In re Aubrey R. , 2017 Me. LEXIS 38 ( 2017 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 37Docket: Han-16-441
Submitted
On Briefs: February 23, 2017
Decided: March 7, 2017
Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE AUBREY R.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] The parents of Aubrey R. appeal from a judgment of the District
Court (Ellsworth, Roberts, J.) terminating their parental rights to Aubrey
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2) (2016). The mother
argues that the court’s findings are insufficient to inform the parties of the
basis for its determination of parental unfitness and to allow for meaningful
appellate review. She further challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the court’s findings of unfitness.1 We affirm the judgment.
[¶2] As we have stated, we will not infer factual findings in a
termination case. In re Amber B., 597 A.2d 937, 938 (Me. 1991); see also
M.R. Civ. P. 52(a) (“[I]n every action for termination of parental rights, the
court shall make specific findings of fact and state its conclusions of law
1 In contrast, the father acknowledges that the court’s findings are “detailed and . . . accurate.”
The father’s only argument on appeal—namely, that if the mother’s parental rights are restored, his
should be as well—is not persuasive, and we do not address it further.
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thereon as required by 22 M.R.S. § 4055.”). Rather, the trial court’s findings
must be sufficient to inform the parties of the basis for the termination
decision and to allow for “meaningful review” on appeal. In re Amber B.,
597 A.2d at 938.
[¶3] Here, the court found that the mother is unable to protect the child
from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child in a reasonable time,
because, while this case was pending, she continued to associate with unsafe
individuals—particularly the father—in violation of the court’s jeopardy
order and the reunification plan. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).
These findings are sufficient to inform the parties of the basis for the parental
unfitness determination and to allow for our review. Compare In re David G.,
659 A.2d 859, 862 (Me. 1995) (stating that findings were sufficient to inform
the parties of the basis for the decision even though they “could have been
more explicit”), with In re Dylan B., 2001 ME 31, ¶ 4, 766 A.2d 577 (stating
that a termination order that did not include any findings of fact, but merely
summarized the testimony, was insufficient to allow for appellate review).
[¶4] The mother next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the court’s determination that she is unable to protect the child from
jeopardy in a reasonable time. Specifically, she argues that the Department
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failed to present evidence that her continued contact with the father would
result in “[s]erious harm or [the] threat of serious harm” to the child. 22 M.R.S.
§ 4002(6)(A) (2016) (emphasis added) (defining “jeopardy” for purposes of
the child protection statutes, including section 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)); see also
22 M.R.S. § 4002(10)(B) (2016) (defining “serious harm” to include “[s]erious
mental or emotional injury or impairment which now or in the future is likely
to be evidenced by serious mental, behavioral or personality disorder”).
[¶5] Notably, the mother does not appear to challenge the evidence
supporting the separate basis of parental unfitness found by the court, that
the mother was unable to take responsibility for the child and will not be able
to do so in a reasonable time. The court’s determination of that type of
unfitness was not erroneous, and we affirm the termination order based on
that unchallenged finding. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b); In re K.M.,
2015 ME 79, ¶ 9, 118 A.3d 812 (“Where the court finds multiple bases for
unfitness, we will affirm if any one of the alternative bases is supported by
clear and convincing evidence.” (quotation marks omitted)).
[¶6] Additionally, contrary to the mother’s contention, the court’s
determination that the mother is also unable to protect the child from
jeopardy was based on competent evidence, which demonstrated the threat
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that the child would suffer serious mental and behavioral issues in the
mother’s care. See In re Jazmine L., 2004 ME 125, ¶ 15, 861 A.2d 1277 (stating
that “when the asserted parental deficit is alleged to cause emotional
harm . . . the Legislature has required that the existence of the emotional harm
or threat of emotional harm be of sufficient severity that, now or in the future,
it is ‘likely to be evidenced by serious mental, behavioral or personality
disorder’” (quoting 22 M.R.S. § 4002(10)(B))). That evidence included the
following:
• evidence from several witnesses that the father committed acts of
domestic violence against the mother to a degree that would jeopardize
the child’s safety;
• a therapist’s testimony that the mother’s inability to separate from the
father demonstrated that she could not “be counted on to protect [the
child]” from exposure to domestic violence and drug abuse, and that if
the mother did not “turn around her choice of men,” the child would be
in a “very unsafe environment” that could lead to future psychological
and behavioral problems for the child;
• a clinical psychologist’s report stating that the mother had little insight
into how her relationships with unsafe individuals might affect the
child;
• the guardian ad litem’s report stating that “the risk to [the child] is that
she will suffer the same developmental trauma [the mother] suffered
because [the mother] has not been able to address her own childhood
trauma”;
• the mother’s own testimony that she believes that the father is safe
around the child when he is not drinking, which, as the court properly
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found, demonstrated the mother’s failure to recognize the risk that the
father’s chronic substance abuse issues pose to the child; and
• the mother’s testimony that she maintained contact with the father
throughout these proceedings in violation of the court’s jeopardy order
and the Department’s reunification plan even though she knew that
losing the child was a likely consequence.
[¶7] Based on this and other evidence, the court did not err by finding,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother is unable to protect the
child from jeopardy and will not be able to do so in a reasonable time. See
In re Cameron Z., 2016 ME 162, ¶¶ 14, 17, --- A.3d --- (affirming a court’s
finding of unfitness based, in part, on the mother’s unwillingness to end a
relationship with the father who himself posed a risk of harm to the children
who were the subject of the termination petition).
[¶8] Further, although not challenged by the mother on appeal, the
court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest does not reflect
any error or abuse of discretion. See id. ¶ 16; 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
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Robert Van Horn, Esq., Van Horn Law Office, Ellsworth, for appellant mother
Jeffrey C. Toothaker, Esq., Ellsworth, for appellant father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Ellsworth District Court docket number PC-2014-28
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY