In re I.S. , 121 A.3d 105 ( 2015 )

0MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2015 ME 100Docket: Som-15-16
Submitted
On Briefs: July 1, 2015
Decided: August 4, 2015
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
IN RE I.S.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] The father of I.S. appeals from a judgment entered by the District Court
(Skowhegan, Fowle, J.) terminating his parental rights pursuant to 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055 (2014). The father contends that the court violated his equal protection or
due process rights by allegedly (1) improperly terminating his parental rights on
the basis of his borderline personality disorder diagnosis, (2) placing a burden of
proof upon him, and/or (3) failing to provide him with a reasonable period of time
for reunification.1 After careful review of the record, we affirm.
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The father also contends that the court erred by admitting a letter from a Department employee to
the father in violation of the rule against hearsay, see M.R. Evid. 802, and that this admission violated his
due process rights by “essentially lower[ing]” the standard of proof. The letter was not offered for the
truth of any statements. Rather, it was admitted as relevant to the father’s complaints regarding the
Department’s alleged delays in providing him services. Other evidence was admitted to prove the
contents of the Department employee’s statement contained in the letter. Accordingly, the letter was
properly admitted at trial. The father has cited no authority for his argument that the standard of proof
was lowered by admission of the letter, and the record reassures us that the trial court applied the proper
standard of proof in this case.
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I. CASE HISTORY AND COURT FINDINGS
[¶2] The child was removed from her mother’s care at birth, in
November 2012, because the child had serious health issues and her mother was
unable to care for her. The father was identified as the child’s biological parent
nearly a year later in early October 2013.
[¶3] With the father’s agreement, the court (Mullen, J.) entered a jeopardy
order in January 2014, finding jeopardy based upon the father’s “history of
significant mental health concerns that have not always been appropriately
managed,” including suicidal and homicidal ideations and self-injurious behaviors,
which were often precipitated by stress. The court found that caring for the child
would be stressful due to her medical needs and that the father “ha[d] not
demonstrated appropriate, healthy coping skills for managing stress.”
[¶4] In June 2014, the Department of Health and Human Services filed a
petition to terminate the father’s parental rights, and a two-day hearing was held in
late September 2014. The Department continued to provide reunification services
up until the time of the hearing. After the hearing, the court (Fowle, J.) terminated
the father’s parental rights upon finding that he is (1) unable to take responsibility
for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet her needs, and (2) unable
to protect the child from jeopardy, and that this is unlikely to change within a time
reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs. See id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii).
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The court also found that termination is in the child’s best interest. See id.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).
[¶5] In its judgment, the court made the following findings, which are
supported by evidence in the record. The father “has been in and out of treatment
for his whole life,” has attempted suicide multiple times, has engaged in
self-harming behaviors including cutting and burning himself, and reports chronic
suicidal ideation. He “has a history of rage episodes,” and, at a psychiatric session
in June 2013, he told the doctor that he was “on the verge of snapping and that he
did not want to take a shotgun and ‘kill [his family].’” The father has reported
having thoughts and dreams of killing, dismembering, mutilating, and/or raping
women. At times he denies that he would ever act on these thoughts, and other
times he “does not know if he will act on them.”
[¶6] The risk that the father will harm himself or others is lower when he
has fewer responsibilities and increases as “the stress of daily living is added to
[his] life.” Being the sole caretaker for the child, who has many medical needs,
would cause his stress to increase. The father does not have the ability to “meet
the developmental and special needs of his child.” “Even with a strong motivation
to change and a strong commitment to change, it is still likely to take several years
for [the father] . . . to be able to parent a medically fragile child.” The father’s
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“mental health is likely to remain unstable for the foreseeable future,” and “the
prognosis for significant change on [his] part is poor.”
[¶7] The child “has significant medical issues and disabilities” and, since
birth, has required a feeding tube that is inserted into her stomach through a “port”
in her upper chest. The close monitoring and maintenance of this process is
difficult and important to the child’s health and safety. The child “requires
occupational therapy and physical therapy, two to three times each month,” due to
mobility difficulties with her thumbs, ankles, and feet. She is expected to have
surgery in Boston to address her thumbs, which are presently “useless.” “[The
child] is thriving in her current home . . . , where she has been since January 2013.”
Her foster parents “have loved her, nourished her, and assisted her with fairly
complex home medical procedures.” They are willing to adopt her.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
[¶8] Contrary to the father’s contentions, there is not even a suggestion in
the record that the court terminated his parental rights solely because he has been
diagnosed as having a borderline personality disorder. The court did not mention
this diagnosis in its judgment. The father’s argument on appeal is predicated upon
his contention that there was no evidence tying his mental health conditions to his
actual ability to parent the child. However, the court made findings, supported by
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competent evidence, that the father’s mental health problems would significantly
affect his ability to parent this child.
[¶9] In addition, the father has not demonstrated that he was treated
differently than other parents who are similarly, demonstrably unfit to parent their
children. Thus, the father has not carried his burden to meet the threshold
requirement of his equal protection challenge. See State v. Bennett, 2015 ME 46,
¶¶ 17-18, 114 A.3d 994.
[¶10] Further, the father was provided with the due process required in the
context of a termination of parental rights. See In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 16,
55 A.3d 463. Although the timeframe for attempted reunification with the child
was affected by the delay in his identification as the child’s father, throughout the
months when the Department offered services to him and visits with the child, the
father’s cooperation was inconsistent. The court appropriately considered the
interests at stake when it determined that the father would not be able to take
responsibility for the child and protect her from jeopardy within a time reasonably
calculated to meet her needs. See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4003(4), 4050, 4052(2-A)(A)
(2014); In re Jamara R., 2005 ME 45, ¶ 22, 870 A.2d 112. Further, there is no
indication that the court shifted the burden of proof to the father to prove he was a
fit parent, as the court made reference to the Department’s burden of proof and
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made subsequent findings by clear and convincing evidence. See 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(B)(2); In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114, ¶ 14, 775 A.2d 1144.
[¶11] Finally, contrary to the father’s contentions, there is clear and
convincing evidence in the record to support the court’s finding of at least one
ground of parental unfitness, see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), and that
termination was in the child’s best interest, see id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a). The father’s
reliance on In re Jazmine L., 2004 ME 125, ¶¶ 18-22, 861 A.2d 1277, is misplaced.
Here, the court did connect its findings regarding the father’s parenting deficits to
the child’s needs. Further, to the extent the father argues that the court relied on
questionable evidence, it was within the court’s province, as fact-finder, to
determine the weight and credibility to be afforded to evidence. See In re
Kayla M., 2001 ME 166, ¶ 6, 785 A.2d 330.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
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On the briefs:
Aaron B. Rowden, Esq., and Jared S. Brewer, Esq., Schneider
& Brewer Attorneys at Law, Waterville, for appellant father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for
appellee Department of Health and Human Services
Skowhegan District Court docket number PC-2012-43
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY