In re J.B. , 2015 Me. LEXIS 24 ( 2015 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2015 ME 25
Docket: Han-14-320
Submitted
On Briefs: February 26, 2015
Decided: March 10, 2015
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR JJ.
IN RE J.B. et al.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] The father of J.B. and A.B. appeals from a judgment entered in the
District Court (Ellsworth, Mallonee, J.) terminating his parental rights to the
children pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(iii)-(iv) (2014). The father
argues that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue,
see In re Trever I., 2009 ME 59, ¶ 28, 973 A.2d 752, and that denial of the motion
improperly affected his right to counsel in the termination hearing,
see 22 M.R.S. § 4005(2) (2014). We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] In May of 2013, the Department of Health and Human Services
requested and received an order removing seven-year-old J.B. and five-year-old
A.B. from the home where they had been living with their mother and her
boyfriend because the children were in immediate risk of serious harm from those
adults. At the time of the children’s removal, the Department was unable to find
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the children’s father. Nonetheless, as is the standard procedure, the court
immediately assigned counsel to represent the father when the children were
removed from their mother’s home. On September 18, 2013, after it was able to
locate the father, who was in prison in Arizona, the Department served him with
the order for preliminary child protection and its petition for child protection order.
Before service of the petition, the father had not had meaningful contact with the
children for over five years.
[¶3] During September of 2013, the father spoke with a Department
caseworker and obtained information about the children’s placement.1 Despite this
knowledge, the father made no meaningful effort to contact them, even when he
was not incarcerated. On October 29, 2013, the court (Mallonee, J.) found
jeopardy as to the father on the ground of his abandonment of the children for more
than six months.
[¶4] On February 6, 2014, the Department filed a petition for termination of
parental rights2 and, on May 14, 2014, the father, who was again incarcerated in
Arizona, was served with that petition. On June 26, 2014, the court held a hearing
on the petition after denying the father’s motion to continue, which was made for
1
During a phone conversation with a Department caseworker in September of 2013, the father stated
that he would be released from prison in time to attend the October 29, 2013, jeopardy hearing, but the
father did not appear at that hearing.
2
The mother agreed to the termination of her parental rights on February 27, 2014.
3
the first time on the morning of the hearing. At the time of the termination
hearing, the father was still incarcerated in Arizona, and he participated in the
proceeding by telephone. On July 3, 2014, the court entered a judgment
terminating the father’s rights on the grounds of his abandonment and failure to
make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the children. The father
timely appealed pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2014) and M.R. App. P. 2.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶5] The father challenges only the court’s denial of his motion to continue
the termination hearing. We review a court’s decision to deny a motion to
continue for abuse of discretion. In re Trever I., 2009 ME 59, ¶ 28, 973 A.2d 752;
In re Frederick P., 2001 ME 138, ¶ 16, 779 A.2d 957. In addition, “[a] party
seeking a continuance has the burden of showing sufficient grounds for granting
the motion and must make known to the presiding justice substantial reasons why
granting the continuance would serve to further justice.” In re Trever I.,
2009 ME 59, ¶ 28, 973 A.2d 752 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶6] The father argues that the court’s denial of his motion to continue
improperly deprived him of his right to counsel pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4005(2),
which states that
[p]arents and custodians are entitled to legal counsel in child
protection proceedings, except a request for a preliminary protection
order under section 4034 or a petition for a medical treatment order
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under section 4071, but including hearings on those orders. They may
request the court to appoint legal counsel for them. The court, if it
finds them indigent, shall appoint and pay the reasonable costs and
expenses of their legal counsel.
[¶7] The father argues that by denying his motion to continue, the court
improperly deprived him of his right to counsel pursuant to section 40053 because
“he was not provided adequate time to speak and confer with his attorney prior to
the hearing.”
[¶8] Contrary to the father’s suggestion, section 4005(2) does not mandate
that the trial court ensure that the parent and the parent’s attorney have a time and
place to confer. Nevertheless, here, when the father’s attorney asked for time to
confer with the father, during the time set aside for the termination hearing, the
court allowed the father’s attorney to confer privately with his client in the
courtroom using the court’s phone. In addition, the court allowed the father’s
attorney to elicit testimony from the father about a variety of events and challenges
about which the father wished to testify, and the court credited the father’s
testimony on these issues. Finally, the trial court had previously continued the
termination hearing in order to ensure that the father could participate
3
The father does not argue that his due process rights were violated by the denial of his motion to
continue. See In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 16, 55 A.3d 463 (stating that, as applied to a termination
hearing, “balancing the interests, where significant rights are at stake, due process requires: notice of the
issues, an opportunity to be heard, the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, the right to
respond to claims and evidence, and an impartial factfinder.” (quotation marks omitted)).
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telephonically and, during the termination hearing, it diligently ensured that the
attorneys and witnesses could be understood by the father at all times.
[¶9] The court’s denial of the motion to continue does not constitute an
abuse of discretion. In addition, competent, and almost entirely uncontroverted,
evidence in the record supports the court’s findings by clear and convincing
evidence of abandonment, failure to make a good faith effort to reunify with the
children, and that termination was in the best interests of the children.
See 22 M.R.S. § 4002(1-A) (2014); 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(iii)-(iv).
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs:
William B. Blaisdell, IV, Esq., Blaisdell & Blaisdell, Ellsworth,
for appellant father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for
appellee Department of Health and Human Services
Ellsworth District Court docket number PC-2013-30
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY