State of Maine v. Michael Journet , 2018 ME 114 ( 2018 )


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  • MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT	       	      	     	      	       Reporter	of	Decisions
    Decision:	 
    2018 ME 114
    Docket:	   Ken-17-492
    Argued:	   May	15,	2018
    Decided:	  August	14,	2018
    Panel:	       SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.
    STATE	OF	MAINE
    v.
    MICHAEL	JOURNET
    ALEXANDER,	J.
    [¶1]		Michael	Journet	appeals	from	a	judgment	of	conviction	entered	by
    the	 trial	 court	 (Kennebec	 County,	 Stanfill,	 J.)	 for	 aggravated	 trafficking	 of
    scheduled	drugs	(Class	A),	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1105-A(1)(B)(1)	(2017),	following	his
    conditional	 guilty	 plea,	 see	 M.R.U.	 Crim.	 P.	 11(a)(2).	 	 On	 appeal,	 Journet
    challenges	the	order	of	the	motion	court	(L.	Walker,	J.)	denying	his	motion	to
    suppress	evidence	seized	by,	and	statements	made	to,	the	police	after	he	was
    arrested	without	a	warrant.		Journet	argues	that	the	officers	lacked	probable
    cause	 to	 effectuate	 a	 warrantless	 arrest,	 and	 that,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 unlawful
    arrest,	the	statements	made	and	evidence	seized	after	the	arrest	are	subject	to
    suppression.		We	affirm	the	judgment.
    2
    I.		PROCEDURAL	HISTORY
    [¶2]		On	December	18,	2015,	Journet	was	charged	by	complaint	with	two
    counts	 of	 aggravated	 trafficking	 in	 scheduled	 drugs	 (Class	 A),	 17-A	 M.R.S
    §	1105-A(1)(B)(1)	 and	 (H)	 (2017),	 and	 one	 count	 of	 violating	 a	 condition	 of
    release	(Class	E),	15	M.R.S.	§	1092(1)(A)	(2017).		On	March	24,	2016,	he	was
    indicted	 by	 the	 Kennebec	 County	 grand	 jury	 for	 the	 felony	 charges.	 	 On
    November	 29,	 2016,	 the	 court	 conducted	 a	 hearing	 on	 Journet’s	 motion	 to
    suppress	the	heroin	seized	and	the	statements	he	made	to	the	arresting	officers
    on	December	16,	2015.
    [¶3]	 	 In	 its	 order	 dated	 February	 9,	 2017,	 the	 motion	 court	 denied
    Journet’s	motion	and	included	the	following	specific	findings,	all	of	which	are
    fully	supported	by	the	record.		On	December	16,	2015,	law	enforcement	officers
    executed	 a	 search	 warrant	 at	 a	 residence	 in	 Augusta.	 	 Illegal	 drugs	 were
    discovered	at	the	residence.		A	cooperating	individual	at	the	residence	advised
    that	 his	 drug	 supplier	 would	 be	 arriving	 at	 the	 residence	 that	 evening—
    between	 5:00	 p.m.	 and	 6:00	 p.m—to	 deliver	 ten	 grams	 of	 heroin.	 	 The
    cooperating	individual	told	the	officers	that	the	dealer	was	a	black	male	whom
    he	knew	as	“Troy,”	that	he	would	be	driving	a	blue	BMW	SUV	and	coming	from
    the	Portland	area,	and	that	“his	known	practice	was	to	transport	heroin	inside
    of	his	pants.”
    3
    [¶4]	 	 In	 its	 order,	 the	 trial	 court	 also	 found	 that	 the	 “cooperating
    [individual]	 set	 up	 a	 buy	 with	 his	 supplier	 .	 .	 .	 memorialized	 in	 text
    communications”	 and	 that	 the	 detective	 “observed	 the	 sale	 orchestrated
    through	 text	 message.”	 	 Although	 the	 record	 does	 not	 specifically	 support	 a
    finding	that	the	detective	observed	the	cooperating	individual	“set	up	a	buy,”	it
    does	support	the	court’s	finding	that	a	“buy”	had	been	arranged	between	the
    cooperating	individual	and	his	supplier,	and	that	the	officer	observed	that	the
    buy	had	been	“orchestrated	through	text	message.”
    [¶5]		At	approximately	6:40	p.m.,	a	little	later	than	the	time	given	by	the
    individual	 at	 the	 residence,	 a	 blue	 BMW	 SUV	 with	 a	 black	 male	 driver	 and	 a
    white	passenger	was	seen	turning	onto	the	dead-end	street.		At	that	time,	law
    enforcement	officers	stopped	the	vehicle.		Journet,	the	driver	of	the	blue	BMW
    SUV,	was	arrested	and	later	confessed	to	the	possession	of	heroin.
    [¶6]		Based	on	these	findings,	the	motion	court	concluded	that,	at	the	time
    Journet’s	 vehicle	 was	 stopped	 and	 he	 was	 apprehended	 in	 the	 course	 of
    committing	 a	 felony	 drug	 offense,	 law	 enforcement	 officers,	 collectively,	 had
    more	than	enough	information	to	establish	probable	cause	to	stop	the	vehicle
    4
    and	 arrest	Journet.		After	entry	of	the	 motion	court’s	decision,	 no	motion	for
    further	findings	was	filed	by	Journet.1		See	M.R.U.	Crim.	P.		23(c).
    [¶7]	 	 On	 September	 28,	 2017,	 the	 court	 (Stanfill,	 J.)	 accepted	 Journet’s
    conditional	 guilty	 plea	 to	 Count	 1,	 aggravated	 trafficking	 in	 scheduled	 drugs
    (Class	A),	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1105-A(1)(B)(1),	pursuant	to	M.R.U.	Crim.	P.	11(a)(2).
    Count	 2,	 the	 second	 count	 for	 aggravated	 trafficking	 in	 scheduled	 drugs
    (Class	A),	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1105-A(1)(H),	was	dismissed.2		On	November	1,	2017,
    the	court	sentenced	Journet	to	a	term	of	imprisonment	of	eight	years	with	all
    but	four	years	suspended,	as	well	as	four	years	of	probation	and	a	$400	fine.
    The	 execution	 of	 the	 sentence	 was	 stayed	 pending	 this	 appeal.	 	 On
    November	9,	2017,	 Journet	 timely	 appealed	 the	 denial	 of	 his	 motion	 to
    suppress.		See	15	M.R.S.	§	2115	(2017);	M.R.	App.	P.	2A,	2B.
    II.		REVIEW	OF	THE	RECORD
    [¶8]		When	a	motion	court’s	finding	of	probable	cause	is	challenged	on
    appeal	 and	 there	 was	 no	 motion	 for	 further	 findings	 after	 the	 entry	 of	 the
    motion	court’s	order,	we	review	the	evidence	in	the	entire	record	in	the	light
    1 		 Following	 an	 adverse	 ruling	 in	 which	 a	 court	 states	 findings,	 it	 may	 be	 a	 competent	 tactical
    choice	not	to	file	a	motion	for	further	findings.		“Not	requesting	findings	.	.	.	appears	a	competent
    tactical	 choice;	 a	 request	 for	 findings	 could	 have	 invited	 adverse	 findings,	 fully	 supported	 by	 the
    record	.	.	.	.”		State	v.	Commeau,	
    2004 ME 78
    ,	¶	21	n.10,	
    852 A.2d 70
    .
    2 		 Count	 3	 alleging	 a	 violation	 of	 a	 condition	 of	 release,	 15	 M.R.S.	 §	 1092(1)(A)	 (2017),	 was
    apparently	dismissed.
    5
    most	 favorable	 to	 the	 motion	 court’s	 order	 to	 determine	 if	 the	 findings	 and
    conclusions	are	supported	by	the	record.		See	State	v.	Kierstead,	
    2015 ME 45
    ,
    ¶	2,	
    114 A.3d 984
    .
    [¶9]		As	Journet	points	out,	the	information	used	by	the	officers	to	arrest
    him	 came	 entirely	 from	 a	 cooperating	 individual	 that	 none	 of	 the	 officers
    involved	in	Journet’s	arrest	had	worked	with	before.		The	discovery	of	illegal
    drugs	 at	 the	 cooperating	 individual’s	 house,	 however,	 demonstrated	 that	 he
    was	 acquiring	 drugs	 from	 someone.	 	 The	 court	 found	 that	 the	 cooperating
    individual	identified	his	dealer	as	a	black	man	whom	he	knew	as	“Troy,”	who
    drove	a	blue	BMW	SUV,	and	who	would	be	coming	to	the	residence	from	the
    Portland	area	that	very	evening.		At	the	motion	hearing,	an	officer	testified	that
    he	 saw	 text	 messages	 confirming	 that	 the	 heroin	 delivery	 described	 by	 the
    cooperating	individual	was	“still	good	to	go”	for	later	that	day.
    [¶10]		The	court’s	findings	are	supported	by	evidence	that	the	involved
    residence	 is	 located	 on	 a	 very	 short,	 dead-end	 street	 that	 is	 accessed	 from	 a
    major	 street.	 	 Taking	 advantage	 of	 that	location,	 four	 officers	 were	 stationed
    near	 the	 residence	 to	 watch	 for	 a	 blue	 BMW	 SUV	 with	 a	 black	 male	 driver.
    Another	officer	parked	his	vehicle	near	the	airport	on	the	major	street,	which
    one	might	use	when	travelling	from	Portland	to	the	residence,	to	watch	for	the
    vehicle.
    6
    [¶11]	 	 At	 around	 6:40	 p.m.,	 a	 little	 later	 than	 the	 time	 given	 by	 the
    individual	 at	 the	 residence,	 a	 blue	 BMW	 SUV	 with	 a	 black	 male	 driver	 and	 a
    white	 passenger	 drove	 past	 the	 location	 near	 the	 airport.	 	 At	 that	 point,	 the
    officer	near	the	airport	notified	the	officers	near	the	residence	that	a	blue	BMW
    SUV	 with	 a	 black	 male	 driver	 and	 a	 white	 passenger	 had	 just	 driven	 by	 his
    location.
    [¶12]		A	detective	stationed	in	a	parking	lot	near	the	residence	received
    the	call	and	noticed	the	“same	vehicle”	pass	his	location.		After	observing	the
    vehicle	turn	onto	the	dead-end	street	and	approach	the	area	of	the	residence,
    he	initiated	a	traffic	stop.		Another	officer	waiting	in	his	patrol	car	on	the	side
    of	 the	 road	 observed	 the	 detective	 initiate	 the	 stop.	 	 The	 other	 officer
    immediately	approached	the	vehicle	and,	as	the	BMW	was	coming	to	a	stop	near
    the	residence,	he	“positioned	[his]	vehicle	in	front	of	it	so	that	after	the	vehicle
    was	stopped	it	couldn’t	.	.	.	go	further.”
    [¶13]	 	 Journet,	 the	 driver,	 was	 ordered	 out	 of	 the	 vehicle.	 	 After	 a	 pat
    down	search,	Journet	was	handcuffed	and	transported	to	the	Kennebec	County
    Sheriff’s	Office.		He	later	confessed	to	possession	of	heroin.		After	the	arrest,	a
    baggie	containing	nearly	ten	grams	of	heroin	was	produced	by	the	passenger.
    [¶14]		Journet	does	not	appear	to	contest	that,	at	the	time	the	vehicle	was
    stopped,	the	officers	had	reasonable	articulable	suspicion	of	criminal	activity
    7
    sufficient	to	initiate	the	stop	and	question	the	vehicle	occupants.		See	State	v.
    Violette,	
    2016 ME 65
    ,	¶¶	3-4,	
    138 A.3d 491
    .		Journet	contends,	however,	that
    the	police	lacked	sufficient	 probable	cause	to	believe	that	he	 was	 engaged	in
    criminal	conduct	to	justify	his	warrantless	arrest.
    III.		LEGAL	ANALYSIS
    [¶15]	 	 The	 standards	 to	 support	 probable	 cause	 to	 arrest	 are	 well
    established.	 	 In	 the	 circumstances	 of	 this	 case,	 law	 enforcement	 officers	 may
    make	a	warrantless	arrest	when	an	officer	has	probable	cause	to	believe	that	a
    person	has	committed	or	is	committing	any	Class	A,	B,	or	C	crime.		17-A	M.R.S.
    §	15(1)(A)(2)	 (2017);	 State	 v.	 Lagasse,	 
    2016 ME 158
    ,	 ¶	 13,	 
    149 A.3d 1153
    .
    “‘Probable	cause	exists	where	facts	and	circumstances	within	the	knowledge	of
    the	officers	and	of	which	they	have	reasonably	trustworthy	information	would
    warrant	a	prudent	and	cautious	person	to	believe	that	the	arrestee	did	commit
    or	 is	 committing	 the	 felonious	 offense.’”	 	 Lagasse,	 
    2016 ME 158
    ,	 ¶	 13,
    
    149 A.3d 1153
    	(quoting	State	v.	Parkinson,	
    389 A.2d 1
    ,	8	(Me.	1978));	see	also
    Maryland	v.	Pringle,	
    540 U.S. 366
    ,	370-71	(2003).
    [¶16]	 	 Probable	 cause	 includes	 the	 collective	 information	 known	 to	 the
    police;	 it	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 the	 personal	 knowledge	 of	 the	 arresting	 officer.
    Lagasse,	
    2016 ME 158
    ,	¶	14,	
    149 A.3d 1153
    ;	State	v.	Carr,	
    1997 ME 221
    ,	¶	7,
    
    704 A.2d 353
    .		Probable	cause	exists	if,	based	on	an	objective	examination	of
    8
    the	facts	known	or	reasonably	believed	by	the	officer	or	officers,	“an	ordinarily
    prudent	and	cautious	officer	would	have	probable	cause	to	arrest	or	search.”
    State	 v.	 Enggass,	 
    571 A.2d 823
    ,	 825	 (Me.	 1990)	 (quoting	 State	 v.	 Heald,
    
    314 A.2d 820
    ,	828	(Me.	1973)).
    [¶17]		When	a	finding	of	probable	cause	is	challenged	on	appeal	and	there
    was	no	motion	for	further	findings	after	the	entry	of	the	motion	court’s	order,
    we	review	the	evidence	in	the	entire	record	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the
    motion	 court’s	 order.	 	 See	 Kierstead,	 
    2015 ME 45
    ,	 ¶	 2,	 
    114 A.3d 984
    .	 	 To
    determine	 whether	 the	 law	 enforcement	 officers	 here	 had	 reasonably
    trustworthy	information	that	would	warrant	a	prudent	and	cautious	officer	to
    believe	 that	 Journet	 did	 commit	 or	 was	 committing	 a	 crime,	 see	 Lagasse,
    
    2016 ME 158
    ,	 ¶	 13,	 
    149 A.3d 1153
    ,	 we	 look	 at	 the	 record	 indicating	 the
    information	the	officers	had	when	Journet	was	stopped	and	arrested.
    [¶18]	 	 The	 court’s	 findings	 underlying	 its	 determination	 that	 probable
    cause	 existed	 are	 supported	 by	 the	 following	 evidence	 in	 the	 record	 and
    reasonable	inferences	that	may	be	drawn	from	that	evidence:
    • The	officers	had	obtained	a	warrant	based	on	probable	cause	to	search	a
    residence	located	on	a	very	short,	dead-end	street	for	evidence	of	illegal
    drug	trafficking.
    • Information	supporting	that	probable	cause	was	sufficient	for	a	judicial
    officer	to	issue	a	search	warrant	for	the	residence.
    9
    • Illegal	drugs	were	found	 at	the	residence	upon	execution	of	the	search
    warrant.
    • The	individual	at	the	residence	when	the	search	warrant	was	executed,
    responding	to	a	suggestion	that	he	cooperate,	disclosed	that	the	supplier
    of	the	illegal	drugs	found	at	the	residence	was	a	black	man	he	knew	as
    “Troy.”
    • The	 individual	 also	 disclosed	 that	 the	 supplier	 regularly	 transported
    illegal	drugs	to	the	Augusta	area.
    • The	 individual	 advised	 that	 the	 supplier	 was	 planning	 to	 arrive	 at	 the
    residence	with	approximately	ten	grams	of	heroin	between	5:00	p.m.	and
    6:00	p.m.	that	evening.
    • The	 individual	 then	 “showed	 [the	 officers]	 text	 messages	 that
    corroborated	this	information,”	indicating	that	the	heroin	 delivery	was
    “good	to	go”	as	described	to	the	officers.
    • The	 individual	 also	 advised	 that	 the	 supplier	 would	 be	 driving	 a	 blue
    BMW	SUV	and	would	be	coming	from	the	Portland	area.
    • At	6:40	p.m.,	a	little	after	the	scheduled	arrival	time	for	the	drug	supplier,
    a	blue	BMW	SUV	driven	by	a	black	 man	drove	on	the	major	street	that
    was	anticipated	to	be	the	likely	travel	route	toward	the	residence	for	a
    vehicle	coming	from	Portland.
    • This	observation	corroborated	the	individual’s	statements	describing	the
    vehicle,	the	driver,	and	the	time	of	arrival.
    • That	information	was	further	corroborated	when	the	described	vehicle—
    driven	 by	 Journet—turned	 off	 the	 major	 street	 onto	 the	 dead-end	 side
    street	and	approached	the	residence	where	illegal	drugs	had	been	found
    earlier	in	the	day.
    10
    [¶19]		This	was	the	totality	of	the	information	that	the	police	possessed
    at	the	time	Journet	was	arrested,3	and	it	provides	more	than	sufficient	support
    for	the	officers	to	determine	that	they	had	probable	cause	to	stop	and	 arrest
    Journet	as	he	approached	the	residence	to	complete	his	heroin	delivery.
    [¶20]		Citing	the	motion	court’s	reference	to	the	“tipster’s	anemic	resume
    as	 an	 informant,”	 Journet	 contends	 that	 the	 individual	 who	 spoke	 with	 the
    police	had	insufficient	indicia	of	reliability	because	the	police	had	not	had	prior
    experience	 with	 him.	 	 However,	 much	 of	 what	 the	 individual	 said	 was
    separately	 corroborated,	 leading	 the	 motion	 court	 to	 conclude	 that	 the
    individual	 was	 “providing	 exceptionally	 accurate	 information	 regarding
    Mr.	Journet.”
    [¶21]		The	police	raid	earlier	in	the	day	confirmed	that	the	residence	that
    Journet	 was	 approaching	 was	 a	 place	 of	 drug	 trafficking.	 	 The	 individual’s
    statements	regarding	the	plan	for	Journet	to	supply	drugs	to	the	residence	that
    evening	were	corroborated	by	the	text	messages	viewed	by	the	officers.		The
    individual’s	 description	 of	 the	 route	 Journet	 might	 travel	 from	 Portland;	 the
    make,	 model,	 and	 color	 of	 the	 vehicle	 Journet	 would	 be	 driving;	 and	 the
    3		The	passenger	initially	refused	to	say	anything,	exercising	her	right	to	remain	silent,	and	then
    began	crying	and	screaming	when	pressed	about	whether	there	were	any	illegal	substances	on	her
    person.		These	facts	could	also	support	a	determination	of	probable	cause	to	arrest	Journet,	but	the
    record	is	unclear	as	to	whether	this	event	occurred	before	or	after	Journet	was	taken	into	custody.
    Therefore,	this	event	was	not	used	by	the	trial	court	to	support	the	probable	cause	determination.
    11
    approximate	time	of	Journet’s	arrival	at	the	residence	were	all	corroborated	by
    the	 officers’	 observations	 leading	 to	 the	 vehicle	 stop	 on	 the	 dead-end	 street
    near	the	residence.
    [¶22]		As	already	noted,	probable	cause	to	arrest	without	a	warrant	exists
    when	the	facts	and	circumstances	collectively	known	to	the	police,	and	of	which
    they	have	reasonably	trustworthy	information,	would	warrant	a	prudent	and
    cautious	person	to	believe	that	the	arrestee	did	commit	or	was	committing	a
    crime.		Lagasse,	
    2016 ME 158
    ,	¶¶	13-14,	
    149 A.3d 1153
    ;	Carr,	
    1997 ME 221
    ,	¶	7,
    
    704 A.2d 353
    .		The	probable	cause	standard	was	satisfied	here	where,	as	the
    court	found,	the	information	stated	by	the	individual	pointing	to	Journet	as	the
    drug	 supplier	 was	 corroborated	 by	 the	 evidence	 in	 the	 record	 as	 described
    above.
    [¶23]		Because	there	was	sufficient	corroborated	information	to	warrant
    any	 prudent	and	cautious	 person	to	believe	that	Journet	was	committing	the
    offense	of	heroin	trafficking,	a	felony,	the	trial	court’s	denial	of	the	motion	to
    suppress	must	be	affirmed.
    The	entry	is:
    Judgment	affirmed.
    12
    Leonard	I.	Sharon,	Esq.	(orally),	Andrucki	&	King,	Lewiston,	and	Jamesa	J.	Drake,
    Esq.,	Drake	Law,	LLC,	Auburn,	for	appellant	Michael	Journet
    Maeghan	 Maloney,	 District	 Attorney,	 and	 Tyler	 J.	 LeClair,	 Asst.	 Dist.	 Atty.
    (orally),	Prosecutorial	District	IV,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine
    Kennebec	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR-2015-2430
    FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY