Amy B. Mills v. Roger M. Fleming , 2017 Me. LEXIS 154 ( 2017 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 144Docket: Ken-16-449
Argued: May 10, 2017
Decided: July 6, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
AMY B. MILLS
v.
ROGER M. FLEMING
SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶1] Amy B. Mills appeals from a judgment of divorce entered in the
District Court (Augusta, Mathews, J.) on her complaint against Roger M.
Fleming. Mills challenges, on constitutional grounds and as an abuse of the
court’s discretion, a provision that requires each parent to make a good faith
effort to transport the parties’ two minor children to specific extracurricular
activities or, alternatively, to provide the other parent a right of first refusal to
transport the children. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Amy B. Mills and Roger M. Fleming are the parents of a ten-year-old
boy and an eight-year-old boy. The court found that both parties are “highly
functional, dedicated[,] and effective parents.” “[T]he children are healthy,
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well-behaved, have many friends, excel at school, excel in their activities they
participate in, and generally are happy.” “[O]n most matters the parents agree
and work very well together.” The parties disagree, however, about the
children’s level of involvement in a developmental soccer league. Fleming
wants the children to continue in the developmental soccer league, but Mills
objects to the commitment of the children’s time.
[¶3] Although the parties were able to resolve almost all other issues in
their relatively complex divorce in an agreement to be incorporated into the
divorce judgment, they were unable to reach an agreement regarding the
soccer program. Following a contested trial on this issue, the court specifically
found that the soccer program is beneficial to the children’s “athletic
development” and “social maturity.” The court further found that the children’s
participation in soccer had not harmed them, the inconvenience to the parents’
schedules is offset by the benefits to the children, and it is in the children’s best
interests to continue participating in the program and “for the parents to work
out their schedules so that the activity may continue.”
[¶4] The court awarded the parties shared parental rights and
responsibilities and equal residential care. The judgment further provided that,
with respect to the children’s extracurricular activities, “unless otherwise
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agreed . . . [e]ach party shall make a good faith effort to get the children to their
activities.” If the parent with whom the children are residing is unable to take
the children to their activities, that parent “shall provide the other parent with
the right of first refusal to transport and assume responsibility for the children.”
[¶5] Mills filed a timely notice of appeal on September 23, 2016. See
14 M.R.S. § 1901 (2016); M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶6] Mills argues that the provision requiring each parent to transport,
or allow the other parent to transport, the children to extracurricular activities,
even when the parent objects to the children’s participation, violates her
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of
her children. See Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 11, 90 A.3d 1169; see also Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000); Conlogue v. Conlogue, 2006 ME 12, ¶ 12,
890 A.2d 691.
[¶7] A judgment respecting parental rights and responsibilities does not
implicate a parent’s fundamental right to parent unless it constitutes a state
intrusion on that right. See Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 20, 761 A.2d
291. Such an intrusion may be found to exist when a judgment directly and
substantially limits the parent’s decision-making authority and delegates an
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aspect of parental rights and responsibilities to a third party. Karamanoglu v.
Gourlaouen, 2016 ME 86, ¶¶ 24-27, 140 A.3d 1249; Pitts, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 17, 90
A.3d 1169; Conlogue, 2006 ME 12, ¶ 16, 890 A.2d 691.
[¶8] Courts deciding parental rights matters are regularly called upon to
resolve disputes when dedicated, loving, and fit parents are unable to reach
agreement regarding their children’s participation in beneficial educational,
sports, and community activities. Court resolution of such disputes, as
occurred here, involves no state intrusion on the parties’ right to parent.
Pursuant to the court’s award of shared parental rights and responsibilities, all
decisions concerning the children remain within the parents’ ultimate
authority, except where the parents cannot agree. Mills and Fleming are even
free by agreement to discontinue the children’s participation in soccer at any
time, and they may create any transportation arrangement that they wish,
without interference or limitation. It is only when the two, fit parents disagree
that the court’s order is needed to resolve the dispute.
[¶9] The necessary court resolution of the parents’ dispute, after each
parent was heard, does not substitute the court’s judgment for that of the
parents; it merely reflects court resolution of a dispute that the parents
themselves could not resolve. The judgment neither directly requires the
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parties to continue—or discontinue—the children’s enrollment in soccer,
should both parties agree on either option, nor does it delegate any aspect of
parental decision-making to a third party. Thus, the provision resolving the
dispute over issues related to the children’s participation in soccer is not a state
intrusion into, and does not infringe upon, their shared right to make decisions
concerning their children. See Karamanoglu, 2016 ME 86, ¶ 26, 140 A.3d 1249.
[¶10] When fit parents, who are parenting separately, cannot agree on
an aspect of their shared parenting responsibilities, and cannot agree on a
nonlitigation-based method of resolving that dispute, the court must undertake
its responsibility to adjudicate the facts and provide a resolution to the dispute.
Although a negotiated resolution by caring parents holds the potential for the
best outcome for the children, the court must act when the parents cannot
resolve their dispute. Absent the court’s availability for that dispute resolution,
the uncertainty, discord, and continued stalemate between the parents would
leave children, torn between those parents, in an untenable circumstance.
Simply put, a court order that allows one parent to make the decision on a
disputed child-related issue does not violate the constitutional rights of either
parent.
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[¶11] The court’s findings and orders regarding the extracurricular
activities here constitute no abuse of the court’s discretion. See Violette v.
Violette, 2015 ME 97, ¶ 30, 120 A.3d 667. The court’s factual findings
concerning the soccer program are supported by testimony and other evidence
that the children enjoy the program, receive athletic and social benefits from
their participation, and do well in school despite their commitment of time to
the program. See id. There is no indication that the court considered any
impermissible factor or inappropriately gave dispositive weight to any factor
in applying the best interest of the child standard. See Knight v. Knight, 680 A.2d
1035, 1038 (Me. 1996).
[¶12] Although Mills disagrees with the court’s resolution of the parties’
disagreement over soccer, the decision was reasonable and was based on the
court’s findings, which were supported by evidence presented at trial. See
Akers v. Akers, 2012 ME 75, ¶ 5, 44 A.3d 311 (“[T]he trial court will often be
presented with circumstances where there is no ‘wrong’ decision . . . .”).
Further, the judgment does not unreasonably restrict the parties’ exercise of
their shared decision-making authority. See Violette, 2015 ME 97, ¶ 31, 120
A.3d 667. The court did not abuse its discretion in finding that continued
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participation in soccer was in each child’s best interest, or in ordering the
default transportation provision.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Kristin A. Gustafson, Esq. (orally), Gustafson Family Law, Augusta, for appellant
Amy B. Mills
Theodore H. Irwin, Jr., Esq. (orally), Irwin Tardy & Morris, Portland, for appellee
Roger M. Fleming
Augusta District Court docket number FM-2014-486
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY