Jeffrey S Maniaci v. Thomas Diroff ( 2019 )

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Syllabus
Chief Justice: Justices:
Bridget M. McCormack Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
Chief Justice Pro Tem:
Richard H. Bernstein
David F. Viviano Elizabeth T. Clement
Megan K. Cavanagh
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions:
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kathryn L. Loomis
MANIACI v DIROFF
Docket No. 158005. Argued on application for leave to appeal October 16, 2019. Decided
November 21, 2019.
In 2014, Jeffrey S. Maniaci filed an action in the Gladwin Circuit Court against Thomas
and Mandy Diroff, asserting that he had the right to use a piece of property (Parcel B) that separated
Vonda Lane from the Tittabawassee River, also known at that location as Secord Lake; defendants
counterclaimed, arguing that they owned Parcel B. In June 2015, plaintiff and defendants entered
into a consent judgment in which defendants conveyed to plaintiff and others an easement to
traverse Parcel B; specifically, the right of ingress and egress access to and from the water’s edge
of the Tittabawassee River across Parcel B to Vonda Lane. The easement expressly allowed the
temporary mooring and launching of watercraft, including by boat trailer, but prohibited use of the
easement for nontemporary mooring, docks, and/or wharfs. In April 2016, plaintiff moved to hold
defendants in contempt for not complying with the consent judgment, asserting that defendants
had failed to remove certain barriers on Parcel B; plaintiff also requested to regrade the easement
to allow a trailer to launch a boat from the parcel. After a hearing on the issue, the court, Thomas
R. Evans, J., denied the motion. Plaintiff sought leave to appeal the postjudgment order in the
Court of Appeals, and in an unpublished order entered November 23, 2016 (Docket No. 333952),
the Court denied the application. In the interim, defendants had conveyed Parcel B to Kenneth G.
Siler and Tonya L. Siler, and in July 2016, the Silers conveyed Parcel B to the Kenneth G. Siler
and Tonya L. Siler Revocable Trust dated April 3, 2013. Plaintiff filed an application for leave to
appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration as on leave granted. 500 Mich. 1057 (2017). On remand, the Court of Appeals,
METER, P.J., and GADOLA and TUKEL, JJ., affirmed the circuit court order in an unpublished per
curiam opinion issued May 15, 2018 (Docket No. 333952), reasoning that just because it was not
feasible to back a boat trailer fully to the water’s edge did not prevent the easement from being
used to launch boats, including with the use of a boat trailer. Plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme
Court ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application for leave to appeal or
take other action. 503 Mich. 1024 (2019).
In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal,
held:
An easement holder cannot make improvements to the servient estate if the improvements
are unnecessary for the effective use of the easement or they unreasonably burden the servient
tenement. Relatedly, the conveyance of an easement gives to the grantee all the rights that are
incident or necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement. In this case, the
easement expressly included the right to bring a boat trailer onto Parcel B and to use it to launch
watercraft into the water. Given the dictionary definition of the word “launch,”—that is, to set (a
boat or ship) in the water—the scope of the easement necessarily included the ability to bring a
boat trailer at least to the water’s edge; in other words, the easement had to include that ability
because in order to set a watercraft in the water, including by boat trailer, one had to be able to
bring the trailer at least to the water’s edge. In addition, because plaintiff had an easement to
launch boats, including by boat trailer, and the ability to perform that action was necessary to the
reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement, he had the right to regrade the shoreline of
Parcel B for easier access to the water.
Court of Appeals judgment reversed, circuit court order denying plaintiff’s request to adjust
the slope of Parcel B vacated in part, and case remanded to the circuit court.
©2019 State of Michigan
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
OPINION
Chief Justice: Justices:
Bridget M. McCormack Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
Chief Justice Pro Tem: Richard H. Bernstein
David F. Viviano Elizabeth T. Clement
Megan K. Cavanagh
FILED November 21, 2019
STATE OF MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT
JEFFREY S. MANIACI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 158005
THOMAS DIROFF and MANDY DIROFF,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
KENNETH G. SILER AND TONYA L.
SILER REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST
DATED APRIL 3, 2013,
Appellee.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
PER CURIAM.
This case involves the scope of an easement to traverse a piece of property (Parcel
B) that separates a road (Vonda Lane) from the Tittabawassee River, also known at this
location as Secord Lake. Pursuant to a June 18, 2015 consent judgment, the defendants1
conveyed an easement across Parcel B for ingress and egress access to and from the
Tittabawassee River to the plaintiff, Jeffrey S. Maniaci, and others. The consent judgment
specified that the easement “may also be used for the temporary mooring and launching of
watercraft, including by boat trailer, but may not be used for non-temporary mooring,
docks, and/or wharfs.”
To decide this case, we must answer two questions. First, does the scope of the
easement include backing a boat trailer all the way to the water’s edge? Second, is it
necessary for effective use of the easement to regrade the shoreline to allow such access
by boat trailer?
We answer both of those questions yes. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals, vacate in part the July 11, 2016 order of the Gladwin Circuit Court,
and remand this case to the Gladwin Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
Michigan law on easements is well established. In Blackhawk Dev Corp v Village
of Dexter, 473 Mich. 33, 41; 700 NW2d 364 (2005), quoting Little v Kin, 468 Mich. 699,
701; 664 NW2d 749 (2003), this Court reaffirmed “[a] fundamental principle of easement
law”: the easement holder cannot “make improvements to the servient estate if such
improvements are unnecessary for the effective use of the easement or they unreasonably
1
In June 2016, the defendants-appellees Thomas and Mandy Diroff conveyed Parcel B to
Kenneth G. Siler and Tonya L. Siler. In July 2016, the Silers then conveyed Parcel B by
quitclaim deed to appellee, the Kenneth G. Siler and Tonya L. Siler Revocable Trust dated
April 3, 2013. This opinion uses “the defendants” to refer to the Diroffs and “the appellee”
to refer to the Siler Trust.
2
burden the servient tenement.” (Quotation marks omitted.) The Court also quoted
Unverzagt v Miller, 306 Mich. 260, 265; 10 NW2d 849 (1943), for the related proposition
that “the conveyance of an easement gives to the grantee all such rights as are incident or
necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement.” (Quotation marks and
citation omitted.)
Applying these legal principles, we have little trouble concluding that the
unambiguous terms of the easement provide an express right to back a boat trailer to the
water’s edge. The consent judgment defines the easement as extending from the end of
Vonda Road to the water’s edge and states that the easement may be used for the
“launching of watercraft, including by boat trailer . . . .” See ¶ 1 of the consent judgment
(defining Parcel B, in part, as “to the water’s edge of the Tittabawassee River”); see also
¶ 2 (granting the plaintiff “an appurtenant non-recreational easement for ingress and egress
access to and from the Tittabawassee River (a/k/a Secord Lake) across Parcel B to and
from Vonda Lane”) (emphasis added). Thus, the easement expressly includes the right to
bring a boat trailer onto the property and to use the trailer to “launch” watercraft into the
water. A lay dictionary includes as its first definition of the word “launch” “to set (a boat
or ship) in the water.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2003); see also
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed) (defining “launch” as “to set (a boat
or ship) afloat”). Because in order to “set a watercraft in the water, including by boat
trailer,” one must be able to bring a boat trailer at least to the water’s edge, the scope of the
easement must include the ability to do so.2 We therefore disagree with the Court of
2
The Court of Appeals erred by going beyond the language of the consent judgment to
determine the scope of the easement. The Court concluded that regrading the shoreline
3
Appeals’ contrary conclusion that “just because it is not feasible to back a boat trailer all
the way to the water’s edge does not prevent the easement from being used to launch boats,
including with the use of a boat trailer.” Maniaci v Diroff, unpublished per curiam opinion
of the Court of Appeals, issued May 15, 2018 (Docket No. 333952), p 5.
We similarly have little difficulty concluding that the plaintiff’s request to regrade
the shoreline of Parcel B is “necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the
easement.”3 Unverzagt, 306 Mich. at 265 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The
appellee’s counsel conceded at oral argument that it is currently not possible to set a boat
in the water by boat trailer on Parcel B. The current slope of Parcel B therefore both
prevents a boat trailer from being backed to the water’s edge, a permitted use within the
scope of the easement, and generally inhibits water access by making it difficult to get
boats of any kind into the water.
The plaintiff has an easement to launch boats, including by boat trailer, on Parcel B.
He seeks to do just that by improving the land to facilitate easy access to the water by
regrading the shoreline.4 This the law gives him the right to do. We reverse the judgment
was outside the scope of the easement, in part, because of evidence that the shoreline
remained unchanged from the commencement of this litigation and evidence
demonstrating that the issue of regrading the shoreline did not arise until long after entry
of the consent judgment. Reference to extrinsic evidence is not appropriate because the
language of the easement is unambiguous. Little, 468 Mich. at 700 & n 2.
3
The appellee makes nothing more than a conclusory statement that the regrading of the
shoreline will unreasonably burden its estate. We consider a challenge under that part of
the Blackhawk test to be abandoned because the appellee failed to present any supporting
argument.
4
We reject the appellee’s contention that regrading the shoreline amounts to “damage to
the surface of the Easement,” thereby implicating ¶ 4 of the consent judgment (placing
4
of the Court of Appeals, vacate the portion of the Gladwin Circuit Court’s July 11, 2016
order denying the plaintiff’s request to adjust the grade or slope of Parcel B, and remand
to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.5
Bridget M. McCormack
Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
Elizabeth T. Clement
Megan K. Cavanagh
responsibility “for restoring the Easement to its pre-damaged state” on those who created
such damage). Rather, we agree with the Court of Appeals that “[g]rading the parcel to
alter the slope sufficiently to launch a boat from a boat trailer” is an improvement. Maniaci,
unpub op at 4.
5
We decide only that the plaintiff is entitled to make some alteration to the shoreline to
facilitate the launching of boats by boat trailer and leave it for the trial court to address any
additional issues on remand that are beyond the scope of that narrow holding.
5