People of Michigan v. Ernesto Evaristo Uribe ( 2016 )

Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
May 18, 2016 Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice
Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
151899 Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
Joan L. Larsen,
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v SC: 151899
COA: 321012
Eaton CC: 13-020404-FC
ERNESTO EVARISTO URIBE,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________/
On March 10, 2016, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to
appeal the May 12, 2015 judgment of the Court of Appeals. The application is again
considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we
VACATE the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals analysis of
whether the Eaton Circuit Court reversibly erred by excluding the proposed MCL
768.27a evidence under MRE 403 is flawed in several central respects. Most notably, the
Court of Appeals failed to duly acknowledge and consider the following legal principles,
which this Court articulated in People v Watkins, 491 Mich. 450 (2012): (1) the trial
court’s evidentiary ruling is “review[ed] for an abuse of discretion,” id. at 467; (2) while
MCL 768.27a prevails over MRE 404(b) as to evidence that falls within the statute’s
scope, the statute does not mandate the admission of all such evidence, but rather “the
Legislature necessarily contemplated that evidence admissible under the statute need not
be considered in all cases and that whether and which evidence would be considered
would be a matter of judicial discretion, as guided by the [non-MRE 404(b)] rules of
evidence,” including MRE 403 and the “other ordinary rules of evidence, such as those
pertaining to hearsay and privilege,” id. at 484-485; and (3) there are “several
considerations” that may properly inform a court’s decision to exclude such evidence
under MRE 403, including but not limited to “the dissimilarity between the other acts and
the charged crime” and “the lack of reliability of the evidence supporting the occurrence
of the other acts,” id. at 487-488.
While we vacate the Court of Appeals judgment in full, we nonetheless reach the
same result: we conclude that the proposed testimony falls within the scope of MCL
2
768.27a and that the trial court’s exclusion of that evidence, when properly evaluated
under MRE 403 and Watkins, amounted to an abuse of discretion warranting reversal. In
ruling the proposed testimony inadmissible under MRE 403, the trial court, citing the
illustrative list of “considerations” in Watkins, expressed concern regarding apparent
inconsistencies between the proposed testimony and prior statements made by the
witness, and certain dissimilarities between the other act and the charged offenses. The
trial court, however, failed to explain—and this Court, on review of the record, fails to
see—how or why these concerns were sufficient in this case to render the “probative
value [of the proposed testimony] . . . substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence,” as required for
exclusion under MRE 403. Id. at 481. The list of “considerations” in Watkins provides a
tool to facilitate, not a standard to supplant, this proper MRE 403 analysis, and it remains
the court’s “responsibility” to carry out such an analysis in determining whether to
exclude MCL 768.27a evidence under that rule. See id. at 489-490. The trial court
misconstrued Watkins and neglected this fundamental responsibility in its evidentiary
analysis; as a result of these legal errors, the court abused its discretion by excluding the
proposed testimony under MRE 403. Accordingly, we REVERSE the trial court’s ruling
to that effect and we REMAND this case to the Eaton Circuit Court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this order.
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
May 18, 2016
s0511
Clerk