Jason Young v. Toni M. King , 208 A.3d 762 ( 2019 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2019 ME 78Docket: Cum-18-325
Argued: February 6, 2019
Decided: May 21, 2019
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Concurrence: JABAR, J., and SAUFLEY, C.J.
JASON YOUNG
v.
TONI M. KING
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Jason Young appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(Portland, Cashman, J.) dismissing, for lack of standing, his complaint seeking to
be determined a de facto parent of Toni M. King’s adopted child. See 19-A M.R.S.
§ 1891(2) (2018). Young argues that the court abused its discretion in
declining to hold a hearing to determine disputed facts and in concluding that
King’s refusal to allow Young to adopt the child was dispositive of the issue of
whether King understood, acknowledged, or accepted that, or behaved as
though, Young was a parent to the child. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)(C) (2018).
We clarify the process, vacate the judgment, and remand for further
proceedings.
2
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The court stated in its judgment that, for purposes of its standing
determination, it accepted the statements contained in the affidavits that Young
submitted on the question of standing.1 Except where indicated otherwise, the
following facts are drawn from those affidavits and from the procedural record.
[¶3] Young and King began dating in 2004. In 2005, the couple
purchased a house together in Limerick, and King, as a single prospective
adoptive parent, applied to adopt a child through an adoption agency. Young
and King had decided to adopt together but were told by the adoption agency
that although they would be identified as a couple in internal documents, his
name could not be mentioned in international documents because many
countries required potential adoptive parents to either be a single woman or
an established married couple. The plan, according to Young, was for him to
adopt the child after King first adopted the child as a single parent.
[¶4] In 2007, King accepted a referral to adopt a six-month-old child from
India. In February 2008, the couple travelled to India to bring the child back to
their home in Limerick. King adopted the child in December 2008 but then told
Young that she was not going to allow him to also adopt the child. Nevertheless,
1As noted below, many of Young’s averments of material facts are sharply contradicted in King’s
affidavits.
3
the three continued to live in their home until November 2011. King agrees in
her affidavit that, during that time, Young played with the child, cooked for the
family, and transported the child to and from daycare. Young avers that he was
involved in raising the child in many other ways, including contributing to the
child’s healthcare by paying for her chiropractic appointments out of pocket, to
the child’s daycare by giving King a check every month to cover half of the costs,
and to the child’s participation in certain activities by enrolling the child in
gymnastics camp, inter alia.
[¶5] King at some point began dating a new partner, and in
November 2011, she and the child moved into King’s new partner’s home,
which is located approximately 150 miles from Limerick. Young remained in
the Limerick house and kept the child’s bedroom there intact, leaving most of
her belongings, including her cat, at the house. For several years following the
move, the child generally spent every other weekend with Young at the
Limerick house, as well as some time during school vacations and summers. In
March 2016, when the Limerick house was sold, Young purchased a new house
that included a bedroom for the child. By April 2018, Young’s opportunities for
visitation with the child had become increasingly inconsistent, and he brought
4
a complaint for a determination of parentage, parental rights, and
responsibilities.
[¶6] King moved to dismiss Young’s complaint for lack of standing to be
determined a de facto parent. Based on the filings, the court agreed and
dismissed Young’s complaint for lack of standing. The court found that because
King did not allow Young to adopt the child and did not otherwise regard Young
as the child’s father, Young failed to show that King understood, acknowledged,
or accepted Young as a co-parent, and Young therefore lacked standing to seek
an adjudication of de facto parenthood. Young moved for reconsideration on
the issue of standing and for a hearing, which the court denied, again finding
that had King behaved as though Young were the child’s father she would have
allowed him to become an adoptive parent. Young appeals. See 14 M.R.S.
§ 1901(1) (2018); 19-A M.R.S. § 104 (2018); M.R. App. P. 2A.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶7] Young argues that the court erred by determining that he failed to
establish standing. The court made its standing determination pursuant to the
de facto parentage framework prescribed in the Maine Parentage Act (MPA),
see 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3) (2018). “We examine the legal aspects of a court’s
standing determination de novo and review for clear error the factual findings
5
underlying that determination.” Lamkin v. Lamkin, 2018 ME 76, ¶ 10,
186 A.3d 1276.
[¶8] Pursuant to the MPA, “a party who files a complaint to be
adjudicated a de facto parent of a child must make an initial showing of standing
that will determine whether the court will hold a plenary hearing on the
ultimate question of whether that person is a de facto parent.” Davis v. McGuire,
2018 ME 72, ¶ 13, 186 A.3d 837; see 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2). To demonstrate
standing, the claimant must satisfy, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
statutory elements laid out in section 1891(3) of the MPA. See Davis,
2018 ME 72, ¶¶ 15, 26, 186 A.3d 837. The standing determination is a
multi-step process. Id. ¶ 15.
First, the claimant is required to file an affidavit along with the
complaint, stating “specific facts” that track the elements of a
de facto parenthood claim. [19-A M.R.S.] § 1891(2)(A). Next, the
adverse party may file a responsive affidavit along with a
responsive pleading. Id. § 1891(2)(B). Finally, the court is to
review the parties’ submissions and either make a determination
based on the parties’ submissions whether the claimant has
demonstrated standing, or, “in its sole discretion, if necessary and
on an expedited basis, hold a hearing to determine disputed facts
that are necessary and material to the issue of standing.” Id.
§ 1891(2)(C).
Id. The claimant has the burden to present persuasive evidence of the
elements of standing—meaning that the proof must be by a
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preponderance—“irrespective of whether the court adjudicates the issue
based on the papers or on evidence presented at a hearing.” Id. ¶¶ 19, 24,
26. The required elements are that
A. The person has resided with the child for a significant period of
time;
B. The person has engaged in consistent caretaking of the child;
C. A bonded and dependent relationship has been established
between the child and the person, the relationship was fostered or
supported by another parent of the child and the person and the
other parent have understood, acknowledged or accepted that or
behaved as though the person is a parent of the child;
D. The person has accepted full and permanent responsibilities as
a parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation;
and
E. The continuing relationship between the person and the child is
in the best interest of the child.
19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)(A)-(E).2 In this case, the court founded its conclusion
that Young lacked standing on its determination that Young could not show that
King acknowledged that he was a parent because she did not allow him to adopt
the child. See id. § 1891(3)(C).
2 In our decisions preceding enactment of the MPA “we held that, in order to establish the
compelling state interest needed to justify governmental interference with a parent-child
relationship, the [claimant] must prove the existence of ‘exceptional circumstances.’” Davis v.
McGuire, 2018 ME 72, ¶ 15 n.7, 186 A.3d 837. We noted in Davis that because the statutory elements
found in 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3) (2018) do not include this requirement, there remains a question as
to “whether proof of the elements alone is a constitutionally adequate foundation for a de facto
parenthood determination.” Id. As in Davis, we need not reach that question in this matter because
the preliminary standing issue has not yet been properly determined. See id.
7
[¶9] On the facts presented, the court’s treatment of the single fact of
King’s refusal to allow Young to adopt as dispositive in the standing analysis
constitutes an error of law. We have recognized that a legal parent can refuse
to allow a claimant to adopt a child yet still consent to the parental role that the
claimant has played in the child’s life. For example, in Kilborn v. Carey, we
reasoned that a legal parent “implicitly, if not explicitly, consented to and
encouraged [a claimant]’s parental role” when the legal parent “admitted that
he only saw his daughter twice over the course of four years, he was not there
for many of her firsts, and he respected the role that [the claimant] played in
her life during that time.” 2016 ME 78, ¶¶ 19-20, 140 A.3d 461 (quotation
marks omitted). Even though “he did not wish to allow the child to be adopted,
he was not opposed to [the claimant] effectively serving as her father.” Id. ¶ 20.
We held that this evidence established that the legal parent intended for the
claimant to be a parent to the child “despite [the legal parent]’s peripheral
presence and objection to formal adoption.” Id. ¶ 21.
[¶10] Although Young concedes that King did not allow him to adopt the
child, that does not necessarily mean that she did not otherwise understand,
acknowledge, or accept that “a bonded and dependent relationship has been
established between” the child and Young, or behave as though Young was a
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parent to the child. 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)(C); see also American Law Institute,
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 2.03, cmt. c (2002) (“Failure to
adopt the child when it would have been possible is some evidence, although
not dispositive, that the legal parent did not agree to the formation of the
de facto parent relationship.”). To determine whether Young presented
persuasive evidence of the statutory requirements, the court was therefore
required to review all of the facts proffered by the parties in their affidavits that
were material to the issue of standing. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2)(C).
[¶11] Given that many of the other facts material to the issue of standing
were contested by the parties and that, if believed, Young’s version of the facts
could have led to a finding that he had standing, the court should have held a
hearing to determine those disputed facts. As we have stated, the court acts
within its discretion by declining to hold a hearing on standing when the
assertions in the petitioner’s affidavits, even if accepted as true, could not
support a conclusion that the petitioner has standing. Davis, 2018 ME 72, ¶ 26
n.9, 186 A.3d 837. This means that, as is true here, where the standing
determination will rest on the resolution of material facts that the parties have
disputed in their affidavits, a hearing will be necessary to allow the court to
9
hear from witnesses and evaluate evidence in order to adjudicate those
contested facts.3
[¶12] Thus, although the decision of whether to conduct an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of standing is within the sole discretion of the court, see
19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2)(C), the conflicting facts presented by the parties’
affidavits created bona fide issues of material fact relating to whether King
“behaved as though [Young] is a parent of the child.” Id. § 1891(3)(C). Cf.
In re Estate of Wright, 637 A.2d 106, 109 (Me. 1994) (stating that “the
allowance of attorney fees and costs rests within the sole discretion of the
Probate Court” and that “[t]he general standard of reviewing a Probate Court’s
decision on a request for fees . . . is the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard” (quotation
marks omitted)); Most v. Most, 477 A.2d 250, 260 (Me. 1984) (“The decision
whether to hold a hearing is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of
discretion.”). For example, Young claims in his affidavit that King allowed the
child to call him “Dad” or “Daddy,” King purchased Father’s Day cards for the
child to give to Young, and King allowed others in the community, such as the
child’s daycare provider, to understand Young to be the child’s father. See
3 We emphasize that the mere existence of disputed facts in the affidavits of the parties is
insufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing; the disputed facts must be necessary and material to
the issue of standing before a hearing is convened pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2)(C).
10
19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2)(A). Resolution of these contested facts—and any other
disputed facts material to the issue of standing—is necessary in this case.
[¶13] On remand, if, after holding an evidentiary hearing, the court
concludes that Young has established standing, Young must still prove a
de facto parent relationship by clear and convincing evidence at a plenary
hearing, see id. § 1891(3); Davis, 2018 ME 72, ¶ 26, 186 A.3d 837.4 Requiring a
preliminary hearing on the issue of standing where, as here, material facts are
contested appropriately balances our recognition that parental rights disputes
can be heavily factbound and that “[t]he facts are often infused with nuances
and coated with an emotional overlay,” Kinter v. Nichols, 1999 ME 11, ¶ 7,
722 A.2d 1274, with our concern for infringement on the fundamental right to
parent, see Davis, 2018 ME 72, ¶ 14, 186 A.3d 837.
4 The court may convene a single consolidated hearing addressing both standing and de facto
parenthood after consideration of (1) the relative complexity of the factual issues of standing and de
facto parenthood; (2) the time and expense involved in conducting separate hearings on those
subjects; and (3) the benefits and burdens upon the parties—including the disruption, caused by the
de facto parentage proceeding, of the legal parent’s constitutionally protected relationship with the
child, see Davis, 2018 ME 72, ¶ 14, 186 A.3d 837—that would be presented by separate hearings as
opposed to a single hearing that addresses both subjects.
At such a consolidated hearing, the court must first adjudicate the question of standing by
applying the preponderance standard of proof. If standing is established, the court may then proceed
to adjudicate the merits of the de facto parentage petition by applying the standard of clear and
convincing evidence. Competent evidence admitted in conjunction with the standing determination
may be considered, to the extent that it is relevant, in the adjudication of the merits of the petition.
11
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for an evidentiary
hearing.
JABAR, J., with whom SAUFLEY, C.J., joins, concurring.
[¶14] We concur with the Court’s opinion remanding the case to the trial
court, but we do not agree that it is necessary for the trial court to conduct a
hearing on the issue of standing. The record in this matter already establishes
sufficient undisputed facts constituting prima facie evidence of standing and
allow the court to reach the merits. Requiring a full hearing on standing, on this
record, will simply result in more costs for all parties.
[¶15] The de facto parentage section of the Maine Parentage Act (MPA)
sets out the procedure that a court must follow when a person seeks to be
adjudicated a de facto parent. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891 (2018). The procedure
begins with a determination of standing pursuant to § 1891(2)(A)-(D),5 which
consists of a multi-step process.
5 In order to establish standing pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2) (2018), the Legislature has
enacted the following process:
A. A person seeking to be adjudicated a de facto parent of a child shall file with the
initial pleadings an affidavit alleging under oath specific facts to support the existence
of a de facto parent relationship with the child as set forth in subsection 3. The
pleadings and affidavit must be served upon all parents and legal guardians of the
child and any other party to the proceeding.
12
[¶16] First the claimant is required to file an affidavit with the complaint
seeking de facto parentage alleging under oath “specific facts” that track the
elements of a de facto parent relationship. Id. § 1891(2)(A). Next, an adverse
party may file a response to the putative de facto parent’s pleading and
affidavit. Id. § 1891(2)(B). Then, pursuant to § 1891(2)(C), the court must
review the parties’ submissions and determine whether the putative de facto
parent has presented prima facie evidence of the requirements set forth in
§ 1891(3)(A)-(E).6
B. An adverse party, parent or legal guardian who files a pleading in response to the
pleadings in paragraph A shall also file an affidavit in response, serving all parties to
the proceeding with a copy.
C. The court shall determine on the basis of the pleadings and affidavits under
paragraphs A and B whether the person seeking to be adjudicated a de facto parent
has presented prima facie evidence of the requirements set forth in subsection 3. The
court may in its sole discretion, if necessary and on an expedited basis, hold a hearing
to determine disputed facts that are necessary and material to the issue of standing.
D. If the court’s determination under paragraph C is in the affirmative, the party
claiming de facto parentage has standing to proceed to adjudication under subsection
3.
6 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)(A)-(E) sets forth the following requirement:
[T]hat the person has fully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal,
committed and responsible parental role in the child’s life. Such a finding requires a
determination by the court that:
A: The person has resided with the child for a significant period of time;
B: The person has engaged in consistent caretaking of the child;
C: A bonded and dependent relationship has been established between the
child and the person, the relationship was fostered or supported by another
parent of the child and the person and the other parent have understood,
13
[¶17] “Prima facie evidence requires only some evidence on every
element of proof necessary to obtain the desired remedy [or judgment].”
Camden Nat’l Bank v. Weintraub, 2016 ME 101, ¶ 11, 143 A.3d 788 (quotation
marks omitted); Cookson v. State, 2014 ME 24, ¶ 16, 86 A.3d 1186.
“[P]rima facie proof is a low standard that does not depend on the reliability or
the credibility of evidence, all of which may be considered at some later time in
the process.” Weintraub, 2016 ME 101, ¶ 11, 143 A.3d 788 (quotation marks
omitted). Thus, “prima facie evidence” requires only some evidence on every
element of proof necessary to establish standing to seek a de facto parentage
claim as set out in § 1891(3).
[¶18] If the presented evidence is uncontested, then the court must
accept the evidence as true and determine whether the uncontested evidence
constitutes prima facie evidence of the statutory elements laid out in § 1891(3)
of the MPA. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2)(C); see also Weintraub, 2016 ME 101,
¶¶ 11-17, 143 A.3d 788; Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2012 ME 57, ¶¶ 33-35,
acknowledged or accepted that or behaved as though the person is a parent
of the child;
D: The person has accepted full and permanent responsibilities as a parent of
the child without expectation of financial compensation; and
E: The continuing relationship between the person and the child is in the best
interest of the child.
14
41 A.3d 551. If there are competing affidavits, then the court must determine
whether there are undisputed facts contained within the competing affidavits
that constitute prima facie evidence of the required elements under § 1891(3).
See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2)(C). Absent undisputed facts that are sufficient to
constitute prima facie evidence, the court must hold a hearing to consider the
disputed facts that are necessary and material to the issue of standing. See
Marie v. Renner, 2008 ME 73, ¶¶ 3-10, 946 A.2d 418 (holding that an
evidentiary hearing was required before the trial court could rule on a motion
to enforce); Seacoast Hangar Condo. II Ass’n v. Martel, 2001 ME 112, ¶ 28,
775 A.2d 1166 (“The court erred in determining, without conducting an
evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual issues in dispute . . . . We remand for
such a hearing.”); State v. Willoughby, 532 A.2d 1020, 1024 (Me. 1987) (“The
receipt of testimony is an essential aspect of a court’s hearing and resolving of
legal disputes.”).
[¶19] Although the parties’ affidavits do contain disputed facts, they also
contain many undisputed facts concerning the relationship between Young and
the child. The undisputed facts establish the following narrative:
[¶20] When King traveled to India to pick up her adopted daughter,
Young traveled with her. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)(C). Young signed a “father
15
figure” letter on paperwork associated with the adoption. See id.
§ 1891(3)(C)-(D). Upon returning from India with the child, Young and King
lived together in a jointly-owned house in Limerick, Maine. See id.
§ 1891(3)(A), (C). During the three years in Limerick, when the parties lived
together, Young took part in the child’s day-to-day caretaking duties, including
sharing diaper changing duties with King, reading stories to the child before
bedtime, frequently making meals for the family, helping the child with daily
hygiene such as brushing her hair and teeth, and picking up the child from day
care once a week—where he was listed as the child’s father. See id.
§ 1891(B)-(D).
[¶21] Between February 2008 and April 2011—the time when King left
the household and moved to Hampden—the child called Young “Daddy” and
sent Young cards from day care referring to him as her daddy. See id.
§ 1891(3)(C), (E). The child continued to send Young Father’s Day and birthday
cards as recently as January 13, 2018. See id. § 1891(3)(C), (E).
[¶22] When King moved to Hampden with the child, who was
5-years-old at the time, she and Young worked out a visitation schedule where
Young would have visitation with the child every other weekend. See id.
§ 1891(3)(A)-(D). Under this arrangement, Young traveled a distance of
16
approximately 150 miles each way to pick up the child on Thursday and drop
her off on Sunday. See id. § 1891(3)(A)-(D). For the first four years of this
visitation schedule, when the child was with Young on the weekends and during
extended visits, the child lived in the same house and in the same bedroom
where she had spent the first three years of her adopted life in Limerick. Young
had maintained the child’s bedroom and took care of the child’s cat following
his split with King. See id. § 1891(3)(B)-(D). When Young moved to Portland
following the sale of the Limerick house in 2016, he maintained a bedroom for
the child and continued to care for her cat. See id. § 1891(3)(B)-(D).
[¶23] The visitation scheduled continued religiously for seven years, see
id. § 1891(3)(A)-(D), until King unilaterally stopped visitation in April 2018. Up
until April 2018, the child referred to Young as her father; in a birthday card
sent from the child to Young on January 13, 2018, the child wrote: “Happy
birthday to a dad I love and a dad I will always love and I will never stop loving
you DaD because I LOVE YOU SO MUCH.” See id. § 1891(C), (E).
[¶24] Notwithstanding the presence of disputed facts, the above
narrative of undisputed facts constitute sufficient prima facie evidence of all of
the elements contained in § 1891(3). The focus must be on the relationship
between Young and the child, not on the relationship between King and Young.
17
It is undisputed that Young, King, and the child lived together as a family in
Limerick, and the child considered Young to be her father. After King moved to
Hampden with the child, this relationship continued. The seven years of
visitation present in this case is no different than the relationship that is
commonplace with divorce cases. There is no dispute that the child considered
Young to be “Daddy” during those many years. For these reasons, Young has
presented prima facie evidence to establish standing to bring a de facto
parentage claim.
[¶25] Standing is a preliminary hurdle that putative de facto parents
must overcome to get their day in court where they must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the elements pursuant to § 1891(3). Under the statute, a
finding of standing in no way establishes those elements; it is simply a
gatekeeping function to ensure that only legitimate cases of de facto
parenthood proceed. After satisfying the standing requirement, the putative
de facto parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence the necessary
elements under § 1891(3).
[¶26] At this juncture of the case, the undisputed facts present a
legitimate claim of de facto parentage. There is no need for a hearing on this
18
preliminary matter. We would remand for a hearing on the merits of Young’s
petition for de facto parentage. 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)-(4).
Timothy E. Robbins, Esq. (orally), South Portland, for appellant Jason Young
Audrey B. Braccio, Esq. (orally), Pelletier & Faircloth LLC, Bangor, for appellee
Toni M. King
Portland District Court docket number FM-2018-445
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY