People of Michigan v. Thomas McClain Hunter ( 2002 )

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED APRIL 24, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 112713
THOMAS McCLAIN HUNTER,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________
PER CURIAM
The defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to
possess with intent to deliver 650 grams or more of cocaine1
and possession with intent to deliver 650 grams or more of
cocaine.2 The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction for
possession with intent to deliver, but reversed the conspiracy
conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to
1
MCL 750.157a, 333.7401(2)(a)(i).
2
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i).
show that defendant and his coconspirator agreed that the
amount of cocaine would exceed the statutory minimum. We
conclude that the evidence was sufficient, and reverse.
I
The evidence at trial showed that the defendant flew from
Detroit to Los Angeles. The details of his activities in
Los Angeles were not established. However, postal inspectors
became suspicious of a package addressed to an apartment in
Oakland County, Michigan, and contacted officials in Oakland
County. A dog trained to detect controlled substances
confirmed the presence of drugs. The package was opened,
inspected, and rewrapped. It contained over 1,000 grams of
cocaine.
An officer then delivered the package to the apartment of
Dorothy Jenkins, the defendant’s girlfriend, to which it was
addressed.3 Ms. Jenkins signed for the package. Officers
later entered the apartment with a search warrant and arrested
her.
Ultimately, Jenkins cooperated with the police. She
testified at length about her discussions with defendant
concerning the California trip and the shipment of drugs, as
well as the defendant’s activities before that time. Jenkins
said that after the package arrived, defendant opened it,
3
Testimony indicated that handwriting on the package was
defendant’s.
2
discarded the outer wrapping, and left, climbing out a back
window.4
The defendant was charged with conspiracy to possess with
intent to deliver 650 or more grams of cocaine and with
possession with intent to deliver that amount of cocaine.5
The jury found the defendant guilty as charged, and he was
sentenced to life in prison.
II
On appeal, the Court of Appeals majority rejected most of
the issues raised by the defendant, but agreed with his claim
that the evidence was insufficient to show an agreement
regarding the amount of cocaine that the defendant would be
sending.6 The majority concluded that the prosecutor’s
evidence established an agreement between defendant and
Jenkins to possess cocaine. However, relying on People v
Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich 334; 562 NW2d 652 (1997), it
found that there was insufficient evidence regarding the
quantity of drugs that they agreed to possess:
In January of 1993, defendant was planning a
trip to Los Angeles, California. Before leaving
4
Though some of his movements were later reconstructed,
the drugs from the package were never recovered.
5
Ms. Jenkins was charged with the same offenses, and
pleaded guilty to a lesser charge as part of her agreement to
testify.
6
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 7,
1998(Docket No. 182324).
3
for Los Angeles, defendant told Jenkins that he was
going to send her a package and asked for her
address. Jenkins admitted that she “had an
agreement with [defendant] that [she] was going to
sign for a package containing cocaine.” However,
she acknowledged that she did not know how much
cocaine would be sent. In Michigan, the crime of
conspiracy is complete upon formation of the
agreement. Justice, supra at 345-346. Thus, the
evidence clearly established a conspiracy to
possess cocaine. There was additional evidence
from which the jury could infer that defendant
intended to deliver in excess of 650 grams of
cocaine. However, there was no evidence, direct or
circumstantial, that Jenkins had the specific
intent to combine with defendant to deliver in
excess of 650 grams of cocaine to a third person.
Under these circumstances, the prosecution failed
to prove an essential element of the conspiracy
charge, Justice, supra at 349, and defendant’s
conviction on that charge must be reversed.
[Emphasis in original.]
Judge Gribbs dissented. He thought the testimony of
coconspirator Jenkins sufficient to establish the quantity
element, explaining:
The coconspirator in this case had an intimate
relationship with defendant and spent a great deal
of time with him. She testified that she saw
defendant with “kind of a large quantity” of
cocaine, larger than a sandwich bag, every two or
three days. The conconspirator indicated the size
of the bags with her hands for the jury. Defendant
arranged to go to California to “check on some
situation” concerning cocaine, and told her that he
was going to mail a package of cocaine to her
apartment. The coconspirator testified that she
and defendant discussed the package of cocaine on a
regular basis and that defendant indicated that the
package was worth “too much money” to walk away
from. The coconspirator knew that she could get
into trouble for signing for the package, and knew
that defendant planned to take the cocaine and “run
with the package” immediately as soon as the
package arrived.
4
Applications for leave to appeal were filed by both the
prosecutor and the defendant, who raised a number of issues
that the Court of Appeals had rejected. We entered orders
denying the defendant’s application7 and holding the
prosecutor’s application in abeyance for People v Mass, Docket
8
No. 115820. People v Mass has been decided, 464 Mich 615;
628 NW2d 540 (2001),9 and we again consider the prosecutor’s
application.
III
This case involves a claim that the evidence was
insufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of conspiracy
to possess with intent to deliver 650 or more grams of
cocaine. In People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748
(1992), we summarized the principles appellate courts are to
7
462 Mich 878(Docket No. 112783).
8
Unpublished order, entered June 13, 2000 (Docket No.
112713).
9
People v Mass does not resolve the issue presented in
this case. In Mass we held that the amount of controlled
substance is an element of a charge of delivery of controlled
substance, but that knowledge of the amount is not. In a
conspiracy case, however, we said that knowledge of the amount
of a controlled substance is an element of conspiracy with
intent to deliver a particular amount. In Mass, the
conspiracy conviction was reversed and reduced to a lesser
offense because the trial court did not submit the amount
element to the jury.
Mass is not helpful to the disposition of this case
because here the trial judge did instruct the jury that in
order to convict it needed to find an agreement to possess
with intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine.
5
apply in reviewing such claims:
In short, when determining whether sufficient
evidence has been presented to sustain a
conviction, a court must view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found that the essential elements of the crime
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations
omitted.]
IV
In People v Justice, supra, we explained the elements of
a conspiracy charge such as that involved in this case:
To be convicted of conspiracy to possess with
intent to deliver a controlled substance, the
people must prove that (1) the defendant possessed
the specific intent to deliver the statutory
minimum as charged, (2) his coconspirator possessed
the specific intent to deliver the statutory
minimum as charged, and (3) the defendant and his
coconspirator possessed the specific intent to
combine to deliver the statutory minimum as charged
to a third person. [454 Mich 349.]
In this case, the prosecution had direct evidence that
defendant and Jenkins conspired to possess with intent to
deliver cocaine. The evidence with regard to their intent
about quantities was circumstantial. Such evidence, however,
unquestionably can establish the requisite element. As we
said in People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 526:
Possession with intent to deliver can be
established by circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences arising from that evidence,
just as it can be established by direct evidence.
Peterson v Oceana Circuit Judge, 243 Mich 215, 217;
219 NW 934 (1928); People v Maliskey, 77 Mich App
444, 453; 258 NW2d 512 (1977). See also [United
States v Montes-Cardenas, 746 F2d 771, 778 (CA 11,
1984)]; [United States v Castillo, 844 F2d 1379,
6
1392 (CA 9, 1988)]; State v Salas, 231 Neb 471,
473-474; 436 NW2d 547 (1989); State v Poellinger,
153 Wis 2d 493, 503-504; 451 NW2d 752 (1990).
Indeed, we agree with the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin that “circumstantial evidence is
oftentimes stronger and more satisfactory than
direct evidence.” Id. at 501-502. For this
reason, inferences drawn from circumstantial
evidence are reviewed in the same manner as those
drawn from direct evidence.
Further, it is well established that it is not necessary
that each of the coconspirators have full knowledge of the
extent of the conspiracy:
A person may be a party to a continuing
conspiracy by knowingly co-operating to further the
object thereof. People v Heidt, [312 Mich 629; 20
NW2d 751 (1945)]. It is not necessary to a
conviction for conspiracy that each defendant have
knowledge of all its ramifications. People v
DeLano, 318 Mich 557 [28 NW2d 909 (1947)]. Nor is
it necessary that one conspirator should know all
of the conspirators or participate in all of the
objects of the conspiracy. People v Garska, 303
Mich 313 [; 6 NW2d 527 (1942)]. [People v Cooper,
326 Mich 514, 521; 40 NW2d 708 (1950), aff’d on
rehearing 328 Mich 159 (1950).]
Applying these principles to the evidence, we conclude
that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the
defendant and Jenkins conspired to possess with intent to
deliver 650 or more grams of a controlled substance. The
evidence clearly showed that defendant and Jenkins conspired
to possess cocaine with intent to deliver. Defendant was to
mail a package containing cocaine from California to Jenkins’
apartment, where she would sign for it.
Other evidence in the case was sufficient for the jury to
7
infer that the amount involved met the statutory minimum.
Jenkins testified that she and the defendant spent a great
deal of time together, and that the defendant frequently had
substantial quantities of cocaine in his possession in plastic
bags. She described the bags as being “bigger than a sandwich
bag.” Using her hands, she demonstrated for the jury the size
of the bags. From those circumstances, the jury would
reasonably infer that defendant and Ms. Jenkins would have
understood that this California trip to obtain cocaine would
involve amounts that were substantial in comparison to the
quantities defendant normally had.
Jenkins went to the airport with the defendant for his
flight to California, and was present when he was stopped by
law enforcement agents because he “pulled out a lot of money”
when purchasing his ticket. The agents questioned him
“because he had all this money.” Jenkins’ awareness of the
amount of money in the defendant’s possession was one more
circumstance from which the jury could infer her intent
regarding the quantity of drugs to be obtained.
Further, Jenkins testified that defendant asked her
repeatedly about the package, and that after defendant’s
return from California, he was upset that the package had not
yet been delivered. When she suggested that he “just leave it
alone” or “let it go,” the defendant replied, “It’s too much
money involved. I can’t just let it go.”
8
Finally, the amount of drugs the defendant mailed from
California, which Jenkins signed for and accepted on
defendant’s instructions, may be considered in evaluating the
coconspirators’ intent regarding the amount to be obtained.
What the conspirators actually did in furtherance of the
conspiracy is evidence of what they had agreed to do. See
Mass, 464 Mich 634; People v Kanar, 314 Mich 242, 249; 22 NW2d
359 (1946); People v Newsome, 3 Mich App 541, 560; 143 NW2d
165 (1966). In this case, the package contained 1,040 grams,
well above the statutory amount of 650 grams.
From all this evidence the jury could have concluded that
the defendant and Jenkins intended to possess an amount of
cocaine in excess of the statutory minimum. Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part and
reinstate the defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to possess
with intent to deliver 650 or more grams of cocaine.
CORRIGAN , C.J., and WEAVER , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and MARKMAN , JJ.,
concurred.
9
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 112713
THOMAS McCLAIN HUNTER,
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________________
WEAVER, J. (concurring).
I concur in the result of the per curiam opinion, but
write separately because I continue to adhere to the view
expressed by the concurring opinion in People v Mass, 464 Mich
615; 628 NW2d 540 (2001). Knowledge of the amount of drugs
delivered should not be an element of a conspiracy to deliver
offense. The judicial imposition of this knowledge
requirement by the Mass majority is inconsistent with the text
of both the delivery statute, MCL 333.7401, and the conspiracy
statute, MCL 750.157a.
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 112713
THOMAS McCLAIN HUNTER,
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).
I would deny leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals
correctly reversed the defendant’s conviction for conspiracy
to possess with intent to deliver more than 650 grams of
cocaine because the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence
of intent to combine and deliver the statutory minimum.
Moreover, leave to appeal should be denied because the
facts are close, because People v Mass, 464 Mich 615; 628 NW2d
540 (2001), solidified this Court’s thinking regarding the
necessary elements in conspiracy to deliver, and finally
because the defendant’s life sentence will not be altered by
this change.
KELLY , J., concurred with CAVANAGH , J.