State of Maine v. John A. Weckerly , 181 A.3d 675 ( 2018 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 40 Docket: Pen-16-514
Argued: October 25, 2017
Decided: March 20, 2018
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
JOHN A. WECKERLY
GORMAN, J.
[¶1] John A. Weckerly appeals from a judgment of conviction for arson
(Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 802(1)(B)(2) (2017), entered by the trial court
(Penobscot County, Anderson, J.) after a jury trial. Weckerly argues that the
court’s admission of evidence of crimes of which he was acquitted in a prior
trial violated the collateral estoppel component of double jeopardy. Given the
unique circumstances presented in this case, we agree and vacate the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] In November of 2011, a Penobscot County grand jury indicted
Weckerly on one count of arson (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 802(1)(B)(2) (Count 1),
for setting fire to a vehicle driven by an investigator with the State Fire
Marshal’s office on August 3, 2011, in Prentiss Plantation, a remote area of the
2
county. Five months later, in April of 2012, the same grand jury issued a second
indictment against Weckerly containing eleven additional charges, all alleged
to have been committed by Weckerly in Prentiss Plantation between May of
2010 and July of 2011: aggravated criminal mischief (Class C), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 805(1)(A) (2017) (Count 2); burglary (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(B)(4)
(2017) (Count 6); theft by unauthorized taking (Class E), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 353(1)(A) (2017) (Count 7); five counts of criminal mischief (Class D),
17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A) (2017) (Counts 3-5, 8, 11); two additional counts of
arson (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 802(1)(B)(2) (Counts 9-10); and another count
of arson (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 802(1)(A) (2017) (Count 12). In particular, in
Counts 9 and 10, the State alleged that Weckerly had committed arson on the
property of Chris Jones on November 16, 2010, and July 3, 2011, respectively;
in Count 11, the State alleged that Weckerly had committed criminal mischief
by spray-painting graffiti on the property of Joseph Couture on July 11, 2011;
and in Count 12, the State alleged that Weckerly had committed arson on the
property of John Dreon on July 20, 2011. Weckerly pleaded not guilty to all
counts.
[¶3] After a six-day trial in 2013, the jury found Weckerly not guilty of
Counts 2-12, but could not reach a verdict on Count 1, the arson of the fire
3
marshal’s vehicle. The court entered a judgment acquitting Weckerly of
Counts 2-12 and, with Weckerly’s agreement, declared a mistrial on Count 1.
[¶4] In preparation for the second trial, Weckerly moved in limine to
exclude any evidence relating to Counts 2-12 on the ground that such evidence
would violate double jeopardy principles because he had already been
acquitted of those charges. After a hearing, the court denied the motion,
concluding that double jeopardy did not preclude the admission of the evidence
and that the evidence was admissible to show Weckerly’s motive, intent, and
state of mind.1
[¶5] In 2015, the court conducted a second jury trial on Count 1. During
the second trial, the court admitted evidence relating to Counts 9-12 that was
presented in the first trial. Three times during the trial, the court instructed the
jury that Weckerly had already been charged with—and acquitted of—those
four crimes. The court denied Weckerly’s later motion for a judgment of
acquittal.
1 We dismissed as interlocutory Weckerly’s appeal from the denial of this motion in limine;
because Weckerly’s appeal did not challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy
grounds, it did not qualify for the double jeopardy exception to the final judgment rule. See State v.
Nielsen, 2000 ME 202, ¶ 1 n.1, 761 A.2d 876. In January of 2014, Weckerly moved to dismiss Count 1
of the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. We affirmed the court’s denial of the motion to
dismiss. State v. Weckerly, Mem-14-146 (Nov. 4, 2014). In that decision, we determined that
Weckerly’s challenge to the court’s denial of his motion in limine to exclude from the second trial the
evidence underlying Counts 2-12 was interlocutory, and we therefore declined to consider the
argument. Id.
4
[¶6] The jury found Weckerly guilty of the arson of the fire marshal’s
vehicle. The court entered a judgment on the verdict, sentencing Weckerly to
seven years in prison, all suspended, with four years of probation and $5,000
in restitution.2 Weckerly appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶7] Both the United States and Maine Constitutions offer protections
against double jeopardy. U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”);
Me. Const. art. I, § 8 (“No person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.”); Ayotte v. State, 2015 ME 158, ¶ 11, 129 A.3d 285.
These provisions prevent a second prosecution for the same offense after an
acquittal or conviction, or the imposition of multiple punishments for the same
offense. Ayotte, 2015 ME 158, ¶ 13, 129 A.3d 285. As the United States Supreme
Court has explained, the prohibition against double jeopardy serves
two vitally important interests. The first is the deeply ingrained
principle that the State with all its resources and power should not
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for
an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state
of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent he may be found guilty. The second is the
preservation of the finality of judgments.
2
Weckerly’s application for leave to appeal his sentence was denied. State v. Weckerly,
No. SRP-16-518 (Me. Sent. Rev. Panel Jan. 26, 2017).
5
Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 117-18 (2009) (citations omitted)
(quotation marks omitted).
[¶8] Weckerly contends that the court violated his right to be protected
against double jeopardy by admitting in his second trial evidence on which the
State relied to try to prove some of the charges of which he was acquitted in his
first trial—namely, evidence for Counts 9-12 regarding three arsons (two fires
on Jones’s property and one fire on Dreon’s property) and one count of criminal
mischief (spray-painted graffiti on Couture’s property).3 Weckerly’s argument
requires us to determine whether and to what extent evidence that was
admitted in a prior prosecution to prove different criminal charges of which the
defendant ultimately was acquitted may be admitted in a later prosecution.4
We consider de novo whether the application of double jeopardy principles
3 There is no dispute that double jeopardy considerations did not bar the prosecution of Weckerly
for arson of the fire marshal’s vehicle in the second trial given the hung jury on that count in the first
trial. See Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 118 (2009) (holding that a mistrial for a hung jury is
a “manifest necessity” that has no preclusive effect on a subsequent prosecution for the same crime
(quotation marks omitted)); State v. Linscott, 416 A.2d 255, 258-59 (Me. 1980) (same); see also State
v. Weckerly, Mem-14-146 (Nov. 4, 2014) (affirming the court’s denial of Weckerly’s motion to dismiss,
on double jeopardy grounds, the second prosecution of Count 1).
4 We are not persuaded by Weckerly’s additional argument—that the court erred by admitting
dog tracking evidence and failing to instruct the jury regarding the reliability of such evidence. See
State v. Logan, 2014 ME 92, ¶ 17, 97 A.3d 121 (holding that the weight and credibility of all admitted
evidence are matters for the fact-finder’s decision alone); State v. Tibbetts, 604 A.2d 20, 22 (Me. 1992)
(stating that it is for the fact-finder to determine the weight to assign an expert opinion); see also
State v. Cole, 1997 ME 112, ¶ 9, 695 A.2d 1180 (approving the use of dog tracking evidence).
6
precludes the admission of evidence. Gray v. TD Bank, N.A., 2012 ME 83, ¶ 10,
45 A.3d 735; State v. Mitchell, 1998 ME 128, ¶ 4, 712 A.2d 1033.
[¶9] Two United States Supreme Court cases are instructive. First, in
Ashe v. Swenson, six men were playing poker when they were robbed at
gunpoint by three or four assailants. 397 U.S. 436, 437 (1970). Each defendant
was charged with a separate count of armed robbery as to each victim, and the
charges were considered in separate trials. Id. at 438-39. After a jury trial, one
of the defendants, Bob Ashe, was acquitted of the robbery as to one of the
victims by a general verdict finding him “not guilty due to insufficient evidence.”
Id. at 439 (quotation marks omitted). In Ashe’s second trial, he was convicted
of the robbery of a different victim at the same poker game. Id. at 439-40.
[¶10] Based on its determination that the “established rule [of collateral
estoppel] is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy,” id. at 445, the Supreme Court held that “when an issue of ultimate
fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot
again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit,” id. at 443. The Court held that when the first acquittal is based on a general jury verdict,
the court in the second trial must “examine the record of [the] prior proceeding,
taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter”
7
to determine “whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an
issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from
consideration” in the second trial. Id. at 444 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶11] After reviewing the record of Ashe’s first trial, the Supreme Court
determined, “[T]he record is utterly devoid of any indication that the first jury
could rationally have found that an armed robbery had not occurred, or that
[the first victim] had not been a victim of that robbery.” Id. at 445. The Court
concluded that the “single rationally conceivable issue in dispute before the
jury was whether the petitioner had been one of the robbers.” Id. Because the first jury necessarily found that Ashe was not one of the robbers, the Court
concluded that the State was barred from introducing in the second trial any of
the evidence used at the first trial to suggest that the defendant was one of the
robbers. Id. at 445-46. Although the second trial involved a different victim, all
of the other circumstances of the two crimes were identical, and a conviction in
the second trial would have required the jury to make findings directly contrary
to those reached in the first trial. Id.
[¶12] In the second instructive decision, Dowling v. United States, the
Supreme Court distinguished Ashe. 493 U.S. 342, 348 (1990). In Dowling, the
defendant was charged with the armed robbery of a bank. Id. at 344. His first
8
trial resulted in a hung jury, and his conviction in the second trial was reversed
on appeal on different grounds. Id.; see Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Dowling,
814 F.2d 134, 140-41 (3d Cir. 1987). Between the second and third trials, the
defendant was tried for and acquitted of burglary, attempted robbery, assault,
and weapons charges in connection with a home invasion that had occurred
two weeks after the bank robbery. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 344-45. In the
defendant’s third trial for bank robbery, the State introduced the testimony of
the victim of the home invasion, who identified the defendant as one of the
assailants. Id. at 344-45. The defendant appealed the bank robbery conviction,
arguing that the admission of the evidence regarding the home invasion
violated double jeopardy collateral estoppel as set forth in Ashe. Id. at 347. [¶13] In its evaluation of the record of the home invasion trial, the
Supreme Court determined that there were multiple possible explanations for
the jury’s general acquittal on the home invasion charges given that the
defendant did not dispute that he had been in the victim’s home on the day in
question; the theory of the defense was instead that no robbery had occurred
because the defendant had gone to the victim’s house to retrieve money from
an individual in the house. Id. at 351-52. The Supreme Court approved the
court’s admission at the third bank robbery trial of the evidence that the
9
defendant was present at the home invasion because the jury in the home
invasion trial had not already “determine[d] an ultimate issue in the [third bank
robbery] case,” id. at 348, that is, the jury had not necessarily decided that the
defendant was not involved in the incident that led to the home invasion
charges: “Because a jury might reasonably conclude that [the defendant] was
the masked man who entered [the home invasion victim’s] home, even if it did
not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] committed the
crimes charged at the first trial, the collateral-estopped component of the
Double Jeopardy Clause is inapposite,”5 id. at 348-49. [¶14] Our approach in Maine is consistent with that employed by the
Supreme Court. In State v. Dean, 589 A.2d 929, 930 (Me. 1991), the defendant
was indicted on one count of gross sexual assault, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B)
5 Having determined that collateral estoppel on double jeopardy grounds did not require the
exclusion of the evidence of the home invasion, the Supreme Court declared such evidence admissible
as long as it is “relevant and probative evidence that is otherwise admissible under the Rules of
Evidence.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348 (1990). Thus, the double jeopardy collateral
estoppel analysis requires a determination of the overlap between the two trials without regard for
the purposes for which the evidence is offered in the second trial or the indicia of reliability of that
evidence. See id. Evidence that does not violate double jeopardy collateral estoppel requirements,
however, might nevertheless be inadmissible for other evidentiary reasons—as irrelevant, see M.R.
Evid. 401, 402; as unfairly prejudicial, see M.R. Evid. 403; or as evidence of prior bad acts to establish
the defendant acted in conformity therewith, see M.R. Evid. 404, for example. In Dowling, the Court
held that the evidence of the home invasion was admissible because the government sought the
admission of that evidence in the bank robbery trial not to establish the defendant’s prior bad acts
exhibiting his poor character, but rather to establish a link between the defendant and a
co-defendant, and to show that the defendant possessed a mask and gun as used in the home invasion
that were identical to those used in the bank robbery. 493 U.S. at 345.
10
(Supp. 1990), and two counts of unlawful sexual contact, 17-A M.R.S.A.
§ 255(1)(C) (Supp. 1990).6 He was acquitted in his first trial on the charge of
gross sexual assault, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charges
of unlawful sexual contact, and the court declared a mistrial. Dean, 589 A.2d at
930. In the second trial, the court admitted evidence of the defendant’s
oral-genital contact with the victim of the alleged gross sexual assault
notwithstanding the defendant’s acquittal of that charge. Id. at 932. The
defendant was convicted of the two unlawful sexual contact charges in the
second trial. Id. at 930-31. [¶15] In Dean, we first noted that the two trials involved no overlap of
facts: “The charge of gross sexual [assault] involved an allegation of a sexual act
completely separate and distinct from the acts constituting unlawful sexual
contact at issue in the second trial.” Id. at 933. We next determined, albeit with
little discussion, that double jeopardy collateral estoppel did not bar in the
second trial the admission of the evidence of oral-genital contact admitted in
the first trial because the jury, by acquitting the defendant of gross sexual
assault, did not necessarily decide the ultimate fact at issue—whether such
6 Section 253(1)(B) has since been amended. See P.L. 2003, ch. 711, § B-2 (effective July 30, 2004)
(codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 253 (2017)). Section 255 has been repealed and replaced by 17-A M.R.S.
§ 255-A (2017). See P.L. 2001, ch. 383, §§ 22-23 (effective Jan. 31, 2003). These amendments are not
relevant to the matter now before us.
11
oral-genital contact had occurred: “The record in this case does not reflect that
the acquittal on the charge of gross sexual [assault] was based on a finding that
no such oral-genital contact occurred.” Id. at 933 & n.5.
[¶16] Because double jeopardy collateral estoppel did not bar the
admission of the evidence, we next considered whether the evidence was
otherwise inadmissible. Id. We determined that the evidence was not evidence
of prior bad acts rendered inadmissible by M.R. Evid. 404 because it was instead
admitted for the limited purpose of establishing the defendant’s “motive,
opportunity, state of mind and the relationship between the parties,” and
because the court gave an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury that “it
could not consider the evidence as indicative of Dean’s character, see M.R. Evid.
404(b), and that Dean could not be convicted of unlawful sexual contact based
on that evidence of oral-genital contact.” Dean, 589 A.2d at 932-33 & n.5. We
further concluded that the admission of the evidence was not unfairly
prejudicial pursuant to M.R. Evid. 403. Dean, 589 A.2d at 933.
[¶17] To evaluate a double jeopardy collateral estoppel argument, we
conduct a case-by-case inquiry by examining the evidence presented and the
theory of the defense in the first trial compared to the charges levied and the
12
evidence offered in the second trial. See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 347-48; Ashe,
397 U.S. at 444. In particular, the Supreme Court in Ashe required as follows:
[T]his approach requires a court to examine the record of a prior
proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge,
and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury
could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that
which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. The
inquiry must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to
all the circumstances of the proceedings.
397 U.S. at 444 (footnote omitted) (quotation marks omitted); see United States
v. Bravo-Fernandez, 790 F.3d 41, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting that the jury
instructions and the parties’ closing arguments are particularly useful in this
inquiry). It is Weckerly’s burden to demonstrate that, by “any reasonable
assessment of the verdict,” the ultimate issue for which the evidence was
offered in his second trial was necessarily decided in his first trial.7
Bravo-Fernandez, 790 F.3d at 54 (quotation marks omitted); see Dowling,
493 U.S. at 350.
7 Neither the Supreme Court nor we have set forth the means by which that burden must be met
or how it is reviewed on appeal, that is, whether Weckerly’s burden was to establish that the ultimate
issue was decided in the first trial as a matter of fact before the trial court (and whether we therefore
review the court’s factual determination for clear error on appeal), or whether Weckerly’s burden is
to establish before us that the ultimate issue was decided in the first trial as a matter of law (and
whether we therefore review the record from the first trial on a de novo basis). We need not address
this portion of the analysis in any detail in this matter, however, because by either approach, our
conclusion is the same.
13
[¶18] We now compare Weckerly’s two trials according to this
procedure. As applied here, the ultimate issue that bears on the application of
double jeopardy collateral estoppel is whether Weckerly committed arson on
Jones’s or Dreon’s property or criminal mischief on Couture’s property. We
must therefore ascertain whether the jury in the first trial necessarily acquitted
Weckerly on the eleven counts on the ground that he was not the person who
committed arson on Jones’s or Dreon’s property or criminal mischief on
Couture’s property, or whether the jury could have acquitted Weckerly based
on some finding other than the identification of Weckerly as the actor—for
example, (1) as to the arson charges, that no fires were set at all, that the fires
were not set with the intent to damage or destroy the property, or that the fires
did not recklessly endanger any person or property, and (2) as to the criminal
mischief charge, that no spray-painting occurred, that Weckerly spray-painted
Couture’s property but lacked the requisite intent in doing so, that the property
belonged to Weckerly rather than to Couture, that the graffiti did not damage
or destroy the property, or that Weckerly had reasonable grounds to believe he
had the right to spray-paint the property. See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 802(1)(A), (B)(2),
806(1)(A). If the jury in Weckerly’s first trial rationally could have acquitted
him only on the ground that he was not the perpetrator of those crimes, the
14
prohibition of double jeopardy demands that any evidence presented by the
State to prove Weckerly was the perpetrator of those crimes in the first trial is
inadmissible for any purpose in the second trial. If the jury in the first trial
rationally could have acquitted Weckerly on some ground other than his
identification as the perpetrator, the evidence relating to those crimes was
admissible in the second trial as long as it was “relevant and probative” and
“otherwise admissible under the Rules of Evidence.” Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348.
[¶19] The trial court explicitly found that “there is little doubt that the
basis for the jury’s decision [in the first trial] was that the State had not proven,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Weckerly] was the person who had
committed the acts alleged.”8 Our review of Weckerly’s first trial unequivocally
leads us to the same conclusion. In particular, we note the following aspects of
Weckerly’s first trial:
• In seeking the exclusion of certain evidence, Weckerly’s attorney argued
that evidence regarding other crimes in the area was not relevant and
was unfairly prejudicial because “there’s nothing linking any of these
other crimes in this area during this two-year period to Mr. Weckerly,”
but did not argue that those other crimes were not committed at all.
• In Weckerly’s brief cross-examination of Couture after Couture’s
testimony about how someone had spray-painted graffiti on his
8 As noted, the judge who presided over the second trial had also presided over the first trial. His
determination that the acquittals were due to the jury’s decision that the State had failed to prove
that Weckerly had committed the crimes charged was never challenged by the State.
15
property, Weckerly did not ask a single question regarding the graffiti on
Couture’s property.
• After John Dreon’s initial testimony regarding the burning of his camp,
Weckerly asked Dreon no questions on cross-examination.
• After another witness testified regarding the fire at Dreon’s camp,
Weckerly again asked no questions on cross-examination.
• Weckerly himself took the stand and gave the following testimony on
direct examination and on cross-examination:
Q: . . . . Now, John, did you spray-paint anybody else’s property?
A: No. As a matter of fact, I don’t ever go off my property except
when I go into town to go to the store.
. . . .
Q: Now, John, you believe there’s a certain group of people
responsible for these problems that--that’s going on in
Prentiss Township, right?
A: Um--yeah. I have always thought that it was the logging
company, but I’m not--you know, I mean, that’s just my
personal opinion.
. . . .
Q: [H]ow firm was your belief that the logging company or
someone associated with the logging company was involved
in what was going on in Prentiss Township?
A: Virtually a hundred percent. . . .
. . . .
16
Q: Who is that [referring to a photograph taken by a game
camera set up in the area of the crimes]?
A: Not me. Do you want me to tell you who I thought that it was?
You know, there’s several different people that I thought it
might have been.
Q: Now, Mr. Weckerly--
A: It’s not me, though.
. . . .
Q: Did you spray-paint that sign there . . . ?
A: No.
. . . .
Q: Did you put that black lettering on Mr. Couture’s shed?
A: No.
[¶20] The record of Weckerly’s first trial therefore establishes no
challenge to whether, when, or how the alleged crimes occurred; Weckerly
defended the counts for arson and criminal mischief (Counts 9-12) based only
on the ground that he was not the person who had perpetrated those crimes.
Because the jury in Weckerly’s first trial necessarily found that Weckerly was
not the person who set fire to Jones’s or Dreon’s property, and was not the
person who spray-painted Couture’s property, evidence that Weckerly was the
person who committed those acts was not admissible in his second trial for any
17
purpose.9 See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348-49; Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444-46. We
therefore conclude that the admission of that evidence was barred by collateral
estoppel and violated Weckerly’s right to be protected from double jeopardy.
[¶21] We also conclude that the error was not harmless, at least as to the
three arson charges. Cf. M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity,
or variance that does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”). In
particular, the circumstantial evidence of Weckerly’s role in the prior arsons
9 Notwithstanding its determination that the failure of proof that Weckerly was the perpetrator
of the prior arsons and criminal mischief was the only rational ground for the jury’s acquittal, the
trial court concluded that the evidence was admissible in Weckerly’s second trial, reasoning, “Such a
finding does not, however, preclude the State from offering evidence that [Weckerly] was the person
who did those very same crimes under the lesser preponderance of the evidence standard.”
There are two ways in which a preponderance standard could be triggered in these
circumstances. First, a failure to prove a particular fact beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case
does not preclude the government from offering evidence of that same fact in a subsequent civil
matter, such as a forfeiture proceeding, in which the preponderance of the evidence standard applies.
Dowling, 493 U.S. at 349; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235-36 (1972)
(per curiam). This type of analysis has no application here, where the beyond a reasonable doubt
analysis applies to both trials at issue.
The second means by which a preponderance standard is triggered in a subsequent criminal trial
is based on the rule of Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988). In that case, the Supreme
Court held that when a trial court must decide whether to admit evidence of a conditional fact, see
Fed. R. Evid. 104—such as evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts as an exception to Fed. R. Evid.
404(b)—the court need only conclude that “the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact, [i.e.,
that the defendant did the prior act,] by a preponderance of the evidence.” Huddleston, 485 U.S. at
690. Such an analysis, however, would apply to the court’s determination of the admissibility of
evidence only after it has been determined that the double jeopardy collateral estoppel hurdle does
not bar its admission. See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348. Huddleston was not a double jeopardy case, and
the preponderance standard enunciated in Huddleston has no application in evaluating, as a matter
of law, the threshold issue of double jeopardy collateral estoppel. Indeed, we relied on Huddleston in
discussing the admissibility of the evidence at issue in State v. Dean, but not in relation to double
jeopardy collateral estoppel; we instead cited to Huddleston in our discussion of the admissibility of
the evidence for purposes of establishing the defendant’s motive and opportunity after we had
already concluded that no double jeopardy collateral estoppel violation had occurred. 589 A.2d 929,
933 n.5 (Me. 1991).
18
likely served as a major component of the jury’s findings that Weckerly had
both the means and motivation to also set fire to the fire marshal’s vehicle.
Given the similarity of the acts and the timing and location of the prior arsons,
we cannot say that the evidence had no effect on the jury’s verdict. Cf. State v.
Larsen, 2013 ME 38, ¶¶ 23-24, 65 A.3d 1203 (defining an error as harmless if it
“did not contribute to the verdict obtained” (quotation marks omitted)).
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Hunter J. Tzovarras, Esq. (orally), Bangor, for appellant John A. Weckerly
R. Christopher Almy, District Attorney, and Mark A. Rucci, Asst. Dist. Atty.
(orally), Prosecutorial District V, Bangor, for appellee State of Maine
Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2011-2754
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY