In re Child of Domenick B. , 2018 ME 158 ( 2018 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 158 Docket: Han-18-285
Submitted
On Briefs: November 28, 2018
Decided: December 6, 2018
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE CHILD OF DOMENICK B.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Domenick B. appeals from an order of the District Court (Ellsworth,
Roberts, J.) terminating his parental rights to his child.1 He argues that there is
insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding of parental unfitness.
Alternatively, the father argues that the court abused its discretion by
terminating his parental rights rather than imposing a permanency
guardianship. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts, all of which are supported by competent
evidence, are drawn from the court’s judgment and the procedural record. See
In re Children of Nicole M., 2018 ME 75, ¶ 2, 187 A.3d 1. The child was born in
The mother consented to the termination of her parental rights, and we thus focus only
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on the procedural history and findings regarding the father.
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December 2013, while the mother was incarcerated in Colorado. Several
months later, the child’s maternal grandparents brought the child to Maine to
reside with them, and the father followed shortly afterwards. The mother was
released from prison on parole in early 2015 and also returned to Maine.
[¶3] Shortly after the mother’s return to Maine, the father was arrested
for assaulting her with the child present. The Department of Health and Human
Services filed a child protection petition, alleging that the father’s substance
abuse, anger, and domestic violence placed the child at risk of harm. See
22 M.R.S. § 4032 (2017). The court entered a jeopardy order by agreement,
placing the child with her maternal grandparents. See 22 M.R.S. § 4035 (2017).
Among other things, for a successful reunification, the jeopardy order required
the father to participate in a substance abuse evaluation and individual therapy
to address childhood trauma and anger issues, participate in random drug
screening, and refrain from using any nonprescribed mood-altering
substances.
[¶4] In November 2017, the Department filed a petition for termination
of the father’s parental rights. See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2017). A two-day hearing
was held on the petition in May and June 2018. Following the hearing, the court
entered a judgment granting the petition to terminate the father’s parental
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rights after finding that he was unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take
responsibility for her within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s
needs. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii) (2017); In re Thomas D., 2004
ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195.
[¶5] The court’s decision was based on the following findings, all of
which are supported by competent evidence in the record. See In re A.M.,
2012 ME 118, ¶ 29, 55 A.3d 463.
The court finds that [the father] has not participated in
individual therapy to address his childhood trauma issues and how
those may impact his parenting capability. [The father] has not
participated in therapy to work on his anger issues. He began
therapy with [a mental health counselor], participated
sporadically, then discontinued treatment October 20, 2017,
without completing his goals.
[The father] has engaged in substance abuse therapy through
[a] methadone program since July of 2016. He has had negative
tests for opiates through his treatment and reports that his opiate
addiction has been in remission for five years. [The father’s]
substance abuse therapy would be considered successful were it
not for his use of alcohol. [The father] has been on notice since he
began participation in the [methadone treatment] program that
alcohol use is dangerous for him and is therefore prohibited. [The
father] was warned to stop his use of alcohol following a failed
screen on March 13, 2018. He promised to discontinue his use of
alcohol at a subsequent family team meeting. Unfortunately, he
tested positive for alcohol twice since March, including the week
before this hearing. The [c]ourt concludes that substance abuse
therapy has not been completed satisfactorily to this point.
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The court recognizes that [the father] loves his [child] very
much, and he wants very much to reunify with [her]. The court also
has no doubt that [the child] loves [her] father. The court finds,
however, that [the father] has been very inconsistent in his mental
health services, and despite the significant passage of time, he has
made insufficient progress towards alleviating jeopardy.
. . . .
[The father], to his credit, has gained employment and taken
steps toward establishing a home where he can care for [the child].
[The father] has simply not made the effort at reunification that he
should have made . . . .
[The father’s] relationship with [the mother] was marred by
domestic violence and substance abuse. Both parents report a
history of violent behaviors toward each other . . . [and the father]
did not complete the therapy he needed to address and understand
how his own childhood trauma and anger issues may impact his
parenting.
This is an old case, and [the child] needs permanency. The
child has been in the custody of DHHS since August 25, 2016. She
has been in the care of her maternal grandparents, with or without
her parents’ involvement, for most of her life. Despite the length of
time and the numerous opportunities, father has made insufficient
progress and is unable to take responsibility of [the child].
. . . .
[The maternal grandparents] have been providing excellent
care for [the child] . . . . Furthermore, the [maternal grandparents]
recognize the importance of [the child] having an ongoing
relationship with her father to whom she is bonded. The [maternal
grandparents] supported [the mother] and [the father] in their
attempts at rehabilitation. These proceedings have strained the
relationship between the [maternal grandparents] and [the father],
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but, they are willing to work to make sure that [the child] has a
relationship going forward.
. . . .
. . . . Given the length of this case, the lack of progress by the
father, and [the child’s] need for permanency, . . . [the guardian ad
litem] recommends that [the father’s] parental rights be
terminated . . . and the court agrees with her assessment.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Parental Unfitness
[¶6] The father’s main argument is that there is insufficient evidence to
establish his parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. Contrary to
his argument, competent evidence supports the court’s determination that the
father is unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the
child within a time reasonably calculated to meet her needs. See 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii); In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195.
[¶7] Throughout the entirety of this case, the father was on notice that
addressing his mental health concerns and remaining sober were the court’s
and the Department’s main concerns. While the father’s continued sobriety
from opioids is commendable, he was repeatedly warned that positive alcohol
tests would put reunification with his child at risk. Despite this, the father
continued to test positive for alcohol use, including the week prior to the
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termination hearing. Further, the father failed to start mental health treatment
for many months and, even then, was inconsistent in his attendance until
ultimately ceasing all treatment in late October 2017. Accordingly, the court
did not err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father has
failed to alleviate jeopardy or be able to take responsibility for the child despite
an almost two-year effort at reunification. See In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104,
¶¶ 21-22, 854 A.2d 195.
B. Child’s Best Interest
[¶8] The father alternatively argues that even if the court did not err by
determining that he was unfit as a parent, it should have ordered a permanency
guardianship rather than termination of his parental rights. We review the
court’s determination regarding the appropriateness of a permanency
guardianship for an abuse of discretion. See In re Haylie W., 2017 ME 157, ¶ 4,
167 A.3d 576; In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶ 11, 154 A.3d 1199; In re Michaela
C., 2002 ME 159, ¶ 27, 809 A.2d 1245 (“The [court’s] judgment on the issue of
best interest is entitled to substantial deference because that court is able to
directly evaluate the testimony of the witnesses.”).
[¶9] Once a court determines that a parent is unfit, it must also determine
whether termination of that parent’s parental rights is in the child’s best
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interest. 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) (2017); In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114, ¶ 19,
775 A.2d 1144. As an alternative to termination, a court may create a
permanency guardianship as part of a permanency plan “to establish safe,
long-term care for a child who is the subject of a child protection proceeding.”
In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶ 12, 154 A.3d 1199; see 22 M.R.S. § 4038-C
(2017). When appropriate, “a permanency guardianship allows parents whose
child[] cannot be returned to them to have a meaningful opportunity to
maintain a legal relationship with their child[], and to have the court determine
their rights to have contact with their child[].” In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18,
¶ 12, 154 A.3d 1199.
[¶10] Here, the court expressly considered the option of a permanency
guardianship upon the request of the father, but determined that it was not in
the child’s best interest because of substantial strain in the relationship
between the father and the maternal grandparents. See id. ¶ 13 (stating that
tensions between a foster parent and the parents was an appropriate factor for
the court to consider in denying a request for a permanency guardianship). The
child has been in the grandparents’ care for almost her entire life, and the
creation of a permanency guardianship would leave the shadow of future legal
proceedings at a time when the child needs a stable, permanent home. See
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22 M.R.S. §§ 4003(4), 4050(2)-(3), 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) (2017); In re Haylie W.,
2017 ME 157, ¶ 4, 167 A.3d 576. Accordingly, the court did not err or abuse its
discretion in terminating the father’s parental rights. See In re Thomas H.,
2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 297.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Robert Van Horn, Esq., Van Horn Law Office, Ellsworth, for appellant father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Ellsworth District Court docket number PC-2016-16
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY