Estate of Darryl Ile v. Foremost Insurance Company ( 2012 )


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  • Order                                                                      Michigan Supreme Court
    Lansing, Michigan
    December 20, 2012                                                                Robert P. Young, Jr.,
    Chief Justice
    143627                                                                           Michael F. Cavanagh
    Marilyn Kelly
    Stephen J. Markman
    Diane M. Hathaway
    Mary Beth Kelly
    DEBRA ILE, as Personal Representative of                                             Brian K. Zahra,
    the ESTATE OF DARRYL ILE, and                                                                   Justices
    DEBRA ILE, individually and on behalf of
    themselves and all others similarly situated,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v                                                      SC: 143627
    COA: 295685
    FOREMOST INSURANCE COMPANY,                            Wayne CC: 09-010741-CK
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________________________/
    On order of the Court, leave to appeal having been granted and the briefs and oral
    arguments of the parties having been considered by the Court, we REVERSE the July 14,
    2011 judgment of the Court of Appeals and we REMAND this case to the Wayne Circuit
    Court for entry of summary disposition in favor of the defendant. The Court of Appeals
    erroneously concluded that the underinsured motorist coverage in the insurance policy
    issued by the defendant to Darryl Ile was illusory because Ile could reasonably believe
    that his insurance premium payment included some charge for underinsurance when there
    are no circumstances in which Ile could recover underinsured motorist benefits given the
    policy limits Ile selected. We have expressly rejected the notion that the perceived
    expectations of a party may override the clear language of a contract. 1
    Moreover, when read as a whole, the clear language of the policy provides for
    combined uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage that, as promised, would have
    operated to supplement any recovery by Ile to ensure that he received a total recovery of
    up to $20,000/$40,000 (the policy limit) had the other vehicle involved in the crash been
    either uninsured or insured in an amount less than $20,000/$40,000. That such coverage
    would, under the terms of the policy, always be labeled “uninsured,” as opposed to
    “underinsured,” does not make the policy illusory.
    1
    Wilkie v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 
    469 Mich 41
     (2003).
    2
    MARILYN KELLY, J. (dissenting).
    I dissent from the majority’s order reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals
    and remanding the case to the trial court for entry of summary disposition in favor of
    defendant. This case, like others, is rife with issues that warrant a more detailed analysis
    than the majority’s order provides. 2
    For instance, the order states that “when read as a whole, the clear language of the
    policy provides for combined uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage . . . .”
    Accordingly, it holds that the policy is not illusory. It is unclear what policy language the
    majority relies on to reach this conclusion. Similarly, the order does not discuss the
    policy’s reduction clause, which prohibits a policy holder from recovering more than the
    $20,000/$40,000 uninsured/underinsured limits. As a consequence, the reader is left
    without an understanding of how those limits apply to this case and whether plaintiff has
    in fact been made whole under the policy. Furthermore, it is uncertain from the order
    why summary disposition in favor of defendant is appropriate. Simply because the
    majority disavows the doctrine of reasonable expectations 3 and holds that the policy is
    not illusory does not automatically entitle defendant to relief.
    In sum, I would not dispose of this case by order. The parties deserve a more
    thorough explanation of the majority’s decision.
    CAVANAGH, J., joins the statement of MARILYN KELLY, J.
    HATHAWAY J., (dissenting).
    I believe that the Court of Appeals majority reached the correct result.
    Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
    2
    See, e.g., Kroon-Harris v Michigan, 
    477 Mich 988
    , 989 (2007) (MARILYN KELLY, J.,
    dissenting) (“Because the majority’s order leaves fundamental questions unanswered, it is
    inadequate.”).
    3
    For a thorough discussion of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, see Wilkie v Auto-
    Owners Ins Co, 
    469 Mich 41
    , 65-70 (2003) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting).
    I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
    foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
    December 20, 2012                   _________________________________________
    t1220                                                                Clerk
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 143627

Filed Date: 12/20/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014