William B. Daniel v. Jennifer M. McCoy , 2023 ME 17 ( 2023 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2023 ME 17Docket: Yor-22-221
Submitted
On Briefs: November 17, 2022
Decided: March 2, 2023
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ.
WILLIAM B. DANIEL
v.
JENNIFER M. MCCOY
CONNORS, J.
[¶1] Jennifer M. McCoy appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(Biddeford, Sutton, J.) adopting, over her objection, the final order of a
Family Law Magistrate (Cadwallader, M.) that ordered McCoy’s divorce from
William B. Daniel, awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities of the
parties’ child to Daniel, and distributed the parties’ property. Clarifying the
procedural avenue a party must take to object to a magistrate’s factfinding as
being insufficient and the options available to the District Court when a party
makes such an objection, we vacate the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] McCoy and Daniel were married in 2016. In July 2021, Daniel filed
a complaint for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Over the
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next few months, the parties participated in case management hearings and
mediation.
[¶3] The first status conference was held by teleconference toward the
end of September, and both parties appeared. A second status conference was
scheduled for November 8, 2021, via teleconference. McCoy did not appear.
The magistrate ordered that a third status conference be scheduled, again by
teleconference, and noted that if McCoy failed to appear “at the next court event,
she [would] be defaulted.” The order also required that Daniel send a proposed
judgment to McCoy. Roughly two weeks before the third conference, Daniel
filed a document that was captioned “Stipulated Divorce Judgment.”
[¶4] McCoy failed to appear for the third status conference. As a result,
the magistrate held a hearing on Daniel’s complaint for divorce and made
determinations on parental rights, child support, and property division. The
magistrate went through Daniel’s proposed judgment during the fifteen-minute
hearing. Daniel was the only witness, and no exhibits were entered in evidence.
[¶5] The magistrate granted Daniel’s complaint for divorce and
judgment was entered on January 25, 2022. The judgment, which is identical
to the “Stipulated Divorce Judgment” that Daniel filed except that the
magistrate made some minor edits, contains two findings supported by
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competent evidence admitted during the hearing. See Low v. Low, 2021 ME 30,
¶ 2, 251 A.3d 735. First, the parties are the parents of one child who is currently
four years old. Second, they are joint owners of two parcels of real estate, one
in Kennebunkport and one in Strong.1 The judgment contains a third finding
not supported by competent evidence: “[Daniel] has been solely responsible for
making payments on [the parties’ debt consolidation] loan since
June 1, 2021 . . . .”
[¶6] The remainder of the judgment contains the magistrate’s allocation
of parental rights and responsibilities and division of property. The magistrate
awarded Daniel sole parental rights and responsibilities of the child, awarded
McCoy supervised visitation at Daniel’s discretion under conditions consistent
with the child’s “best interest,” ordered that McCoy pay child support, and
distributed the parties’ real estate and personal property in accordance with
Daniel’s requests. Specifically, the magistrate awarded the Kennebunkport
property to Daniel and ordered that he pay McCoy 50% of the value of the
parties’ equity in the property. The magistrate also ordered that the Strong
property be sold and that 25% of the proceeds be set aside for anticipated
1 It is not entirely clear where the second parcel of property is located. Although the judgment
states that the parcel is in Strong, other filings in the record reflect that it is in Avon.
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capital gains taxes, with any unused proceeds from the sale to be used to pay
off the debt consolidation loan and then split equally between the parties.
[¶7] Regarding the parties’ personal property, the magistrate awarded
Daniel, inter alia, a Ford F-250 truck and McCoy any vehicle she had acquired
since the parties separated. The magistrate also awarded McCoy a
Subaru Impreza, even though there was no mention of this vehicle during the
hearing.
[¶8] McCoy, acting pro se, timely filed, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 118(a), an
objection to the final order of the magistrate. McCoy requested that the court
reject the order, schedule a new final hearing, and order that Daniel pay for an
attorney for her. The court (Sutton, J.) denied McCoy’s request and adopted the
judgment, making one correction, i.e., that McCoy did not appear for the
hearing.
[¶9] Approximately two weeks later, after obtaining counsel, McCoy filed
motions (1) for relief from judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), (2) to set
aside the default pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 55(c), (3) to reconsider or for a new
trial pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 59, and (4) for amended or additional factual
findings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b). McCoy’s Rule 52(b) motion requested
“specific factual findings regarding the specific division of assets, debts, and
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personal property” and included a list of proposed findings addressing those
issues and two proposed findings concerning the child.
[¶10] By written order entered on June 10, 2022, the same judge denied
McCoy’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion and Rule 55(c) motion, reasoning that she had
failed to diligently pursue her legal rights. It also denied her Rule 59 motion on
the ground that the record supported the judgment. The court did, however,
grant her Rule 52(b) motion and made twelve additional findings, which were
based on its own review of the record, concerning McCoy’s participation in the
proceedings and the value of the property. McCoy timely appealed. M.R. App. P.
2B(c)(1); 14 M.R.S. § 1901(1) (2022).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶11] McCoy argues that the court erred or abused its discretion because,
despite her motion for further findings, the court failed to state the factual basis
for, and failed to consider the factors germane to, its allocation of parental
rights and responsibilities and its division of the parties’ property.2
2 McCoy also argues that the court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 60(b)(6) and
Rule 55(c) motions. Given our ruling, we need not address these arguments.
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A. When asserting that a magistrate’s judgment lacks sufficient
factfinding, the objecting party should make her claim in a
Rule 118(a) objection, not a Rule 52 motion after the District Court
has reviewed the Rule 118(a) objection.
[¶12] Before addressing McCoy’s arguments, we must determine what
findings are properly before us, i.e., solely the findings made by the magistrate
contained in the divorce judgment or those findings and the findings made by
the court after granting McCoy’s Rule 52(b) motion.
[¶13] The court adopted the magistrate’s factual findings without
conducting further proceedings. See M.R. Civ. P. 118(a)(2). Because the court
never took evidence and merely adopted the magistrate’s findings, it was error
for it to grant McCoy’s Rule 52(b) motion and make additional findings on its
own.
[¶14] When a party objects to a magistrate’s judgment on the ground
that the judgment contains insufficient factfinding, the party should file an
objection pursuant to Rule 118(a) and specifically assert that there are
insufficient findings to support the magistrate’s judgment. The reviewing court
can then adopt the judgment, “set the matter for further hearing before a judge
or magistrate[,] or recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions.”
M.R. Civ. P. 118(a)(2).
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[¶15] What the reviewing court cannot do is make its own additional
findings without further hearing. Factfinding “is not an action that could be
taken by a reviewing judge, who can only consider the record as presented to
the judicial officer who presided at the underlying hearing.” Kline v. Burdin,
2017 ME 194, ¶ 13, 170 A.3d 282. The amendment, clarification, or creation of
factual findings “can be properly accomplished only by the judicial officer who
issued the findings in the first place.” Id.; see Pratt v. Sidney, 2009 ME 28, ¶ 12,
967 A.2d 685 (explaining that the court could not “make its own new findings
of fact without hearing any evidence” when reviewing a challenge to the
magistrate’s findings).
[¶16] Consequently, it was erroneous for the court to make additional
findings on its own. As such, the only findings properly before us on appeal are
those contained in the magistrate’s judgment. Because the court adopted the
magistrate’s judgment,3 we review the magistrate’s factual findings for clear
error and discretionary decisions for an abuse of discretion.4 See Pratt, 2009
ME 28, ¶ 7, 967 A.2d 685; Wong v. Hawk, 2012 ME 125, ¶ 14, 55 A.3d 425.
3 A court may modify the magistrate’s judgment or order to fix a clerical error, as it did here,
without setting the matter for rehearing or influencing our standard of review. See M.R. Civ. P. 60(a);
M.R. Civ. P. 100.
4 As noted, McCoy filed a Rule 118(a) objection and, when the District Court denied her objection,
filed various post-judgment motions, including a Rule 52(b) motion. Her Rule 52(b) motion was
inappropriate because, as discussed, the reviewing court could not make additional findings of fact
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B. A remand is necessary because the existing record does not support
the judgment.
1. Parental Rights and Responsibilities
[¶17] Magistrates have jurisdiction to enter final orders involving
parental rights and responsibilities when the matter is uncontested.
See 4 M.R.S. § 183(1)(D)(3) (2022); Ezell v. Lawless, 2008 ME 139, ¶¶ 5-6, 955
A.2d 202 (noting that a magistrate entered an order concerning parental rights
and responsibilities, child support, and paternity after a party failed to appear).
[¶18] A court order establishing parental rights and responsibilities,
whether entered by a magistrate or a judge, must state whether parental rights
will be allocated, shared, or sole in accordance with the standard of the best
interest of the child. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(2)(D)(1) (2022). “This standard
applies without regard to whether a parent appears or fails to appear at
scheduled court events.” Ezell, 2008 ME 139, ¶ 35, 955 A.2d 202 (Levy, J.,
concurring). The court, through the magistrate or judge, makes the best
based on its review of the record. A motion for further findings would be permissible if the reviewing
court reopened the record pursuant to Rule 118(a)(2) and made its own findings, and a party found
those new findings to be insufficient to sustain the new judgment. Because McCoy challenges the
magistrate’s factfinding, or lack thereof, she needed to make her claim in her Rule 118(a) objection.
Her pro se objection does not make this specific argument and simply challenges the magistrate’s
ruling as unjust. Given the previous lack of clarity as to how and when to make a claim that a
magistrate’s factfinding is insufficient, neither McCoy nor the District Court can be faulted for failing
to adhere to this procedure, and, in any event, a remand is required for the reasons set forth in
Section II.B.
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interest determination by considering nineteen statutory factors. See 19-A
M.R.S. § 1653(3)(A)-(S). Although the court is required to consider the best
interest factors, it need not robotically address every factor “solely for the sake
of assuring the parties that it considered every factor, so long as it is otherwise
evident that the court has evaluated the evidence with the best interest factors
in mind.” Nadeau v. Nadeau, 2008 ME 147, ¶ 35, 957 A.2d 108.
[¶19] Here, the only finding in the parental rights portion of the
judgment is that McCoy and Daniel are the child’s parents. The judgment
contains no reference to the best interest factors as a whole or to any factor in
particular. See Whitmore v. Whitmore, 2023 ME 3, ¶ 9, --- A.3d ---. There is no
indication of how the evidence supports the award of sole parental rights and
responsibilities to Daniel with only supervised visitation to McCoy at Daniel’s
discretion and under conditions that are in the child’s best interest. Cf. 19-A
M.R.S. § 1653(1)(C) (explaining that, unless contrary to a child’s best interest,
“it is the public policy of this State to assure minor children of frequent and
continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated or
dissolved their marriage and to encourage parents to share the rights and
responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy”). Although the
judgment uses the phrase “best interest,” it is not part of a finding—it is the
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court qualifying the conditions under which McCoy may have contact with the
child. We must therefore vacate the judgment and remand the matter to the
trial court for further proceedings on this issue.
2. Property Distribution
[¶20] Magistrates may also distribute property in an uncontested
divorce proceeding. See 4 M.R.S. § 183(1)(D)(3). The principles governing
property distribution are the same for magistrates and judges. The division of
marital property, whether through a magistrate or a judge, must be in
proportions that are just. See Viola v. Viola, 2015 ME 6, ¶ 9, 109 A.3d 634.
Importantly, “a just distribution is not synonymous with an equal distribution;
rather the division must be fair and just considering all of the circumstances of
the parties.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). To make a just determination, the
court must consider all relevant factors, including
A. The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital
property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
B. The value of the property set apart to each spouse;
C. The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the
division of property is to become effective, including the
desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live in the
home for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of the
children; and
D. Economic abuse by a spouse.
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19-A M.R.S. § 953(1) (2022).
[¶21] When applying section 953(1), the court, through the magistrate
or judge, “need not specifically enumerate [its] findings on each factor, as long
as it appears that the court has considered those factors, and all other relevant
factors in reaching its decision.” Hutt v. Hanson, 2016 ME 128, ¶ 12, 147 A.3d
352 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “The court is only required to
make findings that are sufficient to inform the parties of the court’s reasoning
and sufficient for effective appellate review.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
[¶22] Here, the property and debt at issue include two parcels of real
estate, a Ford F-250 truck, a Subaru Impreza, a debt consolidation loan, and
various items of personal property. Beginning with the real estate, although
the magistrate found that the parties are the owners of real estate in
Kennebunkport and Strong, it did not assign a dollar value to each parcel of
property or determine how the parties paid for the properties, whether the
parties contributed in other ways to the properties, the economic
circumstances of each party, or the reasoning behind each award. Moreover,
the magistrate could not have made these findings because very little evidence
was admitted during the hearing. McCoy accurately points out that Daniel’s
testimony was mostly a recitation of his requests, not substantive evidence.
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[¶23] Although there is a finding to support the allocation of the debt
consolidation loan, as noted above, see supra ¶ 5, the record lacks competent
evidence to support the finding. Specifically, in the judgment, the magistrate
noted that “[b]ecause [Daniel] has been solely responsible for making
payments on the [debt consolidation] loan since June 1, 2021, the division of
proceeds shall account for [McCoy’s] non-contribution.” There is nothing in the
record supporting the finding that McCoy has not been contributing to the loan.
Daniel testified only that he was asking the court to order that the loan be paid
with the proceeds from the sale of the Strong property.
[¶24] Thus, the magistrate’s distribution of the parties’ property and
debt was an abuse of discretion and erroneous because there are insufficient
findings in the judgment to support the awards and the record lacks competent
evidence to support a finding that was made. Although the magistrate did state
on the record that Daniel’s request “seems fair,” that statement is not enough
to inform the parties, or us on appeal, of the magistrate’s reasoning behind the
distribution of the parties’ property.
[¶25] We recognize that it is common practice in family matters for
evidence and findings to be brief when a party fails to appear. Many proposed
judgments presented to the court, particularly at a default hearing, may not
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contain all the necessary findings. Parties and counsel should take care to
present adequate evidence upon which the court can base its judgment rather
than simply reciting the terms being sought. It is, however, the responsibility
of the court to ensure that the appropriate factors are considered and
enumerated, at least in summary fashion, in the final judgment.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Michelle R. King, Esq., Irwin & Morris, Portland, for appellant Jennifer M. McCoy
Keith P. Richard, Esq., Archipelago, Portland, for appellee William B. Daniel
Biddeford District Court docket number FM-2021-191
For Clerk Reference Only