People of Michigan v. Christopher Blayne Kiyoshk ( 2013 )

Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
January 18, 2013 Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice
143469 Michael F. Cavanagh
Stephen J. Markman
Diane M. Hathaway
Mary Beth Kelly
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Brian K. Zahra
Plaintiff-Appellant, Bridget M. McCormack,
Justices
v SC: 143469
COA: 295552
CHRISTOPHER BLAYNE KIYOSHK, Kalamazoo CC: 06-001463-FJ
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________________________/
On October 10, 2012, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to
appeal the June 2, 2011 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the
application is again considered. MCR 7.302(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal,
we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals and REMAND this case to that
court for consideration of defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. A circuit
court’s authority to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant charged with a felony
committed as a minor constitutes a question of personal, not subject matter, jurisdiction.
“Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a court’s abstract power to try a case of the kind or
character of the one pending and is not dependent on the particular facts of the case.”
People v Lown, 488 Mich. 242, 268 (2011) (emphasis, citations, and internal quotation
marks omitted). The circuit court possessed subject matter jurisdiction here, as
“Michigan circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction and unquestionably have
[subject matter] jurisdiction over felony cases.” Id. Defendant’s age when the offense
was committed does not pertain to the “kind or character” of the case, but rather
constitutes a defendant-specific, “particular fact[].” Whether defendant was of an age
that made circuit court jurisdiction appropriate is thus a question of personal jurisdiction.
See People v Veling, 443 Mich. 23, 31-32 (1993) (noting that statutory procedures which
divested the juvenile court of exclusive jurisdiction over qualifying juveniles who
committed certain offenses operated to give “the circuit courts personal jurisdiction over
those juveniles”) (emphasis added); accord Twyman v State, 459 NE2d 705, 708 (Ind,
1984) (“The age of the [juvenile] offender . . . is merely a restriction on the personal
jurisdiction possessed by a criminal court.”); State v Emery, 636 NW2d 116, 122 (Iowa,
2001), quoting State v Marks, 920 P2d 19, 22 (Ariz App, 1996) (consequence of flawed
transfer proceeding from juvenile to adult court is to “deprive the adult division of
personal jurisdiction”); Sawyers v State, 814 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tenn, 1991) (absence of
proper transfer order from juvenile to criminal court “cannot be said to affect the court’s
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subject matter jurisdiction”); State v Kelley, 537 A2d 483, 488 (Conn, 1988)
(“[Q]uestions relating to the propriety of the transfer of a juvenile from the docket for
Juvenile Matters to the regular criminal docket do not implicate the Superior Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction.”). “[A] party may stipulate to, waive, or implicitly consent to
personal jurisdiction.” Lown, 488 Mich. at 268 (citations omitted). Therefore, by
entering a guilty plea in the circuit court, and failing to contest the circuit court’s
jurisdiction, defendant implicitly consented to that court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction.
HATHAWAY and MCCORMACK, JJ., not participating.
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
January 18, 2013 _________________________________________
t0116 Clerk