Sarah E. Cheney v. Unemployment Insurance Commission , 2016 Me. LEXIS 113 ( 2016 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2016 ME 105Docket: Ken-15-572
Argued: June 9, 2016
Decided: July 12, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and
HUMPHREY, JJ.
SARAH E. CHENEY
v.
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Sarah E. Cheney appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court
(Kennebec County, Marden, J.) affirming a decision of the Unemployment
Insurance Commission that upheld a hearing officer’s decision denying her claim
for unemployment benefits on the ground that she was not available to work
full-time within the meaning of 26 M.R.S. § 1192(3) (2015) and Commission
rules. Cheney contends that the Commission erred in its construction of the
statute, and that its decision is contrary to public policy. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts, drawn from the administrative record, are not
disputed. Sarah Cheney began working for Global Montello Group Corporation at
the Augusta “Mobil on the Run” gas station and convenience store in
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November 2008, eventually becoming assistant manager. She normally worked
forty hours per week on shifts encompassing weekends and some weekdays.
Cheney was on maternity leave from mid-August 2013 until November 6, 2013.
When she returned, disputes with her employer arose over a change to her schedule
that made her childcare situation more difficult, and over an appropriate place for
her to pump breast milk at work. Two days later, due primarily to the latter issue,
she gave her two-week notice.
[¶3] Cheney’s claim for unemployment benefits was denied by the Bureau
of Unemployment Compensation in two Deputy’s Decisions, both issued
January 22, 2014. The first, Deputy’s Decision No. 6, ruled that Cheney
voluntarily left her employment without good cause.1 The second, Deputy’s
Decision No. 8, ruled that Cheney was not “able to work and available for work”
within the meaning of 26 M.R.S. § 1192(3).2
[¶4] Cheney appealed both decisions to the Department of Labor’s Division
of Administrative Hearings. See 26 M.R.S. § 1194(3) (2015). After holding
telephonic hearings on the appeals, during which Cheney testified, the Hearing
1
Title 26 M.R.S. § 1193(1)(A) (2015) provides, in part, that, “An individual shall be disqualified for
benefits . . . [f]or the week in which the claimant left regular employment voluntarily without good cause
attributable to that employment.”
2
The statute provides, in part, that “[a]n unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits
with respect to any week only if . . . [t]he individual is able to work and is available for full-time work at
the individual’s usual or customary trade, occupation, profession or business . . . .” 26 M.R.S. § 1192(3)
(2015).
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Officer affirmed both Deputy’s Decisions. Cheney appealed the Hearing Officer’s
decisions to the Unemployment Insurance Commission pursuant to 26 M.R.S.
§ 1194(3), (5) (2015). In the first of two September 30, 2014, decisions, the
Commission set aside Deputy’s Decision No. 6 upon finding that the lack of a
suitable place to pump breast milk constituted good cause for Cheney to leave her
employment. That decision is not before us on appeal. The second decision
affirmed Deputy’s Decision No. 8, finding that Cheney “was not able and available
for full-time work within the meaning of 26 M.R.S. § 1192(3) and Chapter 9(2)(A)
of the Rules.”
[¶5] Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C, Cheney petitioned the Superior Court to
review the Commission’s “able and available” decision. The court affirmed, and
Cheney appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Commission’s Decision
[¶6] We directly review the Commission’s decision. Ramelli v.
Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 2016 ME 6, ¶ 2, 130 A.3d 963. “Our review is
limited to determining whether the Commission correctly applied the law and
whether its factual findings are supported by any competent evidence.” Id.(alterations and quotation marks omitted). In conducting our review,
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[w]e will not overrule findings of fact supported by substantial
evidence, defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support the resultant conclusion. With
respect to the law, we review de novo issues of statutory
interpretation. However, we defer to an agency in those areas within
its expertise unless a statute or regulation compels a contrary result.
Sinclair Builders, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 2013 ME 76, ¶¶ 9-10,
73 A.3d 1061 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The burden of
demonstrating that a contrary result is compelled rests with Cheney as the party
seeking to overturn the Commission’s decision. Bischoff v. Bd. of Trustees, 661
A.2d 167, 170 (Me. 1995); see Schwartz v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 2006 ME
41, ¶ 8, 895 A.2d 965.
[¶7] The Commission based its decision on statutory provisions and rules
derived from those provisions. Pursuant to statute:
An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with
respect to any week only if:
....
The individual is able to work and is available for full-time work at
the individual’s usual or customary trade, occupation, profession or
business or in such other trade, occupation, profession or business for
which the individual’s prior training or experience shows the
individual to be fitted or qualified; and . . . is actively seeking work in
accordance with the regulations of the commission; provided that no
ineligibility may be found solely because the claimant is unable to
accept employment on a shift, the greater part of which falls between
the hours of midnight to 5 a.m., and is unavailable for that
employment because of parental obligation . . . and provided that an
unemployed individual who is neither able nor available for work due
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to good cause as determined by the deputy is eligible to receive
prorated benefits for that portion of the week during which the
individual was able and available.
26 M.R.S. § 1192(3). “Good cause” as used in section 1192(3) “includ[es] child
care emergencies.” 26 M.R.S. § 1192(13) (2015).
[¶8] The Commission’s rules provide that
[i]n order to be considered to be “available for work,” a claimant must
be “attached to the labor market.” This means that he must be ready
and willing to accept work for which he is qualified under the
conditions which would normally be associated with the labor market.
He must be available to work in locations in which, and during the
hours in which, he could reasonably be expected to be employed.
....
In order to meet the availability for work requirements of the
Employment Security Law, a claimant must be available to accept
work during the hours which are customary for the trade or
occupation in which he usually works or for the trade or occupation in
which he has prior training or experience. Claimants whose
occupations normally involve working on more than one shift must be
available to work on all such shifts.
5 C.M.R. 12 172 009-2 § 2(A) (2004).
[¶9] Here, although the Commission noted Cheney’s availability and
willingness to work many hours during the week, the facts found by the
Commission in denying Cheney’s claim are supported by substantial record
evidence, and the statutes and rules cited supra do not compel a result contrary to
its decision. See Sinclair Builders, Inc., 2013 ME 76, ¶¶ 9-10, 73 A.3d 1061.
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Cheney testified before the Hearing Officer that her normal occupation was retail
work; that over the course of a given year during her ten-year career in that
occupation she worked all days of the week on varied shifts, including day shifts
starting at 5:30 a.m. and overnight shifts lasting until 6:00 a.m.; and that since
January 6, 2014, she was unable to work her normal retail schedule because of her
husband’s job change and its impact on her childcare situation, and as a result she
was restricted to working weekdays from 6:30 p.m. until 6:00 a.m., and at any time
on the weekend.
[¶10] The Commission found that by her own testimony, Cheney was not
“available for full-time work at [her] usual or customary . . . occupation,” 26
M.R.S. § 1192(3), because she was not available to work daytime shifts during the
week—shifts that she had worked in the past. That restriction on her availability
also runs afoul of Rule 2(A), which requires that “[c]laimants whose occupations
normally involve working on more than one shift must be available to work on all
such shifts.” 5 C.M.R. 12 172 009-2 § 2(A) (2004).
[¶11] Concerning the statutory alternative condition for eligibility, namely
that Cheney be “available for full-time work . . . in such other trade, occupation,
profession or business for which [her] prior training or experience shows [her] to
be fitted or qualified,” 26 M.R.S. § 1192(3), the Commission found that the record
did not demonstrate that she could work in a retail position that did not require any
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weekday daytime hours, hours that it found “generally encompass[] standard hours
for any retail establishment or occupation.” We defer to the Commission’s finding
concerning the standard hours required for retail work as an “area[] within its
expertise.” Sinclair Builders, Inc., 2013 ME 76, ¶ 10, 73 A.3d 1061 (quotation
marks omitted).
[¶12] Further supporting the Commission’s decision, the Legislature has
explicitly preserved eligibility for benefits for workers who cannot, due to
“parental obligation,” which would include childcare obligations, work shifts for
which the majority of the hours are midnight to 5:00 a.m. 26 M.R.S. § 1192(3).
As the Commission concluded, the implication of that exception is that eligibility
for benefits is not similarly protected for workers who cannot work other shifts
because of childcare obligations—in this case, daytime shifts during the week. If
eligibility were protected for those shifts as well, then logically the statute would
contain a childcare exception that was not time-restricted. See Musk v. Nelson, 647
A.2d 1198, 1201-02 (Me. 1994) (“[A] well-settled rule of statutory interpretation
states that express mention of one concept implies the exclusion of others not
listed. The statute [at issue] provides a single exception and implicitly denies the
availability of any other.” (citation omitted)).
[¶13] Finally, the “good cause” provision of section 1192(3), providing that
“an unemployed individual who is neither able nor available for work due to good
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cause as determined by the deputy is eligible to receive prorated benefits,” is not
triggered on these facts. The statute defines “good cause” as including “child care
emergencies,” implicitly excluding the kind of ongoing childcare situation that
Cheney testified to. 26 M.R.S. § 1192(13); see Musk, 647 A.2d at 1201-02. If
“good cause” encompassed Cheney’s situation, then the word “emergencies” is
superfluous, and when construing statutes we do not ignore language chosen by the
Legislature. See Blue Yonder, LLC v. State Tax Assessor, 2011 ME 49, ¶ 10,
17 A.3d 667 (“Words in a statute must be given meaning and not treated as
meaningless and superfluous.” (quotation marks omitted)).
[¶14] In sum, although the Commission recognized that its result was
“unfortunate[]” given Cheney’s “commendable” willingness to work many hours
during the week, a different result is not compelled by either statute or rule.
See Sinclair Builders, Inc., 2013 ME 76, ¶ 10, 73 A.3d 106.
B. Public Policy
[¶15] Cheney argues that the Commission’s result is contrary to public
policy because she is denied the protection of the Employment Security Law, see
26 M.R.S. § 1041 (2015), despite being willing and available to work full time.
That is an argument for the Legislature. See State v. Brown, 2014 ME 79, ¶ 1 n.1,
95 A.3d 82 (stating, in discussing other state policies, that “[t]hese policy
arguments are more appropriately addressed to the Maine Legislature”).
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[¶16] In 1957, the Legislature stated the public policy underlying the
unemployment compensation system. P.L. 1957, ch. 381, § 1 (effective
Aug. 28, 1957) (codified at 26 M.R.S. § 1042 (2015)). The Legislature has since
refined its declaration of public policy by enacting provisions protecting the
eligibility of workers facing childcare hardship in two circumstances: (1) when
required to work shifts for which the majority of the assigned hours are midnight to
5:00 a.m., and (2) when facing a “child care emergenc[y].” 26 M.R.S.
§ 1192(3), (13). It has given no similar indication that denying unemployment
benefits to a worker in Cheney’s situation violates public policy. Although we
have held that “Maine’s Employment Security Law is remedial legislation
mandating a liberal construction in favor of the claimant,” we have also recognized
that “a court may not enlarge the scope of the Employment Security Law.”
Ramelli, 2016 ME 6, ¶ 10, 130 A.3d 963 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
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On the briefs:
Adrianne E. Fouts, Esq., Drummond Woodsum, Portland, for
appellant Sarah E. Cheney
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Nancy Macirowski, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for
appellee Unemployment Insurance Commission
At oral argument:
Adrianne E. Fouts, Esq., for appellant Sarah E. Cheney
Nancy Macirowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee
Unemployment Insurance Commission
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number AP-2014-71
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY