Daniel R. Lalonde v. Central Maine Medical Center , 2017 Me. LEXIS 23 ( 2017 )


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  • MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT	                                          Reporter	of	Decisions
    Decision:	 
    2017 ME 22
    Docket:	   And-16-68
    Argued:	   November	9,	2016
    Decided:	  January	31,	2017
    Panel:	       SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.
    DANIEL	R.	LALONDE
    v.
    CENTRAL	MAINE	MEDICAL	CENTER
    ALEXANDER,	J.
    [¶1]		Central	Maine	Medical	Center	(CMMC)	has	filed	this	interlocutory
    appeal	 from	 an	 order	 of	 the	 Superior	 Court	 (Androscoggin	 County,
    MG	Kennedy,	 J.)	 denying	 CMMC’s	 motion	 to	 dismiss,	 based	 on	 a	 claim	 of
    immunity	pursuant	to	24	M.R.S.	§	2511	(2016),	a	complaint	brought	by	Daniel
    R.	Lalonde	seeking	indemnification	for	expenses	he	incurred	in	defense	of	an
    administrative	proceeding	initiated	by	the	Board	of	Licensure	in	Medicine	(the
    Board).		We	reach	the	merits	of	this	appeal,	determine	that	section	2511	of	the
    Maine	 Health	 Security	 Act	 does	 not	 render	 CMMC	 immune	 from	 Lalonde’s
    contractual	claim	for	reimbursement,	and	affirm	the	trial	court’s	order.
    2
    I.		CASE	HISTORY
    [¶2]	 	 The	 following	 facts,	 which	 we	 view	 as	 admitted	 for	 purposes	 of
    this	 appeal	 from	 a	 ruling	 on	 a	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 12(b)(6)	 motion	 to	 dismiss,	 are
    drawn	 from	 Lalonde’s	 complaint.	 	 See	 Andrews	 v.	 Sheepscot	 Island	 Co.,
    
    2016 ME 68
    ,	¶	2,	
    138 A.3d 1197
    .
    [¶3]	 	 CMMC	 is	 a	 nonprofit	 corporation	 which	 operates	 an	 acute	 care
    hospital	 with	 its	 principal	 place	 of	 business	 in	 Lewiston.	 	 Lalonde	 is	 a
    physician	 licensed	 to	 practice	 in	 Maine.	 	 He	 became	 employed	 by	 CMMC	 in
    June	 2005	 under	 a	 “Physician	 Employment	 Agreement”	 drafted	 by	 CMMC.
    The	 employment	 agreement	 provided	 that	 CMMC	 could	 terminate	 Lalonde’s
    employment	with	or	without	cause.		On	June	21,	2012,	CMMC	notified	Lalonde
    that	it	was	terminating	his	employment	without	cause.
    [¶4]	 	 On	 August	 6,	 2012,	 CMMC,	 referencing	 24	M.R.S.	 §	 2506	 (2016),
    notified	 the	 Board	 that	 it	 had	 terminated	 Lalonde’s	 employment	 “because	 of
    concerns	 about	 his	 clinical	 competence	 and	 behavior”	 as	 an	 employee	 of
    CMMC.1		As	a	result	of	CMMC’s	report,	the	Board	initiated	an	investigation	of
    Lalonde.
    1		The	Maine	Health	Security	Act,	at	24	M.R.S.	§	2506	(2016),	requires	that	a	health	care	provider
    report	to	the	appropriate	board	or	authority	when	it	terminates	an	employee	for	reasons	related	to
    the	employee’s	clinical	competence	or	unprofessional	conduct.
    3
    [¶5]	 	 CMMC’s	 corporate	 bylaws	 provide	 that	 CMMC	 will	 indemnify
    present	 or	 former	 employees	 for	 attorney	 fees	 and	 costs	 associated	 with
    defending	a	court	or	administrative	action	arising	out	of	events	pertaining	to
    their	employment	with	CMMC:
    This	corporation	shall	in	all	cases	indemnify	any	person	who	was
    or	is	a	party	.	.	.	to	any	threatened,	pending	or	completed	action,
    suit,	 or	 proceeding,	 whether	 civil,	 criminal,	 or	 administrative,	 by
    reason	of	the	fact	that	that	person	was	a[n]	.	.	.	employee	or	agent
    of	 the	 corporation,	 against	 expenses,	 including	 attorney	 fees	 .	 .	 .
    actually	and	reasonably	incurred	by	the	person	in	connection	with
    such	action,	suit	or	proceeding;	provided	that	no	indemnification
    shall	 be	 made	 for	 any	 person	 with	 respect	 to	 any	 matter	 unless
    the	 Board	 of	 Trustees	 .	 .	 .	 determines	 that	 that	 person	 acted	 in
    good	faith	in	the	reasonable	belief	that	his	or	her	actions	were	in
    the	best	interests	of	the	corporation	.	.	.	.
    [¶6]		Independent	of	any	rights	conferred	by	the	bylaws	or	employment
    contracts	 of	 a	 nonprofit	 corporation,	 the	 Maine	 Nonprofit	 Corporation	 Act,
    13-B	M.R.S.	§§	101-1406	(2016),	at	section	714(2),	provides	that:
    [an]	employee	or	agent	of	a	corporation	[who]	has	been	successful
    on	 the	 merits	 or	 otherwise	 in	 defense	 of	 any	 action,	 suit	 or
    proceeding	 [to	 which	 he	 was	 made	 a	 party	 by	 reason	 of	 his
    employment],	.	.	.	shall	be	indemnified	against	expenses,	including
    attorneys’	 fees,	 actually	 and	 reasonably	 incurred	 by	 him	 in
    connection	therewith.
    [¶7]		In	November	2012	and	April	2014,	Lalonde	requested	that	CMMC
    indemnify	 him	 for	 all	 expenses,	 including	 attorney	 fees,	 incurred	 during	 the
    pendency	of	the	Board’s	proceeding.		CMMC	declined	the	requests.		On	July	11,
    4
    2014,	the	Board	notified	Lalonde	that	it	had	dismissed	the	complaint	against
    him.	 	 Lalonde	 again	 requested	 indemnification	 from	 CMMC.	 	 In	 April	 2015,
    CMMC’s	Board	of	Trustees	determined	that	it	would	not	indemnify	Lalonde.
    [¶8]		On	May	7,	2015,	Lalonde	filed	a	complaint	against	CMMC	seeking	a
    judgment—pursuant	to	either	the	Nonprofit	Corporation	Act	or	the	corporate
    bylaws	 of	 CMMC—awarding	 him	 attorney	 fees	 and	 costs	 incurred	 in	 his
    defense	 of	 the	 administrative	 proceeding	 initiated	 by	 the	 Board.	 	 CMMC
    moved	to	dismiss	Lalonde’s	complaint,	arguing	that,	pursuant	to	section	2511
    of	 the	 Maine	 Health	 Security	 Act,	 24	 M.R.S.	 §§	 2501-2988	 (2016),	 CMMC	 is
    absolutely	 immune	 from	 civil	 liability	 for	 making	 its	 report,	 pursuant	 to
    section	2506,	to	the	Board.2
    [¶9]	 	 After	 a	 hearing,	 the	 court	 agreed	 with	 CMMC	 that,	 pursuant	 to
    section	 2511,	 CMMC	 is	 absolutely	 immune	 from	 civil	 liability	 for	 reporting
    Lalonde’s	 termination	 to	 the	 Board.	 	 However,	 the	 court	 determined	 that
    Lalonde	 was	 not	 claiming	 damages	 from	 CMMC	 for	 making	 a	 report	 to	 the
    Board.	 	 Instead,	 the	 court	 concluded,	 he	 was	 seeking	 the	 enforcement	 of	 a
    2
    CMMC	 alternatively	 argued	 that	 the	 court	 should	 dismiss	 the	 complaint	 on	 the	 basis	 that
    Lalonde	 will	 be	 unable	 to	 prove	 his	 allegations	 because	 he	 relies	 on	 information	 contained	 in
    confidential	and	privileged	records.		The	court	declined	to	reach	the	issue,	concluding	that	matters
    outside	 the	 complaint,	 including	 the	 admissibility	 of	 evidence,	 are	 not	 considered	 on	 a	 motion	 to
    dismiss	for	failure	to	state	a	claim.		Because	the	provability	of	Lalonde’s	claims	is	not	inextricably
    tied	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 immunity,	 we	 decline	 to	 consider	 the	 issue	 on	 this	 interlocutory	 appeal.	 	 See
    Clifford	v.	MaineGeneral	Med.	Ctr.,	
    2014 ME 60
    ,	¶	75,	
    91 A.3d 567
    .
    5
    contractual	 or	 statutory	 right	 to	 indemnification,	 and	 the	 allegation	 that
    CMMC	 reported	 Lalonde’s	 termination	 to	 the	 Board,	 thus	 triggering	 the
    Board’s	 actions	 against	 Lalonde,	 was	 not	 an	 essential	 fact	 of	 his
    indemnification	 claim.	 	 Thus,	 the	 court	 denied	 CMMC’s	 motion	 to	 dismiss,
    concluding	that	Lalonde’s	claims	were	not	barred	by	CMMC’s	immunity	under
    section	2511	of	the	Maine	Health	Security	Act.		This	appeal	followed.
    II.		LEGAL	ANALYSIS
    A.	   Interlocutory	Appeal.
    [¶10]		CMMC’s	interlocutory	appeal	is	not	barred	by	the	final	judgment
    rule	 because	 CMMC	 asserts	 a	 claim	 of	 immunity	 pursuant	 to	 section	 2511.
    Interlocutory	appeals	are	allowed	from	orders	denying	motions	to	dismiss	or
    motions	for	summary	judgment	when	the	asserted	basis	for	the	motion	is	the
    complete	 or	 qualified	 immunity	 of	 the	 defendant	 from	 suit.	 	 See	 Estate	 of
    Fortier	v.	City	of	Lewiston,	
    2010 ME 50
    ,	¶	1,	
    997 A.2d 84
    ;	Knowlton	v.	Attorney
    General,	
    2009 ME 79
    ,	¶	10,	
    976 A.2d 973
    ;	Wilcox	v.	City	of	Portland,	
    2009 ME 53
    ,	¶	11,	
    970 A.2d 295
    ;	Hawkes	v.	Commercial	Union	Ins.	Co.,	
    2001 ME 8
    ,	¶	6,
    
    764 A.2d 258
    .
    6
    B.	    Denial	of	Motion	to	Dismiss
    [¶11]		An	affirmative	defense	of	immunity	may	be	raised	by	a	motion	to
    dismiss	 for	 failure	 to	 state	 a	 claim.	 	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 8(c);	 see	 Munjoy	 Sporting
    &	Athletic	Club	v.	Dow,	
    2000 ME 141
    ,	¶	17,	
    755 A.2d 531
    .		When	we	review	a
    trial	 court’s	 denial	 of	 a	 motion	 to	 dismiss	 for	 failure	 to	 state	 a	 claim	 upon
    which	 relief	 can	 be	 granted,	 we	 view	 the	 facts	 alleged	 in	 the	 complaint	 as	 if
    they	 were	 admitted	 and	 in	 the	 light	 most	 favorable	 to	 the	 plaintiff.
    See	Andrews,	 
    2016 ME 68
    ,	 ¶	 8,	 
    138 A.3d 1197
    ;	 see	 also	 Moody	 v.	 State	 Liquor
    &	Lottery	Comm’n,	
    2004 ME 20
    ,	¶	7,	
    843 A.2d 43
    	(stating	that	when	reviewing
    a	ruling	on	a	motion	to	dismiss,	the	complaint	is	examined	“in	the	light	most
    favorable	 to	 the	 plaintiff	 to	 determine	 whether	 it	 sets	 forth	 elements	 of	 a
    cause	 of	 action	 or	 alleges	 facts	 that	 would	 entitle	 the	 plaintiff	 to	 relief
    pursuant	to	some	legal	theory”).
    [¶12]		Section	2511(1)	of	the	Health	Security	Act	grants	immunity	from
    civil	liability	to	a	“health	care	provider,”	such	as	CMMC,	“for	making	any	report
    or	 other	 information	 available	 to	 any	 board,”	 such	 as	 the	 Medical	 Board.
    See	also	 24	 M.R.S.	 §	2502(1),	 (2)	 (2016).	 Specifically,	 24	 M.R.S.	 §	2511(1)
    states:
    7
    Any	 person	 acting	 without	 malice,	 any	 physician,	 podiatrist,
    health	care	provider,	health	care	entity	.	.	.	and	any	entity	required
    to	report	under	this	chapter	are	immune	from	civil	liability:
    1.	 	Reporting.		 For	 making	 any	 report	 or	 other	 information
    available	 to	 any	 board,	 appropriate	 authority,	 professional
    competence	 committee	 or	 professional	 review	 committee
    pursuant	to	law.
    [¶13]		The	specific	terms	of	section	2511	give	CMMC	immunity	from	any
    suit	 claiming	 harm	 by	 defamation,	 slander,	 breach	 of	 contract,	 interference
    with	 an	 expectancy,	 or	 any	 other	 cause	 of	 action	 seeking	 damages	 or	 other
    remedies	 based	 on	 CMMC’s	 report	 to	 the	 Board.	 	 The	 focus	 of	 Lalonde’s
    complaint	is	not	CMMC’s	report	to	the	Board,	but	rather	Lalonde’s	defense	in
    an	 administrative	 action	 before	 a	 professional	 licensing	 board	 and	 CMMC’s
    bylaws	that	entitle	an	employee	to	reimbursement	for	defense	costs.
    [¶14]	 	 To	 obtain	 relief	 under	 a	 contractual	 indemnification	 theory,
    Lalonde	 must	 prove	 that	 (1)	 he	 and	 CMMC	 had	 a	 legally	 binding	 contract,
    (2)	CMMC	 breached	 a	 material	 term	 of	 the	 contract,	 and	 (3)	 CMMC’s	 breach
    caused	 him	 to	 suffer	 damages.	 	 See	 Tobin	 v.	 Barter,	 
    2014 ME 51
    ,	 ¶¶	 9-10,
    
    89 A.3d 1088
    .		Lalonde’s	complaint	satisfies	each	of	the	required	elements.		It
    asserts	that	(1)	CMMC’s	bylaws	created	a	legally	binding	contract	between	the
    hospital	 and	 Lalonde;	 (2)	 CMMC	 breached	 the	 contract’s	 indemnification
    clause;	and	(3)	CMMC’s	breach	caused	him	to	incur	financial	loss.		See	Whalen
    8
    v.	 Down	 East	 Cmty.	 Hosp.,	 
    2009 ME 99
    ,	 ¶	 9,	 
    980 A.2d 1252
    	 (stating	 that
    hospital	bylaws	may	create	a	valid,	enforceable	contract	between	the	hospital
    and	its	staff	physicians).
    [¶15]		To	prevail	on	a	theory	of	statutory	indemnification	under	section
    714(2)	of	the	Nonprofit	Corporation	Act,	Lalonde	must	prove	that	(1)	he	was
    an	 employee	 of	 CMMC,	 (2)	 CMMC	 is	 a	 nonprofit	 hospital,	 (3)	 he	 successfully
    defended	 an	 action	 brought	 against	 him	 by	 reason	 of	 his	 employment	 with
    CMMC,	and	(4)	he	incurred	expenses	as	a	result	of	defending	the	action.		See
    13-B	 M.R.S.	 §	714(2).	 	 Based	 on	 the	 facts	 recounted	 above,	 Lalonde’s
    complaint	 satisfies	 each	 of	 the	 required	 elements	 of	 section	 714(2).	 	 The
    CMMC	 bylaws,	 however,	 are	 more	 favorable	 to	 Lalonde,	 because	 the	 bylaws
    do	 not	 condition	 payment	 on	 a	 successful	 defense	 and	 consequently	 allow
    payment	during,	rather	than	after,	the	proceeding.
    [¶16]	 	 Because	 CMMC’s	 bylaws	 are	 more	 favorable	 to	 Lalonde	 on	 his
    contract	theory	of	recovery,	and	because	the	record	is	unclear	as	to	whether
    the	 Board’s	 dismissal	 of	 the	 complaint	 was	 a	 decision	 based	 on	 a	 successful
    defense	 of	 the	 claim	 or	 on	 some	 other	 grounds	 that	 might	 not	 generate
    liability	 for	 indemnification	 pursuant	 to	 section	 714(2),	 we	 limit	 further
    discussion	to	application	and	interpretation	of	the	CMMC	bylaws.
    9
    [¶17]	 	 To	 generate	 liability	 for	 indemnification,	 the	 bylaws	 do	 not
    require	evidence	of	the	cause	of	an	action	or	investigation,	only	that	a	board
    action	 or	 investigation	 regarding	 an	 employee	 occurred.	 	 While	 the	 Board’s
    action	against	Lalonde	was	prompted	by	a	report	made	by	CMMC,	and	Lalonde
    alleged	that	fact,	perhaps	unnecessarily,	in	his	complaint,	Lalonde’s	complaint
    does	 not	 seek	 to	 hold	 CMMC	 civilly	 liable	 for	 its	 report.	 	 Therefore,	 section
    2511	 is	 inapplicable.	 	 The	 CMMC	 bylaws	 create	 an	 indemnification
    responsibility	regardless	of	the	cause	of	the	investigation	and,	in	effect,	create
    a	contractual	exception	to	section	2511	immunity	when	CMMC	may	initiate	or
    assist	an	action	before	the	Board	that	involves	one	of	its	employees.
    [¶18]		That	the	CMMC	bylaws	create	a	contractual	exception	to	section
    2511	 immunity	 becomes	 more	 apparent	 when	 one	 recognizes	 that	 section
    2511(3)	 extends	 immunity	 to	 any	 activity	 “assisting	 the	 board,	 authority	 or
    committee	 in	 carrying	 out	 any	 of	 its	 duties	 or	 functions	 provided	 by	 law.”
    See	24	M.R.S.	§	2511(3).		To	the	extent	that	CMMC	would	likely	be	called	upon
    to	 provide	 information	 or	 assistance	 in	 most	 investigations	 or	 actions
    regarding	 its	 employees,	 the	 indemnification	 clause	 in	 the	 CMMC	 bylaws
    would	 be	 rendered	 meaningless	 if	 section	 2511	 were	 read,	 as	 CMMC	 argues
    that	section	2511	should	be	read,	to	bar	contractual	indemnification	any	time
    10
    CMMC	initiates,	participates	in,	or	assists	an	action	or	investigation	regarding
    one	of	its	employees.
    [¶19]		Viewing	the	complaint	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	Lalonde,	the
    allegations	 in	 the	 complaint	 are,	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 law,	 sufficient	 to	 overcome	 a
    Rule	12(b)(6)	motion,	because	they	state	the	elements	of	a	cause	of	action	and
    facts	that	would	entitle	Lalonde	to	relief	pursuant	to	some	legal	theory.		Thus,
    CMMC	is	not	immune	from	Lalonde’s	action	for	indemnification	for	the	costs
    of	his	defense.
    The	entry	is:
    Judgment	affirmed.
    Michael	 R.	 Poulin,	 Esq.	 (orally),	 Skelton,	 Taintor	 &	 Abbott,	 Auburn,	 for
    appellant	Central	Maine	Medical	Center
    Christopher	 C.	 Taintor,	 Esq.	 (orally),	 Norman,	 Hanson	 &	 DeTroy,	 LLC,
    Portland,	for	appellee	Daniel	R.	Lalonde
    Androscoggin	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	CV-2015-78
    FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY