Erik Wuori v. Travis Otis , 2020 ME 27 ( 2020 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2020 ME 27
Docket: Wal-19-121
Argued: October 10, 2019
Decided: March 3, 2020
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.*
ERIK WUORI
v.
TRAVIS OTIS
HUMPHREY, J.
[¶1] Travis Otis appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Belfast,
Mathews, J.) ordering the turnover and sale of his boat to satisfy a money
judgment against him in favor of Erik Wuori. See 14 M.R.S. § 3131 (2018). In
this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the court erred in concluding
that “First Team”—a thirty-six-foot boat owned by Otis—was not used
“primarily for commercial fishing” and, therefore, was not exempt from
attachment and execution. See 14 M.R.S. § 4422(9) (2018). We vacate the
judgment.
* Although Justices Alexander and Hjelm participated in the appeal, they retired before this
opinion was certified.
2
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The relevant procedural record of this case begins on December 10,
2018, when a judgment was entered in favor of Wuori and against Otis in the
amount of $60,000. On January 31, 2019, Wuori served Otis with a disclosure
subpoena to appear before the trial court to determine Otis’s ability to satisfy
the judgment. See 14 M.R.S. § 3122 (2018). The court held a disclosure hearing
on February 15, 2019, at which Otis appeared and testified. See 14 M.R.S.
§ 3125(1) (2018). On March 13, 2019, the court entered an order of turnover
and sale of Otis’s boat in favor of Wuori, see 14 M.R.S. § 3131, after finding the
following facts.
[¶3] Otis owns a thirty-six-foot boat named “First Team” that is worth
$55,000. Otis has not used his boat to catch and sell lobsters since 2014.
Instead, he uses the boat to catch lobsters for the Maine Department of Marine
Resources (the Department) to collect data on juvenile lobsters.1
1 The Maine Department of Marine Resources conducts a “ventless trap survey” annually from
June to August, during which the Department hires local lobstermen for the purpose of collecting
data about the State’s juvenile lobster population. See Me. Dept. of Marine Resources
website/Research/Ventless Trap Survey (last visited Feb. 28, 2020). In describing the work he does
with the Department as part of the ventless trap survey, Otis testified that “we . . . take everything
down to the harbor, we load it on the vessel, we load the vessel with all the bait, all the buoys that we
need; we get the data points from the State of Maine, we plot the course, and then we go out and we
deploy that gear. A few days later, we come back, we cycle through, we pull all the gear, we re-bait
all the gear, we take all the things that we catch in the traps, [and] we . . . data catalog those.”
3
[¶4] The court concluded that the boat was not exempt from attachment
and execution within the meaning of 14 M.R.S. § 4422(9) because Otis “does not
harvest the lobster he catches but returns them to the ocean”2 and thus, he
“does not use the boat ‘primarily for commercial fishing.’”3 The court ordered
that Otis turn over the boat to Wuori to be sold in order to satisfy the $60,000
money judgment previously entered in Wuori’s favor. See 14 M.R.S. § 3131.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶5] The sole issue we address in this appeal is whether the court erred
in concluding, pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 4422(9), that Otis’s use of his boat in his
work for the Department does not constitute “commercial fishing.”4 Otis
contends that, because he is a licensed lobsterman and is compensated for
using his boat to provide a service to the Department by hauling and catching
lobsters for its data collection program, he is engaged in “commercial fishing.”
2 The word “harvest” used by the court does not appear in the exempt property statute, 14 M.R.S.
§ 4422 (2018); however, it is defined as “to gather in (a crop, etc.)” or “to catch, shoot, trap, etc. (fish
or game), usually in an intensive, systemic way, as for commercial purposes,” Harvest, Webster’s New
World College Dictionary (5th ed. 2016), and as “[to] catch or kill (animals) for human consumption
or use,” Harvest, New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010).
3The court also concluded that Otis “failed to carry his burden of proof” in regards to the
exemption. See Steelstone Indus., Inc. v. McCrum, 2001 ME 171, ¶¶ 8-10, 785 A.2d 1256.
4 The parties did not raise before the trial court or on appeal the issue of whether Otis’s work for
the Department was the “primary” use of his boat. Rather, the focus of their dispute is whether Otis’s
use of the boat constituted “commercial fishing” within the meaning of the exemption statute, and we
limit our discussion to that issue. See 14 M.R.S. § 4422(9).
4
He argues that the statute does not require him to sell the lobsters he catches
for the use of his boat to be a “commercial” activity.
A. Standard of Review
[¶6] We review the “court’s interpretation and application of a statute
de novo, looking first to the plain meaning of the statutory language to give
effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Teele v. West-Harper, 2017 ME 196, ¶ 10, 170
A.3d 803. We interpret the plain language “by taking into account the subject
matter and purposes of the statute, and the consequences of a particular
interpretation,” Ford Motor Co. v. Darling’s, 2016 ME 171, ¶ 24, 151 A.3d 507
(quotation marks omitted), and give “technical or trade expressions . . . a
meaning understood by the trade or profession,” Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling
Prof’ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 12, 896 A.2d 271; see 1 M.R.S. § 72(3) (2018).
In doing so, we seek “to avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results.” Andrews
v. Sheepscot Island Co., 2016 ME 68, ¶ 9, 138 A.3d 1197. We also “consider the
whole statutory scheme of which the section at issue forms a part so that a
harmonious result, presumably the intent of the Legislature, may be achieved.”
Urrutia v. Interstate Brands Int’l, 2018 ME 24, ¶ 12, 179 A.3d 312 (quotation
marks omitted).
5
[¶7] If the plain language of a statute is ambiguous, only then “will we
look beyond that language to examine other indicia of legislative intent, such as
legislative history.” Scamman v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 2017 ME 41, ¶ 14,
157 A.3d 223. “Statutory language is considered ambiguous if it is reasonably
susceptible to different interpretations.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
B. The Exemption Statute—14 M.R.S. § 4422(9)
[¶8] As a means of allowing judgment creditors to enforce money
judgments, the Legislature established a process for obtaining orders requiring
judgment debtors to turn over their property. See 14 M.R.S. §§ 3120-38 (2018).
However, as a matter of public policy, specific property is exempt from this
process. See 14 M.R.S. § 4422. These exemptions from attachment and
execution have existed since the earliest days of Maine’s statehood. See, e.g.,
Martin v. Buswell, 108 Me. 263, 264-65, 80 A. 828 (1911) (stating that “at a very
early day” it was evident to the Legislature that it “was against sound public
policy” to take tools from a debtor that could be used by the debtor to pay a
debt); R.S. ch. 114, § 38 (1841) (listing property exempt from attachment and
execution). As early as 1835, the Legislature determined that a debtor’s
interest in a boat “usually employed in the fishing business” would be exempt
6
from attachment, see P.L. 1835, ch. 172 (codified as R.S. ch. 114, § 38 (1841)),
and this exemption has remained in existence in various forms ever since.5
[¶9] Relevant to this appeal, the statute exempts from attachment and
execution “[t]he debtor’s interest in one boat, not exceeding 46 feet in length,
used by the debtor primarily for commercial fishing.” 14 M.R.S. § 4422(9). It is
the debtor’s burden to establish the elements necessary to qualify for the
exemption—in particular that the boat is used for “commercial fishing.” See
Steelstone Indus., Inc. v. McCrum, 2001 ME 171, ¶¶ 8-10, 785 A.2d 1256; Daniels
v. Daniels, 593 A.2d 658, 660 (Me. 1991). However, because neither
“commercial” nor “fishing” is defined in the statutes governing money
judgments or exempt property, see 14 M.R.S. § 3121 (2018) (providing
definitions for the enforcement of money judgments); 14 M.R.S. § 4421 (2018)
(providing definitions for property exempt from attachment), we begin our
review by analyzing the plain meaning of those terms.
5 See 14 M.R.S.A. § 4401 (1964), repealed and replaced by P.L. 1981, ch. 431 (effective Sept. 18,
1981) (codified at 14 M.R.S. § 4422 (2018)); R.S. ch. 112, § 67 (1954); R.S. ch. 99, § 67 (1944); R.S. ch.
95, § 67 (1930); R.S. ch. 86, § 64 (1916); R.S. ch. 83, § 64 (1903); R.S. ch. 81, § 62 (1883); R.S. ch. 81,
§ 59 (1871); R.S. ch. 81, § 36 (1857).
7
1. “Commercial Fishing”
[¶10] On its face, the statute exempts from attachment and execution a
boat used primarily for “commercial fishing.” 14 M.R.S. § 4422(9). The word
“fishing” is commonly understood as the act of catching fish6 and, because we
give “technical or trade expressions . . . a meaning understood by the trade or
profession,” Cobb, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 12, 896 A.2d 271, it also encompasses the act
of catching other marine organisms like lobsters and crabs. See, e.g., 12 M.R.S.
§ 6421 (2018) (including the requirements to obtain a crab or lobster “fishing”
license); 13-188 C.M.R. ch. 25 (effective August 21, 2018) (discussing “lobster
fishing” pursuant to the Department of Marine Resources’ lobster and crab
regulations). As such, the word “fishing” is not ambiguous.
[¶11] The meaning of “commercial,” however, can be understood in
different ways. “Commercial” may mean “concerned with or engaged in
commerce,” Commercial, New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010), or “of
or relating to commerce,” Commercial, American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language (5th ed. 2016). “Commerce,” in turn, is defined as “the buying
and selling of goods, especially on a large scale, as between cities or nations.”
6 Dictionaries define the term “fishing” as “the activity of catching fish, either for food or as a
sport,” Fishing, New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010), and “the catching of fish for sport or
as a living,” Fishing, Webster’s New World College Dictionary (5th ed. 2016).
8
Commerce, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed.
2016). Alternatively, “commercial” may be understood as “making or intended
to make a profit,” Commercial, New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010),
or “having profit as a chief aim,” Commercial, American Heritage Dictionary of
the English Language (5th ed. 2016).
[¶12] Because the meaning of “commercial” is “reasonably susceptible
to different interpretations,” Scamman, 2017 ME 41, ¶ 14, 157 A.3d 223, the
term is ambiguous. Therefore, we must “examine other indicia of legislative
intent, such as legislative history,” id., and determine whether the Legislature
intended to define “commercial” as relating to “the buying or selling of goods,
especially on a large scale,” Commerce, American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language (5th ed. 2016), or as “having profit as a chief aim,”
Commercial, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed.
2016).
2. Statutory History
[¶13] In 1981, the Legislature enacted P.L 1981, ch. 431 (effective
Sept. 18, 1981), which codified the current property exemptions at 14 M.R.S.
9
4422.7 The Legislature’s purpose in enacting this new legislation was, in part,
to “[m]erge into one list the statutory property exemptions for state collection
proceedings and federal bankruptcy proceedings.” L.D. 1642, Statement of Fact
(110th Legis. 1981). However, there is no evidence in this enacting legislation
from which we can glean the Legislature’s intended meaning of “commercial
fishing.”
[¶14] More recently, the Legislature amended section 4422(9), updating
the boat–size limitation from five tons to forty-six feet. See P.L. 2013, ch. 510
(effective April 2, 2014). In doing so, the Legislature stated that the change to
the statute was necessary because “the description of a debtor’s fishing boat
that is used for income-generating purposes [was] out of date.” P.L. 2013, ch.
510, Emergency Preamble (emphasis added). Absent the amendment to
section 4422(9), the use of the outdated description would allow for “the
attachment of fishing boats that are commonly used in commercial fishing,
leading to an inability of the debtor to generate income, which is contradictory
to the reason for the exemption.” Id. (emphasis added).
7 P.L. 1981, ch. 431 repealed and replaced 14 M.R.S.A. § 4401 (1964), the prior exempt-property
statute.
10
[¶15] This rationale underlying the enactment of P.L. 2013, ch. 510 was
echoed by its sponsoring legislator, who testified that the 2014 amendment
was necessary “in order to protect the original intent of the law, to exempt the
tools of the trade of individual commercial fishermen who make their living by
use of their boat.” An Act to Revise the Description of Commercial Fishing Vessels
that are Exempt from Attachment: Hearing on L.D. 1778 Before the J. Standing
Comm. on Judiciary, 126th Legis. (2014) (testimony of Rep. Cooper of
Yarmouth)(emphasis added). Additionally, the legislator stated that revising
the statute to reflect the increased length of modern fishing boats was “a
necessity to continue [the exemption’s] usefulness to debtors, to enable them
to have a fresh start and to continue to use the skills they have acquired to earn
a living.” Id.
[¶16] Based on the available legislative history, we deduce that the
Legislature’s use of the word “commercial” when referring to a boat “used by
the debtor . . . for commercial fishing” was intended to include not only a boat
used to catch and sell lobsters, but also a boat used by a lobsterman who is
compensated to provide the service of catching lobsters. In other words, the
phrase “commercial fishing” was intended to include any boats engaged in
11
fishing “for income-generating purposes.” P.L. 2013, ch. 510, Emergency
Preamble.
[¶17] This interpretation of “commercial fishing” is consistent with “the
whole statutory scheme,” of which section 4422(9) forms a part.8 Urrutia, 2018
ME 24, ¶ 12, 179 A.3d 312. For example, the Legislature determined that both
“farm equipment” and “logging implements,” when they are used
“commercially,” are also exempt from attachment. See 14 M.R.S. § 4422(8),
(9-A). Like a fishing boat, farming and logging equipment can be used by a
debtor to generate income without selling crops or logs, which allows the
debtor to eventually satisfy a debt. If, instead, the law is interpreted to provide
that the tools of a debtor engaged in commercial logging are only exempt from
attachment when the tools are used to sell the wood “harvest[ed] and haul[ed],”
but not exempt when used to provide the service of “harvest[ing] or haul[ing]
8 This interpretation is also consistent with our earlier readings of previous versions of the
exempt-property statute. See Martin v. Buswell, 108 Me. 263, 264, 80 A. 828 (1911) (“[I]t became
clearly evident to law makers . . . that it was against sound public policy to take from the artisan or
the husbandman by attachment the tools or implements by the use of which alone he could perform
the services that would enable him to pay his debt or contribute to the support of his family.”); Walker
v. Carkin, 88 Me. 302, 304, 34 A. 29 (1896) (“Exemptions are intended to preserve to a debtor the
means necessary for obtaining a livelihood in his vocation.”); Files v. Stevens, 84 Me. 84, 85, 24 A. 584
(1891) (“The evident object of the statute is that . . . persons should not be deprived of the simple
means by which they gained a livelihood in their respective vocations.”).
12
wood,” a debtor would face “illogical or inconsistent results,” Andrews, 2016 ME
68, ¶ 9, 138 A.3d 1197. See 14 M.R.S. § 4422(9-A).9
[¶18] Contrary to the court’s conclusion that Otis is not engaged in
commercial fishing because he does not sell the lobsters he catches, the
distinction between selling goods and providing “for pay” the underlying
service of catching and releasing lobsters cannot be a distinction that the
Legislature intended when it used the phrase “commercial fishing.” As with
farm and logging equipment, such a narrow reading of the statute for fishing
boats would lead “to an inability of the debtor to generate income, which is
contradictory to the reason for the exemption.” P.L. 2013, ch. 510, Emergency
Preamble.
[¶19] Having determined that the meaning of “commercial fishing” in
section 4422(9) is ambiguous, and having considered the available legislative
history of section 4422, we conclude that the Legislature’s intent in providing
an exemption for a boat used “for commercial fishing” must include those
instances where a debtor uses a boat for catching fish and other marine
9 Our rule of statutory interpretation analyzing the whole statutory scheme is bolstered here by
the Legislature’s recent exemption for “logging implements,” 14 M.R.S. § 4422(9-A), in which the
Legislature stated that the exemption is “similar to the exemption already allowed for farm
implements and fishing boats for persons employed in commercial farming and fishing.” L.D. 1550,
Summary (124th Legis. 2009).
13
organisms, such as lobsters, while “having profit as a chief aim,” Commercial,
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2016), or “for
income-generating purposes,” P.L. 2013, ch. 510, Emergency Preamble. Thus,
it cannot be only the sale of fish or lobsters by a debtor that determines whether
the debtor’s use of his boat is “commercial.” Rather, “commercial” use of a boat
must also encompass use for providing the service of setting lobster traps and
catching lobsters for compensation.
C. Application of Section 4422(9)
[¶20] We now apply our interpretation of “commercial fishing” to Otis’s
use of his thirty-six foot fishing boat to catch lobsters for the Department. In
order to catch these lobsters, he must be, and is, licensed by the State of Maine.
See 12 M.R.S. § 6421. He uses his boat to set and haul lobster traps, and catches
lobsters that are used by the Department as part of its own scientific research.
Otis does not sell the lobsters he catches, but as a direct result of the services
he provides as a licensed lobsterman, he is paid $16,300 by the Department.
Therefore, Otis is engaged in the act of catching lobsters and provides this
service “for income-generating purposes,” P.L. 2013, ch. 510, Emergency
Preamble, and while “having profit as a chief aim,” Commercial, American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2016).
14
[¶21] Although Wuori contends that Otis uses his boat for “data
collection” rather than commercial fishing, this limited view overlooks the
actual use of Otis’s boat. In fact, it is the Department that is engaged in lobster
“data collection.” Otis, on the other hand, uses his boat to catch and haul
lobsters for the Department’s data collection purposes. Although he returns
the lobsters to the sea, his hauling and catching is compensated by the
Department. Therefore, Otis’s use of his boat constitutes “commercial fishing.”
[¶22] Therefore, the court erred in interpreting and applying section
4422(9) when it concluded that Otis did not use his boat for “commercial
fishing” and that his boat was not exempt from attachment.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Aaron Fethke, Esq. (orally), Fethke Law Offices, Searsport, for appellant Travis
Otis
Christopher K. MacLean, Esq., and Laura P. Shaw, Esq. (orally), Camden Law
LLP, Camden, for appellee Erik Wuori
Belfast District Court docket number SA-2019-16
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY