In re Children of Tasha R. ( 2018 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 64Docket: Pen-17-520
Submitted
On Briefs: April 25, 2018
Decided: May 8, 2018
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE CHILDREN OF TASHA R.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Tasha R. appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(Bangor, Jordan, J.) terminating her parental rights to two of her children
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), (iv) (2017).
Contrary to the mother’s contention, the court did not abuse its discretion in
proceeding with the termination hearing notwithstanding her request to
replace her court-appointed counsel. The mother does not challenge the court’s
findings by clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness and that
termination is in the children’s best interests. See In re Zarianna C., 2018 ME 11,
¶ 2, 177 A.3d 1270; In re Alexavier G., 2017 ME 227, ¶ 1 & n.1, 174 A.3d 891(stating that when the trial court found three bases for parental unfitness, a
single undisputed basis “constitutes a waiver of this issue on appeal” and “alone
is sufficient to support the court’s termination of her parental rights”).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
2
[¶2] The mother failed to appear for the September 26, 2017, hearing on
the Department of Health and Human Services’ petition to terminate her
parental rights. Her court-appointed counsel was present and represented her
interests. Earlier, on September 15, acting pro se, the mother filed two
handwritten letters with the court raising numerous issues. Relevant to the
sole issue she raises on appeal, in one of the letters the mother alleged that her
attorney had failed to adequately communicate with and otherwise represent
her, and she named another attorney that she wished to have appointed to her
case.1 Upon finding that “I don’t take anything from [the letters] . . . [t]hey’re
allegations . . . [and the mother] is not here today,” and without objection from
any party, the court proceeded with the evidentiary hearing, in which the State,
the mother’s counsel, and the guardian ad litem participated.
[¶3] Although the mother has a due process right to appointed counsel
in this child protection proceeding, In re T.B., 2013 ME 49, ¶ 14, 65 A.3d 1282,
“the right to counsel does not include unfettered freedom to change attorneys,”
State v. Goodno, 511 A.2d 456, 457 (Me. 1986). We review the trial court’s
decision on a motion to change counsel for an abuse of discretion. In re J.R. Jr.,
1
In addition to representing the absent mother at the hearing, counsel filed a notice of appeal and
appellant’s brief on her behalf. There is no indication in the record that the prospective substitute
attorney named in the mother’s letter was even aware of her request.
3
2013 ME 58, ¶ 19, 69 A.3d 406; see In re Evelyn A., 2017 ME 182, ¶ 19,
169 A.3d 914 (“Although we recognize the trial court’s goal of protecting the
parents’ fundamental right to effective assistance of counsel, the court must be
careful, in protecting that right, not to ignore the simultaneous interest of the
State in promoting ‘the early establishment of permanent plans for the children,
22 M.R.S. § 4003(4) [2017].’” (citation omitted)). On these facts we find no
abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to proceed with the termination
hearing.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Randy G. Day, Esq., Garland, for appellant mother
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Bangor District Court docket numbers PC-2016-74, 75
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY