People v. Woolfolk , 497 Mich. 23 ( 2014 )

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Syllabus
Chief Justice: Justices:
Robert P. Young, Jr. Michael F. Cavanagh
Stephen J. Markman
Mary Beth Kelly
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions:
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Corbin R. Davis
PEOPLE v WOOLFOLK
Docket No. 149127. Decided December 2, 2014.
Deandre M. Woolfolk was convicted following a jury trial in the Wayne Circuit Court of
first-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony for his part in
a fatal shooting that took place one to two hours before defendant’s 18th birthday. The court,
Vera Massey Jones, J., sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for
the murder conviction and a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction.
Defendant appealed, alleging, among other things, that sending him to life in prison without the
possibility of parole violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller v Alabama, 567 US ___; 132 S
Ct 2455; 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), because he had not yet turned 18 when the crime was
committed. The Court of Appeals, BOONSTRA, P.J., and DONOFRIO and BECKERING, JJ.,
affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing, holding that defendant did not attain the
age of 18 until the anniversary date of his birth and that the common-law rule, under which one
becomes of full age the first moment of the day before the anniversary of his or her birth, did not
apply to defendant. 304 Mich. App. 450 (2014). The prosecutor applied for leave to appeal, and
defendant applied for leave to cross-appeal.
In a memorandum opinion signed by Chief Justice YOUNG and Justices MARKMAN,
KELLY, ZAHRA, MCCORMACK, and VIVIANO, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to
appeal and without hearing oral argument, held:
A defendant is a juvenile for the purposes of Miller when he or she is under the age of 18
as determined by his or her anniversary of birth. By this calculation, defendant remained under
the age of 18 at the time he committed the instant homicide offense and is therefore entitled to be
treated in accordance with the rule in Miller.
Court of Appeals judgment affirmed; leave to appeal as cross-appellant denied.
Justice CAVANAGH concurred in the result only.
©2014 State of Michigan
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion
Chief Justice: Justices:
Robert P. Young, Jr. Michael F. Cavanagh
Stephen J. Markman
Mary Beth Kelly
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
FILED DECEMBER 2, 2014
STATE OF MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee,
v No. 149127
DEANDRE MARTEZ WOOLFOLK,
Defendant-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
MEMORANDUM OPINION.
The issue before this Court concerns the matter of age calculation for the purposes
of Miller v Alabama, 567 US ___; 132 S. Ct. 2455; 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), in which the
United States Supreme Court held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the
age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” The Court of Appeals in a very thorough and
thoughtful opinion held that such calculation must be made with reference to a person’s
anniversary of birth. We agree and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m. on January 28, 2007, defendant took part in a fatal
shooting. Defendant was born on January 29, 1989, so the shooting occurred one to two
hours before the 18th anniversary of his birthday. A jury found defendant guilty of first-
degree murder, MCL 750.316, and the trial court sentenced defendant to mandatory life
in prison without the possibility of parole for the conviction. On direct appeal, defendant
argued that he was entitled to resentencing in accordance with Miller because he was
“under the age of 18” when the shooting occurred. While affirming defendant’s
convictions, the Court of Appeals remanded for resentencing on the grounds asserted by
defendant. People v Woolfolk, 304 Mich. App. 450; 848 NW2d 169 (2014).
“[T]he common law prevails except as abrogated by the Constitution, the
Legislature, or this Court.” People v Stevenson, 416 Mich. 383, 389; 331 NW2d 143
(1982). This state’s common law is adopted from England, In re Receivership of 11910 S
Francis Rd, 492 Mich. 208, 219; 821 NW2d 503 (2012), and to identify such law this
Court may consider original English cases and authorities, People v Duffield, 387 Mich.
300, 314; 197 NW2d 25 (1972).
In Nichols v Ramsel, 2 Mod 280; 86 Eng Rep 1072 (KB, 1677), the court of
common pleas in England stated:
So in a devise the question was, whether the testator was of age or
not? And the evidence was, that he was born the first day of January in the
afternoon of that day, and died in the morning on the last day of December:
and it was held by all the Judges that he was of full age; for there shall be
no fraction of a day.
Furthermore, the English jurist and expositor of the common law, William Blackstone,
has written:
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So that full age in male or female is twenty-one years, which age is
completed on the day preceding the anniversary of a person’s birth; who till
that time is an infant, and so styled in law. [Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England (Jones ed, 1976), p 661.]
Given these authorities, as well as additional ones cited by the Court of Appeals, we
agree that under English common law, an individual reaches the next year of age on the
day preceding his or her anniversary of birth. This common law was adopted as the law
of this state upon statehood and has since remained the law of this state.
However, this Court “[has] not hesitated to examine common-law doctrines in
view of changes in society’s mores, institutions, and problems, and to alter those
doctrines where necessary.” Adkins v Thomas Solvent Co, 440 Mich. 293, 317; 487
NW2d 715 (1992). Our role when doing so is “to determine which common-law rules
best serve the interests of Michigan citizens.” Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship,
462 Mich. 591, 607; 614 NW2d 88 (2000). More particularly, our role in such
circumstances is to determine the “prevailing customs and practices of the people” in this
state. Woodman v Kera, LLC, 486 Mich. 228, 278; 785 NW2d 1 (2010) (MARKMAN, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
As recognized by the Court of Appeals, this Court at times has seemingly
employed language consistent with calculating age by anniversary of birth. See, e.g., Bay
Trust Co v Agricultural Life Ins Co, 279 Mich. 248, 253; 271 N.W. 749 (1937) (arguably
set forth in dicta). Compare People v Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 722; 299 NW2d 304 (1980)
(“It is a well-settled principle that a ‘point assumed without consideration is of course not
decided.’ ”). Notwithstanding that dicta cannot establish the basis for a change in
common law, the language in Bay Trust is consistent with this Court’s present
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understanding of the prevailing customs and practices of the people to determine the next
year of age by anniversary of birth, not by the day preceding the anniversary of birth as at
English common law. In addition, we are persuaded by the Court of Appeals’ recitation
of statutes referring to year of age by date of birth. See, e.g., MCL 380.1561(1). These
statutes express legislative policy that this Court may also consider in discerning the
common law. Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 453-454; 254 NW2d 759 (1977). We
therefore take this opportunity to make clear that the common law of this state should
now be understood to provide that a defendant is a juvenile for the purposes of Miller
when he or she is under the age of 18, as determined by his or her anniversary of birth.
By this calculation, defendant remained “under the age of 18” at the time he committed
the instant homicide offense and is therefore entitled to be treated in accordance with the
United States Supreme Court’s rule in Miller.
We thus affirm the Court of Appeals. The application for leave to appeal as cross-
appellant is denied, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be
reviewed by this Court.
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Mary Beth Kelly
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
CAVANAGH, J. I concur in the result only.
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