Donald J. Trump v. Secretary of State , 2024 ME 5 ( 2024 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2024 ME 5Docket: Ken-24-24
Submitted on
Memoranda: January 24, 2024
Decided: January 24, 2024
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and DOUGLAS, JJ., and
HUMPHREY, A.R.J.
DONALD J. TRUMP
v.
SECRETARY OF STATE et al.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] “With the exception of opinions issued on solemn occasions under
article VI, Section 3, of the Constitution, the judiciary in this state is not
empowered to render advisory opinions.” Bar Harbor Banking & Tr. Co. v.
Alexander, 411 A.2d 74, 76 (Me. 1980). Consistent with our judicial role, and to
avoid issuing advisory opinions, we adhere to a final judgment rule that
requires a trial court’s decision to be final before we consider an appeal. See
id.; State v. Me. State Emps. Ass’n, 482 A.2d 461, 463, 465 (Me. 1984). “The
reasons for the final judgment rule are many and strong. It helps curtail
interruption, delay, duplication and harassment; it minimizes interference with
the trial process; it serves the goal of judicial economy; and it saves the
2
appellate court from deciding issues which may ultimately be mooted, thus not
only leaving a crisper, more comprehensible record for review in the end but
also in many cases avoiding an appeal altogether.” Me. State Emps. Ass’n, 482
A.2d at 464.
[¶2] Here, the Secretary of State and three challengers to Donald
J. Trump’s primary petition—Kimberley Rosen, Thomas Saviello, and Ethan
Strimling—appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court (Kennebec
County, Murphy, J.) remanding to the Secretary of State the matter in which the
Secretary of State decided that the petition submitted by former President of
the United States Donald J. Trump as a candidate for the Maine Republican
Party’s presidential primary was invalid because of a false declaration of
qualification on his candidate consent form. Because the appeal is not from a
final judgment, we dismiss the appeal as interlocutory and not justiciable.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶3] By the filing deadline of December 1, 2023, Donald J. Trump filed a
petition for his candidacy for President of the United States and submitted a
required notarized candidate consent form for the Republican Party’s
presidential primary. See 21-A M.R.S. § 336 (2023), amended by P.L. 2023, ch.
304, § A-5 (emergency, effective June 26, 2023) (to be codified at 21-A M.R.S.
3
§ 336); P.L. 2023, ch. 389, § 2 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (to be codified at
21-A M.R.S. § 336(3)). On the form provided, Trump supplied identifying
information, stated his voting residence, and included his notarized signature
beneath the following language:
Qualifications of President of the United States (U.S.
Constitution, Article II, Section 1)
§ Be a natural born U.S. Citizen
§ Have been a resident of the United States for at least 14 years
§ Be at least 35 years of age
____________________________________________________________________________
Candidate’s Consent
I hereby declare my intent to be a candidate for the Office of
President of the United States and participate in the Presidential
Primary for the party named above to be held on March 5, 2024, in
the State of Maine. I further declare that my residence is in the
municipality and state listed above; that I am enrolled in the party
named on this consent; that I meet the qualifications to hold this
office as listed above; and that this declaration is true.
[¶4] By December 8, 2023—the statutory deadline for raising challenges
to the petition—the Secretary of State received three challenges.1 See
21-A M.R.S. § 336(3); 21-A M.R.S. § 337(2)(A) (2023). Rosen, Saviello, and
Strimling together argued that Trump should be removed from the primary
1 Because two of the challengers, Mary Anne Royal and Paul Gordon, have not appealed from the
Secretary of State’s decision on their challenges or from the trial court’s order, we do not discuss the
issues that they raised in their challenges.
4
ballot because, having previously taken an oath as President of the United
States “to support the Constitution of the United States,” Trump “engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same,” which precludes him from holding
the office of President under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 3.2 The Secretary of State held a hearing in accordance
with 21-A M.R.S. § 337 and the Maine Administrative Procedure Act, 5 M.R.S.
§§ 9051-9064 (2023), on December 15, 2023. The Secretary of State was
required to determine, after the hearing, whether “any part of the declaration”
in the candidate consent form was false, thereby rendering the consent and the
primary petition void. 21-A M.R.S. § 336(3) (“If, pursuant to the challenge
procedures in section 337, any part of the declaration is found to be false by the
Secretary of State, the consent and the primary petition are void.”).
[¶5] On December 19, after the hearing and the parties’ initial briefing,
the Colorado Supreme Court certified an opinion holding that Trump was
2 This section provides:
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President
and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or
under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or
as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an
executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United
States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid
or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each
House, remove such disability.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3.
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disqualified under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment from appearing on
the primary ballot in Colorado. Anderson v. Griswold, No. 23SA300, 2023 WL
8770111, --- P.3d --- (Colo. Dec. 19, 2023), cert. granted sub nom. Trump v.
Anderson, No. 23-719, 2024 WL 61814 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2024). On December 21,
2023, the Secretary of State accepted supplemental briefs from the parties
addressing the Colorado decision.
[¶6] In the Secretary of State’s decision, issued on December 28, 2023,
she concluded that she had the authority to exclude unqualified candidates
from the primary ballot and found that Trump was not qualified to appear on
the ballot because he had sworn, as President, to support the United States
Constitution and had then engaged in insurrection against the United States.
See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3. She suspended the effect of her decision until
the Superior Court ruled on any appeal.
[¶7] Trump timely appealed to the Superior Court by filing a petition for
review of final agency action on January 2, 2024, within five days after the
Secretary of State issued her decision. See 21-A M.R.S. § 337(2)(D); 5 M.R.S.
§§ 11001, 11002 (2023); M.R. Civ. P. 80C. Among other proceedings in the
Superior Court, Trump moved to stay the court proceedings after the Supreme
Court of the United States issued a writ of certiorari on his appeal from
6
Anderson v. Griswold, No. 23SA300, 2023 WL 8770111, --- P.3d ---. The
Secretary of State and Rosen, Saviello, and Strimling opposed Trump’s motion
to stay.
[¶8] After receiving briefs from all parties and several amici, the court
entered an order on January 17, 2024. Among other rulings, the court denied
Trump’s motion to stay the court proceedings; stayed, by agreement of all
parties, the effect of the Secretary of State’s ruling pending the outcome of the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson; and remanded the matter
to the Secretary of State with instructions to issue a new ruling “modifying,
withdrawing, or confirming” her December 28 decision after the Supreme
Court reaches a decision in Anderson. The court reasoned that a remand was
necessary because Maine’s statutory scheme contemplates the Secretary of
State—not the courts—having the initial authority to decide a challenge
asserting the falsity of a candidate’s oath in a candidate consent form.3
[¶9] The Secretary of State appealed to us by filing a notice of appeal in
the Superior Court on January 19, 2024, within the three-day period
established by section 337(2)(E). See also M.R. Civ. P. 80C(n); 5 M.R.S. § 11008
3 See Bar Harbor Banking & Tr. Co. v. Alexander, 411 A.2d 74, 77 (Me. 1980) (explaining the
“judicial policy of not deciding an issue concerning which an administrative agency has decision
capacity until after the agency has considered the issue” (alteration and quotation marks omitted)).
7
(2023). On that same day, we ordered the Secretary of State and any other
appellants to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as
interlocutory. Rosen, Saviello, and Strimling thereafter filed a timely notice of
appeal. On January 23, 2024, we accepted memoranda on the issue. We now
dismiss the appeal because we conclude that it is interlocutory and that no
statutory or judicially created exception to our rule requiring a final judgment
on appeal applies.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶10] An appeal to the Law Court is generally “not ripe for appellate
review unless the appeal is from a final judgment.” Stewart Title Guar. Co. v.
State Tax Assessor, 2006 ME 18, ¶ 3, 892 A.2d 1162. It is well settled that when
a matter has been remanded to an agency for further proceedings, the Superior
Court decision is not a final judgment because it does not fully decide and
dispose of the entire case, “leaving no further questions for . . . future
consideration and judgment by the administrative agency.” Est. of Pirozzolo v.
Dep’t of Marine Res., 2017 ME 147, ¶ 5, 167 A.3d 552 (quotation marks
omitted); see also, e.g., Fox Islands Wind Neighbors v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 2015
ME 53, ¶ 9, 116 A.3d 940. Rule 80C(m) expressly contemplates that any appeal
to us occurs after the remand and that issues generated before a remand to an
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agency will be considered if raised in an appeal brought after the entry of a final
judgment.4 See also Farrell v. State, Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 415 A.2d 828, 829 (Me.
1980) (“Our dismissal of plaintiff’s appeal is solely because it is premature and
does not foreclose later review of the whole case to determine whether he has
been caused any prejudice by the action of the Superior Court.”).
[¶11] We have, on rare occasions, considered appeals from remand
orders “when the remaining action [was] essentially ministerial, such as the
formal issuance of a permit,” Est. of Pirozzolo, 2017 ME 147, ¶ 5, 167 A.3d 552(quotation marks omitted). The remand order here, however, directs actions
that are more than ministerial. Where “the issue which the parties seek to
present to this court might be affected by the action taken pursuant to the
remand order, we will usually refrain from entertaining the appeal.” Id.(quotation marks omitted).
[¶12] Although the order on appeal here is patently interlocutory, the
Secretary of State and the challengers to Trump’s petition contend that
(A) there is statutory authorization for an interlocutory appeal and (B) two
4“If the court remands the case for further proceedings, all issues raised on the court’s review of
the agency action shall be preserved in a subsequent appeal taken from a final judgment entered on
review of such agency action.” M.R. Civ. P. 80C(m). The 1997 Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule
80C(m) states, “Rule 80C(m) is amended to clarify that an order of remand from the Superior Court
to the governmental agency is not a final judgment from which an appeal lies, absent special
circumstances.”
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judicially created exceptions to our final judgment rule apply: (1) the judicial
economy exception and (2) the death knell exception. See Me. State Emps. Ass’n,
482 A.2d at 464.
A. Statutory Authorization for Interlocutory Appeal
[¶13] The Secretary of State argues that section 337(2)(E) requires us to
enter a final opinion on the merits of the matter before us. The judicial review
portions of section 337(2) provide in relevant part as follows:
D. A challenger or a candidate may appeal the decision of the
Secretary of State by commencing an action in the Superior Court.
This action must be conducted in accordance with the Maine Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 80C, except as modified by this section. . . .
The court shall issue a written decision containing its findings of
fact and conclusions of law and setting forth the reasons for its
decision within 20 days of the date of the decision of the Secretary
of State.
E. Any aggrieved party may appeal [to the Law Court] the decision
of the Superior Court, on questions of law, by filing a notice of
appeal within 3 days of that decision. . . . As soon as the record and
briefs have been filed, the court shall immediately consider the
case. The court shall issue its decision within 14 days of the date of
the decision of the Superior Court.
In accordance with section 337(2)(D), the Superior Court conducted the action
by following Rule 80C of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
that “[t]he manner and scope of review of final agency action or the failure or
refusal of an agency to act shall be as provided by 5 M.R.S.A. § 11007(2) through
10
§ 11007(4).” M.R. Civ. P. 80C(c). As authorized by section 11007, the Superior
Court decided to “[r]emand the case for further proceedings . . . or take such
action as the court deems necessary.” 5 M.R.S. § 11007(4)(B) (2023). The
Secretary of State then appealed to us, invoking 21-A M.R.S. § 337(2)(E).
[¶14] We have entertained appeals from orders other than final
judgments where there is specific statutory authorization for such an appeal
from a particular interlocutory order. Me. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Bangor & Aroostook
R.R. Co., 395 A.2d 1107, 1113 (Me. 1978). For instance, the Legislature has
expressly authorized interlocutory appeals “from [a]n order denying an
application to compel arbitration.” 14 M.R.S. § 5945(1)(A) (2023); see
Champagne v. Victory Homes, Inc., 2006 ME 58, ¶ 7, 897 A.2d 803. We review
jeopardy and medical treatment orders in child protection proceedings because
the Legislature has specifically authorized those interlocutory appeals even
though the orders do not finally resolve a child protection matter: “A party
aggrieved by an order of a court entered pursuant to section 4035 . . . or 4071
may appeal directly to the Supreme Judicial Court sitting as the Law Court . . . .”
22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2023); see 22 M.R.S. § 4035 (2023) (jeopardy orders);
22 M.R.S. § 4071 (2023) (medical treatment orders); In re Dakota P., 2005 ME
112, ¶ 12, 863 A.2d 280. By statute, certain decisions in criminal matters may also
be appealed immediately even though they are not final judgments:
An appeal may be taken by the State in criminal cases on questions
of law from the District Court and from the Superior Court to the
Supreme Judicial Court sitting as the Law Court: From an order of
the court prior to trial which suppresses any evidence, including,
but not limited to, physical or identification evidence or evidence
of a confession or admission; from an order which prevents the
prosecution from obtaining evidence; from a pretrial dismissal of
an indictment, information or complaint; or from any other order
of the court prior to trial which, either under the particular
circumstances of the case or generally for the type of order in
question, has a reasonable likelihood of causing either serious
impairment to or termination of the prosecution.
15 M.R.S. § 2115-A(1) (2023). In the presence of such an explicit authorization,
we honor “a legislative intention to create an exception to the final judgment
rule allowing immediate appeal of such interlocutory orders.” Me. Cent. R.R. Co.,
395 A.2d at 1113.
[¶15] Here, there is no such explicit authorization. To the contrary,
section 337(2)(D) states that the appeal “must be conducted in accordance with
the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 80C, except as modified by this
section.” Nothing in section 337 modifies the final judgment rule or authorizes
any interlocutory appeal. Moreover, the statute requires the Superior Court to
“issue a written decision containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law
and setting forth the reasons for its decision.” 21-A M.R.S. § 337(2)(D). By
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statute, the Superior Court is expressly authorized to enter a decision
“[r]emand[ing] the case for further proceedings . . . or tak[ing] such action as
the court deems necessary.” 5 M.R.S. § 11007(4)(B).
[¶16] As to the statutory authorization of an appeal from “the decision
of the Superior Court” and the direction in the statute that we “issue [a]
decision” within fourteen days after the Superior Court’s decision, id.
§ 337(2)(E), the Legislature cannot “supplant the power of the courts to
determine whether a justiciable controversy has been presented.” Bryant v.
Town of Camden, 2016 ME 27, ¶ 14 & n. 4, 132 A.3d 1183 (citing Me. Const. art.
III, §§ 1, 2 (establishing the separation of powers between the branches of
Maine’s government and prohibiting any branch from exercising the powers of
another branch)). Our decision to dismiss the appeal as interlocutory within
that period may not be the final word in the matter, but it decides the case as it
has been presented to us. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the statute
requires us to disregard the lack of justiciability of the decision challenged on
appeal.5
5 We note this is not the first time a matter has been remanded to the Secretary of State upon the
Superior Court’s judicial review of an election-related decision. In Reed v. Sec’y of State, 2020 ME 57,
232 A.3d 202, the Secretary of State issued a decision declaring a petition for a direct initiative of
legislation valid and the proposed legislation eligible for a statewide vote. Id. ¶ 7; see 21-A M.R.S.
§ 905(1) (2018) (since amended in ways not relevant here, most recently by P.L. 2023, ch. 342, § 1
(effective Oct. 25, 2023) (to be codified at 21-A M.R.S. § 905(1))). On appeal to the Superior Court,
the court remanded the matter for the Secretary of State to take additional evidence, after which the
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B. Judicially Created Exceptions to the Final Judgment Rule
[¶17] The next question is whether a judicially created exception to the
final judgment rule weighs in favor of immediate appellate review of the
Superior Court’s interlocutory order.
1. Judicial Economy Exception
[¶18] The judicial economy exception applies when resolution of the
appeal can “establish a final, or practically final, disposition of the entire
litigation” and the interests of justice require that an immediate review be
undertaken. Me. State Emps. Ass’n, 482 A.2d at 464-65; see Forest Ecology
Network v. Land Use Regul. Comm’n, 2012 ME 36, ¶ 17, 39 A.3d 74; see also
Maples v. Compass Harbor Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 2022 ME 26,¶ 17 n.9, 273 A.3d 358(“We clarify here that the availability of the judicial economy exception does
not depend on our deciding the case in a certain way, cf. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Rural
Hous. Serv. v. Carter, 2002 ME 103, ¶ 13, 799 A.2d 1232, and, with respect to the
first requirement, a party need only demonstrate that, in at least one
alternative, our ruling on appeal might establish a final, or practically final,
Secretary of State issued a final decision, the Superior Court reviewed that decision, and the matter
came to us on appeal. Reed, 2020 ME 57, ¶¶ 8-11, 232 A.3d 202. This process enabled us to make a
final decision that did not depend on any additional proceedings and decision-making. See id.
¶¶ 12-24.
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disposition of the entire litigation, see, e.g., Liberty v. Bennett, 2012 ME 81, ¶ 19,
46 A.3d 1141; Cutting v. Down E. Orthopedic Assocs., P.A., 2021 ME 1, ¶¶ 16-18,
244 A.3d 226.”).
[¶19] Uncertainties regarding multiple issues of federal law pervade the
proceedings pending in Maine and are likely to require additional proceedings
to ensure the proper application of the law. We would run a high risk of issuing
an advisory opinion if we decided the matter on the merits before a final
judgment has been entered. Especially when several possible outcomes of the
present appeal would not finally resolve the matter,6 we cannot conclude that
our review “has the potential to establish a final disposition of the entire
litigation.” Forest Ecology Network, 2012 ME 36, ¶ 23, 39 A.3d 74.
[¶20] The expedited timeline set forth by statute does not persuade us
of the need for our immediate review.7 If we were to issue a final decision, only
then to learn from the Supreme Court that, for instance, Section 3 of the
As just two examples, we could vacate the Superior Court’s decision and remand the matter for
6
the court to reach a final judgment, or we could affirm the Superior Court’s decision, which would
result in a remand to the Secretary of State.
7If a final determination of disqualification were to be made before the ranked-choice primary
on March 5, 2024, the vote could proceed, with the Secretary of State issuing a notice informing voters
of the disqualification. See 21-A M.R.S. §§ 1(27-C)(E), 371(5), 441(1), 723-A (2023), amended by P.L.
2023, ch. 304, §§ A-14 to A-19, A-39 (emergency, effective June 26, 2023, except as to 21-A M.R.S.
§ 723-A(5-B), which is effective Jan. 1, 2024) (to be codified at 21-A M.R.S. § 723-A).
15
Fourteenth Amendment is not self-executing or that all findings regarding
insurrection must be reached by a higher standard of proof than the Secretary
of State applied,8 a flurry of court activity would ensue in an effort to reopen
the decision of the Secretary of State or seek independent judicial relief, causing
delay that the existing interlocutory order might avoid. This is not an instance
in which judicial economy concerns encourage us to undertake immediate
review.
[¶21] Finally, in their discussion of the judicial economy exception, the
challengers have also alluded to another potential exception to the final
judgment rule without specifically raising it: the separation of powers
exception. This exception applies if the Superior Court has interfered with
“apparently legitimate executive department activity” in disruption of the
administrative process, in a way that “encourages the circumvention of
statutorily authorized investigation and enforcement mechanisms.” Bar
Harbor Banking & Tr. Co., 411 A.2d at 75-77 (reviewing a Superior Court’s
temporary restraining order enjoining a scheduled administrative hearing).
The court here remanded for the Secretary of State to exercise her statutorily
8 In particular, the potential for the Supreme Court’s decision to require additional fact-finding by
the Secretary of State weighs against our acceptance of an interlocutory appeal. See Wilcox v. City of
Portland, 2009 ME 53, ¶¶ 13-14, 970 A.2d 295.
16
authorized function of making a final determination of whether “any part of
[Trump’s] declaration is . . . false” after the Supreme Court decides Anderson.
21-A M.R.S. § 336(3). Far from interfering with “legitimate executive branch
activity,” the Superior Court order respects the separation of powers and the
primary role of the Secretary of State in making the determination at issue.
2. Death Knell Exception
[¶22] “The death knell exception permits judicial review when failure to
do so would preclude any effective review or would result in irreparable
injury.” Me. State Emps. Ass’n, 482 A.2d at 464 (quotation marks omitted).
Thus, we will undertake immediate review when “the appellant would
obviously suffer irreparable harm otherwise and the issue pressed on appeal
would be effectively mooted if not immediately addressed.” Id. “The exception
is only available when the injury to the plaintiff’s claimed right would otherwise
be imminent, concrete, and irreparable.” Carter, 2002 ME 103, ¶ 12, 799 A.2d
1232 (quotation marks omitted); see also Me. State Emps. Ass’n, 482 A.2d at
464-65 (declining to review a remand order when it could be challenged after
entry of a final judgment).
[¶23] Even when ballot printing deadlines are at issue, we have not
always applied the death knell exception. In Crafts v. Quinn, 482 A.2d 825 (Me.
17
1984), we declined to apply the death knell exception in a case where the
plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to allow more time to obtain signatures for the
Libertarian Party’s presidential candidate, even though a final disposition by
the Superior Court would not be reached before the election without our
acceptance of an immediate appeal. Id. at 827-29.
[¶24] In contrast, in Alliance for Retired Americans v. Secretary of State,
2020 ME 123, 240 A.3d 45, we applied the death knell exception to review an
interlocutory order denying a preliminary injunction enjoining the rejection of
certain absentee ballots. Id. ¶¶ 1, 5. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory
judgment that statutes governing the deadline for absentee ballots and the
validation and rejection of absentee ballots were unconstitutional as applied
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. ¶ 1 & n.4. We reviewed the decision
immediately because “once the November election [was] held, the claimed
injury to [the plaintiff voters’] constitutional right to vote”—which was
“specific to th[e] pandemic-affected election cycle—[could not] be repaired,
even if they eventually prevail[ed] on their complaint for declaratory judgment
after the election.” Id. ¶ 6.
[¶25] The Secretary of State suggests that there is irreparable harm
because a delay in certainty about whether Trump’s name should appear on the
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primary ballot will result in voter confusion. This uncertainty is, however,
precisely what guides our decision not to undertake immediate appellate
review in this particular case. There are multiple alternative outcomes that
would be more effectively addressed through the Superior Court’s order of
remand to the Secretary of State.
[¶26] We are also struck by the fact that the parties, including the
Secretary of State, all agreed that the effect of the Secretary of State’s decision
should be stayed until Anderson is decided. Given that, we cannot conclude that
concrete, irreparable harm would flow from our decision not to review this
matter immediately. Carter, 2002 ME 103, ¶ 12, 799 A.2d 1232. Indeed, there
is at least as great a risk of additional process and delay if we consider this
appeal and reach an ostensibly final decision, and then the Supreme Court’s
decision makes additional court or administrative action necessary to comply
with the federal law it announces with no clear path for resolution. Given the
high level of uncertainty, the Secretary of State has not identified a concrete and
irreparable harm arising from our decision not to review this matter
immediately. See id.19
III. CONCLUSION
[¶27] Our final judgment rule exists for situations such as this, where
other decisionmakers’ choices are likely to alter the landscape of the case and
narrow the scope of our review. See Me. State Emps. Ass’n, 482 A.2d at 464.
Requiring a final judgment in this situation serves the interests of justice;
enhances administrative and judicial efficiency; averts our issuance of what
would likely be, at least in some part, an advisory opinion; and allows for true
and effective decision-making when the matter is ripe. See Est. of Pirozzolo,
2017 ME 147, ¶ 5, 167 A.3d 552; Bar Harbor Banking & Tr. Co., 411 A.2d at 76.
The entry is:
Appeal dismissed as interlocutory.
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, Thomas A. Knowlton, Dep. Atty. Gen., and
Jason Anton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for
appellant Secretary of State
Benjamin Gaines, Esq., Gaines Law, LLC, Brunswick, and James T. Kilbreth, Esq.,
Drummond Woodsum, Portland, for appellants Kimberley Rosen, Thomas
Saviello, and Ethan Strimling
Bruce W. Hepler, Esq., and Benjamin E. Hartwell, Esq., The Law Offices of Bruce
W. Hepler, LLC, Portland; Scott E. Gessler, Esq., and Geoffrey N. Blue, Esq.,
Gessler Blue LLC, Greenwood Village, Colorado; Ronald D. Coleman, Esq., and
Gary M. Lawkowski, Esq., Dhillon Law Group, Inc., Newark, New Jersey, and
Alexandria, Virginia, for appellee Donald J. Trump
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number AP-2024-1
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY