In re Isabelle W. , 2017 Me. LEXIS 87 ( 2017 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 81Docket: Sag-16-463
Submitted
On Briefs: April 27, 2017
Decided: May 4, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE ISABELLE W.
HUMPHREY, J.
[¶1] The father of Isabelle W. appeals from a judgment of the District
Court (West Bath, Dobson, J.) terminating his parental rights to the child
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A), (B)(2) (2016).1 We affirm the judgment
because the record contains sufficient evidence to support the court’s
findings, by clear and convincing evidence, of at least one ground of parental
unfitness and that termination is in the child’s best interest.2 See, e.g.,
In re M.S., 2014 ME 54, ¶¶ 14-15, 90 A.3d 443.
[¶2] The child was placed in the custody of the Department of Health
and Human Services in June 2014, when she was ten days old, upon reports
that the mother was abusing heroin and nonprescribed medication and had a
1
The court also terminated the mother’s parental rights to the child. The mother has not
appealed from the judgment.
2 In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the judgment, the father
argues that the Department’s actions exhibited gender bias. The record contains no support for this
accusation.
2
history of domestic violence toward the father, and that the father was unable
or unwilling to protect himself or the child from the risk of harm posed by the
mother. The child has been in Department custody for her entire life since
then, except for an unsuccessful trial placement with the mother in September
and October 2015 that lasted seven weeks.
[¶3] In September 2014, the father agreed to the entry of a jeopardy
order in which the court ordered him to participate in “services and treatment
as recommended by the Department, including completing a substance abuse
evaluation, parenting education, domestic violence treatment, and individual
therapy.” In March 2015, he signed a rehabilitation and reunification plan,
see 22 M.R.S. § 4041(1-A)(A)(1) (2016), providing that for the child to be
returned to his care, he would have to engage in mental health treatment and
“[d]emonstrate an understanding of domestic violence” issues and their
effects on children.
[¶4] The Department filed a petition seeking termination of the father’s
parental rights on April 21, 2016, more than twenty-two months after the
child entered Department custody.
[¶5] After a two-day hearing on the Department’s petition, the court
found the following facts, which are supported by competent evidence in the
3
record. See In re M.S., 2014 ME 54, ¶ 13, 90 A.3d 443. The father has failed to
participate consistently in mental health treatment and he has been minimally
engaged with the other services outlined in the rehabilitation and
reunification plan. In May 2016, for example, the father had not
communicated with the Department in months. His visits with the child have
been sporadic and inconsistent throughout the proceedings. The court
specifically found that the father—and not the foster parent, as the father
suggested—was responsible for his missed visits. The father has also failed to
demonstrate that he recognizes the risk posed by the mother’s ongoing
substance abuse problems. At the time of the termination hearing, the mother
was pregnant, and both the mother and the father acknowledged that the
father might also be the father of this new child.
[¶6] Since entering Department custody, the child has resided with her
maternal grandmother. She is in a safe, nurturing home where her needs can
be met, and she is happy and healthy. The grandmother wishes to adopt the
child.
[¶7] Based on these facts, the court found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the father is unfit to parent the child on three grounds: (1) he is
unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and these
4
circumstances are unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to
meet the child’s needs, (2) he is unable or unwilling to take responsibility for
the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, and
(3) he has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with
the child. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), (iv). The court also found,
by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the father’s parental
rights is in the child’s best interest. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).
[¶8] Given the factual findings described above, the court’s unfitness
and best interest determinations constitute neither clear error nor an abuse of
discretion. See In re R.M., 2015 ME 38, ¶ 7, 114 A.3d 212 (“We review the
court’s factual findings for clear error and its ultimate conclusion regarding
the best interest of the child for an abuse of discretion, viewing the facts, and
the weight to be given them, through the trial court’s lens.”); see also 22 M.R.S.
§ 4050(3) (2016) (providing that one of the purposes of the statutes
governing termination of parental rights is to “[p]romote the adoption of
children into stable families rather than allowing children to remain in the
impermanency of foster care”); In re B.P., 2015 ME 139, ¶ 19, 126 A.3d 713.3
3 We are not persuaded by the father’s argument that the court committed clear error when it
found that “the Department has made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and reunify the family” in
accordance with 22 M.R.S. § 4041 (2016). First, the finding is well-supported by the record; and
second, as we have explained, “[t]he Department’s compliance with its rehabilitation and
5
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Nathaniel Seth Levy, Esq., Brunswick, for appellant Father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of
Maine
West Bath District Court docket number PC-2014-15
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
reunification duties as outlined in section 4041 does not constitute a discrete element requiring
proof in termination proceedings, nor does the failure of the Department to comply with section
4041 preclude findings of parental unfitness.” In re Doris G., 2006 ME 142, ¶ 17, 912 A.2d 572.