Arthur Whitmore v. Charlevoix County Road Commission ( 2011 )


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  • Order                                                                        Michigan Supreme Court
    Lansing, Michigan
    December 21, 2011                                                                  Robert P. Young, Jr.,
    Chief Justice
    142106                                                                             Michael F. Cavanagh
    Marilyn Kelly
    Stephen J. Markman
    Diane M. Hathaway
    Mary Beth Kelly
    ARTHUR WHITMORE and ELAINE                                                             Brian K. Zahra,
    WHITMORE,                                                                                         Justices
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v                                                       SC: 142106
    COA: 289672
    Charlevoix CC: 08-014922-NO
    CHARLEVOIX COUNTY ROAD
    COMMISSION,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _________________________________________/
    On December 7, 2011, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave
    to appeal the October 7, 2010 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court,
    the application is again considered. MCR 7.302(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to
    appeal we AFFIRM the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part.
    The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court’s denial of defendant’s
    motion for summary disposition, MCR 2.116(C)(7). In reviewing a motion for summary
    disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7), a court must accept “[t]he contents of the
    complaint . . . as true unless contradicted by documentation submitted by the movant.”
    Maiden v Rozwood, 
    461 Mich 109
    , 119 (1999), citing Patterson v Kleiman, 
    447 Mich 429
    , 434 n 6 (1994). While “a movant under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is not required to file
    supportive material, and the opposing party need not reply with supportive material,” a
    party “may support a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) by affidavits, depositions,
    admissions, or other documentary evidence,” as long as “the substance or content of the
    supporting proofs [is] admissible in evidence.” 
    Id.
    MCL 691.1403 requires a governmental agency to have either actual or
    constructive knowledge of the “particular condition [that] posed an unreasonable threat to
    safe public travel . . . .” Wilson v Alpena Co Rd Comm, 
    474 Mich 161
    , 169 (2006).
    Constructive notice is conclusively established when “the defect has been readily
    apparent to an ordinarily observant person for 30 days or longer before the injury.” MCL
    2
    691.1403. Plaintiffs pled that the alleged defect causing their injuries existed for 30 days
    or longer before the injuries. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to summary
    disposition on this basis.
    We clarify that plaintiffs did not properly plead actual knowledge of the particular
    defect that caused their injuries because they only allege that defendant knew of general
    problems with the highway that required frequent patching and that defendant scheduled
    reconstruction of the highway. Wilson, 
    474 Mich at 169
    . The Court of Appeals erred to
    the extent that its rationale is inconsistent with Wilson.
    The Court of Appeals correctly determined that defendant is not entitled to
    summary disposition for failure to comply with MCL 691.1404(1). MCL 691.1404(1)
    requires an injured person to serve, within 120 days, notice on the governmental agency
    that “specif[ies] the exact location and nature of the defect.” Defendant is not entitled to
    summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) because it did not challenge below
    plaintiffs’ assertion that they accompanied their § 1404(1) notice with a police report that
    specified additional details required by § 1404(1).
    We REVERSE in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals regarding defendant’s
    motion to strike portions of plaintiffs’ allegations relating to defendant’s alleged failure to
    warn, for the reasons stated in Judge BANDSTRA’s partial dissent. Plaintiffs’ only theory
    of recovery is based on defendant’s duty to maintain the highway “in reasonable repair so
    that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel,” pursuant to MCL 691.1402.
    Plaintiffs’ alleged failure to warn claims are barred under § 1402 pursuant to this Court’s
    decision in Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 
    463 Mich 143
     (2000), as Judge
    BANDSTRA’s partial dissent properly recognized.
    We REMAND this case to the Charlevoix Circuit Court for further proceedings
    consistent with this order.
    We do not retain jurisdiction.
    CAVANAGH, MARILYN KELLY, and HATHAWAY, JJ., would deny leave to appeal.
    I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
    foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
    December 21, 2011                   _________________________________________
    t1214                                                                 Clerk
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 142106

Filed Date: 12/21/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014