In re Carlos C. ( 2016 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2016 ME 179Docket: Yor-16-251
Submitted
On Briefs: November 29, 2016
Decided: December 13, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE CARLOS C.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] The father of Carlos C. appeals from a judgment of the District
Court (Biddeford, Foster, J.) terminating his parental rights to the child.
See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2015). The father argues that the evidence is
insufficient to support the court’s determinations that he is parentally unfit
within the meaning of the child protection statutes and that termination is in
the child’s best interest. We affirm.1
[¶2] First, there is competent evidence in the record to support the
court’s findings, to the clear and convincing standard of proof, that the father
is “unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and these
circumstances are unlikely to change within a time which is reasonably
1 At our request, the guardian ad litem provided us with copies of two reports that were missing
from the record on appeal. The parties agree that these are accurate copies of the reports that were
filed with the trial court during the termination proceedings. We now consider the record on
appeal to be complete.
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calculated to meet the child’s needs,” that he is “unwilling or unable to take
responsibility for the child within a time which is reasonably calculated to
meet the child’s needs,” and that he “failed to make a good faith effort to
rehabilitate and reunify with the child.” 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b);
see In re Cameron Z., 2016 ME 162, ¶¶ 16-18, --- A.3d ---.
[¶3] These findings of parental unfitness are supported by evidence
cited in the court’s judgment, including evidence of the father’s ongoing
substance abuse, his participation in reunification services that was “less than
consistent,” and his “very superficial” insight into the child’s significant special
needs. As the court found, for example, while this child protection case was
pending, the father remained out of touch with the Department of Health and
Human Services caseworker for significant periods of time despite multiple
attempts the caseworker made to reach him using contact information he
provided; he twice failed to attend intake sessions for a domestic violence
program before finally beginning to participate in it; two months before the
termination hearing, he refused to take a drug test; he quit two substance
abuse programs before entering into a different program several months
before the termination hearing; despite his counselor’s recommendation, he
has refused to participate in group addiction programs; he has continually
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relapsed, including using unprescribed Suboxone as recently as the week
before the termination hearing and then invoking his Fifth Amendment
privilege at trial when asked about the circumstances of that and other illegal
drug-related activity; and although he is in the “early stages” of recovery, he
still has not “really accepted that his substance abuse constitutes a significant
barrier to reunification.” This evidence, combined with the record as a whole,
supports the court’s ultimate finding of parental unfitness.
[¶4] Second, given the evidence in the record, the court did not abuse
its discretion by determining that termination is in the child’s best interest.
See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a); In re J.V., 2015 ME 163, ¶ 13, 129 A.3d 958;
In re C.P., 2013 ME 57, ¶ 16, 67 A.3d 558.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs:
Brian D. Burke, Esq., Fairfield & Associates, P.A., Lyman, for
appellant father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for
appellee Department of Health and Human Services
Biddeford District Court docket number PC-2014-65
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY