has been made
by a court.” 23 M.R.S. § 3028(2).
[¶12] The plain language of section 3028 provides that any person may
seek declaratory relief to finally resolve the question of whether a road has
been abandoned. Despite the broad sweep of the section 3029 reference to the
availability of Rule 80B review in chapter 304 actions, we confirm that section
3028 specifically and expressly authorizes parties to challenge a road
abandonment determination by seeking declaratory relief, independent from
any relief that may also be available pursuant to Rule 80B.4 See Bd. of Selectmen
4 We recognize the principle of exclusivity, which provides that
when a legislative body has made provision, by the terms of a statute or ordinance,
for a direct means by which the decision of an administrative body can be reviewed
in a manner to afford adequate remedy, such direct avenue is intended to be
exclusive. Resort to the courts by alternative routes will not be tolerated, subject only
to an exception for those circumstances in which the course of “direct appeal” review
8
v. Kennebec Cty. Comm’rs, 393 A.2d 526, 528 (Me. 1978) (“The statutory
framework in which section 3028 is set indicates that the legislature intended
the action for a declaratory judgment to be the exclusive method for
determining finally any dispute as to whether a town or county way has been
discontinued by abandonment.”).
[¶13] Abandonment is distinct from other methods by which a town may
disclaim property, such as discontinuance, where a municipality affirmatively
elects to “discontinue” a town way. See P.L. 2015, ch. 464, § 5 (effective
July 29, 2016) (to be codified at 23 M.R.S. § 3026-A) (providing that the
municipal legislative body votes to approve or disapprove an order of
discontinuance filed by municipal officers).5 Discontinuance is well suited for
judicial review pursuant to the language of section 3029 and Rule 80B. See
by a court is inadequate and court action restricting a party to it will cause that party
irreparable injury.
Colby v. York Cty. Comm’rs, 442 A.2d 544, 547 (Me. 1982) (quoting Fisher v. Dame, 433 A.2d 366, 372
(Me. 1981)). We have also stated that “when direct review is available pursuant to Rule 80B, it
provides the exclusive process for judicial review unless it is inadequate.” Gorham v. Androscoggin
Cty., 2011 ME 63, ¶ 22, 21 A.3d 115.
The exclusivity principle does not bar an action for declaratory relief pursuant to section
3028 because the declaratory relief action is not necessarily a mechanism for judicial review of a
municipal action or nonaction regarding road abandonment. Rather, the declaratory relief
prescribed by section 3028 seeks a final resolution as to the status of a road, and such an action may
be pursued absent a municipality first acting on a presumption of abandonment.
5 Title 23 M.R.S. § 3026 (2015) was effective during the events of this case and has since been
repealed and replaced by P.L. 2015, ch. 464, §§ 4, 5 (effective July 29, 2016) (to be codified at 23 M.R.S.
§ 3026-A).
9
M.R. Civ. P. 80B(a) (“When review by the Superior Court . . . of any action or
failure or refusal to act by a governmental agency . . . is provided by statute or
is otherwise available by law, proceedings for such review shall . . . be governed
by these Rules of Civil Procedure as modified by this rule.” (Emphasis added.)).
In contrast, a municipality’s determination that a road is abandoned is not an
“action” by a governmental agency. When a municipality makes a
determination that a road is abandoned pursuant to section 3028 it is not
engaging in any legislative action to abandon the road; rather, the municipality
is merely positing that a road has or has not been abandoned due to the passage
of time and maintenance history. See 23 M.R.S. § 3028(1). Because a person
aggrieved by road abandonment has become aggrieved only by the operation
of law—not by a municipal board’s observation that the abandonment has
occurred—there is no municipal action to form the basis of a Rule 80B appeal.
Therefore, a declaratory judgment action, as expressly permitted in
section 3028, is the appropriate and statutorily authorized process for
resolving the status of a presumptively abandoned town way.6
6 The Pauls allege in their amended complaint and second amended complaint that the Board
“voted to determine that the ‘upper portion’ of Bolin Hill Road [has been] abandoned pursuant to
23 M.R.S. § 3028(2) and that a public easement is retained over the abandoned portion by the
inhabitants of the Town of Liberty.” As with the determination of abandonment, the Board’s
“determination” that a public easement is retained is not legislative action, and the existence or
nonexistence of a public easement may be appropriately addressed in a declaratory judgment action.
10
[¶14] In denying the Pauls leave to amend their complaint, the court also
reasoned that the Pauls could not use a declaratory judgment action to enable
them to bring an action that was otherwise time-barred. Cf. Sold, Inc. v. Town of
Gorham, 2005 ME 24, ¶ 10, 868 A.2d 172 (“A declaratory judgment action
cannot be used to create a cause of action that does not otherwise exist. . . . Thus,
a declaratory judgment action cannot be used to revive a cause of action that is
otherwise barred by the passage of time.”). The court’s reasoning, however,
was based on the erroneous conclusion that a Rule 80B appeal was the method
by which to challenge a town's determination that the passage of time has
resulted in a road abandonment. As noted above, an action for declaratory
relief is the appropriate avenue for determining the abandonment status of a
town way, and thus is not subject to the time limits of Rule 80B(b). See Colby v.
York Cty. Comm’rs, 442 A.2d 544, 547 (Me. 1982) (“[I]n the present
circumstance where the action is filed after the expiration of thirty days, the
existence of an independent basis for judicial intervention or an exception to
the exclusivity of direct review is crucial.”). Because the Pauls could properly
assert a declaratory judgment action as specifically provided by statute, any
untimeliness of an 80B appeal would have no effect on the issues raised in the
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motion to amend.7
[¶15] We note also that the factors typically supporting the denial of
requests for leave to amend seem not to be present here. The fact that the Pauls’
second motion to amend was filed about fifteen weeks after the Town
responded to the original complaint does not, on this record, constitute an
undue delay. Compare Montgomery, 2016 ME 44, ¶ 15, 135 A.3d 106 (affirming
the denial of a third motion to amend a complaint made three years after
commencement of the suit), with Kelly v. Michaud’s Ins. Agency, Inc.,
651 A.2d 345, 347 (Me. 1994) (vacating the denial of a motion to amend made
six weeks after a responsive pleading was filed and seven months before the
discovery deadline). Moreover, there is no apparent undue prejudice from the
delay, because the declaratory judgment action addresses issues already
presented by the inapplicable Rule 80B complaint. See Bangor Motor Co. v.
Chapman, 452 A.2d 389, 393 (Me. 1982). Finally, the record offers no evidence
of bad faith or futility of amendment; amending the complaint would have
saved the complaint from dismissal by asserting a cause of action that was both
permitted and timely pursuant to 23 M.R.S. § 3028.
7 To the extent that the Pauls’ declaratory judgment action challenges the process and procedures
under which the Town “voted to determine” the status of the abandonment and public easement,
these are issues that are ordinarily addressed in a Rule 80B appeal. The declaratory judgment action
cannot be used to revive or litigate 80B issues that are otherwise lost due to untimeliness.
12
[¶16] For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the court erred
in denying the Pauls’ motion for leave to amend Count I of the complaint upon
the assumption that declaratory judgment was not available as a matter of law.
B. Motion to Dismiss
1. Count I (Relief Pursuant to Rule 80B)
[¶17] The court dismissed Count I of the Pauls’ amended complaint on
the grounds that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the original
Rule 80B complaint was untimely. See M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Statutory
limitations on appeal periods are jurisdictional.” Davric Me. Corp. v. Bangor
Historic Track, Inc., 2000 ME 102, ¶ 11, 751 A.2d 1024. We review the grant of
a motion to dismiss challenging the court’s jurisdiction de novo but make no
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Gorham v. Androscoggin Cty., 2011 ME 63,
¶ 9, 21 A.3d 115.
[¶18] As discussed supra, 23 M.R.S. § 3029 permits an aggrieved
landowner to appeal a municipal action pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B. The rule
provides that
[t]he time within which review may be sought shall be as provided
by statute, except that if no time limit is specified by statute, the
complaint shall be filed within 30 days after notice of any action or
refusal to act of which review is sought unless the court enlarges
the time in accordance with Rule 6(b) . . . .
13
M.R. Civ. P. 80B(b). Because sections 3028 and 3029 do not provide a time limit
for Rule 80B appeals, Rule 80B’s thirty-day time limit applies. See id. The
Board’s vote, confirming that the road had been abandoned by the passage of
time and operation of law, took place on December 29, 2014.8 Accordingly, the
Pauls’ Rule 80B appeal should have been filed on or before January 28, 2015,
but was not filed until February 27, 2015. Thus, because the Rule 80B action
was untimely, it was subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
We discern no error in the court’s dismissing Count I of the amended complaint
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
2. Count II (Damages Pursuant to Section 3029)
[¶19] A court properly dismisses a complaint when the complaint fails
“to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We
review a court’s decision on a motion to dismiss pursuant to
M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) by examining the plaintiff’s complaint “in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause
8 In the context of Rule 80B, “‘notice of any action’ refers to an action that fully decides and
disposes of the whole cause leaving no further questions for . . . future consideration and
judgment . . . .” Gorham, 2011 ME 63, ¶ 12, 21 A.3d 115 (quotation marks omitted); see
M.R. Civ. P. 80B(b). For example, in Gorham, we held that “for purposes of Rule 80B(b), ‘notice of any
action’ involving the dismissal of a county employee . . . occurs when the employee receives a copy of
the written decision of the [agency],” rather than when the agency voted on the matter, because the
applicable statute requires the agency to issue a written decision. Id. ¶¶ 17-20. In contrast, 23 M.R.S.
§ 3028 did not require the Board to issue a written decision regarding its December 2014 vote, so
the Rule 80B appeal period commenced upon the affirmative vote of the Board.
14
of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to
some legal theory.” Bean v. Cummings, 2008 ME 18, ¶ 7, 939 A.2d 676.
(quotation marks omitted). We will affirm a dismissal “only when it appears
beyond doubt that a plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that
he might prove in support of his claim.” Id. Our review of issues of statutory
interpretation is de novo. Fox Islands Wind Neighbors v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
2015 ME 53, ¶ 11, 116 A.3d 940.
[¶20] With respect to damages, 23 M.R.S. § 3029 provides:
Any person aggrieved by the determination of the damages
awarded to owners of property or interests therein under this
chapter may, within 60 days after the day of taking, appeal to the
Superior Court . . . . The court shall determine damages . . . .
We conclude that the plain language of section 3029 does not create a separate
cause of action to obtain damages in appeals from proceedings undertaken
pursuant to the subsections of chapter 304; rather, it provides a basis to appeal
the amount of damages awarded pursuant to other sections in the chapter. As
we have explained, because compensation “pursuant to section 3029 depends,
first, on the municipality’s award of damages pursuant to . . . some other section
of chapter 304, section 3029 essentially provides a subsequent procedure that
allows for a de novo determination of damages.” Frustaci v. City of S. Portland,
2005 ME 101, ¶ 10, 879 A.2d 1001. That other section is the “underlying
15
authority for [an] award of damages” pursuant to section 3029. Id.[¶21] Section 3028 does not reference or provide for an assessment of
damages due to road abandonment,9 and thus does not provide an “underlying
authority” for a damages award as a result of road abandonment.10 Because
statutory damages are not available pursuant to section 3028 and section 3029
does not create a separate basis for damages, there is no claim for relief stated
in Count II of the Pauls’ complaint. Therefore, the court did not err in dismissing
Count II of the amended complaint pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
9 Unlike section 3028, other sections in chapter 304 do discuss damages in the context of
permitting a municipality to acquire or disclaim property. See 23 M.R.S. § 3023 (2015) (eminent
domain); 23 M.R.S. § 3025 (2015) (dedication and acceptance); P.L. 2015, ch. 464, § 5 (effective
July 29, 2016) (to be codified at 23 M.R.S. § 3026-A) (discontinuance); 23 M.R.S. § 3027 (2015)
(vacation) (Title 23 M.R.S. § 3027 has since been amended. P.L. 2015, ch. 464, § 6 (effective
July 29, 2016) (to be codified at 23 M.R.S. § 3027(1))); 23 M.R.S. § 3028 (abandonment).
10 We recognize that this interpretation of section 3029 could be read as conflicting with other
language from our decision in Frustaci. In that case, we explained:
Section 3029 provides the authority for any landowner harmed by government action
discussed in any provision in chapter 304 to seek a de novo determination of the
entitlement to and appropriate amount of damages in the Superior Court following a
municipality’s administrative decision . . . . [Section 3029] allows damages to be
sought in the Superior Court from the many assorted government actions mentioned
in chapter 304 . . . including the discontinuance or abandonment of town ways . . . .
Frustaci v. City of S. Portland, 2005 ME 101, ¶ 11, 879 A.2d 1001 (citing 23 M.R.S. §§ 3023, 3026, 3027,
3028). In Frustaci, we held that a constitutionally significant taking is not required to pursue
damages caused by municipal actions pursuant to chapter 304, id. ¶ 9, but we did not intend to create
a cause of action for damages pursuant to section 3028 where one did not previously exist. In
conjunction with our prior statements in Frustaci—that another section provided the “underlying
authority” for section 3029 damages and that section 3029 is a “subsequent procedure” for de novo
review of damages—we clarify that section 3029 should not be construed to create a basis for
damages in the context of section 3028 abandonment.
16
III. CONCLUSION
[¶22] We remand to allow the court to address the motion for leave to
amend in accordance with the principles set out in section A, above. Although
our affirmance of the dismissal of Counts I and II (the only counts of the
complaint) would seemingly leave nothing to amend, the Superior Court’s
action on the motion to amend necessarily occurs before action on the motion
to dismiss. Accordingly, our remand effectively resets the court’s action on the
motion to amend to a prior point in time when the complaint remained viable.
The entry is:
The order denying the Pauls’ motion for leave to
amend is vacated. The motion for leave to
amend is remanded to the Superior Court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The order granting the Town of Liberty’s motion
to dismiss Counts I and II is affirmed.
On the briefs:
Adam P. Paul, Debra M. Paul, and George E. Paul, appellants
pro se
Kristin M. Collins, Esq., and William S. Kelly, Esq., Kelly &
Collins, LLC, Belfast, for appellee Town of Liberty
Waldo County Superior Court docket number RE-2015-04
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY