In re D.C. , 2015 Me. LEXIS 27 ( 2015 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2015 ME 24
Docket: Kno-14-256
Submitted
On Briefs: February 26, 2015
Decided: March 10, 2015
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
IN RE D.C. et al.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] The father of D.C., M.E.C., and M.C. appeals from a judgment entered
by the District Court (Rockland, Worth, J.) terminating his parental rights pursuant
to 22 M.R.S. § 4055 (2014). The father contends that the court erred in finding, by
clear and convincing evidence, that he was unfit and that termination was in the
children’s best interest because the court relied on evidence of his fitness from
June 2013 and earlier, but not on evidence he presented of his fitness at the time of
the hearing. We affirm.
[¶2] The children were removed from their father’s care in September 2011.
With the father’s agreement, the court entered a jeopardy order in November 2011,
finding jeopardy based upon incidents where one child was harmed and all three
children were endangered by exposure to drugs and drug use by their parents and
others in the home. The Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition
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for termination of the father’s parental rights in June 2013, and a two-day hearing
was held in April 2014.
[¶3] At the termination hearing, the court heard competent evidence to
support its findings that, between the time of the jeopardy order and the hearing,
the father behaved in the following manner: He failed to refrain from abusing
illegal substances; failed to appear for a significant number of scheduled drug
screens from 2012-2014; tested positive at different times for bath salts, marijuana,
and buprenorphine; and admitted to using bath salts, Dilaudid, morphine, and
oxycodone in 2012 and 2013. The father did not fully engage in substance abuse
treatment, and he failed to refrain from criminal activity. He also failed to
maintain consistent, positive visitation with the children, appeared to be under the
influence of substances at multiple visits, and was once arrested while visiting his
children for being under the influence of substances. He failed to engage with a
local therapist to develop parenting skills, and failed to obtain and maintain safe
and stable housing in a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs.
Finally, he failed to work with the Department consistently, at times behaving in a
threatening manner toward the caseworker and service providers, failing to keep in
contact with the Department, and refusing to sign (or revoking already-signed)
releases that would allow the Department to access his medical records and other
important information.
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[¶4] Further, the court heard competent evidence that the oldest child has
remained in the home in which he was first placed after he was removed from his
father’s care, is doing well, is having his needs met there, and considers it his
home. He wishes to stay there, and his current caretaker wishes to adopt him. The
younger two children are “high-needs children.” They will require a guardian who
is “consistently available, thoughtful, mature, and sober,” who can engage the
children with the services and treatment they need, and who can “provide a stable
and predictable home.” The record indicates that the father does not meet those
criteria. The younger children are welcome to stay in their current placement until
a permanent home is found, and the Department has started to identify permanent
homes for them.
[¶5] Therefore, contrary to the father’s contentions, there is clear and
convincing evidence in the record to support the court’s finding of at least one
ground of parental unfitness. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), (iv);
In re Michaela C., 2002 ME 159, ¶¶ 17, 21-23, 809 A.2d 1245. Further, unlike in
In re Heather G., 2002 ME 151, ¶¶ 10-11, 805 A.2d 249, which the father cites as
support for his argument, here the trial court expressly considered the father’s
evidence, and at times even explained what his evidence signified to the court or
why evidence that would otherwise support the father’s case was not necessarily
reliable. The record in no way suggests that the trial court failed to critically assess
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the evidence before it, but rather supports the court’s findings and conclusions.
See In re Marpheen C., 2002 ME 170, ¶¶ 3, 5, 812 A.2d 972.
[¶6] Finally, there was ample evidence in the record that termination of the
father’s rights was in the children’s best interest. See 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a); In re C.P., 2013 ME 57, ¶¶ 19-20, 67 A.3d 558.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs:
Scott F. Hess, Esq., Law Office of Scott F. Hess, LLC,
Augusta, for appellant father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for
appellee Department of Heath and Human Services
Rockland District Court docket number PC-2011-17
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY