In re Child of Stacy H. , 2020 ME 66 ( 2020 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2020 ME 66
Docket: Aro-19-509
Submitted
On Briefs: May 4, 2020
Decided: May 12, 2020
Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.
IN RE CHILD OF STACY H.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Stacy H. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Presque Isle,
Nelson, J.) terminating her parental rights to her child. The mother argues that
there were insufficient findings and evidence to support the court’s
determination that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best
interest. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The Department of Health and Human Services initiated child
protection proceedings against the mother and father of this child by filing a
child protection petition on December 12, 2017, alleging that the then
eighteen-month-old child had been taken to the hospital for possibly ingesting
the mother’s prescribed medication.1 See 22 M.R.S. § 4032 (2020). The
1The Department did not initially seek a preliminary protection order because it had reached an
agreement with the mother for her to retain custody of the child with a safety plan in place.
2
Department also alleged that the mother had a long history of substance abuse
issues, placing the child at risk of exposure to drugs, drug paraphernalia, and
dangerous individuals; had exposed the child to domestic violence; and had
neglected her older child.2
[¶3] On March 2, 2018, the court (O’Mara, J.) entered a jeopardy order
with the mother’s agreement, finding jeopardy to the child from the mother’s
struggles with drug addiction, her use of methamphetamine and amphetamines
on multiple occasions during the course of the child protection proceedings, the
threat of neglect to the child, and the child’s exposure to domestic violence.
See 22 M.R.S. § 4035 (2020).
[¶4] The Department sought a preliminary protection order on
August 10, 2018, alleging that the mother was selling drugs out of her home,
was not participating in substance abuse counseling, was exposing the child to
potential abuse by visitors, had been overheard yelling at the child, and had
relapsed on methamphetamine. See 22 M.R.S. § 4034(1) (2020). The court
(Nelson, J.) entered a preliminary protection order that day, placing the child in
the Department’s custody. See 22 M.R.S. § 4034(2) (2020). The mother waived
2The court later terminated the father’s parental rights. Because the father does not appeal from
that judgment, we discuss the facts and procedure only as they relate to the mother.
3
her opportunity for a summary preliminary hearing. See 22 M.R.S. § 4034(4)
(2020).
[¶5] A year later, on August 22, 2019, the Department petitioned for the
termination of the mother’s parental rights. See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2020). After
a two-day testimonial hearing, by judgment dated December 5, 2019, the court
found the following facts by clear and convincing evidence.3 See In re Child of
Olivia F., 2019 ME 149, ¶ 3, 217 A.3d 1106.
This case involves chronic substance abuse problems . . . and
significant domestic violence issues in the home. . . . A domestic
violence incident prompted Department intervention with the
family in February of 2017 . . . .
Mother has had a drug problem since she was a teenager. She
made some progress in her late twenties . . . . That progress came
to an end when she . . . began using bath salts approximately six
years ago. This caused her life . . . to completely fall apart. She has
been . . . struggling with her addiction and mental health issues
since that time.
After attending an intensive inpatient treatment program
with [the child] in the spring of 2018 following the entry of the
Jeopardy Order, mother returned to the community and again was
using illegal drugs. She admitted to using methamphetamine while
[the child] was in her care in August of 2018. . . . Rather than take
responsibility for her slip-ups, mother blamed the Department and
her providers.
3The court entered judicial review orders on July 6, 2018 (Soucy, J.); October 25, 2018 (Nelson, J.);
and February 28, 2019, maintaining the Department’s custody of the child and establishing a
permanency plan of reunification with the mother. By a judicial review order entered on
December 18, 2019, the court established a permanency plan of adoption for the child.
4
[M]other completed the intensive outpatient program in
February of 2019. It does not appear that she gained any insight
from the program. In May of 2019, mother again was abusing
prescription medication that she allegedly located among her
things when she was moving to a new apartment. In addition,
mother was using methamphetamine again as well. She was
completely overwhelmed, even though [the child] was not in her
care. She again blamed her providers for failing her.
Despite the identification early on in the case of a significant
need for mother being mental health counseling, mother did
virtually nothing to follow up and engage in mental health
treatment services. . . . Without proper attention to, and treatment
of, her mental health issues, which has not occurred to this point,
mother will be unable to effectively parent [the child] due to the
co-occurrence of her substance abuse disorder and mental health
diagnoses.
When the case hit its most critical stage, with the prospect of
a termination of parental rights looming, mother failed to put forth
much effort at attending to her substance abuse treatment needs,
attending only a few sessions. At the hearing, her current
substance abuse treatment provider indicated that she was again
in the intensive outpatient treatment program, which is a program
for the beginning of the recovery process. There were many excuses
for the lack of participation presented at the hearing, none of them
credible.
Mother has exhibited a lack of understanding of how her
mental health and substance abuse issues have caused her much
misery in her life. She takes very little, if any responsibility for the
way her life is now. Whenever she is overwhelmed, which happens
easily, she resorts to abusing substances. . . .
....
5
. . . The court finds that permanency is important for [the
child]. She is dependent on others for her care and must have
consistent care.
. . . [The mother is] not able to effectively manage [her] own
care, much less care for this child. [Her] lack of success in
addressing the domestic violence issues, mental health issues, and
substance abuse issues as well as [her] chronic instability make it
unlikely that [she] will be able to provide the child permanency at
any time in the foreseeable future, if ever. In light of the child’s age
and her need for stability, predictability and adequate care, she
simply cannot wait to see if at some point in the future [the mother]
makes sufficient progress in dealing with [her] issues to consider
moving forward with reunification. It is in [the child’s] best
interest that she be provided that stability, predictability and
adequate care now by way of a termination of her [mother’s]
parental rights.
The delay in this case has had a negative effect on the child.
She has been in limbo while her [mother has] been given time to
work on [her] own issues. . . . The child has been living with her
paternal aunt since the spring of 2019. The child’s . . . behaviors
have improved in her new placement. Her aunt has been a
tremendous resource for the child and actively advocates for her
needs. The child is thriving in her aunt’s home. The stability that a
termination of parental rights would provide is in the child’s best
interest so that she can achieve permanence.
[¶6] Based on these findings, the court terminated the mother’s parental
rights to the child on the grounds that she is unwilling or unable to protect the
child from jeopardy and unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child
within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, and that
termination is in the child’s best interest. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a),
6
(b)(i), (ii) (2020). The mother timely appeals. See 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2020);
M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶7] The mother challenges the court’s finding that termination of her
parental rights was in the best interest of the child. We review for clear error
the court’s factual findings supporting its best interest determination, and we
will not disturb those findings if there is any competent evidence in the record
to support them. In re Child of Olivia F., 2019 ME 149, ¶ 5, 217 A.3d 1106. We
review the court’s ultimate best interest determination for an abuse of
discretion. Id.
[¶8] Contrary to the mother’s contention, the court adequately
considered the child’s best interest when it terminated the mother’s parental
rights. The statute requires the court to consider “the best interest of the child,
the needs of the child, including the child's age, the child’s attachments to
relevant persons, periods of attachments and separation, the child’s ability to
integrate into a substitute placement or back into the parent’s home and the
child’s physical and emotional needs.” 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (2)
(2020). It does not require the court to issue written findings addressing every
component of a best interest analysis, see In re Jacob B., 2008 ME 168, ¶¶ 13-19,
7
959 A.2d 734, nor was the court bound to accept the evidence of best interest
offered by the mother, see In re Children of James B., 2020 ME 14,
¶ 10, --- A.3d ---. The court expressly made several findings regarding the
child’s best interest, including that the child needs predictability and stability
in her life, that she is thriving and her behavioral issues have improved while
in her aunt’s care, and that the aunt provides tremendous support to the child.
See 22 M.R.S. § 4050(2)-(3) (2020); In re Child of Ronald W., 2018 ME 107, ¶ 11,
190 A.3d 1029 (“[T]he court’s order indicates that it carefully and
appropriately considered the child’s needs for stability and permanency . . . .”).
Those findings were supported by sufficient record evidence presented at the
termination hearing.4 See In re Child of Sherri Y., 2019 ME 162, ¶ 7, 221 A.3d
120 (“[A] court may draw from the same findings in making its unfitness and
best interest determinations.”).
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
4 Although the mother does not challenge the court’s findings regarding parental unfitness, those
findings, too, are supported by competent record evidence. See In re Child of Olivia F., 2019 ME 149,
¶ 3, 217 A.3d 1106.
8
Allan Hanson, Esq, Caribou, for appellant Mother
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Presque Isle District Court docket number PC-2017-30
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY