State of Maine v. Reginald J. Dobbins Jr. , 2019 ME 116 ( 2019 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2019 ME 116Docket: Aro-17-539
Argued: November 7, 2018
Decided: July 23, 2019
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Concurrence: ALEXANDER, J.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
REGINALD J. DOBBINS JR.
HJELM, J.
[¶1] On an evening in March of 2015, a sixty-one-year-old man was
bludgeoned and stabbed to death in his Houlton residence. Reginald J. Dobbins
Jr. was charged with murder, found guilty by a jury, and sentenced by the court
(Aroostook County, Stewart, J.) to sixty-five years in prison. Dobbins appeals
the resulting judgment of conviction. He asserts that the court erred by
excluding certain evidence purporting to show that his friend, Samuel Geary,
was responsible for the murder, including evidence that Geary had pleaded
guilty to murdering the same man. Dobbins also contends that the sentence is
unconstitutional because it “condemns Dobbins to die in prison for a crime that
happened when he was just 18 years old.” We conclude that the court erred by
2
excluding evidence of Geary’s guilty plea to the murder charge but that the
error was harmless due to the magnitude and strength of the evidence that was
admitted to demonstrate both Geary’s and Dobbins’s guilt. We are
unpersuaded by the remainder of Dobbins’s arguments and affirm the
judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] We describe the background of this case based on the evidence seen
in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, see State v. Davis, 2018 ME 116,
¶ 2, 191 A.3d 1147, and the procedural record.
[¶3] On March 1, 2015, the victim was killed in his mobile home, which
was ransacked. An autopsy revealed that the victim had sustained twenty-one
blunt-trauma injuries to his arms, torso, and head, and ten sharp-instrument
injuries to his head and back. Most of the victim’s head trauma was caused by
the face and claw of a hammer that was used to brutally fracture his skull and
lacerate his brain. The stab wounds, caused by a knife, penetrated the victim’s
lungs.
[¶4] Dobbins, who was eighteen years old at the time of the murder, was
arrested about a week later and charged with intentional or knowing murder,
see 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2018). He was indicted for that charge in May of
3
2015 and pleaded not guilty. Samuel Geary was sixteen years old at the time of
the murder and was charged with murder in Juvenile Court1 but was later
bound over to be tried as an adult, see 15 M.R.S. § 3101(4) (2018). In May of
2016, the State filed a notice of joinder of the charges pending against Dobbins
and Geary. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 8(b). Dobbins opposed joinder in part on the
ground that, because Dobbins and Geary each contended that the other was
responsible for the murder, their theories of the case were too antagonistic to
allow for a fair trial if their cases were joined. The court ordered that the cases
be joined for trial, but in May of 2017 Geary pleaded guilty to the murder
charge. His sentencing hearing was continued until after Dobbins’s trial was to
be held.
[¶5] The court held an eight-day jury trial in Dobbins’s case in June of
2017. The State’s theory of the case was not specific as to whether Dobbins was
the principal or an accomplice to Geary. Dobbins’s defense was that Geary
murdered the victim “while Dobbins stood by in shock.” During the trial, the
State wanted to call Geary as a witness, but Geary’s attorney informed the court
that Geary would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and refuse to testify. Dobbins argued that for Geary to be
1 The District Court, when exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to the Maine Juvenile Code, is
referred to as the Juvenile Court. See 15 M.R.S. § 3003(15) (2018).
4
able to assert the privilege, the State was required to call him as a witness. The
court denied Dobbins’s request but held a hearing outside the presence of the
jury where, after Geary was placed under oath, he invoked his Fifth Amendment
privilege. The court dismissed Geary as a witness, and he did not testify before
the jury.
[¶6] Dobbins offered in evidence words that Geary had carved into the
surface of a wooden shelf in his room where he was being held pretrial at the
Mountain View Youth Development Center.2 The statement said: “Every one
has a story, whats urs?” Below that was, “1) Murder.” Dobbins offered this as
a statement made by Geary against interest pursuant to Maine Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3). Additionally, Dobbins sought to admit a certified copy of a court
docket entry documenting Geary’s guilty plea to the murder charge. The State
objected to the admission of both forms of evidence. Outside the presence of
the jury, the parties conducted voir dire of the Mountain View staff member
who had discovered a number of Geary’s carved statements, including the one
quoted above. After the parties were heard on the admissibility of the evidence
offered by Dobbins, the court excluded evidence of both the carving and the
guilty plea, concluding that none of that evidence constituted an admissible
2 The State conceded that the carving was Geary’s.
5
statement against interest. Regarding the evidence of Geary’s guilty plea, the
court also concluded that the risk of unfair prejudice to the State would not be
sufficiently ameliorated by a limiting instruction, which Dobbins proposed,
advising the jury that evidence of the plea did not have the effect of exonerating
Dobbins.
[¶7] After the close of the evidence, the court instructed the jury that it
could consider Dobbins’s guilt as either a principal or an accomplice to murder.
After deliberations, the jury found Dobbins guilty. At a hearing held in October
of 2017, the court sentenced Dobbins to a prison term of sixty-five years.
Dobbins applied for leave to appeal his sentence, which was denied by the
Sentence Review Panel. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 2151, 2152 (2018); M.R. App. P. 20.
Dobbins also filed a timely appeal from the judgment. 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2018);
M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶8] On appeal, Dobbins raises two categories of challenges. He first
argues that the trial court erred by concluding that neither the evidence of
Geary’s carving nor the court record of Geary’s guilty plea was admissible
pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3) and that the exclusion of that evidence deprived
6
him of a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to present a defense.3 He also
asserts that the sixty-five-year prison sentence violates the Eighth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the Maine
Constitution. We address these issues in turn.
A. Evidentiary Challenges
[¶9] Dobbins contends that the court “mechanistically applied” the
Maine Rules of Evidence so as to deny him the opportunity to present a
complete defense in violation of his constitutional rights under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.4
[¶10] The core of Dobbins’s arguments relates to evidentiary principles
governing the admissibility of hearsay evidence. We review a trial court’s
decision to admit or exclude hearsay evidence for an abuse of discretion, State
v. Watson, 2016 ME 176, ¶ 10, 152 A.3d 152, and we review an alleged
3 In a related challenge, Dobbins asserts that the court erred by allowing Geary to assert his
privilege against self-incrimination outside the jury’s presence. This contention is not persuasive,
and we do not address it further. See M.R. Evid. 512(b) (“In criminal jury trials, proceedings shall be
conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to allow privilege claims to be made outside of the hearing
of the jury.”); State v. Norwood, 2014 ME 97, ¶ 11, 97 A.3d 613.
Although Dobbins’s characterization of the court’s rulings as a “mechanistic application” of the
4
Maine Rules of Evidence—a phrase borrowed from case law, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
302 (1973)—may be seen to suggest that the rulings were correct as gauged by the standards in the
rules, we understand him to assert that the rulings were erroneous pursuant to both the rules and
constitutional principles.
7
constitutional violation de novo, State v. Hassan, 2018 ME 22, ¶ 11,
179 A.3d 898.
1. Evidence of Geary’s Carving
[¶11] Geary’s words were found carved into a wooden shelf in his room
at Mountain View and stated, “Every one has a story, whats urs? 1) Murder.”
That statement was near others, also made by Geary, which said things such as
“do or die,” “no salvation,” and “talk shit, get hit.” Dobbins contends that the
court erroneously concluded that the statement that included the reference to
murder is not admissible hearsay pursuant to Maine Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3) and that this error contributed to a violation of his constitutional
right to present a defense.
[¶12] Dobbins offered the statement as Geary’s admission that he was
involved in committing the murder. See M.R. Evid. 801. Because the statement
was offered to prove its truth, it was admissible at trial only if, among other
things, it fell within an exception to the general rule that bars the admission of
hearsay evidence. See M.R. Evid. 802. The exception at issue here is
Rule 804(b)(3).
[¶13] Subject to a limitation not applicable here, Rule 804(b)(3) creates
an exception to the general prohibition against the admission of hearsay for a
8
statement that is against the declarant’s interest. In the context of this case, the
foundation for the admissibility of hearsay pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3)
comprises three elements: (1) the declarant is “unavailable” to testify within
the meaning of Rule 804(a); (2) the statement is contrary to the declarant’s
interests to a degree that a reasonable person would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true; and (3) there exist clear indications
demonstrating the statement’s trustworthiness.5 M.R. Evid. 804(b)(3). We
have stated that the last of these factors implicates
the following four additional factors:
1. the time of the declaration and the party to whom it
was made;
2. the existence of corroborating evidence in the case;
3. whether the declaration is inherently inconsistent
with the accused’s guilt; and
4. whether at the time of the incriminating statement
the declarant had any probable motive to falsify.
State v. Small, 2003 ME 107, ¶ 25, 830 A.2d 423 (citing State v. Cochran,
2000 ME 78, ¶ 12, 749 A.2d 1274).
5 This third factor becomes a foundational element for the admission of a statement against
interest only in a criminal proceeding where—as here—the out-of-court statement “tends to expose
the declarant to criminal liability.” M.R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(B).
9
[¶14] Here, there is no dispute that Geary was unavailable as a witness
because he legitimately invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. See
M.R. Evid. 804(a)(1). The question is whether the evidence of Geary’s carving
meets the other two elements of a statement against interest. In excluding the
evidence, the court concluded that the meaning and purpose of the statement
were unexplained and unknown. In other words, the content of Geary’s
statement is enigmatic to the point that it does not carry meaningful indicia that
he intended the statement to be against his interest. The court legitimately
hypothesized that, if the statement had anything to do with this murder in the
first place, the statement could well have been an accusation by Geary that
someone else—Dobbins, for example—committed it. The court further
concluded that the additional carved statements, such as “do or die,” “no
salvation,” and “talk shit, get hit,” contributed to the uncertainty about what
Geary meant by the “murder” reference.
[¶15] Additionally, the court found that there remained a material
question of whether Geary had an incentive to be truthful when he made the
statement because the reasons why he created the statement were
undeveloped in the record. As the court noted, because it is not clear what
10
Geary was trying to express, it cannot be determined whether the statement
was truthful.
[¶16] The court did not abuse its discretion as gatekeeper by concluding
that, given the ambiguities and unanswered questions surrounding the
statement, Geary’s carved words did not have the “persuasive assurances of
trustworthiness” necessary to bring it “well within the basic rationale” of the
hearsay exception. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
Further, the exclusion of the evidence did not deprive Dobbins of his
constitutional right to present a meaningful defense. See id.; see also State v.
Burbank, 2019 ME 37, ¶ 22, 204 A.3d 851 (“State rulemakers have broad
latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from
criminal trials so long as those rules are not ‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to
the purposes they are designed to serve.’” (alterations and quotation marks
omitted)).
2. Evidence of Geary’s Guilty Plea
[¶17] Dobbins next contends that the court erred by excluding from
evidence the docket entry in Geary’s case showing that Geary had entered a
guilty plea to the murder charge. Dobbins argues both that the court erred by
not analyzing the admissibility of the guilty plea under the public record
11
exception to the hearsay rule, M.R. Evid. 803(8),6 and that its exclusion
contributed to the deprivation of Dobbins’s constitutional rights. Dobbins is
correct that the court abused its discretion by excluding the docket entry
showing Geary’s guilty plea, but, given the substantial body of evidence of both
Dobbins’s and Geary’s criminal involvement in the murder that was presented
to the jury, the court’s error was harmless.
[¶18] The docket entry of Geary’s guilty plea to the murder charge
contains two layers of hearsay: first, it represents an out-of-court statement by
Geary—his guilty plea itself; and, second, it is an out-of-court written statement
by a court employee that Geary had entered that plea. See M.R. Evid. 801(c).
When a statement contains multiple layers of hearsay, each layer must be
analyzed individually and determined to be admissible for the underlying
hearsay statement ultimately to be admissible. See M.R. Evid. 805 (“Hearsay
within hearsay is not excluded by the rule against hearsay if each part of the
combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule.”). Consequently,
Dobbins was required to demonstrate that Geary’s guilty plea and the written
6 At trial, Dobbins asserted that the docket record reflecting Geary’s guilty plea should be admitted
as a statement against interest under M.R. Evid. 804(b)(3), but the court concluded otherwise.
Although Dobbins’s primary argument on appeal is that the court erred by failing to apply the
Rule 803(8) framework, his argument also implicates Rule 804, which we therefore address.
12
docket record memorializing that plea each fell within an exception to the rule
barring the admission of hearsay evidence.
a. Rule 804(b)(3)
[¶19] The application of Rule 804(b)(3) determines whether the first
layer of hearsay—Geary’s guilty plea—is admissible. Without controversy, the
court properly determined that Geary was unavailable and that a guilty plea to
a murder charge is a statement against penal interest. The remaining question
is whether evidence of the plea meets the third element created by the Rule—
that the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea clearly indicate that
the admission of guilt was trustworthy.
[¶20] In analyzing that foundational element, the court appropriately
considered the four subfactors articulated in Cochran, discussed above. See
2000 ME 78, ¶ 12, 749 A.2d 1274. The court properly concluded that the
evidence satisfied three of those trustworthiness factors: (1) that an indicium
of trustworthiness arises from Geary’s declaration of his guilt to a judge—in
fact, the same jurist who was presiding at Dobbins’s trial—during a court
proceeding held a month prior to Dobbins’s trial; (2) that there was
corroborating testimonial and forensic evidence of Geary’s guilt, the factual
basis for which the court confirmed at the plea hearing, see M.R.U.
13
Crim. P. 11(b)(3) (as applicable here, requiring the court to ensure that there is
a “factual basis” for a charge to which a defendant pleads guilty); and (3) that
nothing in the record suggested that Geary had a motive to lie by pleading
guilty. The trustworthiness of Geary’s statement against penal interest is
materially enhanced because it took the form of a guilty plea to the most serious
criminal offense created by State law, see 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1251, 1252 (2018)
(providing that the minimum sentence for murder is 25 years and that only a
murder charge may result in a sentence of life imprisonment), and was
presented in a proceeding where Geary’s interests were surrounded by a full
panoply of procedural protections, see M.R.U. Crim. P. 11; see also, e.g.,
Laferriere v. State, 1997 ME 169, ¶ 12, 697 A.2d 1301 (“Unlike at a trial, the
defendant who enters a plea of guilty in a Rule 11 proceeding is cooperating in
the creation of a record intended to instill confidence that the outcome is
a reliable reflection of guilt.”); United States v. Winley, 638 F.2d 560, 562 (2d Cir.
1981) (affirming the determination that a guilty plea was reliable under Fed. R.
Evid. 804(b)(3)).
[¶21] Despite concluding that these factors supported the admissibility
of evidence of Geary’s guilty plea, however, the court excluded that evidence
based on the remaining trustworthiness factor found in Cochran, namely,
14
whether the out-of-court declaration is “inherently inconsistent” with the guilt
of the accused—here, Dobbins. The court concluded that Geary’s guilty plea
was not inherently inconsistent with Dobbins’s guilt because the State’s
evidence did not cast Geary as solely culpable for the murder and because it
could not be determined whether Geary, when entering the plea, was taking
sole responsibility for the murder or, alternatively, was admitting that he had
acted in concert with Dobbins either as a principal or an accomplice.
[¶22] The requirement that the proponent demonstrate circumstances
clearly indicating the trustworthiness of the statement against penal interest,
when offered in a criminal proceeding, was added to Rule 804(b)(3) in 1976.
M.R. Evid. 804 Advisory Committee’s Note to 2011 amend. Previously, we had
expressed concern that if every admission of guilt to a crime by a nonparty were
admissible as a statement against interest, the administration of justice would
be “seriously handicap[ped]” because the door would be opened for
“defendants to produce perjured and fraudulent ‘confessions’ by others who,
for some reason or other, have absconded or are otherwise unavailable as
witnesses.” State v. Gervais, 317 A.2d 796, 802-03 (Me. 1974).7 The
A leading commentator has also pointed to the “well-known phenomenon of numerous patently
7
false confessions” made by people who had nothing to do with the crimes to which they confessed,
as a separate justification for imposing a requirement that the proponent of the out-of-court
15
requirement set out in Rule 804(3)(b), requiring, as a foundational matter, a
showing that the nonparty’s confession is trustworthy, ameliorates this
concern. See State v. Smith, 415 A.2d 553, 559 (Me. 1980) (discussing
Rule 804(b)(3) in its present formulation); Gervais, 317 A.2d at 802 (noting,
prior to the rule change, that most jurisdictions that had adopted a rule
allowing the admission of statements against penal interests attached “certain
specific safeguards” to protect the State’s legitimate interests while also
providing “essential justice and common fairness” to the defendant seeking to
present the evidence).
[¶23] Here, the court conflated the question of whether Geary’s guilty
plea was trustworthy with the question of whether, in addition to being
inculpatory for Geary, it was exculpatory of Dobbins. The latter issue is one of
relevance and probative value, which must be addressed—as we do below—in
the context of Maine Rules of Evidence 402 and 403. The predicate question of
the trustworthiness of Geary’s guilty plea, on the other hand, assumes that that
evidence is relevant by having an exculpatory effect as to the accused. The
proper inquiry is whether the inculpatory declaration was made under
circumstances that make any exculpatory effect as to the accused less than
statement demonstrate surrounding circumstances of trustworthiness. Field & Murray, Maine
Evidence § 804.4 at 520 (6th ed. 2007).
16
clearly trustworthy. See Smith, 415 A.2d at 561 (stating that “the circumstances
indicating trustworthiness must clearly corroborate the exculpatory, as well as
the inculpatory, nature of the statement . . . to assure the reliability of the
declaration’s exculpation of the accused, the ultimate issue on which the
evidence is offered” (emphasis omitted)). This provides some assurance that
the admission is reliable and diminishes the prospect of presenting a fact-finder
with a nonparty’s fraudulent or otherwise false confession to a crime, which
was made for the purpose of deflecting guilt away from the accused.
[¶24] In the court’s Rule 804(b)(3) analysis, all of the factors it
articulated demonstrated that Geary’s admission of guilt embodied in his guilty
plea was trustworthy, and the court did not identify any factor that would raise
a suspicion about the trustworthiness of any exculpatory effect Geary’s plea
would have as to Dobbins. On this record, in other words, it cannot be said that
by pleading guilty, Geary was fabricating his own guilt and attempting to “shift
culpability” away from Dobbins. See State v. Small, 2003 ME 107, ¶ 27,
830 A.2d 423. Although the court appropriately raised the question of whether,
given the particular circumstances of this case, Geary’s guilty plea could be seen
as an exoneration of Dobbins, that concern would not suffice as a basis to
exclude the evidence pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3), because the fact remains that
17
Geary’s plea was a statement against penal interest that necessarily met each
of the foundational elements prescribed by that rule. Therefore, the court’s
invocation of Rule 804(b)(3) as the basis to exclude evidence of the guilty plea
was erroneous.
b. Rule 803(8)
[¶25] Dobbins next challenges the court’s determination that the public
record exception was not the “appropriate framework” for analyzing the
admissibility of Geary’s guilty plea. This implicates the second layer of hearsay,
namely, the docket entry memorializing Geary’s guilty plea.
[¶26] The court erred by not considering the admissibility of Geary’s
guilty plea pursuant, in part, to the public record exception to the hearsay rule
because the docket entry constitutes the second layer of hearsay exceptions
that must be met for the court record of Geary’s statement against penal
interest ultimately to be admissible. Nonetheless, the record establishes that
the docket entry was within the public records exception to the hearsay rule.
[¶27] As we have held, the admissibility of certified docket entries draws
on the public records exception to the hearsay rule found in Maine Rule of
Evidence 803(8). See State v. Troy, 2014 ME 9, ¶ 16 n.7, 86 A.3d 591. Pursuant
to that rule, “[a] record or statement of a public office” is not subject to
18
exclusion, despite its hearsay character, if the record “sets out . . . [t]he office’s
regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities,” with exceptions not
applicable here. M.R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(i). A criminal docket record
documenting Geary’s guilty plea clearly satisfies the rule’s requirements. A
clerk’s office, where docket records of court events are created and maintained,
is a “public office,” and the docket record reflects the activity—the entry of a
guilty plea, for example—of that public office’s regularly conducted judicial
business. See M.R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(i); see also, e.g., United States v. Cantu,
167 F.3d 198, 204 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[C]ertified court records are public records,
thereby falling within the public records exception to the hearsay rule”); United
States v. Gotti, 641 F. Supp. 283, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that the record of
third party’s guilty plea was admissible as a public record). Consequently,
evidence of Geary’s guilty plea is not barred by the rules prohibiting the
admission of hearsay evidence.
[¶28] As the final step in the evidentiary analysis, we now consider the
effect of Rule 403.
c. Rule 403
[¶29] Although much of the court’s explanation of its reasoning for
excluding evidence of Geary’s guilty plea focused on Rule 804(b)(3), the court
19
also touched on Rule 403 and its principles and concluded that the evidence at
issue was inadmissible pursuant to that authority. In doing so, the court
acknowledged Dobbins’s theory of the case that Geary was solely responsible
for the murder. The court reasoned, however, that allowing evidence of Geary’s
plea “in a vacuum” would invite the jury to speculate why Geary pleaded guilty.
The court also stated that evidence of the guilty plea is not necessarily
exculpatory as to Dobbins because one defendant could be an accomplice to the
other and that—specific to Rule 403—the presentation of evidence that Geary
had pleaded guilty would mislead or confuse the jury in Dobbins’s trial.
[¶30] Pursuant to Rule 403, a court may exclude evidence “if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” State v. Maderios, 2016 ME 155,
¶ 10, 149 A.3d 1145 (quotation marks omitted). Although “[t]he trial court is
afforded wide discretion to make Rule 403 determinations,” id. (quotation
marks omitted), the court’s exclusion of the evidence here exceeded the bounds
of that discretion.
[¶31] At trial, the extent of Geary’s participation in the murder was a
material issue and constituted the core of Dobbins’s defense. As we discuss
below, both the State and Dobbins presented the jury with considerable
20
testimonial and forensic evidence of Geary’s guilt. Although evidence that
Geary had pleaded guilty to murder is not necessarily inconsistent with
Dobbins’s own guilt, the evidence of Geary’s plea is not devoid of probative
value. See M.R. Evid. 401 (stating that “[e]vidence is relevant if . . . [i]t has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence; and . . . [t]he fact is of consequence in determining the action”
(emphasis added)).
[¶32] Then, the court must determine whether the danger of unfair
prejudice to a party substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence
at issue. M.R. Evid. 403. Here, for two reasons, the risk of any prejudice unfair
to the State, as the party opposing introduction of the evidence, was—at most—
remote.
[¶33] First, the State’s assertion that evidence of Geary’s guilty plea
would be unfairly prejudicial to its interests is belied by several aspects of its
own approach to the case against Dobbins. Before Geary pleaded guilty, the
State sought to join the cases against him and Dobbins so that there would be a
single, consolidated trial where the State would present evidence of both
defendants’ guilt. The court denied Dobbins’s motion for relief from prejudicial
joinder, indicating that the court was satisfied that the guilt of one defendant as
21
established at a consolidated trial would not interfere with the jury’s ability to
make a proper determination of whether the State also proved the other
defendant’s guilt.
[¶34] Only Dobbins actually proceeded to trial, but during that trial the
State’s case included significant evidence connecting Geary to the murder. The
State’s pretrial willingness to present evidence of Geary’s guilt simultaneously
with its effort to prove Dobbins’s guilt, and the body of evidence the State itself
presented at Dobbins’s trial demonstrating Geary’s culpability, show that, even
in the State’s view, the presentation of evidence of Geary’s guilt—whatever
form that evidence might take—cannot be properly regarded as an unfair
impediment to the State’s case against Dobbins.
[¶35] Second, any concern that the jury might attach improper
significance to evidence of Geary’s plea would have been alleviated by the
limiting instruction that Dobbins himself proposed to the court—that the plea
does not have the effect of exonerating Dobbins. Indeed, in its instructions to
the jury about the ways Dobbins could be found guilty, the court instructed the
jury on the law of accomplice liability to make clear that more than one person
can be guilty of a single crime.8 See 17-A M.R.S. § 57(3)(A) (2018); State v. Hurd,
8 When the parties presented their arguments on the admissibility of evidence of Geary’s guilty
plea, the State took the position that the evidence would have to be considered in the context of
22
2010 ME 118, ¶ 29, 8 A.3d 651. In excluding evidence of Geary’s guilty plea,
however, the court concluded that—as to Geary—the same type of instruction
would not adequately inform the jury that the plea still allowed for Dobbins to
be found guilty.
[¶36] The concurring opinion asserts that Dobbins intended to use
evidence of Geary’s guilty plea to demonstrate, by itself, that Dobbins could not
be found guilty of the murder. See Concurring Opinion at ¶¶ 66-67. That
assertion, however, is belied by Dobbins’s explicit statement to the court that
he did not intend to argue to the jury that Geary’s guilty plea alone meant that
Dobbins could not be found guilty. The concurrence’s analysis is further
compromised by Dobbins’s own request that evidence of Geary’s plea be
accompanied by a limiting instruction to the jury that the plea does not
exonerate Dobbins. Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions, see
State v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 55, 58 A.3d 1032, and the limiting instruction
that Dobbins proposed would have eliminated any prospect that the State
Geary’s entire plea hearing—an argument that, in effect, invoked the rule of completeness, see M.R.
Evid. 106. Neither party submitted a transcript of the plea hearing, however, and the record does not
contain any meaningful description of what that additional evidence might be. Consequently, on this
record, we cannot know whether the basis for Geary’s guilty plea was as the only guilty person, or as
a principal with Dobbins as the accomplice, or as an accomplice with Dobbins as the principal. This
record therefore does not present an occasion for us to consider whether, notwithstanding Dobbins’s
constitutional right of confrontation, the court-promulgated rule of completeness would entitle the
State to present any such evidence.
23
would be unfairly prejudiced by the admission of evidence that Geary had
pleaded guilty, just as with the substantial evidence of Geary’s guilt that was
admitted during the trial—evidence that the State characterizes on appeal as
“abundant.” There is no reason why additional evidence of Geary’s guilt in the
form of the docket entry of his guilty plea would have resulted in any unfair
prejudice to the State if other evidence of his guilt did not have that effect.
[¶37] For these reasons,9 the court abused its discretion by excluding
evidence of Geary’s guilty plea based on its application of Rule 403.10 See, e.g.,
State v. Thurlow, 1998 ME 139, ¶ 6, 712 A.2d 518.
d. Harmless Error
[¶38] Having determined that the court erred by excluding evidence of
Geary’s guilty plea, we must next consider the effect of that error and, more
particularly, whether it was harmless as gauged by its effect on Dobbins’s
9 Given our conclusion that the court erred in excluding the evidence pursuant to the Rules of
Evidence, we do not reach Dobbins’s alternative argument that the court’s evidentiary ruling was
unconstitutional.
10 We note that in different contexts, “[r]esolution of cases involving co-defendants and
consequences that may have occurred to co-defendants should not be considered by the jury,
whether or not the co-defendants were originally joined for trial.” Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction
Manual § 4-9 cmt. (2017-2018 ed.). Cases that preclude admission of evidence of guilty pleas or
findings adverse to co-defendants in criminal trials focus on avoiding a presumption of guilt arising
from a co-defendant’s admission—in effect, guilt by association. See, e.g., United States v.
Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 18-24 (1st Cir. 2008). Here, it was Dobbins, and not the State, who offered
evidence of Geary’s guilty plea. The general reasoning for excluding this type of evidence is therefore
inapposite here.
24
“substantial rights,” M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(a); see M.R. Evid. 103(a). Error is
harmless if it was not “sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome of
the proceeding.” Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 33, 58 A.3d 1032 (quotation marks
omitted); see also State v. Larsen, 2013 ME 38, ¶ 23, 65 A.3d 1203 (“A
constitutional error made at trial may be deemed harmless if we are satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the trial record as a whole, that the error
did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (quotation marks omitted)); State
v. Patton, 2012 ME 101, ¶ 17, 50 A.3d 544.
[¶39] Here, the State’s evidence of Dobbins’s guilt is so substantial that,
even if the record had been supplemented by evidence of Geary’s plea, the same
result would have obtained. Further, the record, viewed in its totality, already
contains evidence of Geary’s own significant involvement in the murder to an
extent that the exclusion of evidence of his guilty plea itself would not have
changed the verdict. We briefly review the considerable evidence presented to
the jury showing both Dobbins’s and Geary’s involvement in the murder.
i. Evidence of Dobbins’s Guilt
[¶40] Dobbins’s guilt was proved to the jury with physical and forensic
evidence and with testimony. Two murder weapons were found in Dobbins’s
residence. Investigators recovered one of the murder weapons—a folding knife
25
with blood containing the victim’s DNA—hidden in a wall in Dobbins’s
bedroom. Dobbins later told investigators that the knife was his. Investigators
recovered the second murder weapon—a hammer—from a kitchen drawer in
Dobbins’s home. Additionally, the victim’s blood was found on one of Dobbins’s
sneakers. And on a glove recovered near where the victim’s truck was located,
forensic examiners found the victim’s DNA in a bloodstain and Dobbins’s DNA
inside the glove.
[¶41] As to the testimonial evidence, during the investigation, detectives
interviewed Dobbins three times, and each time Dobbins gave fundamentally
contradictory accounts of his actions surrounding the murder. Dobbins was
first interviewed just before investigators searched Dobbins’s home pursuant
to a warrant and recovered physical evidence implicating him in the murder.
During that interview, Dobbins told investigators that on the night of the
murder he had been with Geary and that the two walked past the victim’s
residence to meet someone who lived near the victim for purposes of a
drug-related transaction. Dobbins further stated that while walking past the
victim’s home, he heard men’s voices nearby, but he then changed his story to
state that he was confused and that the voice was Geary’s mother’s on a cell
phone. He also said that he and Geary were given a ride back into town by the
26
girlfriend of the individual they went to meet, which contradicts the testimony
of his own father, who stated that it was he who drove Dobbins and Geary back.
Dobbins stated that he was wearing a yellow jacket and that Geary was wearing
a “hoodie.” But while investigators were conducting the search at Dobbins’s
home, his mother told the officers that Dobbins actually had been wearing the
black coat that police seized, on which blood from both the victim and Geary
was later found. Dobbins denied to police that he had been wearing the black
coat, but at that point in the interview he began to sweat and went to the
bathroom to vomit.
[¶42] Not long after investigators completed the search of Dobbins’s
residence, Dobbins contacted one of the detectives and said he needed to talk.
During the resulting second interview, Dobbins admitted that he had been at
the victim’s home but claimed that he stood outside while Geary went inside,
beat the victim with an object, and then demanded that Dobbins enter the
home, where he claimed to have witnessed Geary repeatedly stab the victim.
Dobbins further said that it was Geary who was wearing the blood-stained
black coat, changing his previous account that Geary had worn a hoodie.
[¶43] During the third interview, Dobbins continued to blame Geary for
the murder, but he changed his statement about the black coat by admitting
27
that he had worn it—but not until after the murder—stating that Geary had
demanded to wear it as a “blood shield” immediately before entering the
victim’s home and gave it back to Dobbins after committing the murder. After
his arrest, Dobbins admitted that he lied to police in some statements he had
made during the first interview, and he admitted that he had driven the victim’s
truck after the murder and that the knife with the victim’s DNA belonged to him,
not to Geary as he had previously claimed.
[¶44] In addition to Dobbins’s evolving statements, the jury was
presented with a video showing him purchasing a video game at a local store a
day or so after the murder, at a time when he claimed to police he had been at
home and in distress because of his reported shock at having watched Geary
kill the victim.
[¶45] The jury also heard testimony from Dobbins’s cellmate, who
testified that Dobbins had confessed his involvement in the murder. The
cellmate testified that Dobbins at first blamed Geary but then said that both he
and Geary, after getting drunk, went to the victim’s home to rob him of drugs,
that they brought the knife and the hammer, that they attacked the victim
repeatedly with the hammer, and that Geary then stabbed the victim repeatedly
with a knife. The cellmate’s testimony about Dobbins’s description of the
28
victim’s injuries was consistent with the findings of the pathologist who
conducted the post-mortem examination, of which the witness had no
knowledge.
ii. Evidence of Geary’s Participation in the Murder
[¶46] As to Geary, on this record, see supra n.8, and as we discuss below,
his guilty plea by itself can signify nothing more than his involvement in the
murder as an accomplice. Even without evidence of that plea, his substantial
participation in the murder is established by a considerable amount of physical
and forensic evidence. At the murder scene, Geary’s DNA was found in blood
on a chair next to the victim’s body and in blood inside the victim’s pants pocket.
Blood with Geary’s DNA was also found in numerous places inside the
passenger compartment of the victim’s truck, which was found off the side the
road on the night of the murder. Some of Geary’s DNA in the truck was mixed
with the DNA from the victim’s blood.
[¶47] When investigators searched Dobbins’s residence, they recovered,
among other items, the claw hammer—one of the murder weapons. The
victim’s DNA was found in blood on the claw, and Geary’s DNA was on the
handle.11 On the black coat noted above, forensic analysts found bloodstains
Although Dobbins asserts that Geary’s DNA was found on the knife recovered from Dobbins’s
11
bedroom wall, the only DNA on the knife was from the victim. While conducting a search of Geary’s
29
containing DNA that matched both the victim and Geary, as well as Dobbins’s
DNA. Police also seized a pair of driving gloves from Dobbins’s residence. A
finger on one of the gloves had a slice, and both Dobbins’s and Geary’s DNA
were found in bloodstains on the gloves.
[¶48] Geary’s involvement in the murder was also demonstrated
through testimonial evidence. Dobbins himself told officers that he was with
Geary at the victim’s residence during the murder and that Geary had stabbed
the victim. Independent of Dobbins’s statements, several witnesses observed
two men that evening generally matching Geary’s and Dobbins’s descriptions
walking on the road where the victim lived, heading away from the victim’s
residence. Dobbins’s father confirmed that he had picked up the two men that
night.12
[¶49] Evidence of Geary’s guilty plea would have demonstrated that
Geary admitted his guilt but—to the extent revealed by this record, see supra
n.8—without framing his guilt as that of a lone actor. Accordingly, although
person and residence, however, investigators observed a recent cut on Geary’s hand. Geary also had
scratch marks on his right shoulder, and bruising and red marks on his hands, elbows, and wrists.
12 The record reveals that there was additional evidence of Geary’s involvement in the murder
that Dobbins had intended to present at trial but, for reasons not explained in the record, ultimately
chose not to. That evidence consisted of testimony from two witnesses, who testified during Geary’s
bind-over hearing, see 15 M.R.S. § 3101(4)(A) (2018), that “Geary admitted responsibility for the
murder.”
30
Dobbins sought to use evidence of Geary’s plea to support the notion that Geary
was solely responsible for the murder, evidence of the plea could not have
proven that point. Rather, that evidence could have demonstrated only that he
admitted that he was either a principal or an accomplice, without specifying
which. See 17-A M.R.S. § 57(3)(A). Accomplice liability attaches to a person
who is present at the scene of a crime “upon the State’s proof of any conduct
promoting or facilitating, however slightly, the commission of the crime.” State
v. Pheng, 2002 ME 40, ¶ 9, 791 A.2d 925 (emphasis added). Given the
undisputed evidence of Geary’s presence at the murder scene and the
significant blood evidence demonstrating his physical participation in the
murder, evidence of Geary’s plea would have added little because, on the
existing record, it is not reasonable to conclude that the jury found that Geary
had nothing to do with the murder. Therefore, the additional evidence—not
presented to the jury—that Geary had pleaded guilty to the charge would have
been little more than cumulative and, beyond a reasonable doubt, would not
have changed the outcome of Dobbins’s trial.
[¶50] Given the magnitude of the evidence presented to the jury during
the eight-day trial demonstrating both Geary’s and Dobbins’s guilt, the
exclusion of evidence of Geary’s plea could not have affected the jury’s verdict.
31
See Patton, 2012 ME 101, ¶ 18, 50 A.3d 544. The erroneous evidentiary ruling
was therefore harmless.
B. Challenge to the Sentence
[¶51] Dobbins next contends that the sixty-five-year prison term
imposed by the court is unconstitutionally excessive. The Sentence Review
Panel denied Dobbins’s application for a discretionary sentence review, leaving
Dobbins with a direct appeal from a sentence, which confines the appellate
challenge to “a claim that the sentence is illegal, imposed in an illegal manner,
or beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and the illegality appears plainly in the
record.” State v. Bennett, 2015 ME 46, ¶ 11, 114 A.3d 994 (quotation marks
omitted). On a direct appeal such as this, we review only the legality, and not
the propriety, of the sentence,13 and we do so de novo. Id. ¶ 14.
[¶52] The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids
the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
As part of his constitutional challenge, Dobbins asserts that the psychological treatment he
13
received, his diagnosed learning disability, his family history, and his history of substance abuse are
mitigating factors that the court did not adequately consider. A court’s factual findings or
discretionary determinations in sentencing are cognizable only on a discretionary appeal, State v.
Plante, 2018 ME 61, ¶ 5, 184 A.3d 873, and therefore we do not consider such challenges on direct
appeal. See State v. Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶ 15, 21 A.3d 1033 (“[N]either the general propriety of
the sentence[] imposed by the Superior Court, nor [defendant]’s lack of a serious criminal record or
other individual factors, have any significance in determining whether his punishment is
unconstitutional.”); see also State v. Gilman, 2010 ME 35, ¶ 21, 993 A.2d 14 (holding that article I,
section 9 of the Maine Constitution “does not require consideration of the individual circumstances
of each offender”).
32
Further, article I, section 9 of the Maine Constitution provides that “all penalties
and punishments shall be proportioned to the offense.” Me. Const. art. I, § 9. To
assess whether a sentence violates the Maine Constitution, we first “look to see
whether a particular sentence is greatly disproportionate to the offense for
which it is imposed,” and second, “if it is not greatly disproportionate, we
examine whether it offends prevailing notions of decency.” State v. Lopez,
2018 ME 59, ¶ 15, 184 A.3d 880 (quotation marks omitted). If a sentence fails
either part of the test, it is unconstitutional. Id. “In applying this test, we are
mindful that only the most extreme punishment decided upon by the
Legislature as appropriate for an offense could so offend or shock the collective
conscience of the people of Maine as to be unconstitutionally disproportionate,
or cruel and unusual.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
[¶53] Dobbins asserts that “youth is the ultimate mitigating factor” and
that Maine courts “should not be authorized to impose life sentences or de facto
life sentences on young people with no meaningful hope for rehabilitation or
release.”
[¶54] Dobbins’s argument ultimately fails because it is built on two
incorrect predicates, one factual and the other legal.
33
[¶55] For the first incorrect analytical element, the sixty-five-year
sentence imposed by the court is in fact a term of years, not a life sentence. See
17-A M.R.S. § 1251(1) (“A person convicted of the crime of murder must be
sentenced to imprisonment for life or for any term of years that is not less than
25.” (emphasis added)). Further, because Dobbins was eighteen years old
when he was arrested and twenty-one at the time of the sentencing hearing, the
sentence cannot be properly viewed even as a de facto life sentence. See State
v. Wood, 662 A.2d 908, 913 (Me. 1995) (suggesting that “a sentence for a term
of years must be viewed objectively in evaluating whether it constitutes a de
facto life sentence”).
[¶56] The second flaw in Dobbins’s assertion is his misapplication of the
legal principles emanating from the case law he cites as authority. Those cases
specifically address mandatory life sentences of juveniles when neither the
sentence nor applicable law allows for the possibility of parole. In Graham v.
Florida, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Eighth
Amendment’s proscription against “cruel and unusual punishments” bars the
imposition of a life sentence without parole on a juvenile offender convicted of
a non-homicide crime because there is a difference “in a moral sense” between
homicide and non-homicide crimes. 560 U.S. 48, 69, 82 (2010). Two years
34
later, in Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court extended Graham to homicide
prosecutions against juveniles and held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the mandatory imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012). In Miller, the Court did not
foreclose life sentences altogether but instead requires a sentencing authority
“to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible
penalty for juveniles” and “to take into account how children are different, and
how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime
in prison.” Id. at 480, 489.14
[¶57] The opinions in Graham and Miller are built on two factors that are
not present here: offenders who are younger than eighteen at the time of the
crime, and the imposition of a life sentence (discretionary in Graham,
mandatory in Miller) without any possibility of parole. Neither circumstance is
present here.
14 Dobbins also relies on a third case, a habeas corpus proceeding, Cruz v. United States,
No. 11-CV-787, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52924, at *70 (D. Conn. March 29, 2018), where the court
extended the Supreme Court’s analysis in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), to set aside a
mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for an offender who was eighteen years old
at the time of his crime. Cruz, however, is inapposite because the sentence was for life, and it was
mandatory. Id. at *5. Moreover, the court in Cruz explicitly stated that its ruling “does not foreclose
a court’s ability to sentence an 18-year-old to life imprisonment without parole, but requires the
sentencer to take into account how adolescents, including late adolescents, ‘are different, and how
those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.’” 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 52924 at *70 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480). Here, when imposing its sentence on Dobbins,
the court explicitly considered those age-related differences.
35
[¶58] The lesson emanating from Miller—which is the case that
addresses the constitutionality of sentences for criminal homicides—is that
statutes creating mandatory sentences of life imprisonment for juveniles are
unconstitutional because those laws foreclose the court from individualizing
the sentence to the juvenile offender. See 567 U.S. 460 at 478, 489. Even to the
extent that Miller may properly be applied here—to an offender who was an
adult at the time he committed the murder—the principle of individualization
was honored because here the court did precisely what Miller requires in
juvenile proceedings: fashioning the sentence to the unique circumstances of
the case as required by 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C (2018). That statute requires a
court to examine the particular circumstances of the crime to establish the basic
sentence, and then, “in order to individualize each sentence and set the
maximum term, the court next considers aggravating and mitigating factors
that will either reduce, enhance, or have no effect on the maximum sentence.”
State v. Parker, 2017 ME 28, ¶ 32, 156 A.3d 118 (emphasis added).
[¶59] During the sentencing hearing, each party made a plenary
presentation to the court focusing on the particular circumstances of the crime,
of Dobbins, and of those affected by the victim’s death. In determining the basic
term of imprisonment pursuant to the first step of its statutory analysis, the
36
court carefully considered the factors particular to this case, including the
planning that led to the murder, the extreme cruelty of the crime, and Dobbins’s
pecuniary motivation to commit the murder. The court then explicitly
recognized the factors germane to Dobbins’s unique circumstances, including
his criminal history, education, intellectual level, substance abuse issues, family
dynamics, and—important to Dobbins’s primary challenge to the sentence—
his age. The court also considered Dobbins’s post-crime conduct, such as his
failure to take responsibility and the untruthful accounts he provided to
investigators. The court’s consideration of Dobbins’s particular circumstances
fully comported with the constitutional requirements established by the
Supreme Court.
[¶60] Further, given the nature of Dobbins’s crime, the sentence imposed
by the court is entirely proportionate, even for someone of his age—it is the
brutal nature of this crime, and not the sentence, that shocks the conscience.
See Me. Const. art. I, § 9; Lopez, 2018 ME 59, ¶ 15, 184 A.3d 880. The sentence
did not violate the federal or Maine constitutions.
III. CONCLUSION
[¶61] Although the court’s exclusion of Geary’s guilty plea constituted an
abuse of discretion, the error was harmless. Moreover, the sentence imposed
37
upon Dobbins was not constitutionally flawed. We therefore affirm the
judgment.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
ALEXANDER, J., concurring.
[¶62] I concur that Reginald J. Dobbins Jr.’s conviction of murder should
be affirmed. However, I do not join the Court’s opinion because, in my view, the
trial court properly excluded the evidence of the docket entry proffered to
demonstrate that Samuel Geary had pleaded guilty to the murder.
[¶63] As the Court acknowledges, the record indicates that in opposing
the State’s motion for joinder a year before the trial, Dobbins asserted that
Geary had made statements indicating that (1) Dobbins was responsible for the
murder and (2) Geary’s theory of the case was too antagonistic to Dobbins for
Dobbins to receive a fair trial if the cases were joined for trial. Court’s Opinion
¶ 4. Specifically, in opposing joinder, Dobbins stated,
At the bind-over hearing, Mr. Geary testified and presented a
defense that Mr. Dobbins was solely responsible for the offense and
forced Mr. Geary to be present at the offense. Mr. Geary presented
a defense that he was too small and weak to have committed the
offense and the older and bigger Mr. Dobbins committed the
38
offense. It is expected Mr. Geary would present the same defense if
these cases were joined for trial . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
[¶64] In its review of the case file before the start of the trial, the trial
court would have been reminded of Dobbins’s statements opposing joinder and
could properly consider those statements in exercising its discretion in ruling
on relevant evidentiary issues at trial.
[¶65] During trial, Dobbins sought to introduce the docket entry
indicating that Geary had pleaded guilty to the murder. Dobbins did not
propose to offer the bind-over hearing transcript or Geary’s plea colloquy with
the trial court, which would have been a more complete statement of Geary’s
acceptance of responsibility for the murder and Geary’s previously expressed
view that—to quote Dobbins’s counsel—Dobbins “was solely responsible” for
the murder.
[¶66] In his opening statement to the jury, Dobbins’s counsel asserted,
“Samuel Geary is guilty of murder. Reggie Dobbins witnessed a murder. And
that’s why Reggie Dobbins is not guilty of murder.” Dobbins’s brief on appeal
asserts that his “theory of defense was that his friend, Sam Geary, murdered
[the victim] while Dobbins stood by in shock.” Dobbins’s theory of defense and
his arguments to the trial court in support of admitting the docket entry
39
suggested that Dobbins planned to use the docket entry evidence of Geary’s
plea to argue that Geary’s conviction exonerated Dobbins, or that Geary was
solely responsible for the murder, or at least that the plea created a reasonable
doubt as to Dobbins’s guilt.
[¶67] With Dobbins’s in-the-record statements opposing the motion for
joinder, the trial court was properly concerned that admission of the docket
entry alone, for the purposes to be asserted by the defense, could mislead the
jury as to the meaning and significance of Geary’s plea. Dobbins could not and
should not have been permitted to assert one view of Geary’s statements
regarding Dobbins’s responsibility for the murder in opposing joinder—that
Dobbins “was solely responsible” for the murder—and a completely opposite
view of Geary’s statements regarding Dobbins’s responsibility for the murder
at trial. If the docket entry reflecting Geary’s plea had been introduced as an
exception to the hearsay rule, some recognition for Geary’s statements
asserting that Dobbins “was solely responsible” for the murder would have
been necessary to counter the misleading suggestion that Dobbins was
seemingly prepared to make to the jury that Geary’s plea indicated Geary’s sole
responsibility for the murder.
40
[¶68] The Court decides that the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing Dobbins’s effort to mislead the jury and should have allowed evidence
of Geary’s plea without evidence of Geary’s actual statements about Dobbins’s
responsibility for the murder. Contrary to the Court’s decision, I would hold
that the trial court acted within its broad discretion pursuant to M.R. Evid. 403
to exclude the docket entry after determining that its probative value—without
additional evidence to provide the proper context—was substantially
outweighed by its potential to mislead the jury. See State v. Filler, 2010 ME 90,
¶ 17, 3 A.3d 365 (reiterating that “[c]ourts are afforded wide discretion to make
Rule 403 determinations”).
[¶69] Geary’s guilty plea, as the Court acknowledges, had little probative
value because it was not necessarily inconsistent with Dobbins’s guilt and there
was plenty of other evidence admitted that established Geary’s involvement in
the murder. Court’s Opinion ¶¶ 31, 46-50. On the other hand, the trial court
correctly concluded that admitting the docket entry indicating Geary’s guilty
plea “in a vacuum” would have invited the jury to speculate whether Geary
pleaded guilty as a principal or an accomplice and allowed Dobbins to distort
the jury’s role as fact-finder by suggesting that Geary’s plea indicated that Geary
accepted sole responsibility for the murder.
41
[¶70] Furthermore, had the court admitted Geary’s plea in evidence, the
State’s ability to provide context by introducing inculpatory statements made
by Geary about Dobbins would have been limited by the Confrontation Clause,
see U.S. Const. amend. VI, which prohibits the admission of statements by a
nontestifying codefendant to implicate a defendant in a crime. See Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1968). Thus, in addition to its potential to
mislead the jury, the admission of Geary’s plea would have been unfairly
prejudicial to the State; this lends further support to the trial court’s decision
to exclude the plea pursuant to Rule 403.
[¶71] Because the trial court properly weighed and considered these
factors in accordance with Rule 403, it did not exceed the bounds of its
discretion, see State v. Lipham, 2006 ME 137, ¶ 9, 910 A.2d 388, when it rejected
Dobbins’s efforts to mislead the jury by introducing Geary’s guilty plea without
the context necessary for the jury to consider accurately its meaning and
significance.
42
Tina Heather Nadeau, Esq. (orally), The Law Office of Tina Heather Nadeau,
PLLC, Portland, and Rory A. McNamara, Esq., Drake Law, LLC, Berwick, for
appellant Reginald J. Dobbins Jr.
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and John Alsop, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Aroostook County Superior Court docket number CR-2015-35
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY