In re Child of Nichole W. , 2019 ME 167 ( 2019 )


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  • MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                                  Reporter of Decisions
    Decision:    
    2019 ME 167
    Docket:      Ken-19-291
    Submitted
    On Briefs: December 17, 2019
    Decided:     December 19, 2019
    Panel:          SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
    IN RE CHILD OF NICHOLE W.
    PER CURIAM
    [¶1]      Nichole W. appeals from a judgment of the District Court
    (Waterville, Stanfill, J.) terminating her parental rights to her child.1 See
    22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(iv) (2018). The court did not
    err or abuse its discretion in terminating the mother’s parental rights, and we
    affirm the judgment.
    [¶2] In January 2018, when the child was less than a month old, the
    Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition for a child protection
    order and requested a preliminary protection order because the mother had
    checked out of the hospital against medical advice and left her child at the
    hospital without arranging for the child’s care. See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4032, 4034(1)
    1As of the time that the mother’s parental rights were terminated, paternity of the child had not
    been established. Service by publication was ordered on the same day that the termination order
    was entered.
    2
    (2018). The court (Montgomery, J.) entered a preliminary protection order
    granting custody of the child to the Department. See 22 M.R.S. § 4034(2)
    (2018).
    [¶3] Although the mother was afforded the opportunity for a summary
    preliminary hearing, she did not appear. See 22 M.R.S. § 4034(4) (2018). Nor
    did she appear at the subsequent jeopardy hearing held in May 2018.2 See
    22 M.R.S. § 4035 (2018). Based on the evidence presented at that hearing, the
    court (Stanfill, J.) found the child to be in circumstances of jeopardy because the
    mother had missed visits with the child, including at the hospital; had made
    poor decisions about her own health; and had experienced housing instability
    and domestic violence without participating in services to alleviate these
    circumstances. The court ordered in late 2018 that the Department could cease
    reunification efforts with the mother because the mother had abandoned the
    child.
    [¶4] The Department filed a petition for termination of the mother’s
    parental rights in April 2019.            Despite having notice of the July 2019
    termination hearing, the mother did not appear. The court heard testimony
    Although the mother was present in the courthouse on that day, she was warned by a Judicial
    2
    Marshal about her behavior and left the premises before the hearing began.
    3
    from the child’s foster mother, the Department caseworker assigned to the
    mother, the mother’s assigned community counseling caseworker, and the
    guardian ad litem.3 The court terminated the mother’s parental rights upon
    finding as follows:
    This case started [with] [the mother] having left the hospital . . .
    after giving birth and not seeing her newborn for a week. She has
    a long history of housing instability, mental health issues, and
    remaining in domestically violent relationships. The court has no
    evidence of any rehabilitation efforts, and it appears she remains
    without her own housing. Most importantly, she has abandoned
    her daughter. She has not seen her in well over a year and has no
    relationship with her. [The child] deserves permanency. She is
    thriving in her foster family. It is in her best interest to be freed for
    adoption.
    [¶5] The mother timely appealed from the judgment but has not raised
    any arguments on appeal. Her counsel filed a brief, in accordance with the
    procedure outlined in In re M.C., 
    2014 ME 128
    , ¶ 7, 
    104 A.3d 139
    , indicating the
    absence of any arguable issue of merit, and he notified the mother that she
    could file a separate brief if she believed there was a valid ground for appeal
    and could request the appointment of new counsel if she desired new
    representation. We entered an order authorizing the mother to file a separate
    3 Although the guardian ad litem’s final report and three other previous reports were not
    admitted at trial, see 22 M.R.S. § 4005(1)(D) (2018), the court’s findings are fully supported by
    witness testimony and the reports of the guardian ad litem that were properly admitted in evidence.
    4
    brief by October 17, 2019, but the mother did not do so. We granted the
    Department's motion to consider this appeal on the mother's brief without
    briefing from the Department.
    [¶6] If a court finds multiple bases for parental unfitness, “we will affirm
    if any one of the alternative bases is supported by clear and convincing
    evidence.” In re M.B., 
    2013 ME 46
    , ¶ 37, 
    65 A.3d 1260
    . Here, the court found
    the mother unfit based on all four grounds of unfitness, see 22 M.R.S.
    § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(iv), and the evidence is sufficient to support all of those
    grounds, including abandonment.4 See 22 M.R.S. § 4002(1-A) (2018). The
    evidentiary record further supports the court’s determination that termination
    of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child, who, by the
    time the judgment was entered, had spent the first year and a half of her young
    life in foster care.          See 
    id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).
                  We affirm the court’s
    well-supported judgment.
    The entry is:
    Judgment affirmed.
    4The other bases for termination are that the mother is “unwilling or unable to protect the child
    from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time which is reasonably
    calculated to meet the child's needs,” she “has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the
    child within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs,” and she “has failed to
    make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child pursuant to section 4041.” 22 M.R.S.
    § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), (iv).
    5
    Christopher S. Berryment, Esq., Mexico, for appellant Mother
    With leave of the Court, the Department of Health and Human Services did not
    file a brief
    Waterville District Court docket number PC-2018-3
    FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
    

Document Info

Citation Numbers: 2019 ME 167

Filed Date: 12/19/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/19/2019