In re Addilyn R. , 2017 ME 236 ( 2017 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 236Docket: Pen-17-301
Submitted
On Briefs: November 29, 2017
Decided: December 19, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE ADDILYN R.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] The mother of Addilyn R. appeals from a judgment of the District
Court (Bangor, Campbell, J.) terminating her parental rights to Addilyn
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2016). On
appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support both the
court’s finding of parental unfitness and its finding that termination is in the
child’s best interest. Because competent record evidence supports the court’s
findings, we affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] To support its findings of unfitness and that termination was in the
child’s best interest, the court made the following specific findings of fact,
which are supported by the record:
Mother was referred to the Family Treatment Drug Court
(FTDC) in September of 2016. . . . Mother, however, did not
cooperate . . . and was never screened for the program. . . .
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Mother has not cooperated with [the Department]
regarding drug screens, which the court finds to be very troubling
given mother’s history of substance abuse. [The Department case
manager] testified that since she started on the case in July of
2016, she requested that mother submit to drug screens 23 times.
Mother missed 11 times. Of the . . . requests for drug screens in
2017, mother has missed eight.
Mother has an ongoing pattern of drug use. Mother admits
to using marijuana regularly. In October of 2016, mother tested
positive for cocaine metabolites. In February or March of 2017,
father reported to [the Department case manager] that mother
was drinking alcohol on a recent trip to Portland. Mother tested
positive for benzodiazepines on March 3, 2017, and on March 20,
2017. Since March 20, 2017, [the Department case manager]
requested mother to submit to five drug screens. Mother tested
positive for marijuana on the two times that she submitted to
tests. Mother failed to appear for the other three tests.
. . . .
In this case, mother clearly has a chronic substance abuse
problem. . . .
. . . .
. . . There is no doubt that both mother and father love [the
child] very much. However, [the child] has been in the custody of
[the Department] since June 2, 2016. . . .
. . . .
[The child] has been placed with [the foster parents] since
June 2, 2016. [They] are experienced foster parents and have
provided excellent care for the child. [The foster mother] has
been very attentive to [the child’s] medical needs resulting from
her asthma. [She] has transported [the child] to her medical
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appointments. [The foster parents] have provided a safe and
stable home. [The child] is doing well in the [foster parents’]
care. . . .
The court has had the benefit of an experienced GAL. The
child needs to have permanency, and [the foster parents] are able
to provide it for her. [The GAL] believes that it is in the best
interest of the child for the parental rights of both mother and
father to be terminated, and the court agrees with her assessment.
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in
the best interest of [the child] to have the parental rights of her
mother and father terminated. . . .
II. DISCUSSION
[¶3] The court found the rebuttable presumption contained in 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1-A)(C) (2016) to apply to this case. The rebuttable presumption
provides,
The court may presume that the parent is unwilling or unable to
protect the child from jeopardy and these circumstances are
unlikely to change within a time which is reasonably calculated to
meet the child’s needs if:
. . . .
C. The child has been placed in the legal custody or care of
the department, the parent has a chronic substance abuse
problem, and the parent’s prognosis indicates that the child
will not be able to return to the custody of the parent within
a reasonable period of time, considering the child’s age and
the need for a permanent home. The fact that a parent has
been unable to provide safe care of a child for a period of
9 months due to substance abuse constitutes a chronic
substance abuse problem.
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22 M.R.S. § 4055(1-A)(C). Here, the court’s supported findings show that the
child has been placed in the legal custody or care of the Department, that the
mother has a chronic substance abuse problem, and that the mother’s
prognosis indicates that the child will not be able to return to the mother’s
custody within a reasonable period of time.
[¶4] We have recently held that the statutory “presumption” of parental
unfitness in child protection cases is analogous to a permissive inference in
criminal cases, where the fact-finder is entitled to reach a certain conclusion
based on a specified factual predicate, but the burden of proof does not shift to
the opposing party—here, a parent. See In re Evelyn A., 2017 ME 182,
¶¶ 31-32, 169 A.3d 914. In this case, the court invoked the evidentiary
analysis allowed by section 4055(1-A)(C), but the judgment demonstrates
that the court treated that statute as the pathway to an inference, and placed
the burden of proof entirely on the Department and did not require or expect
the mother to meet any evidentiary burden. The court therefore properly
applied section 4055(1-A)(C) as the basis to infer that the mother is unwilling
or unable to protect the child from jeopardy in a time which is reasonably
calculated to meet the child’s needs. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i),
(1-A). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in its finding of unfitness as to
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the mother. See In re K.M., 2015 ME 79, ¶ 9, 118 A.3d 812 (“Where the court
finds multiple bases for unfitness, we will affirm if any one of the alternative
bases is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” (quotation marks
omitted)).
[¶5] Tellingly, the mother was offered the opportunity and resources
available through the Family Treatment Drug Court.1 Her refusal to
participate in that program demonstrates her unwillingness to take the steps
necessary to protect her child from jeopardy within a time that meets the
child’s needs. Contrary to the mother’s argument, there is also sufficient
evidence in the record to support the court’s finding that termination of the
mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. See In re Kayla M.,
2001 ME 166, ¶ 13, 785 A.2d 330.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
1 The Family Treatment Drug Court is described in part on the Judicial Branch’s website: “The
Family Treatment Drug Court is a specialty docket located in the Maine District Courts that works
with those families whose children have been at risk of abuse or neglect due to parental abuse of
drugs or alcohol.” Me. Judicial Branch website/Courts/Drug Treatment Courts/Family Treatment
Drug Court (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).
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Erik T. Crocker, Esq., Farrell, Rosenblatt & Russell, Bangor, for appellant
Mother
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Bangor District Court docket number PC-2016-30
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY