State of Maine v. Dennis J. Dechaine ( 2015 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2015 ME 88Docket: Kno-14-187
Argued: May 14, 2015
Decided: July 21, 2015
Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, and CLIFFORD, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
DENNIS J. DECHAINE
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Dennis J. Dechaine appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court
(Knox County, Bradford, J.) denying his motion for a new trial, which was brought
pursuant to the post-conviction DNA analysis statute, 15 M.R.S. §§ 2136-2138
(2014). Dechaine contends that the court erred or abused its discretion in
(1) finding that the new DNA evidence admitted at the hearing, “when considered
with all the other evidence in the case, old and new,” did not make it probable that
a different verdict would result from a new trial, id. § 2138(10)(C)(1); (2) limiting
the evidence that could be presented at the hearing to evidence concerning the new
DNA testing and analysis; and (3) denying his motion to recuse. We affirm the
judgment.
2
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] In 1989, Dechaine was convicted of the kidnapping, sexual assault, and
murder of twelve-year-old Sarah Cherry. State v. Dechaine, 572 A.2d 130, 131-32
(Me. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 857 (1990). We have addressed the case three
times before today: id. (direct appeal); State v. Dechaine, 630 A.2d 234 (Me. 1993)
(affirming the trial court’s denial of Dechaine’s motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence); and State v. Dechaine, 644 A.2d 458 (Me. 1994)
(affirming the trial court’s order requiring Dechaine to return certain trial exhibits).
In two of those decisions we summarized portions of the evidence heard by the
jury at Dechaine’s trial, concluding that “[b]ased on all the evidence, the jury’s
conclusion that Dechaine was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all charges
submitted to it was rational.” Dechaine, 572 A.2d at 131-32 & n.3; see Dechaine,
630 A.2d at 236-37.
[¶3] In 2000, the United States District Court for the District of Maine
(Carter, J.) denied Dechaine’s petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus,
affirming the recommended decision of United States Magistrate Judge
David M. Cohen. Dechaine v. Warden, 2000 WL 33775285(D. Me. Nov. 21, 2000), aff’g Dechaine v. Warden, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12289,
2000 WL 1183165 (D. Me. July 28, 2000). Because the Superior Court’s
judgment in the case at bar rested in part on its finding that “as several other courts
3
have found, the evidence of Dechaine’s guilt is substantial,” we think it useful,
before discussing the facts specific to Dechaine’s current motion for a new trial, to
begin with Magistrate Judge Cohen’s extensive review of that evidence insofar as
it is relevant to this appeal.1
A. Pre-Trial Motion To Obtain DNA Evidence
On January 26, 1989[,] Dechaine, through counsel Thomas
J. Connolly, filed a motion for a continuance and permission to
conduct DNA testing, then “a radical and new technique,” on
fingernail clippings taken from Cherry’s body. The court promptly
scheduled a hearing at which Judith Brinkman, a forensic chemist
with the Maine State Police Crime Lab, testified and explained the
forensic significance of DNA testing. Brinkman testified that in
contrast to traditional serological testing methods, DNA “should be
like a fingerprint, much more discriminating from one person
compared to another except for in identical twins because identical
twins have the exact same DNA.” There were three methods of DNA
testing; the method that Connolly proposed to use was known as
“polymerase chain reaction,” or “PCR,” then conducted only by one
laboratory in California (which had a three- to four-month backlog)
and in the “research stages” at the FBI laboratory.
Brinkman testified that she had been provided with ten
fingernail clippings obtained during Cherry’s autopsy and had used up
eight of them (all but the thumbnails) to perform blood-typing tests.
The blood adhering to the nails was found to be human blood
containing A and H antigens, consistent with type A blood but also
possibly resulting from a mixture of bloods of type A and/or type O.
The blood on the nails could not have been contributed by someone
with type AB or B blood; however, that ruled out a relatively small
percentage of the population inasmuch as persons with type A blood
1
Magistrate Judge Cohen’s recommended decision includes complete record citations for each of the
facts he recited, which, because they are readily obtainable, we have omitted for the ease of the reader.
4
comprised forty-one percent of the population and persons with type
O forty-five percent.
Brinkman had tested the whole blood of both Dechaine and
Cherry, determining that of Dechaine to be type O and that of Cherry
to be type A. She theorized that the blood on the nails was solely that
of Cherry, noting that Cherry’s hands were found bound and
positioned near her neck, which had been bleeding. She further
explained, “There was nothing that led me to believe that there was a
mixture [of bloods]. If someone had scratched someone hard enough
to make them bleed and cause crust underneath the fingernails, you
would expect to find tissue, some type of skin material or something
indicating that there you know, that there had been scratching or you
would expect to find some type of trauma to the nail such as broken
nails or something like that and there didn’t they didn’t appear to be
that way.”
Brinkman reported that she had spoken with Jennifer
Mehavolin of the California testing laboratory, who had advised that
based on the small amount of blood available on the thumbnail
clippings, it did not “sound like the possibility of getting good
results.” In Brinkman’s opinion, high heat and humidity at the time of
the murder also could have degraded the DNA. At the conclusion of
the hearing the motion to continue for purposes of performing DNA
testing was denied.
B. Trial
Venue in the case was changed to Knox County, Maine, where
Dechaine was tried from March 6-18, 1989[,] with Superior Court
Justice Carl O. Bradford presiding.
Testimony at trial revealed that John and Jennifer Henkel of
Lewis Hill Road, Bowdoin, hired Cherry, a twelve-year-old girl who
had just finished sixth grade, to babysit their ten-month-old infant on
Wednesday, July 6, 1988. Cherry’s mother, Debra Cherry Crossman,
reminded her daughter the previous evening (as she always told her
children when leaving) not to let anyone into the house or to inform
any caller that she was alone. Only Cherry’s mother, stepfather,
5
Christopher Crossman, sister Hillary, great-grandmother and friend
Julie Wagg knew she was babysitting that day. At noon Jennifer
Henkel called home and spoke with Cherry, who said that she was
feeding the baby and about to fix herself some lunch.
Holly Johnson, a neighbor across the street from the Henkels,
testified that at approximately 1 p.m. she heard a vehicle slowing
down at the Henkels’ driveway and heard the Henkel dogs barking.
About fifteen minutes later she saw a red Toyota truck heading
northbound. She could not be sure that the two vehicles were the
same or that the truck was in fact a Toyota.
Jennifer Henkel arrived home at about 3:20 p.m. She
immediately noticed some papers[,] a little looseleaf notebook and a
car-repair bill in the driveway and picked them up. She found both
the garage-level and upper-level doors to the house, which she had left
unlocked but closed, slightly ajar. Upon entering she saw the
television set turned on, Cherry’s eyeglasses folded neatly in a
rocking chair and her blue-jean jacket, sneakers and socks in a little
neat pile next to a couch. Nothing seemed disturbed, misplaced or
damaged. The baby was asleep in her crib, but Cherry was nowhere
to be found. After a half-hour of fruitless searching an increasingly
frantic Jennifer Henkel called police. Following his arrival home
from work at between 3:30 p.m. and 3:45 p.m. John Henkel noticed
what he thought was an unusual tire impression in the driveway and
set some rocks around it to preserve it.
Sometime between 4:20 p.m. and 4:49 p.m. Leo Scopino and
Daniel Reed, deputy sheriffs with the Sagadahoc County Sheriff’s
Department, responded to Henkel’s call. Jennifer Henkel showed
them the car-repair bill and notebook she had found in the driveway.
The car-repair bill had the name “Dennis Dechaine” on top of it and
described damage to a 1981 Toyota pickup truck. Neither the Henkels
nor Cherry’s mother ever had heard of Dechaine.
Scopino and Reed found a phone-book listing for a Dennis
Dechaine on Old Post Road in Bowdoinham and drove to the
residence, arriving sometime after 5 p.m. Dechaine was not there, but
the officers spoke to his wife. As the evening wore on, additional
6
police officers became involved in a search for Cherry, Dechaine or
Dechaine’s vehicle. A command post was set up at the corner of
Lewis Hill and Dead River roads.
Arthur Spaulding, whose house is set back in the woods about
five or six hundred feet off of Dead River Road, testified that
sometime that evening between 8 and 8:30, after he had started his
generator, he saw a man in a blue polo shirt who appeared to be in his
twenties walk past his window in the direction of Dead River Road.
At about 8:45 p.m. Helen Small Buttrick of Dead River Road,
who was driving home with her husband Harry, spotted a man
walking across the lawn of her mother’s home, which was about seven
hundred feet from the Buttricks’ residence. The Buttricks stopped and
asked the man, who turned out to be Dechaine, what he wanted.
Dechaine told the Buttricks he had been fishing and could not find his
truck. Harry Buttrick offered to help Dechaine find it following a
brief stop at the Buttrick home. Helen Buttrick, who noticed nothing
unusual about Dechaine’s behavior, asked him where he lived.
Dechaine responded that he lived in Yarmouth, was visiting in
Bowdoinham “and sort of on the side he said I should have stayed
there.” He also said that he had been in the woods for two hours and
had followed the sound of a generator and come out. Dechaine left
with Harry Buttrick to look for his truck.
At about 9 p.m. Mark Westrum, a detective with the Sagadahoc
County Sheriff’s Department, and Deputy John Ackley reported to the
command post at the intersection of Lewis Hill and Dead River roads.
Within thirteen minutes Ackley received a call from Helen Small
Buttrick advising that her husband was driving with a man who stated
that he had lost his pickup truck. Ackley and Westrum set off to find
the Buttrick vehicle, which they quickly located. Buttrick suggested
that the police might be able to help Dechaine find his vehicle, and
Dechaine got into the back seat of the police cruiser.
Ackley and Westrum drove Dechaine to the command post,
where Ackley exited the vehicle and Reed got in. Reed gave
Dechaine a Miranda warning and explained that the police were
investigating the disappearance of a twelve-year-old girl. Dechaine
7
stated that he had been fishing and lost his truck. According to Reed,
Dechaine initially denied that the papers found in the Henkel
driveway were his. He then acknowledged that they were his and
stated that he kept them in the passenger seat of his truck. Dechaine
and Reed engaged in a heated exchange over how the papers could
have gotten into the Henkel driveway, after which Dechaine told
Reed, “whoever grabbed the girl saw these, placed them up at the
head of the driveway to set me up.”
Following the questioning Westrum [patted] Dechaine down.
He noticed a handprint, fingers pointing downward, on the back of
Dechaine’s shirt. Scopino also searched Dechaine. He found no
weapons but observed a one-to-two-and-a-half inch scratch and
circular bruise on Dechaine’s inner left arm and a circular scratch on
Dechaine’s right knuckle, which appeared to be fresh. Scopino
observed that Dechaine was trembling and his eyes were extremely
large. He saw no blood on Dechaine’s clothes.
Dechaine was moved to a different cruiser, in the process of
which Westrum discovered Dechaine’s keys placed underneath the
seat behind which Dechaine had been seated. Dechaine then was
taken on a search for his truck, which was located at approximately
12:05 a.m. on July 7th. The truck, a red Toyota pickup with damage
to the right-hand fender, was locked. Dechaine consented to its
removal and search.
At approximately 2:40 a.m. Dechaine was again questioned,
this time by Maine State Police Detective Alfred Hendsbee.
Hendsbee asked Dechaine point-blank if [he] had taken Cherry, to
which Dechaine responded that he did not do it and never would do
such a thing. Hendsbee examined Dechaine and noticed, in addition
to a bruise on his arm and a muddy handprint on the back of his shirt,
faint scratch marks in his kidney area on the right-hand side that had
not drawn blood. Dechaine’s pants appeared damp. Dechaine stated
that he had made the handprint swatting flies and got the scratches
walking through the woods. After being photographed at
Bowdoinham Town Hall Dechaine was driven home at approximately
4 a.m.
8
In the early-morning hours of July 7th Maine State Police
Trooper Thomas Bureau performed a search with a dog in the vicinity
of Dechaine’s truck. The dog picked up a track from the driver’s door
that headed in a northeasterly direction for approximately one hundred
and fifty feet to the edge of a bog, made a loop and came back to the
driver’s door. Bureau casted the dog around the truck, and when he
got to the passenger side he picked up a track that looped back in a
westerly direction toward the Hallowell/Litchfield Road, crossed that
road and continued in a westerly direction to a stream, crossed the
stream and began to head in a southerly direction, at which point the
dog stopped tracking. Bureau could not tell whether the tracks picked
up from the driver and passenger side were the tracks of the same
person. The truck was secured and taken to the Maine State Police
crime lab in Augusta.
On July 7th Dechaine and his wife, Nancy Emmons, consulted
with attorney George Carlton. Emmons testified that on that day,
when a photograph of Cherry was shown on the television news,
Dechaine exclaimed, “my God, I’ve never seen that girl before.” He
also remarked that he had never kidnapped anyone.
A search team discovered Cherry’s body concealed under a pile
of brush at about noon on July 8th. The body was found in a wooded
area off of Hallowell Road approximately four hundred feet from the
spot on the opposite side of the road where Dechaine’s truck had been
located. The distance from the Henkel residence on Lewis Hill Road
north to the intersection of Dead River Road was about 1.9 miles; the
distance from that intersection west on Dead River Road to Hallowell
Road was about one mile; and the Dechaine truck was found about
three-tenths of a mile north of that intersection off of Hallowell Road.
The Spaulding residence was four-tenths of a mile west of the
intersection of Dead River and Hallowell roads.
Dr. Ronald Roy, chief medical examiner for the State of Maine,
supervised removal of the body and conducted an autopsy upon it.
Cherry was found bound and gagged . . . . She had been grazed and
stabbed repeatedly in the head, neck and chest by a sharp instrument
(in Dr. Roy’s opinion a small knife, like a penknife) and strangled
with a scarf. She had died on July 6th, the precise time unknown.
9
Cherry’s bound hands were positioned in front of her chest, just below
her neck, and there was blood under her fingernails. Dr. Roy stated
that he would not expect the blood to be that of her assailant inasmuch
as even if she had scratched her assailant, “when you scratch
somebody you don’t come away with bloody fingernails.” In
Dr. Roy’s opinion, the stab wounds were small enough that he would
not have been surprised if no blood transferred to the assailant.
Following discovery of the body, at approximately 2 p.m. on
July 8th Hendsbee drove to the Dechaine residence and found
Dechaine and Emmons sitting on their porch. According to
Hendsbee, Dechaine immediately approached the vehicle and stated,
“I can’t believe I could do such a thing. The real me is not like that.
I know me. I couldn’t do anything like that. It must be somebody
else inside of me.” Dechaine cooperated in the execution of a search
warrant, saying, “do what you’ve got to do.” Hendsbee testified that
during the search Dechaine also said that he could not believe he
killed this girl when he could not even kill his own chickens.
Hendsbee asked Emmons whether Dechaine carried a knife. Emmons
responded that he had a penknife on his key ring. Hendsbee then
informed her that the knife was not on Dechaine’s key chain. She was
surprised.
Dechaine was arrested that afternoon and charged with the
murder of Cherry. Westrum, who helped book Dechaine that day,
testified that Dechaine became emotional, crying and sobbing and
saying, “Oh my God; it should have never happened. . . . Why did I do
this?” According to Westrum, Dechaine’s comments at that time
included the following: “I didn’t think it actually happened until I saw
her face on the news; then it all came back to me. I remembered it. . . .
Why did I kill her? . . . What punishment could they ever give me that
would equal what I’ve done.” Dechaine was transferred that evening
to Lincoln County Jail. Darryl Robert Maxcy, a Lincoln County
corrections officer, testified that Dechaine said, “You people need to
know I’m the one who murdered that girl, and you may want to put
me in isolation.” A second corrections officer who was also present,
Brenda Dermody, recalled Dechaine having made a nearly identical
statement.
10
Following removal of the body Bureau returned to the vicinity
to confirm his suspicion that his dog had refused to continue tracking
in the early-morning hours of July 7th because he had never scented a
dead body and did not like the smell. The dog hesitated to go near the
spot where the body had lain. Bureau estimated that during the earlier
search the dog had stopped tracking approximately seventy-five to
one hundred feet away from the body.
On July 8th the dog also discovered a piece of yellow rope on
the ground two hundred and fifty eight feet from the location in which
Dechaine’s truck had been found and one hundred and forty five feet
from the location of the body. Later testing revealed that the piece of
rope used to bind Cherry’s wrists, a piece of rope recovered from
inside Dechaine’s truck and the piece of rope found in the woods all
had the same basic characteristics. The piece of rope found in the
woods and that from Dechaine’s truck matched exactly; they “were
once one rope.” The rope binding Cherry’s wrists was too damaged
to permit a conclusion whether there was an exact match with the rope
found in the woods.
Four latent fingerprints were found on the surfaces of
Dechaine’s truck. One could not be identified; the other three
matched those of Dechaine. No fingerprint of Cherry’s was found on
the numerous items inside the truck, nor any hair that matched hers.
Nor was any blood found, except blood on a napkin that appeared to
be old.
Dusting of the two doors and doorframes leading to the Henkel
residence yielded two latent fingerprints, neither of which matched
those of Dechaine or Cherry. The notebook and autobody-receipt
were not tested for latent fingerprints in part because so many people
had handled them. Scopino in addition had written in the notebook
upon first responding to Jennifer Henkel’s call[,] an admitted mistake.
The tire imprint detected by John Henkel was found to have a design
consistent with the tread design of the left front tire of Dechaine’s
truck. No conclusive determination was possible because of the
faintness of the cast of the tire that the Maine Crime Lab had prepared
and the relatively poor quality of the impression in the driveway.
11
No blood or unidentified hairs or fibers were found on the
clothes Dechaine had been wearing on July 6th; however, they
happened to have been laundered by the time police seized them. No
blood, hairs or fibers matching any from Cherry’s body (other than
blue cotton of negligible probative value) were found under his
fingernails. A pink synthetic fiber discovered on a tree near the body
did not match fibers found on either Dechaine or Cherry.
Dechaine took the stand in his own defense at trial, denying that
he had abducted, tied up, buried or killed Cherry. He also denied
having confessed. Dechaine, who was thirty-one years old at the time
of trial, testified that on the afternoon of July 6th he went to a wildlife
refuge on Merry Meeting Bay where he injected a drug that he had
purchased in a museum bathroom in Boston from a person who told
him it was speed. He then took a route that led him to Hallowell
Road, noticed a woods road and pulled into it. He wandered into the
woods off the side of the road and injected more of the drug. Feeling
“more lucid” and “more energetic,” he wandered for some period of
time in the Hallowell Road area, stopping frequently and finishing the
remainder of the drug. At one point he was unable to find his truck,
which may or may not ultimately have been found where he last left
it. He did not believe that he had left it locked.
[Dechaine testified that] [a]t about dusk he followed the sound
of a generator and came out to a dirt road. He lied to the Buttricks
about where he was from and his activities that afternoon for fear that
they would notice he was under the influence of drugs. He told the
same lie (that he had been out fishing) to police for the same reason.
He recalled having immediately acknowledged ownership of the
auto-body receipt and notebook when presented with those items by
Reed. He hid his keys from the police when he discovered them after
mistakenly informing the police that he had left them in his truck.
He wanted to avoid further confrontation, particularly with Reed. He
was not carrying a penknife on his key ring in July 1988. Asked
whether there was any period of which he had no memory, Dechaine
replied, “I can safely say there are periods of time where my memory
is probably not as sharp as it could have been, but I think that’s
because I was doing nothing of any significance to have to cause me
to have reference points.”
12
Dechaine had a reputation for peacefulness and non-violence.
He was upset by violence and the sight of blood.
....
After approximately nine hours of deliberation the jury returned
a verdict of guilty as to all counts.
....
E. Custody of Clippings
Prior to the filing of Dechaine’s motion for a new trial Connolly
sought to remove certain of the defense exhibits in the Dechaine case.
At a hearing held February 4, 1991[,] Connolly and prosecutor [Eric]
Wright represented to the court that they had agreed that the exhibits
in issue, which included some obtained by the state but offered by the
defense, should be maintained in the custody of the court. The court
thereafter issued an order “that the clerk of court shall not permit the
removal of any exhibit in this case without further Order of the court”
and that “insofar as any person wishes to examine any exhibit, such
examination is to be done within the clerk’s office and under the
supervision of the clerk.”
By form letter dated April 17, 1992[,] an assistant clerk of the
court informed counsel for both Dechaine and the state that the
exhibits would be disposed of in two weeks unless removed by
counsel. By letter dated April 22, 1992[,] Connolly asked that the
clerk not dispose of any evidence, offered to arrange for pickup if
necessary and called the clerk’s attention to the existence of the
previous order in the matter. The court signed a form order dated
April 30, 1992[,] authorizing the clerk to dispose of any exhibits not
removed by counsel of record within thirty days. On May 5, 1992[,]
Connolly removed defense exhibits 1-26, 26A and 27-46 from the
clerk’s office. By letter dated June 8, 1993[,] Connolly transmitted
fingernail clippings that he stated were those of Cherry to a laboratory
in Boston for DNA testing.
13
On December 13, 1993[,] the state filed a motion for return of
property taken by Connolly, including the thumbnail clippings
(exhibits 26 and 26A). A hearing was held at which
Fernand LaRochelle, supervisor of the criminal division of the
Attorney General’s Office, testified that he became aware for the first
time on December 9, 1993[,] that Connolly possessed the fingernail
clippings. LaRochelle contacted Connolly, who declined to return the
clippings, stating “that they were in a safe place and that if we
executed a search warrant of his office that we would not find them
because they were not there.” At the conclusion of proceedings the
court ordered the property at issue turned over to the state crime
laboratory forthwith, with a proviso that the fingernail clippings could
be destroyed only upon express written order of the court. Connolly
that day returned certain exhibits, including the fingernail clippings.
The order compelling return of the exhibits was upheld on appeal.
On May 24, 1994[,] CBR Laboratories, Inc. reported the results
of tests on fingernail clippings that it had received from Connolly on
June 10, 1993[,] and on blood labeled as that of Dechaine that it had
received on April 22, 1994. The laboratory found that there were two
or more donors to the DNA extracted from one of the fingernails and
excluded Dechaine as a donor.
F. State Post-Conviction Review Proceeding
Dechaine on September 29, 1995[,] filed a pro se state petition
for post-conviction review. He alleged one ground of actual
innocence and three grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . .
The state on April 4, 1996[,] moved to depose Dechaine’s
co-counsel George Carlton, noting inter alia that (i) the State Petition
had been languishing inasmuch as Dechaine had failed to respond to
the court’s inquiries concerning whether he had retained or required
appointment of counsel, (ii) Carlton, whom the state represented was
not present at trial when Dechaine testified, possessed knowledge
disproving Dechaine’s claim of innocence, (iii) although Dechaine
had known the results of the CBR Laboratories DNA testing since
May 1994, he had waited to file the State Petition until
14
September 15, 1995, two weeks after Carlton suffered a stroke, and
(iv) Carlton was still capable of providing reliable information.
....
The state on June 12, 1996[,] moved to dismiss the State
Petition pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 2128(5), which had been amended
effective September 29, 1995 (the day of Dechaine’s filing) to
provide:
A petition may be dismissed if it appears that by delay in
its filing the State has been prejudiced in its ability to
respond to the petition or to retry the petitioner, unless
the petitioner shows that it is based on grounds of which
the petitioner could not have had knowledge by the
exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances
prejudicial to the State occurred. If the delay is more
than 5 years following the final disposition of any direct
appeal to the Maine Law Court . . . prejudice is
presumed, although this presumption is rebuttable by the
petitioner.
....
In support of its Motion To Dismiss, the state on
December 19, 1996[,] filed five affidavits, three of which addressed
Carlton’s purported knowledge of Dechaine’s guilt. These included
an affidavit of LaRochelle averring inter alia that on the morning of
July 8, 1988[,] he called Carlton and “told him that I had just two
questions for him and he could answer or not. I asked
Attorney Carlton if Sarah was still alive, and, if so, were we searching
in the right area. Attorney Carlton replied that Sarah was not alive
and added something to the effect that we were looking in the right
area.”
....
By decision filed February 10, 1999[,] the court granted the
Motion To Dismiss, holding that not only had Dechaine failed to rebut
15
the statutory presumption of prejudice pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A.
§ 2128(5) but that the state also had demonstrated actual prejudice.
The court noted that following the state’s “extensive but ultimately
unsuccessful efforts to depose Carlton, which were continually
opposed by the Petitioner[,]” Carlton had died on June 21, 1998. . . .
The court [also] concluded, “The dismissal of the Dechaine PCR
petition on procedural grounds will not result in a manifest injustice
because the Petitioner cannot show that no reasonable juror would
convict him even if he could get DNA test results of the victim’s
fingernail nail [sic] clippings into evidence.”
....
II. Discussion
....
The voluminous record in this case raises troubling questions.
How could the professedly non-violent Dechaine have randomly
abducted a twelve-year-old child and committed this atrocious crime?
Dechaine denied under oath that he did it. No fingerprints, hairs or
fibers matching those of Dechaine were found on or near the victim or
at the Henkel home. Conversely, no fingerprints, hairs or fibers
matching those of Cherry were found on Dechaine or in or on
Dechaine’s truck. Debris, including a pink synthetic fiber, was found
near the crime scene that had no apparent connection to Dechaine or
Cherry. The Maine State Police tracking dog did not pick up a track
from one side of Dechaine’s truck to the other[,] evidence that the
state conceded was “a little ambiguous.” Cherry had been warned not
to let a stranger into the house, and there was no evidence of a
struggle there. Dechaine’s purported confessions contained no details
of the crime. Dechaine was cooperative with police officers, allowing
his person and his truck to be searched (although he admitted both that
he hid his keys and at various points lied).
Nonetheless, the evidence of Dechaine’s guilt remains
substantial. Dechaine’s papers were found in the Henkel driveway; a
neighbor thought she saw a red Toyota pickup truck heading north (in
the direction in which the body later was found) shortly after the last
16
known contact with Cherry; Dechaine’s truck was found near the
body; Dechaine himself emerged from the woods in the general
vicinity of the body; a rope from Dechaine’s truck was found in
between the truck and the body; the rope used to bind Cherry’s hands
was consistent with that in Dechaine’s truck and that found in the
woods; the dog evidence indicated that someone headed from the
passenger side of Dechaine’s truck toward the spot where the body
was found; Nancy Emmons was surprised that the penknife was not
on her husband’s key ring; and four police or corrections officers
testified that Dechaine made incriminating statements on three
separate occasions within the space of several hours on July 8, 1988[,]
the pivotal day on which the body was found and Dechaine was
placed under arrest. Finally, three attorneys aver that Carlton
indicated to them that Dechaine was guilty; most chillingly, that
Carlton conveyed to LaRochelle of the Attorney General’s Office on
the morning of July 8, 1988[,] before Cherry’s body was found that
Cherry was no longer alive and that searchers were looking in the
right place.
....
Against this backdrop, Dechaine now offers the May 1994
DNA evidence that two people contributed DNA to the Cherry
thumbnail clippings, neither of which was him. This evidence,
standing alone, simply does not suffice to place this now
twelve-year-old case “within the narrow class of cases . . . implicating
a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”
As an initial matter, as the state points out, the manner in which
the nail clippings were handled raises concerns about chain of custody
and possible contamination. Even assuming arguendo that there were
no such problem, the presence of a DNA profile inconsistent with
those of either Cherry or Dechaine does not in itself undermine the
weight of the evidence against Dechaine. There is no evidence that
the mystery DNA necessarily or even likely transferred to the nail
clippings during commission of the crime. Indeed, the only evidence
of record touching on the subject remains that of Brinkman and Roy
to the effect that the blood of the assailant would not have been
expected to be found on Cherry’s nails.
17
Even with the benefit of the DNA evidence and the excluded
Senecal[2] evidence, a reasonable juror could have found Dechaine
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Dechaine, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12289 at *3-24, *27, *37-48, *60-64 (citations
omitted).
[¶4] The instant case began in 2003 when Dechaine filed a motion for a new
trial pursuant to Maine’s original DNA analysis statute. See 15 M.R.S.
§§ 2136-2138 (2005). Following DNA testing, the court limited the scope of the
evidence that Dechaine would be allowed to present at a hearing on the motion to
any new DNA evidence, excluding proffered evidence related to Dechaine’s
admissions and the time of the victim’s death. On the day that the hearing was to
take place, Dechaine withdrew his motion on the ground that he could not meet his
burden under the then-existing statute.
[¶5] The Legislature made substantial changes to the statute in 2006.
P.L. 2005, ch. 659, §§ 1-6 (effective Sept. 1, 2006) (codified at 15 M.R.S.
§§ 2136-2138 (2014)). In 2008 Dechaine again moved for a new trial, this time
2
Dechaine had identified Douglas Senecal as an alternative suspect.
18
pursuant to the amended statute.3 The court ordered additional DNA testing and
analysis on several items pursuant to an agreement reached by the parties.
3
In its present form the statute provides, in part:
§ 2138. Motion; process
1. Filing motion. A person authorized in section 2137 who chooses to move for
DNA analysis shall file the motion in the underlying criminal proceeding. The motion
must be assigned to the trial judge or justice who imposed the sentence unless that judge
or justice is unavailable, in which case the appropriate chief judge or chief justice shall
assign the motion to another judge or justice. Filing and service must be made in
accordance with Rule 49 of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure.
....
4-A. Standard for ordering DNA analysis. The court shall order DNA analysis if a
person authorized under section 2137 presents prima facie evidence that:
A. A sample of the evidence is available for DNA analysis;
B. The evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to
establish that the evidence has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced or
altered in a material way;
C. The evidence was not previously subjected to DNA analysis or, if previously
analyzed, will be subject to DNA analysis technology that was not available when
the person was convicted;
D. The identity of the person as the perpetrator of the crime that resulted in the
conviction was at issue during the person's trial; and
E. The evidence sought to be analyzed, or the additional information that the new
technology is capable of providing regarding evidence sought to be reanalyzed, is
material to the issue of whether the person is the perpetrator of, or accomplice to,
the crime that resulted in the conviction.
....
8. Results. The crime lab shall provide the results of the DNA analysis under this
chapter to the court, the person authorized in section 2137 and the attorney for the State.
Upon motion by the person or the attorney for the State, the court may order that copies
of the analysis protocols, laboratory procedures, laboratory notes and other relevant
records compiled by the crime lab be provided to the court and to all parties.
19
A. If the results of the DNA analysis are inconclusive or show that the person is
the source of the evidence, the court shall deny any motion for a new trial. If the
DNA analysis results show that the person is the source of the evidence, the
defendant's DNA record must be added to the state DNA data base and state DNA
data bank.
B. If the results of the DNA analysis show that the person is not the source of the
evidence and the person does not have counsel, the court shall appoint counsel if
the court finds that the person is indigent. The court shall then hold a hearing
pursuant to subsection 10.
....
10. Standard for granting new trial; court's findings; new trial granted or
denied. If the results of the DNA testing under this section show that the person is not
the source of the evidence, the person authorized in section 2137 must show by clear and
convincing evidence that:
A. Only the perpetrator of the crime or crimes for which the person was convicted
could be the source of the evidence, and that the DNA test results, when
considered with all the other evidence in the case, old and new, admitted in the
hearing conducted under this section on behalf of the person show that the person
is actually innocent. If the court finds that the person authorized in section 2137
has met the evidentiary burden of this paragraph, the court shall grant a new trial;
B. Only the perpetrator of the crime or crimes for which the person was convicted
could be the source of the evidence, and that the DNA test results, when
considered with all the other evidence in the case, old and new, admitted in the
hearing conducted under this section on behalf of the person would make it
probable that a different verdict would result upon a new trial; or
C. All of the prerequisites for obtaining a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence are met as follows:
(1) The DNA test results, when considered with all the other evidence in the
case, old and new, admitted in the hearing conducted under this section on
behalf of the person would make it probable that a different verdict would
result upon a new trial;
(2) The proffered DNA test results have been discovered by the person since
the trial;
(3) The proffered DNA test results could not have been obtained by the person
prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence;
(4) The DNA test results and other evidence admitted at the hearing conducted
under this section on behalf of the person are material to the issue as to who is
responsible for the crime for which the person was convicted; and
20
[¶6] Two years later, Dechaine moved to allow evidence at the pending
hearing concerning (1) the time of the victim’s death, (2) “any alternative suspect,”
(3) “any so-called confession or admissions,” and (4) “[a]ll other evidence which is
exculpatory.” As authority for his request, Dechaine relied upon the amended
statute and the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions.
The State objected, contending that the court was already required by statute to
consider “all the other evidence in the case, old and new,” and that the statutory
definition of that phrase, which included the evidence admitted at trial and prior
proceedings, limited the admissible evidence to evidence concerning the new DNA
testing and analysis. See 15 M.R.S. § 2138(10). Construing and quoting
section 2138(10), the court found that “[i]t is . . . clear that ‘new’ evidence may be
admitted only if it is ‘relevant to the DNA testing and analysis conducted on the
(5) The DNA test results and other evidence admitted at the hearing conducted
under this section on behalf of the person are not merely cumulative or
impeaching, unless it is clear that such impeachment would have resulted in a
different verdict.
The court shall state its findings of fact on the record or make written findings of fact
supporting its decision to grant or deny the person authorized in section 2137 a new trial
under this section. If the court finds that the person authorized in section 2137 has met
the evidentiary burden of paragraph A, the court shall grant a new trial.
For purposes of this subsection, “all the other evidence in the case, old and new,” means
the evidence admitted at trial; evidence admitted in any hearing on a motion for new trial
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure; evidence admitted at any
collateral proceeding, state or federal; evidence admitted at the hearing conducted under
this section relevant to the DNA testing and analysis conducted on the sample; and
evidence relevant to the identity of the source of the DNA sample.
15 M.R.S. § 2138 (2014).
21
sample’ or ‘relevant to the identity of the source of the DNA sample.’” The court
granted Dechaine’s motion “to the extent that the DNA evidence and analysis
actually implicates [an] alternative suspect,” and otherwise denied the motion.
[¶7] In July 2011, Dechaine filed a motion asking the court to recuse and
a motion to present a claim of actual innocence. The State objected, arguing that
(1) the statute did not contemplate relitigating trial issues apart from issues
generated by the new DNA analysis; and (2) if a “freestanding” claim of actual
innocence is cognizable in Maine, it must be resolved in the statutory
post-conviction review process. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 2121-2132 (2014). The court
ruled that “[t]o establish actual innocence under [15 M.R.S.]
[s]ection 2138(10)(A), the defendant may introduce ‘all the other evidence in the
case, old and new.’” It denied the motion insofar as it sought to present a claim of
actual innocence independent of the statute.
[¶8] The motion for new trial went to hearing on June 12-14, 2012. At the
conclusion of the hearing, Dechaine requested additional DNA testing, utilizing a
different sample-collection technique, on the victim’s t-shirt and bra, a bandana
that had been used as a gag, and a scarf that had been used as a ligature around her
neck. The court granted the request and recessed the hearing. After the DNA
testing laboratory filed five additional reports concerning those items, the hearing
resumed on November 7, 2013, and concluded the following day.
22
[¶9] On April 9, 2014, the court denied Dechaine’s motion for a new trial in
a twenty-seven-page decision, finding that Dechaine had not met the burden
imposed on him by 15 M.R.S. § 2138(10)(C) to show by clear and convincing
evidence that a new trial would probably result in a different verdict.
See 15 M.R.S. § 2138(10)(C)(1) (requiring the defendant to establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that “[t]he DNA test results, when considered with all the
other evidence in the case, old and new, admitted in the hearing . . . would make it
probable that a different verdict would result upon a new trial”). By separate
order, the court also denied Dechaine’s motion to recuse.
[¶10] The court based its ultimate conclusion on its findings that (1) none of
the new DNA evidence implicated Douglas Senecal, whom Dechaine had
advanced as an alternative suspect since the beginning of the case; (2) there was no
evidence that unidentified male DNA found on one-half of the victim’s left
thumbnail (discussed in detail infra), which did not come from Dechaine, was
connected to her murder; (3) concerning the left thumbnail DNA, the testimony of
Catherine MacMillan, a Maine State Police Crime Laboratory forensic DNA
analyst, and that of two additional experts in DNA analysis, was “credible and
persuasive” when those witnesses opined that contamination of the sample in the
circumstances of this case was likely; (4) contamination of the left thumbnail
sample was further suggested by the fact that the DNA on the nail did not match
23
male DNA found on other items closely related to the crime that were the subject
of the November 2013 hearing; and (5) “as several other courts have found, the
evidence of Dechaine’s guilt is substantial.”
[¶11] This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion For New Trial
[¶12] Dechaine contends that he is entitled to a new trial pursuant to
15 M.R.S. § 2138(10)(C), which provides:
If the results of the DNA testing under this section show that the
person is not the source of the evidence, the person authorized in
section 2137 must show by clear and convincing evidence that:
....
C. All of the prerequisites for obtaining a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence are met as follows:
(1) The DNA test results, when considered with all the other
evidence in the case, old and new, admitted in the hearing
conducted under this section on behalf of the person would make
it probable that a different verdict would result upon a new trial;
(2) The proffered DNA test results have been discovered by the
person since the trial;
(3) The proffered DNA test results could not have been obtained
by the person prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence;
(4) The DNA test results and other evidence admitted at the
hearing conducted under this section on behalf of the person are
24
material to the issue as to who is responsible for the crime for
which the person was convicted; and
(5) The DNA test results and other evidence admitted at the
hearing conducted under this section on behalf of the person are
not merely cumulative or impeaching, unless it is clear that such
impeachment would have resulted in a different verdict.
....
For purposes of this subsection, “all the other evidence in the case, old
and new,” means the evidence admitted at trial; evidence admitted in
any hearing on a motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the
Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure; evidence admitted at any
collateral proceeding, state or federal; evidence admitted at the
hearing conducted under this section relevant to the DNA testing and
analysis conducted on the sample; and evidence relevant to the
identity of the source of the DNA sample.
15 M.R.S. § 2138(10).
[¶13] We recently stated the standard of review:
We review a court’s factual findings on a motion for a new trial for
clear error. We review the court’s interpretation of the
post-conviction DNA analysis statute de novo. When a court has
reached findings that are supported by the record and has interpreted
and applied the statute properly, the court’s ultimate decision whether
to grant a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Reese, 2013 ME 10, ¶ 22, 60 A.3d 1277 (citations omitted). Additionally,
“[w]hen reviewing on appeal findings of fact that must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, we determine whether the factfinder could reasonably have
been persuaded that the required factual finding was or was not proved to be highly
25
probable.” Bailey v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 2014 ME 58, ¶ 17, 90 A.3d 1137(quotation marks omitted).
[¶14] What follows is a discussion of the evidence admitted during the two
parts of the hearing on Dechaine’s motion for a new trial, and the application of the
requirements of section 2138(10)(C) to that evidence given the burden of proof
specified by the statute.
1. Left Thumbnail DNA
[¶15] During the three days of hearing in June 2012, the primary piece of
evidence at issue was the DNA mixture that included male DNA found on one-half
of Sarah Cherry’s left thumbnail. As discussed infra, experts testified that
Dechaine was excluded as its source, as was Douglas Senecal and other potential
alternative suspects. The contributor of the DNA remains unknown, and,
according to Catherine MacMillan, because the DNA was degraded and did not
yield a full profile, DNA alone can never positively identify that person. Dechaine
contends that the presence of another male’s DNA on the victim’s thumbnail
makes it probable that a new jury would acquit him. The State argues that a new
trial would not yield a different result for several reasons, chief among them being
the likelihood that the male DNA resulted from contamination of the nail sample
and is therefore not evidence that is relevant to the question of who committed the
crime.
26
[¶16] The trial court’s thorough decision amply supports its ultimate
conclusion that “the defendant has failed to connect the DNA under Sarah’s
fingernails to her murderer.” Relevant to the thumbnail DNA, the decision
discussed the chain of custody, the results of the DNA testing, and the possibility
of contamination.
(a) The Chain of Custody
[¶17] In July 1988 the victim’s thumbnails went from the autopsy room to
the State Crime Lab for blood typing, but not DNA testing. From there they went
to the jury room at the trial; an exhibit room at the Knox County Superior Court
Clerk’s Office following the trial; a file in Attorney Thomas Connolly’s office
when they were released to him by the clerk’s office; CBR Labs via FedEx in 1993
when Connolly sent them there for DNA testing; back to Connolly’s office via
FedEx; back to the State pursuant to a court order some nineteen months after
Connolly took possession of them; and finally back to the State Crime Laboratory
for DNA testing in March 2003, almost fifteen years after they were collected at
the autopsy.
(b) Results of the DNA Testing
[¶18] CBR Labs and the State Crime Laboratory made the same finding—
half of the left thumbnail tested by CBR showed the presence of a degraded DNA
mixture that included male DNA, and it yielded a partial profile from which
27
Dechaine was excluded. The remaining half, as well as the right thumbnail,
revealed no male DNA. Catherine MacMillan testified that she was only able to
exclude Dechaine as a contributor to the mixture by significantly lowering the
laboratory’s normal testing threshold. She further testified that she could not
identify what biological material was the source of the DNA (nor could any of the
experts), or say how it came to be on the nail, when it was placed there, or whose it
was. The experts who testified at the hearing disagreed as to whether it was
possible to say that the male DNA in the mixture came from only one male.
(c) Possibility of Contamination
[¶19] The court heard testimony from Robert Goodrich, a veteran forensic
medical technician with the Chief Medical Examiner’s Office who assisted at the
Cherry autopsy, which was performed in the local hospital morgue. Goodrich
described conditions at the autopsy that, from a DNA collection perspective, can
only be described as primitive. The court could easily conclude that at the time the
fingernail clippings were originally taken they were potentially exposed to DNA
unrelated to the crime coming from other bodies that the nail clippers had been
used on; the tool chest that they were stored in; the bloody, “grungy” towels that
the clippers were laid on in the chest; or the examiners themselves, who wore no
masks and only sometimes wore gloves. It was explained by a state trooper who
28
worked for the crime lab in the mid-1980s, and by Attorney Connolly, that blood
evidence, not DNA, was the focus of sample collection at that time.
[¶20] MacMillan testified that the conditions described by Goodrich
suggested “a very highly contaminated toolbox.” She said that she would be
concerned about contamination of samples obtained under those circumstances
because when utilizing modern polymerase chain reaction (PCR) DNA analysis, in
which a very small amount of genetic material is replicated millions of times in
order to produce a sample for analysis, even the act of speaking over a sample
could contaminate it and affect the result. She agreed that if a sample were
contaminated with DNA not related to the crime, then the PCR process would
replicate the irrelevant DNA millions of times. MacMillan said that despite the
techniques the State Crime Laboratory now utilizes—single-use instruments and
pipette tips, sterile scalpels, gloves, bleach for the analysts’ gloves and hands, and
an autoclave to sterilize tubes—cross-contamination has occurred.
[¶21] Other experts who testified at the hearing, including Dr. Frederick
Bieber, a member of the Harvard Medical School faculty and a geneticist at
Brigham and Women’s Hospital, and Dr. Carll Ladd, the supervisor of the DNA
section at the Connecticut Forensic Laboratory, agreed with MacMillan’s concern
regarding the possibility of contamination. The court explicitly found the
testimony of MacMillan, Bieber, and Ladd concerning the probability of
29
contamination to be “credible and persuasive.” Dr. Ladd went so far as to say, in
discussing the collection of the victim’s fingernails at the autopsy, “I can’t imagine
anybody in forensic DNA testing attempting to defend that procedure by today’s
standards.”
2. Other New DNA Evidence
[¶22] During the two days of hearing in November 2013, the focus was on
several items that had been sent for a new round of DNA testing using a scraping,
as opposed to swabbing, collection technique. Specifically, testing was performed
on the victim’s t-shirt and bra, a bandana that was found in her mouth, and a scarf
that was used as a ligature around her neck. The testing generated five additional
reports from Orchid Cellmark Labs, dated
• 8/31/12: the initial supplemental report;
• 9/28/12: generated after Orchid Cellmark received a blood
sample from Dechaine;
• 10/12/12: generated after William Moore, a private investigator
and the son of James Moore (author of a book about the
Dechaine case), traveled to Florida and obtained at a restaurant
a coffee cup, napkin, and fork purportedly used by Douglas
Senecal, whom Dechaine had previously advanced as an
alternative suspect;
• 12/28/12: generated using a different form of testing—instead
of Y-STR testing, which analyzes only male Y-chromosome
DNA, this report resulted from standard STR testing utilizing
an additional amplification method; and
30
• 7/19/13: generated using STR testing with a second
amplification method.
[¶23] Dr. Rick Staub, the expert called by Dechaine who represented Orchid
Cellmark at the hearing, testified that the DNA analyzed in the reports
was of low quantity and could be subject to what we call stochastic
effects and is sometimes difficult to interpret. . . . In plain English that
means . . . when you get to a [] low enough level, it doesn’t always
amplify and give you everything that’s there. . . . [I]t can cause the
interpretation to be confusing. . . . [I]f a laboratory is careful in their
analysis . . . it would be accurate. But you have to be very careful
when you analyze. . . . It can lead to inconclusive results . . . .
....
I think in general the samples were fairly low level. Some were
higher than others, but pretty low levels. . . . Particularly the male
DNA in the samples. . . . Because the samples were a mixture of male
and female DNA.
[¶24] In summary form, the additional testing yielded the following results:
• T-shirt: Y-STR testing revealed a mixture containing at least
two males from which Dechaine could not be excluded and
from which the coffee cup DNA (presumably Senecal’s) could
be excluded. Dr. Staub calculated the inclusion probability for
Caucasian males as 11 in 4114, that is, 1 Caucasian male of 374
could be a contributor to the mixture. He agreed that that
statistic becomes meaningful if an identified male who could be
a contributor was at or near the scene of the crime.
• Scarf: In Y-STR testing of two samples taken from the scarf,
one yielded a mixture of at least two males and the other was
unclear. Dechaine could not be excluded from the profile
obtained, nor could the coffee cup donor. Staub calculated the
inclusion probability for Dechaine as 115 in 4114, or roughly
1 in 35; the probability for the coffee cup donor was 96 in 4114
31
[roughly 1 in 43]. In STR testing (the last two reports), no
conclusion could be reached regarding Dechaine.
• Bra: The bra yielded a male DNA profile; analysis was
inconclusive as to whether Dechaine could be a contributor.
However, Staub testified that it appeared to be the same male
who was a contributor on the t-shirt, scarf, and bra, and so he
agreed that of the people that Orchid Cellmark tested, only
Dechaine fit the criteria. The coffee cup donor, who was
excluded from the t-shirt, did not fit the criteria.
• Bandana: The bandana yielded no male DNA.
• Left Thumbnail: Although the thumbnail DNA was not
specifically the subject of the Orchid Cellmark reports, Staub
testified that both Dechaine and the coffee cup donor were
excluded as its source.
[¶25] Prior to the new round of testing, Dr. Staub had a working hypothesis
that if DNA on the items closely associated with the victim also matched the left
thumbnail DNA, then that finding would work against the possibility that the
thumbnail DNA resulted from contamination. He agreed that the test results
refuted that hypothesis.
[¶26] Dr. Greg Hampikian, a professor of biology and criminal justice at
Boise State University and the director of the Idaho Innocence Project, who was
called by Dechaine and who testified at both the June 2012 and November 2013
hearings, took no issue with Staub’s analysis, although he stood by his earlier
opinion that the half of the left thumbnail on which there was no male DNA served
as a control for the half on which there was—in Hampikian’s view, if there was
32
contamination then it would be seen on both parts of the nail. Hampikian agreed
that (1) the coffee cup donor was excluded from the nail sample, (2) Dechaine
could not be excluded from the t-shirt and scarf, and (3) “the nails don’t fit all the
other evidence.”
[¶27] Dr. Ladd, who was called by the State and who also testified in both
parts of the hearing, repeated his earlier conclusion that “based on the way the
clippers were stored and handled [] I would say that is textbook conditions for
contamination.” He disagreed with Hampikian that the second half of the
thumbnail served as a control; in Ladd’s view it was not a known quantity as a
standard control would be, but rather “simply [] another evidentiary sample.” He
said that the second half of the nail might have DNA on it at such a low level as to
be non-reproducible, and that “when you’re talking about low level contaminants,
you can’t assume that they are evenly spread out.”
[¶28] Ladd also testified that when a laboratory engages in “low copy
number PCR” or “enhanced interrogation methods,” as in this case, the testing
process becomes “considerably more sensitive than traditional STR testing,” with
the result that “you’ve increased the chance of contamination being a factor in the
results.” Ladd said that ultimately
there then becomes a question as to whether you can determine if the
reported results are reflective of the evidence at the time of the
incident and so to what degree are they scientifically relevant. . . .
33
[T]he disagreement is not whether somebody is included or excluded,
it’s whether they are relevant to the incident.
....
With these types of enhanced interrogation procedures, and given that
the proper safeguards for mitigating contamination were definitely not
employed in this case and are not employed back in the ‘80s anywhere
in the United States, it is difficult to answer [whether the DNA results
from the five new reports were the product of contamination or are
otherwise meaningful]. . . . Is that the way the evidence was at the
time of the incident? I don’t believe it’s possible to conclusively
make that determination.
[¶29] Ladd also took issue with using the coffee cup DNA as “[a] pseudo
known [] used to represent the profile of a particular individual.” He said that
another person’s DNA can be on an item that is collected, or the collector can
simply make a mistake. Finally, he noted that the Cellmark reports indicated
apparent contamination at the laboratory itself, which he said was “not really
surprising” given the “particularly sensitive procedures” being used.
3. Application of the Burden of Proof to These Facts
[¶30] Pursuant to section 2138(10)(C), Dechaine had the burden to establish
by clear and convincing evidence all five of its enumerated elements. The court
found that he failed to prove two, namely that “[t]he DNA test results, when
considered with all the other evidence in the case, old and new . . . would make it
probable that a different verdict would result upon a new trial,” and that “[t]he
DNA test results and other evidence admitted at the hearing . . . are material to the
34
issue as to who is responsible for the crime for which the person was convicted.”
15 M.R.S. § 2138(10)(C)(1), (4).
[¶31] When, as here, the court determines that the perpetrator is not the only
possible source of the DNA at issue, we consider two questions:
(1) whether the court erred in determining that the DNA could have
come from a source other than the perpetrator of the crime, and (2) if
the court’s finding that the DNA could have come from another
source is supported by competent evidence in the record, whether the
court erred or abused its discretion in denying the motion for a new
trial pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 2138(10)(C).
Reese, 2013 ME 10, ¶ 24, 60 A.3d 1277 (citation omitted).
[¶32] Here, the court did not clearly err in finding that the left thumbnail
DNA could have come from a source other than the perpetrator. As discussed,
there was ample expert testimony, found to be “credible and persuasive” by the
court, that the DNA could have resulted from contamination at the autopsy or later,
during the left thumbnail’s fifteen-year odyssey from the autopsy room to the State
Crime Laboratory. Furthermore, the court was justified in finding that there was
no evidence that Sarah Cherry had struggled with her killer, meaning that it was
entirely possible that the small amount of unidentified male DNA on her thumbnail
was left there before her death by a person and in a manner altogether unrelated to
her murder. In sum, “the court’s finding that [] contamination was possible is not
clearly erroneous.” Reese, 2013 ME 10, ¶ 26, 60 A.3d 1277.
35
[¶33] Turning to the court’s determination that a new trial would probably
not result in a different verdict, the second round of testing that was the subject of
the November 2013 hearing does not help Dechaine’s cause, in that it was, to the
limited extent that inclusion ratios are useful, inculpatory and not exculpatory. The
experts all testified that only Dechaine, of the identified males compared, could not
be excluded as a sole contributor of the male DNA found on the t-shirt, bra, and
scarf.
[¶34] Concerning the left thumbnail DNA that was the subject of the
June 2012 hearing, the record supports the court’s findings that (1) there is no
evidence that the DNA is connected to the crime at all, although there is abundant
evidentiary support for a contrary conclusion that the DNA likely resulted from
contamination as opposed to being left by the murderer; that support included the
fact that none of the profiles generated from items known to be intimately
connected to the crime in the second round of testing matched the thumbnail
DNA;4 (2) it identifies no one; and (3) it excludes Douglas Senecal, the man that
Dechaine previously identified as an alternative suspect.
4
In Reese, we took note of
the conundrum that may be faced by lab analysts, judges, attorneys, and juries when
evidence that was collected and stored pursuant to now-outdated protocols is subjected to
more advanced modes of DNA testing. Although the advances in DNA testing may
provide more information about the DNA present in old samples, the new DNA evidence
will not necessarily be illuminating on issues related to defendants’ guilt or innocence if
36
[¶35] Finally, the court recognized the substantial evidence of Dechaine’s
guilt, as we did twenty-five years ago. See Dechaine, 572 A.2d at 132 n.3.
Nothing produced in the most recent five-day hearing changes that analysis and
“make[s] it probable that a different verdict would result upon a new trial.”
15 M.R.S. § 2138(10)(C)(1). It is likely that a jury examining the new, arguably
inculpatory DNA evidence, along with “all the other evidence in the case, old and
new,” would reach the same verdict as did the original jury. See id. Accordingly,
Dechaine failed to prove the elements of section 2138(10)(C) by clear and
convincing evidence, and the court’s denial of his motion for a new trial was not
erroneous or an abuse of its discretion. See Reese, 2013 ME 10, ¶¶ 24, 32,
60 A.3d 1277.
B. Actual Innocence Claim
[¶36] Dechaine contends that it was “constitutionally impermissible and
manifestly unjust” to deny him the opportunity to present evidence at the DNA
analysis hearing concerning (1) the time of the victim’s death, (2) alternative
suspects, and (3) his “so-called confessions”; that is, to present a claim of actual
innocence based in part on evidence not connected to the new DNA analysis. The
court, finding that “Maine has never recognized a freestanding claim of actual
the samples were not handled and preserved using the more rigorous lab practices that are
in place today.
State v. Reese, 2013 ME 10, ¶ 27 n.6, 60 A.3d 1277. That caution is applicable in this case.
37
innocence as grounds for post-conviction relief,” denied Dechaine’s request “to
present [a] claim of actual innocence independent of the statutory mechanism set
forth in 15 M.R.S. § 2138(10)(A).” It allowed him “to introduce evidence relating
to an alternative suspect . . . to the extent that the DNA evidence and analysis
actually implicates the alternative suspect.”
[¶37] The court’s interpretation of section 2138 was correct because
Maine’s post-conviction review process “provides a comprehensive and, except for
direct appeals from a criminal judgment, exclusive method of review of those
criminal judgments and of post-sentencing proceedings occurring during the course
of sentences.” 15 M.R.S. § 2122. The DNA analysis statute affords a defendant a
narrow opportunity to prove actual innocence or otherwise obtain a new trial
outside of the post-conviction review process.5 It is, however, limited in scope by
its own terms.
[¶38] Section 2138(10) provides that the “other evidence in the case, old
and new” that the court is to consider
means the evidence admitted at trial; evidence admitted in any hearing
on a motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Maine Rules of
5
The statute allows a defendant to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that
[o]nly the perpetrator of the crime or crimes for which the person was convicted could be
the source of the evidence, and that the DNA test results, when considered with all the
other evidence in the case, old and new, admitted in the hearing . . . show that the person
is actually innocent.
15 M.R.S. § 2138(10)(A) (2014). The court explicitly allowed Dechaine to pursue that opportunity.
38
Criminal Procedure; evidence admitted at any collateral proceeding,
state or federal; evidence admitted at the hearing conducted under this
section relevant to the DNA testing and analysis conducted on the
sample; and evidence relevant to the identity of the source of the DNA
sample.
In other words, evidence admitted at the trial or in any prior collateral proceeding
concerning, inter alia, the time of the victim’s death, alternative suspects, or the
defendant’s confessions must be considered by the court in deciding a motion for a
new trial based on new DNA analysis.
[¶39] The “hearing conducted under [section 2138],” on the other hand,
allows the court to consider only two kinds of new evidence—that “relevant to the
DNA testing and analysis conducted on the sample,” and that “relevant to the
identity of the source of the DNA sample.” 15 M.R.S. § 2138(10)(C). The statute
says nothing about reopening or supplementing the evidence introduced in prior
proceedings; rather, it allows the admission of DNA-related evidence that could
not have been known at those prior proceedings, namely the new DNA results and
their impact on identifying the perpetrator. Accordingly, the trial court did not err
in construing the statute to bar a “freestanding” claim of actual innocence.
See Reese, 2013 ME 10, ¶ 22, 60 A.3d 1277 (stating that the trial court’s
interpretation of the post-conviction DNA analysis statute is reviewed de novo).
[¶40] Dechaine’s assertion that the Due Process Clauses of the United
States and Maine Constitutions compel the admission of the evidence that he seeks
39
to introduce is not persuasive. We have previously noted six safeguards, in
addition to a direct appeal, that exist in Maine law to ensure that a defendant
receives post-conviction due process, including the statute at issue here. State v.
Blakesley, 2010 ME 19, ¶ 13, 989 A.2d 746.
[¶41] Furthermore, in discussing the due process required in a
post-conviction context, the United States Supreme Court said that
[a] criminal defendant proved guilty after a fair trial does not have the
same liberty interests as a free man.
....
The State accordingly has more flexibility in deciding what
procedures are needed in the context of postconviction relief. When a
State chooses to offer help to those seeking relief from convictions,
due process does not dictate the exact form such assistance must
assume.
....
[T]he question is whether consideration of [a defendant’s] claim
within the framework of the State’s procedures for postconviction
relief offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, or
transgresses any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in
operation.
....
[I]t is [the defendant’s] burden to demonstrate the inadequacy of the
state-law procedures available to him in state postconviction relief.
....
40
[Here, the defendant] obliquely relies on an asserted federal
constitutional right to be released upon proof of “actual innocence.”
Whether such a federal right exists is an open question. We have
struggled with it over the years . . . . [The defendant] does not dispute
that a federal actual innocence claim . . . would be brought in habeas.
Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68-69, 71-72 (2009) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
[¶42] Dechaine has not met his burden of demonstrating the alleged
inadequacy of Maine’s post-conviction relief procedures; indeed, the fact that he
has been afforded the opportunity to pursue his post-trial claims in several
proceedings demonstrates the opposite. The Maine Constitution affords him no
greater protection than the Fourteenth Amendment rights discussed in Osborne.
Doe I v. Williams, 2013 ME 24, ¶ 61, 61 A.3d 718.
C. Motion to Recuse
[¶43] Dechaine finally contends that the justice who presided at his trial was
required to recuse because various rulings that he made over the twenty-seven-year
history of this case equated to a predisposition against him, and so “[g]iven the
lengthy and remarkable history of this case and repeated assertions of innocence by
[Dechaine] . . . the DNA Motion for a New Trial should have been presided over
by an objective Justice with no question of bias or prejudice or earlier involvement
in the case.”
41
[¶44] As Dechaine recognizes, the DNA analysis statute requires that “[t]he
motion must be assigned to the trial judge or justice who imposed the sentence
unless that judge or justice is unavailable.” 15 M.R.S. § 2138(1). The Justice’s
decision not to recuse is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re J.R. Jr.,
2013 ME 58, ¶ 16, 69 A.3d 406. We have said that “[g]enerally, knowledge
gained in a prior proceeding is not a sufficient ground to recuse a judge in a
subsequent matter,” and that “[a] judge is as much obliged not to recuse himself
when it is not called for as he is obliged to when it is.” Id. ¶¶ 17-18 (quotation
marks omitted).
[¶45] Here, Justice Bradford considered the appropriate canons of judicial
conduct and relevant decisions of this Court, noted that Dechaine does not allege
“any personal bias or prejudice,” and observed that we found no fault with his trial
rulings on direct appeal. See Dechaine, 572 A.2d at 132-36. Particularly where
the statute directed that the sentencing justice preside at Dechaine’s hearing, the
record reveals no abuse of discretion.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
42
On the briefs:
Steven C. Peterson, Esq., West Rockport, for appellant Dennis
J. Dechaine
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for
appellee State of Maine
At oral argument:
Steven C. Peterson, Esq., for appellant Dennis J. Dechaine
Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee State of
Maine
Knox Superior Court docket number CR-1989-71
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY