Totten v. Detroit Aluminum & Brass Corp. , 344 Mich. 414 ( 1955 )

Reid, J.

This suit is in the form of a common-law action, trespass on the case. Defendant claims' the action is of such nature that under our statute, it is not cognizable by a court of common-law-jurisdiction. :

Defendant took the deposition of plaintiff, Dale1 H. Totten, as cross-examination, which deposition was filed on April 30, 1954, the same day on which' defendant’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings was filed. The motion was denied by the court'on May 24,1954. On leave granted, defendant took an appeal in the nature of certiorari from the order of the trial court denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings. ' CL 1948, §650.14 (Stat Ann § 27.2604). ■:

Plaintiff claims that he was employed as time-1 keeper in the office of defendant. The last day of regular work before a long week end and Christmas holiday fell upon Friday, December 21, 1951. Defendant arranged a pre-holiday party for certain of' its employees in the offices and within its factory building. In connection with the pre-holiday party, defendant continued plaintiff on duty and directed him to remain throughout the said party and to close' up and make sure that all persons attending the party had left defendant’s premises before plaintiff should conclude his work and leave the same. At a1 late hour on December 21, 1951, the pre-Christmas' party came to an end and plaintiff walked out of the plant and crossed Christopher street to defendant’s parking lot where all the employees of the company parked free. Plaintiff further claims that when he got to his car he started the motor and concluded he had better go back and check to see whether everything was all right, whether he had locked the office, turned out the lights and everything, because that was very important; that he often does things like that; that he went back to the factory after having turned off the engine in his car, came to the same door of the factory that he had come out of; there was no one at the door and the door has an automatic lock; it has glass; that when he pounded on the door the plant patrolman came to the entranceway inside; that plaintiff told him he wanted to get back on company business; that the patrolman “just waved his hand and waved me away from the door,” so plaintiff turned around and went back to the car, after again crossing Christopher street, but does not know whether he got as far as the car because he had a fainting spell due to his diabetic condition.

It is further the claim of plaintiff that he lay in a comatose condition so long as to suffer from the effects of partial freezing, and as a result he lost all 8 fingers and most of his hands which were amputated by reason of the exposure; that he also suffered shock and agony and that his health has been greatly reduced and permanently impaired, on which grounds he seeks damages.

Plaintiff further alleges in his declaration that he had a right to re-entrance to the plant and factory and further, that the defendant, its servants, employees and agents were personally well acquainted with plaintiff, knew of his status as employee, and of his disabilities as a chronic diabetic, but negligently, recklessly and wilfully barred and excluded plaintiff from the plant and denied him entrance thereto and subjected him to the risk of coma, collapse and death and by reason of the negligence and wilful misconduct of defendant’s servants and agents, that plaintiff collapsed on the parking lot and became unconscious and in a coma, and that by reason of his exposure he suffered damages for which he brings suit.

Plaintiff recognizes that the relationship of the parties here presented is of an employee acting outside of the jurisdiction of his employment but claims it to be within the outside limits of the employer-employee relationship.

' Defendant stresses that the plaintiff himself characterized his purpose in returning to the factory as being “company business,” and that plaintiff’s allegation of a right of re-entry into the factory could only be the right of an employee, in which claim we find defendant correct and we conclude that plaintiff bases his action upon the relationship.

Defendant stresses the title to the workmen’s compensation act as indicative of its purpose, which title is:

“An act to promote the welfare of the people of this State, relating to the liability of employers for injuries or death sustained by their employees, providing compensation for the disability or death resulting from occupational injuries or disease or accidental injury to or death of employees and methods for the payment, and apportionment of the same, establishing an industrial accident board, defining its powers, providing for a review of its awards, making an appropriation to carry out the provisions of this act, and restricting the right to compensation or damages in such cases to such as are provided by this act.” See caption preceding CL 1948, §411.1 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.141).

While the parties differ in their interpretation of the title, it seems to us fairly certain that the title should be. considered as relating to the liabilities of employers for injuries or death sustained by their employees, within the limits of the relationship, and that the right to compensation or damages in such cases is restricted to such compensation as is provided for by the act. In Munson v. Christie, 270 Mich 94, we say at page 98:

“It appears from the title the act is one providing that as against the employer the injured employee ánd his dependents have no rights and can enforce no liability except those provided in the act. We need not read beyond the title of the act to find this intent and purpose of the legislature clearly expressed.”^*

Courts in some States in construing the statutes of their own State have held that the workmen’s compensation law does not bar an employee from suing his employer at law for an injury for which no recovery is provided by the terms of the act. Still we consider that such conclusions by other jurisdictions must be read in the light of applicable statutes. See Dailey v. River Raisin Paper Co., 269 Mich 443.

Our workmen’s compensation act taken in its entirety and read- in light of the title to the act, as we construe it, hars plaintiff’s action. Plaintiff’s action is of such a nature as not now cognizable by a Michigan court of common-law jurisdiction.

The order appealed from is reversed. The cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment for defendant. Costs to defendant.

Cars, C. J., and Sharpe, Dethmers, and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Reid, J.

* For several citations concerning several questions on the meaning and validity of the workmen's compensation aet, see Dalion v. Ford Motor Co., 314 Mich 152 (19 NCCA NS 158).