Maureen D. Davis v. Bennie C. McGuire III , 2018 ME 72 ( 2018 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 72Docket: Som-17-240
Argued: December 13, 2017
Decided: May 24, 2018
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
MAUREEN D. DAVIS
v.
BENNIE C. MCGUIRE III
HJELM, J.
[¶1] Maureen D. Davis appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(Skowhegan,1 Stanfill, J.) dismissing, for lack of standing, her complaint seeking
to be determined a de facto parent of her grandson. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2)
(2017). Davis argues that the court erred by concluding after a contested
hearing that she failed to establish that she has standing to proceed to a plenary
hearing and that the court improperly held her to a greater standard than that
to which an unrelated third party would be held. We affirm the judgment.
1 In the captions of several orders issued in this matter, including the judgment, the court location
is designated as Waterville rather than Skowhegan. The case, however, was filed as, and remained, a
Skowhegan proceeding.
2
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts are either undisputed or drawn from the court’s
findings of fact, all of which are supported by the record.2 See Thorndike v. Lisio,
2017 ME 14, ¶ 2, 154 A.3d 624.
[¶3] Davis’s daughter, Danielle, gave birth to a boy in December of 2007.
Bennie C. McGuire III is the child’s father. In 2008, Danielle filed a complaint to
determine parental rights and responsibilities and child support. In 2009, by
agreement of Danielle and McGuire, the District Court (Skowhegan, Carlson, M.)
entered a judgment awarding Danielle sole parental rights and responsibilities,
with no rights of contact to McGuire, and ordering McGuire to pay Danielle child
support. Danielle died in early August of 2016.
[¶4] Davis has consistently been involved in the child’s life. For example,
the child frequently stayed overnight at Davis’s home, where Davis provided
the child with his own space and allowed him to keep belongings. The child’s
address for purposes of school and extracurricular activities, however, was
Danielle’s, and he refers to Davis as his grandmother. Further, before Danielle’s
2 After the court issued its judgment, which contained findings of fact, Davis filed a properly
formulated motion for further findings and conclusions of law, see M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), which the court
denied. With respect to facts in dispute, we therefore do not attribute findings to the court beyond
those articulated in its judgment. See Ehret v. Ehret, 2016 ME 43, ¶ 9, 135 A.3d 101.
3
death Davis did not seek formal recognition as a parent to the child, and
Danielle did not indicate informally that she regarded Davis as the child’s
parent.
[¶5] Less than one week after Danielle died, Davis filed an ex parte
petition in the Somerset County Probate Court seeking temporary guardianship
of the child. In her petition, Davis alleged that the child had resided both with
her and with Danielle since his birth and that McGuire had not participated in
the child’s life during the past eight years other than a handful of visits with the
child in Maine. The court (Washburn, J.) granted Davis a six-month temporary
guardianship of the child.
[¶6] Upon learning of the order of temporary guardianship several days
after it was issued, McGuire filed a petition to terminate the guardianship. The
Probate Court commenced a hearing on McGuire’s petition, but before the
hearing could be completed, Davis filed a complaint in the District Court in
Skowhegan seeking an adjudication that she is a de facto parent of the child and
an order establishing parental rights and responsibilities and child support.
McGuire filed an answer to Davis’s complaint and a motion to dismiss for lack
of standing. Both Davis’s complaint and McGuire’s answer were accompanied
by affidavits. See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1891(2)(A), (B).
4
[¶7] Pursuant to the Home Court Act, see 4 M.R.S. § 152(5-A) (2017), the
Probate Court case was transferred to the District Court in Skowhegan, which
conducted a consolidated hearing (Kelly, J.) on Davis’s guardianship petition
and McGuire’s petition to terminate the temporary guardianship. While the
hearing was ongoing, the parties reached an agreement for a temporary
co-guardianship, which the court accepted and entered as an order that made
Davis and McGuire the child’s co-guardians until February of 2017 and
provided that the child would move to Ohio with McGuire in late December
of 2016. The order stayed all deadlines in the de facto parenthood case and
continued the case to February for either an uncontested hearing or a case
management conference, specifically reserving the issue of standing. The
parties’ agreement subsequently faltered, however, as was demonstrated in
early December of 2016 when McGuire filed a motion for contempt, which the
court ultimately denied after holding a hearing the following month.
[¶8] With the resumption of proceedings on Davis’s de facto parenthood
complaint, the court (Stanfill, J.) issued a written order on standing. In the
order, the court stated that based on its review of the parties’ affidavits filed
with the complaint and the answer, it “has serious concerns whether
Ms. Davis’s role has historically been as a loving and involved grandparent or
5
as a de facto parent.” For that reason, the court scheduled a hearing pursuant
to section 1891(2)(C) for the court “to determine” whether Davis satisfied
specified aspects of the standing framework.
[¶9] At the resulting hearing, held in March of 2017, both parties
testified, and, by agreement, the record included transcripts from the earlier
proceedings held in both the Probate Court and the District Court.3 Later that
month, the court entered a judgment dismissing Davis’s de facto parenthood
complaint for lack of standing. The order contained a number of findings of fact
and reiterated that the purpose of the hearing was for the court “to determine
those facts” that were controverted.
[¶10] In its judgment, the court addressed the separate statutory criteria
that must be met for a party to establish de facto parenthood. See 19-A M.R.S.
§ 1891(3) (2017). But see infra n.7. The court found that Davis had presented
prima facie evidence
that she has engaged in consistent caretaking of [the child]; that
there is a bonded and dependent relationship between Ms. Davis
and [the child] that was fostered by [the child’s] mother Danielle;
that [Davis] accepts full and permanent responsibility of the child
without expectation of financial compensation; and that the
3 The court’s consideration of evidence presented in a separate proceeding is permissible where
the parties agree to that enhanced record. See Cabral v. L’Heureux, 2017 ME 50, ¶¶ 11 n.4, 12,
157 A.3d 795.
6
continuing relationship between Ms. Davis and [the child] is in his
best interest.
The court also found, however, that Davis did not present “prima facie evidence
that [the child] resided with her for a significant period of time” or
that Danielle understood, acknowledged or accepted that or
behaved as though Ms. Davis was [the child’s] parent as opposed to
a loving, involved and supportive grandparent. . . . [A]lthough it
appears that Danielle relied heavily on Ms. Davis for help with [the
child], taking care of him after school, getting him to events, and the
like, there is little evidence that Danielle saw Ms. Davis as a parent,
with rights equal to hers, as opposed to a wonderful and important
grandmother who provided consistent support and assistance.
The court further found that, given the child’s bond with Davis, the child’s
separation from her would cause him “despair.” Following from its finding that
McGuire is a fit and competent parent, the court concluded that the best interest
of the child by itself is nonetheless insufficient to confer standing on Davis.
[¶11] Because the court concluded that Davis failed to prove several
elements necessary to establish her standing to proceed with the de facto
parenthood claim, the court dismissed the complaint. Davis moved for
additional findings and to amend the judgment. See M.R. Civ. P. 52, 59. The
7
court denied the motion, see supra n.2, and Davis timely appealed to us. M.R.
App. P. 2(b)(3) (Tower 2016).4
II. DISCUSSION
[¶12] In this case, we consider for the first time the process required by
the Maine Parentage Act (MPA), see 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1831-1939 (2017),5 when a
party seeks a court adjudication that he or she is a de facto parent. The aspect
of the judicial process at issue here is the determination of standing. To
consider Davis’s challenges to the court’s conclusion that she did not
demonstrate her standing to proceed with the de facto parenthood complaint,
we must first examine the standards of proof created by the MPA prescribing
what Davis was required to show to establish standing. Against those legal
standards that we draw from the statute, we will then consider Davis’s specific
challenges.
A. Standard of Proof to Establish Standing
[¶13] Pursuant to the framework described both in our de facto
parenthood decisions that predated the enactment of the MPA and now in the
4 The restyled Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply because this appeal was filed
before September 1, 2017. See M.R. App. P. 1 (restyled Rules).
5 The Maine Parentage Act (MPA) became effective July 1, 2016. See P.L. 2015, ch. 296, §§ A-1,
D-1.
8
MPA itself, a party who files a complaint to be adjudicated a de facto parent of
a child must make an initial showing of standing that will determine whether
the court will hold a plenary hearing on the ultimate question of whether that
person is a de facto parent. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891; e.g., Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME
59, ¶ 35, 90 A.3d 1169 (plurality opinion);6 Philbrook v. Theriault, 2008 ME 152,
¶¶ 19-22, 957 A.2d 74. The requirement of a preliminary showing of standing
is a function of the principle that a parent has a fundamental right to raise his
or her child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion);
Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 18, 761 A.2d 291 (“[T]he right to direct and
control a child’s upbringing is a ‘fundamental’ liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause.”).
[¶14] By itself, a third party’s assertion of de facto parenthood rights
results in a disruption of the parent-child relationship because it “forc[es] a
parent to expend time and resources defending against a third-party claim to a
child [and] is itself an infringement on the fundamental right to parent.” Pitts,
2014 ME 59, ¶ 35, 90 A.3d 1169; see also Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 30, 761 A.2d
6 The nature of the showing necessary for a judicial determination of de facto parenthood was
articulated in a plurality opinion in Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, 90 A.3d 1196. A majority of the Court,
comprising those who joined the plurality and concurring opinions, id. ¶¶ 35, 42, took the view that
standing must be established preliminarily to any adjudication of the de facto parenthood claim itself.
That aspect of our opinion in Pitts is therefore authoritative.
9
291 (addressing the same effect of a third-party claim brought pursuant to the
Grandparents Visitation Act, 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1801-1805 (2017)). Accordingly,
to protect “against unwarranted intrusions into an intact family’s life,” see
Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 30, 761 A.2d 291, we developed the requirement of
standing that requires the petitioner to demonstrate an entitlement to proceed
with the claim itself. That requirement is now codified in the MPA. See
19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2); L.D. 1017, Enacted Law Summary (127th Legis. 2015)
(stating that the MPA “codifies the de facto parent doctrine, now firmly
established by case law, to require an explicit determination of standing as a
prerequisite for maintaining an action”); see also infra n.8.
[¶15] Pursuant to section 1891(2)(C) of the MPA, to demonstrate
standing, the party claiming de facto parenthood must present “prima facie
evidence” of the statutory elements that are necessary to ultimately establish
the existence of a de facto parent relationship with the child.7 That statute
7 In our case law that preceded the 2017 enactment of the MPA, which contains the statutory
authority governing de facto parenthood, we discussed what a petitioner is required to prove to be
adjudicated as a de facto parent so that the state does not unconstitutionally intrude into the parent’s
fundamental relationship with his or her child. In those cases, we held that, in order to establish the
compelling state interest needed to justify governmental interference with a parent-child
relationship, the petitioner must prove the existence of “exceptional circumstances.” See, e.g.,
Thorndike v. Lisio, 2017 ME 14, ¶¶ 17, 19, 154 A.3d 624; Kilborn v. Carey, 2016 ME 78, ¶¶ 17, 22,
140 A.3d 461. In another case, a plurality opinion and a dissenting opinion each expressed the view
that, for a de facto parenthood adjudication to be constitutional, the exceptional circumstance must
be harm to the child in the absence of such an adjudication. Pitts, 2014 ME 59, ¶¶ 14-17, 29, 36,
61-65, 90 A.3d 1169.
10
prescribes a multi-step process for the determination of standing. 19-A M.R.S.
§ 1891. First, the claimant is required to file an affidavit along with the
complaint, stating “specific facts” that track the elements of a de facto
parenthood claim. Id. § 1891(2)(A). Next, the adverse party may file a
responsive affidavit along with a responsive pleading. Id. § 1891(2)(B). Finally,
the court is to review the parties’ submissions and either make a determination
based on the parties’ submissions whether the claimant has demonstrated
standing, or, “in its sole discretion, if necessary and on an expedited basis, hold
a hearing to determine disputed facts that are necessary and material to the
issue of standing.” Id. § 1891(2)(C).
The statutory elements of proof of de facto parenthood found in 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3) (2017),
however, do not explicitly include these factors. See, e.g., Kilborn, 2016 ME 78, ¶¶ 1 n.1, 25 n.7,
140 A.3d 461 (pointing out that the MPA’s formulation of de facto parenthood does not require a
showing of harm to the child). Our case law explained that an exceptional circumstance requires
proof “that the child’s life would be substantially and negatively affected if the person who has
undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in that child’s life is
removed from that role.” Id. ¶ 22 (quotation marks omitted). Section 1891(3) describes the
relationship between the putative de facto parent and the child in the same way, but omits any
reference to the effect that the removal of that person from the child’s life would have on the child.
This leaves the question of whether proof of the statutory elements alone is a constitutionally
adequate foundation for a de facto parenthood determination, or whether a petitioner must prove
something more than those statutory elements to make the statute constitutional as applied. We do
not reach this question because, as the court correctly determined, Davis’s submissions do not satisfy
even the statutory criteria for standing, and so this case is not an occasion to consider whether, to be
constitutionally applied, a petitioner for de facto parenthood must prove factors beyond those
articulated in the statute.
11
[¶16] To consider the merits of Davis’s contention on appeal that the
court erred by concluding that she had not met her burden of proof to show
standing, we must examine the standards of proof by which her evidence of
standing must be assessed pursuant to the MPA. The issue arises because of
the language in section 1891(2) that bears on the standard of proof that the
claimant must satisfy in the standing analysis. As is noted above, section
1891(2)(C) provides that in making its standing determination based on the
parties’ affidavits and pleadings, the court decides whether the claimant has
presented “prima facie evidence” of a de facto parenthood relationship with the
child. If, however, the court exercises its discretion to hold a hearing on the
question of standing, the court will “determine disputed facts.” Id. § 1891(2)(C)
(emphasis added). Because the Legislature has described the standards of
proof in two different ways depending on the form of the evidence presented
to the court, we must construe this aspect of the statute to determine if those
standards are different in substance.
[¶17] The goal of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect
to the Legislature’s intent. See Dickau v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 ME 158, ¶ 19,
107 A.3d 621. “Among the many sources we may consult to determine that
legislative intent, we first determine if the language of the statute . . . is plain
12
and unambiguous.” Id. When examining the plain language of a statute, we
“tak[e] into account the subject matter and purposes of the statute, and the
consequences of a particular interpretation,” id. ¶ 21, with the objective to
“avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results,” Wong v. Hawk, 2012 ME 125,
¶ 8, 55 A.3d 425 (quotation marks omitted). “If the statutory language is
ambiguous, meaning that it is reasonably susceptible to multiple
interpretations, or is silent on a particular point, we will then consider other
indicia of legislative intent including the purpose of the statute.” Griffin v.
Griffin, 2014 ME 70, ¶ 18, 92 A.3d 1144 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶18] Taken by itself, the Legislature’s designation of the standard of
proof that the court must apply at a contested evidentiary hearing is not
ambiguous: the plain language of the statute’s description of that standard is
one of persuasion because the statute calls for the court to “determine”—i.e.,
find—the facts. 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2)(C). There may be a latent ambiguity in
this provision, however, because the standard of proof applicable to a standing
determination conducted solely on the parties’ written submissions is the
presentation of “prima facie evidence.” Id. In some contexts, this means
meeting merely a burden of producing evidence that, if believed, would satisfy
the greater burden of persuasion. See, e.g., Camden Nat’l Bank v. Weintraub,
13
2016 ME 101, ¶ 11, 143 A.3d 788 (stating that to make a “prima facie case” as
required by the anti-SLAPP statute, see 14 M.R.S. § 556 (2017), the claimant
must present “only some evidence on every element of proof necessary to
obtain the desired remedy,” without regard to the reliability or credibility of
the evidence (quotation marks omitted)); Lougee Conservancy v. CitiMortgage,
Inc., 2012 ME 103, ¶ 12, 48 A.3d 774 (stating that to defeat a motion for
summary judgment, a plaintiff must satisfy the “prima facie evidence standard
[that]. . . requires proof only of enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer
the fact at issue and rule in the party's favor”). The resulting question is
whether in the MPA the Legislature intended to impose two different
evidentiary standards when the court makes a determination of standing: the
lesser standard of production when the court makes that determination based
on the parties’ written submissions, and the greater standard of persuasion
when the court chooses to hold a contested hearing on that issue.
[¶19] For three reasons, we conclude that the single standard of proof
that governs the court’s determination of standing is that of persuasion,
irrespective of whether the court adjudicates the issue based on the papers or
on evidence presented at a hearing.
14
[¶20] First, the statutory standard of a “prima facie” demonstration of
standing echoes the language we articulated in de facto parenthood cases that
predated the enactment of the MPA. See, e.g., Curtis v. Medeiros, 2016 ME 180,
¶ 18, 152 A.3d 605; Eaton v. Paradis, 2014 ME 61, ¶ 8, 91 A.3d 590 (quoting
Philbrook, 2008 ME 152, 957 A.2d 74); Pitts, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 35, 90 A.3d 1169;
Philbrook, 2008 ME 152, ¶¶ 17, 19-22, 957 A.2d 74. Given the legislative history
of the MPA,8 we use the common law that the MPA later attempted to codify as
one way to understand the Legislature’s intentions. In none of those cases have
we equated the standard of prima facie evidence with the mere burden of
production. In fact, we suggested the contrary. For example, we stated that,
when addressing a claim of standing, “the court must make a preliminary
determination that [a de facto parenthood] relationship does in fact exist before
a parent can be required to litigate the issue.” Philbrook, 2008 ME 152, ¶ 19,
957 A.2d 74 (emphasis added). Proving that a fact exists requires more than
8 Although those cases predated and therefore were not governed by the MPA, which became
effective on July 1, 2016, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1891 (2017), enacted by P.L. 2015, ch. 296, §§ A-1, D-1, our
discussion in these cases regarding the procedure at the standing and plenary hearing stages is
relevant to and aligned with 19-A M.R.S. § 1891. Further, the legislative history of the MPA indicates
that the de facto parentage section of the MPA is intended to codify the existing common law
doctrines that “require an explicit determination of standing as a prerequisite for maintaining an
action, [and] recognize the elevated burden of proof that a person claiming such status must satisfy
. . . .” See L.D. 1017, Enacted Law Summary (127th Legis. 2015); see also Family Law Advisory
Commission, Report to Maine Legislature Joint Standing Committee on Judiciary Pursuant to Resolve
2014, c. 83 On Proposed “Maine Parentage Act” 4-5 (Dec. 2014).
15
simply proffering evidence that, if believed, would prove the point. Rather,
proof of the existence of a fact requires satisfying the burden of persuasion.
[¶21] We have also explained that even when the court determines
standing based on a review of affidavits, the question to be addressed by the
court is whether the claimants “can meet their burden of proof.” See Davis v.
Anderson, 2008 ME 125, ¶ 17, 953 A.2d 1166 (emphasis added). The “burden
of proof” ordinarily means the burden of persuasion. See Dir., Office of Workers’
Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272-76 (1994). And, in
the analogous procedural context of the Grandparents Visitation Act, a
petitioning grandparent must prove that “it is more likely than not”—i.e.,
shown by a preponderance of the evidence—that he or she has standing and is
therefore entitled to proceed to the merits of a claim to establish visitation
rights with a grandchild. 19-A M.R.S. § 1803(2)(C); see also Rideout, 2000 ME
198, ¶ 30, 761 A.2d 291 (explaining that “grandparents must demonstrate
standing before they may litigate their [GVA] claim” by “convinc[ing] the court
that they are among those grandparents who may pursue visits under the
[GVA]” (emphasis added)). The level of proof that requires a party to convince
the court of standing clearly exceeds merely presenting evidence of standing.
16
[¶22] In light of these statements describing the quantum of proof
necessary to demonstrate standing and the procedural phase where the court
makes that determination, it is evident that “prima facie” as used in this statute
is not a reference to the quantum of necessary proof but rather is merely a
temporal indicator that the standing requirement is to be determined
preliminarily to any ultimate adjudication of de facto parenthood.
[¶23] Second, compared to a mere burden of production, the burden of
persuasion is more consistent with the constitutional aspect of a de facto
parenthood proceeding. As is discussed above, a central purpose of requiring
a de facto parenthood claimant to prove standing is to protect a parent from
undue interference with his or her constitutional liberty interests arising from
the parent-child relationship. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66; Rideout, 2000 ME
198, ¶ 18, 761 A.2d 291. If a party claiming to be a de facto parent were entitled
to a plenary hearing by merely proffering information, albeit in affidavit form,
that correlated with the elements of a de facto parenthood claim, the legal
parents could face excessive exposure to unwarranted and ultimately
unsubstantiated interference with their constitutionally protected parenting
interest. Holding a party seeking de facto parenthood status to the burden of
persuasion, regardless of the setting where the court determines standing, best
17
achieves the desired balance between the “parents’ fundamental rights [and]
the legitimate interests of third parties . . . asserting their status as de facto
parents.” Eaton, 2014 ME 61, ¶ 8, 91 A.3d 590.
[¶24] Third and finally, there is no principled reason why a standing
determination should be subject to one standard of proof if the court makes
that determination based on the pleadings and affidavits, and a greater
standard of proof if the evidence is presented in a different way, namely, at a
contested hearing. In either procedural setting, the question of standing
presented to the court is, in the end, identical. As we have noted, pursuant to
the plain terms of section 1891(2)(C), the standard of proof requires the
claimant to present persuasive evidence of standing. Given that evidentiary
standard applicable in a contested hearing held by the court in its discretion,
the standard for an adjudication of standing without a court hearing should not
be lower.
[¶25] For these reasons, a party seeking to be adjudicated as a de facto
parent is subject to a preliminary burden to persuade the court of the party’s
standing, and not merely to produce evidence of standing.
[¶26] In this context, we note that we have not explicitly articulated the
standard of proof applicable to the question of standing, although we have
18
made more general characterizations of that standard, as discussed above. See
supra ¶ 19. For the reasons explained above, the claimant’s evidence must be
persuasive, meaning that the proof must be at least a preponderance.9 See
Jacobs v. Jacobs, 507 A.2d 596, 599 (Me. 1986) (“The standard of proof in a civil
case between two private parties is ordinarily preponderance of the evidence,
a rule that is departed from only in those rare circumstances where a higher
standard of proof is clearly justified for constitutional or other significant policy
reasons.”). The standard governing a standing determination need not be
greater than that, however, because at the plenary hearing a petitioner who
already established standing must prove a de facto parent relationship by clear
and convincing evidence—that is, to a high level of probability. See 19-A M.R.S.
§ 1891(3); In re G.T., 2016 ME 2, ¶ 10, 130 A.3d 389; Eaton, 2014 ME 61, ¶ 9,
91 A.3d 590; Pitts, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 27, 90 A.3d 1169. To require a petitioner to
prove at a preliminary hearing the same elements and to the same standard of
proof that govern the plenary hearing would render the latter duplicative.
9 Of course, when the court initially examines the parties’ standing submissions on the papers and
determines that there are contested facts, it need not hold a hearing on standing if, even assuming
the petitioner’s assertions are true, they could not or do not meet the preponderance standard.
19
[¶27] Having identified the statutory requirements governing standing,
we now consider Davis’s assertion that the court erred by determining that she
does not have standing to pursue her complaint for de facto parenthood.
B. Davis’s Standing
[¶28] To establish standing pursuant to the MPA, but see supra n.7, a
petitioner must prove each of the elements of a de facto parent relationship
with the child by—as we now hold—a preponderance of the evidence. The
elements are as follows:
A. The person has resided with the child for a significant period of
time;
B. The person has engaged in consistent caretaking of the child;
C. A bonded and dependent relationship has been established
between the child and the person, the relationship was fostered
or supported by another parent of the child and the person and
the other parent have understood, acknowledged or accepted
that or behaved as though the person is a parent of the child;
D. The person has accepted full and permanent responsibilities as
a parent of the child without expectation of financial
compensation; and
E. The continuing relationship between the person and the child is
in the best interest of the child.
19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)(A)-(E). Because Davis had the burden of proof at the
hearing on standing, see id. § 1891(2), she must establish on appeal that the
20
evidence compelled the court to find each of those five elements in her favor.
See id. § 1891(3)(A)-(E); Baillargeon v. Estate of Daigle, 2010 ME 127, ¶ 20,
8 A.3d 709.
[¶29] After reviewing the affidavits presented by Davis and McGuire, the
court found that Davis had not presented prima facie evidence on several
necessary statutory elements of a de facto parenthood case—that the child had
resided with her for a significant period of time as required by section
1891(3)(A), and that Danielle understood, acknowledged or accepted that
Davis had a parental relationship with the child or behaved as though the Davis
was a parent of the child, as required in part of section 1891(3)(C). The court
then held a hearing on those criteria so that, on the basis of the parties’
evidence, it could “determine” the facts in dispute.
[¶30] The court issued its dispositive order on standing after the
hearing.10 The court found that the child had never resided at Davis’s home
even though he stayed there frequently and had a space of his own and kept
10 Although the judgment made reference to “prima facie evidence,” it is apparent that the court
held Davis to the burden of persuasion, which, as we hold today, was correct. In the order stating
that a hearing would be held, the court explained that the purpose of the hearing was to allow the
court “to determine” facts bearing on certain elements of a de facto parenthood case. At the hearing
itself, the court stated that its intent was to “make the determination as to standing.” And in the
judgment issued following the hearing, the court made reference to the statutory provision that, at a
hearing on standing, the court was to “determine” facts that bear on standing, see 19-A M.R.S.
§ 1891(2)(C).
21
some of his belongings there. Rather, the child resided at Danielle’s home,
which was separate from Davis’s, and it was this address that was used for
school purposes and extracurricular activities. The court also found that
Danielle did not regard Davis as the child’s parent with rights equal to hers.
Although Davis consistently supported and assisted Danielle with raising the
child, and Davis’s relationship with this child differed from the relationships
she has with her other grandchildren, the court did not err in its ultimate
conclusion that Davis’s relationship with the child was a
grandparent-grandchild relationship and not that of a de facto parent.
[¶31] We have previously addressed the issue presented here—whether
the court erred by dismissing a grandparent’s de facto parenthood complaint
for want of standing. Philbrook, 2008 ME 152, 957 A.2d 74. In that case, the
petitioners, who were the children’s maternal grandparents, had provided
substantial care to the children when the children’s mother lived in the
grandparents’ home with the children on and off for a period of years. Id.
¶¶ 2-13. In affirming the judgment dismissing the petition, we stated:
We have never extended the de facto parent concept to
include an individual who has not been understood to be the child’s
parent but who intermittently assumes parental duties at certain
points of time in a child’s life. Rather, when we have recognized a
person as a de facto parent, we have done so in circumstances when
22
the individual was understood and acknowledged to be the child’s
parent both by the child and by the child’s other parent.11
Id. ¶ 23. It is not enough that the grandparents had “provided needed care for
the [children],” because “they were never thought to be the [children’s]
parents.” Id. ¶ 26.
[¶32] Here, the court found that Davis had a bonded and dependent
relationship with the child and that Danielle fostered that relationship. The
court found, however, that Danielle did not understand, acknowledge, or accept
Davis as a parent even though Danielle accepted Davis’s care for her son. The
court correctly drew the proper distinction, which can be nuanced and subtle,
between the role of a nurturing and involved caregiver and one who acts with
and is recognized as being fully equivalent to a parent. Cf. Kilborn v. Carey,
2016 ME 78, ¶¶ 4-7, 19, 140 A.3d 461 (describing evidence that demonstrated
the mother’s intent that the putative de facto parent assume a parental role for
the child). Here, the evidence did not compel the court to find that Danielle
regarded Davis as a parent to the child.12 As a result of this determination, the
11 The MPA does not require the child to acknowledge the putative de facto parent as a parent.
See generally 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3). However, subsection 3 appears to be a codification of the
principle that the child’s parent must recognize the putative de facto parent as a parent.
12 Davis argues that “[w]hile assuming a parental role completely certainly strengthens a claim
for de facto parentage, the wording of the statute does not require this.” In fact, section 1891(3)(C),
the common law that it codifies, and the very term “de facto parent” require just that. See 19-A M.R.S.
§ 1891(3).
23
court was required to dismiss the complaint—as it did—because Davis did not
have standing to proceed with her de facto parenthood claim.13
[¶33] Finally, contrary to Davis’s contention, dismissal of her complaint
for lack of standing does not mean that a grandparent is held to a higher
standard than the standard that applies to someone who is not a family
member. Proper application of the constitutionally based principles regulating
de facto parenthood proceedings will require any person—regardless of
whether there is a biological relationship to the child—to present exacting
proof to be adjudicated a de facto parent and awarded parental rights to
someone else’s child. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891. Here, Davis was found to lack
standing not because she was held to a standard that is greater than would have
been applied if she were not the child’s grandparent, but rather because she
failed to persuade the court that the child’s mother acknowledged, accepted, or
understood her as a parent to the child.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
13 Because a petitioner’s failure to satisfy any of the elements of standing is fatal to the petition
itself, we need not and do not address the court’s alternative conclusion that the child had not resided
with Davis for a significant period. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2), (3) (setting out the elements to
establish standing in the conjunctive).
24
Elissa J. Roberts, Esq. (orally), Schneider & Brewer, Waterville, for appellant
Maureen D. Davis
Tiffany Bond, Esq. (orally), BondLaw, Portland, for appellee Bennie C.
McGuire III
Skowhegan District Court docket number FM-2016-235
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY