People of Michigan v. Theodore Muttscheler ( 2008 )

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:
Opinion Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED JUNE 18, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 136101
THEODORE MUTTSCHELER,
Defendant-Appellee.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 136199
THEODORE MUTTSCHELER,
Defendant-Appellant.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
MEMORANDUM OPINION.
In this case, we are called on to interpret the intermediate-sanction
sentencing statute, MCL 769.34(4)(a), and decide whether a defendant whose
recommended minimum sentence range requires the imposition of an intermediate
sanction may be sentenced to serve time in prison, rather than jail. The Court of
Appeals held that, absent a departure supported by substantial and compelling
reasons, a trial court may not impose an indeterminate prison sentence on a
defendant for whom the sentencing guidelines require an intermediate sanction
because an “intermediate sanction does not include a prison sentence.” People v
Muttscheler (On Reconsideration), unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued March 25, 2008 (Docket No. 275411), p 2. In lieu of granting
either the prosecution’s or defendant’s application for leave to appeal, we affirm
that judgment.
While defendant was incarcerated in prison, guards found a crude weapon
in his cell during a routine search. Defendant pleaded guilty of attempted
possession of a weapon by a prisoner, in exchange for the prosecution’s dismissal
of an habitual-offender notice and the imposition of a sentence within the
applicable sentencing guidelines range. Under the guidelines, defendant’s
recommended minimum sentence range was 5 to 17 months. The trial court
sentenced him to 12 to 30 months in prison, to be served consecutively to the
sentences he was already serving.1 Defendant then moved to withdraw his plea,
1
Because defendant was incarcerated when he committed the offense,
MCL 768.7a(1) requires a consecutive sentence. Specifically, the relevant part of
the statute provides:
A person who is incarcerated in a penal or reformatory
institution in this state, or who escapes from such an institution, and
who commits a crime during that incarceration or escape which is
punishable by imprisonment in a penal or reformatory institution in
this state shall, upon conviction of that crime, be sentenced as
provided by law. The term of imprisonment imposed for the crime
(continued…)
2
but the trial court denied his motion. On leave granted, the Court of Appeals
reversed in a split decision. The Court held that defendant was entitled to an
intermediate sanction, which would at most be a jail term of no more than 12
months. Id. It remanded the case for resentencing within the guidelines, in
accordance with the plea agreement. If the trial court could not agree to that, the
Court held, defendant must be allowed to withdraw his plea. Id.
As noted, under the sentencing guidelines, defendant’s recommended
minimum sentence range was 5 to 17 months. MCL 769.34(4)(a) provides:
If the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence
range for a defendant determined under the sentencing guidelines set
forth in chapter XVII is 18 months or less, the court shall impose an
intermediate sanction unless the court states on the record a
substantial and compelling reason to sentence the individual to the
jurisdiction of the department of corrections. An intermediate
sanction may include a jail term that does not exceed the upper limit
of the recommended minimum sentence range or 12 months,
whichever is less. [Emphasis added.]
Furthermore, MCL 769.31(b) defines “intermediate sanction” as “probation
or any sanction, other than imprisonment in a state prison or state reformatory, that
may lawfully be imposed.” The statute identifies a variety of possible
intermediate sanctions, such as community service, probation, a jail sentence, a
fine, house arrest, etc., but it unequivocally states that a prison sentence is not an
intermediate sanction. See also People v Stauffer, 465 Mich 633, 635; 640 NW2d
(…continued)
shall begin to run at the expiration of the term or terms of
imprisonment which the person is serving or has become liable to
serve in a penal or reformatory institution in this state.
3
869 (2002). Stauffer implies that when the guidelines require an intermediate
sanction, even if the length of the sentence does not exceed the statute’s 12-month
maximum, the sentence is an upward departure if the defendant is required to
serve it in prison, rather than in jail. Id. at 636. Accordingly, the trial court cannot
impose a prison sentence unless it identifies substantial and compelling reasons for
the departure. Id.The Court of Appeals correctly stated that the trial court erred by relying on
People v Weatherford, 193 Mich App 115; 483 NW2d 924 (1992). Weatherford,
predating the enactment of the legislative sentencing guidelines, was decided in
the “era” of the judicial sentencing guidelines, 1983 through 1998. See People v
Hegwood, 465 Mich 432, 438; 636 NW2d 127 (2001). Because the minimum
sentence ranges recommended by the judicial guidelines were not the product of
legislative action, sentencing courts could not be required to adhere to them. Id.Courts could sentence outside the guidelines simply by articulating a reason why
such a sentence should be imposed. Id.; Michigan Sentencing Guidelines (2d ed,
1988), p 7. Thus, what the Court of Appeals determined to be a sufficient reason
for the departure in Weatherford is inapplicable to a sentence imposed under the
legislative sentencing guidelines.
More importantly, the sentence in Weatherford was imposed after a jury
trial. The trial court there was not bound by any plea agreement to sentence within
the guidelines, as the trial court was in the present case. Because the parties here
agreed to a sentence within the guidelines, the trial court violated the agreement
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not only by sentencing defendant to prison, but also by imposing an indeterminate
sentence, under which defendant could be imprisoned for longer than the 12-
month maximum allowed by the intermediate-sanction statute.
Finally, we conclude the Court of Appeals did not err when it held that
defendant will be allowed to withdraw his plea only if the trial court cannot agree
to a sentence within the guidelines. As the Court noted, defendant does not assert
his innocence; the heart of his argument is that the prosecution did not fulfill its
end of the bargain. Muttscheler, supra at 2.2 Accordingly, enforcement of that
bargain is the proper remedy.
Affirmed.
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
2
We note that this issue is simplified somewhat by the fact that defendant’s
new sentence must be served consecutively to the existing sentence. If the
sentences could have been served concurrently, defendant might have chosen to
agree to a departure in order to serve his new term in prison while he
simultaneously served his existing prison term. Agreeing to such a departure from
an intermediate sanction would waive an appellate challenge, unless the length of
the sentence also exceeded 12 months, as it did in this case. People v Wiley, 472
Mich 153, 154; 693 NW2d 800 (2005).
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