State of Michigan v. City Council for City of Detroit ( 2002 )

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh
O pinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED JULY 17, 2002
STATE OF MICHIGAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
and
CITY COUNCIL FOR THE CITY OF
DETROIT, et al.,
Intervening Counter­
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v Nos. 121918, 121919
WAYNE COUNTY CLERK, and WAYNE
COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
THE DETROIT ELECTION COMMISSION,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________
STATE OF MICHIGAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
and
CITY COUNCIL FOR THE CITY OF
DETROIT, et al.,
Intervening Counter-
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v Nos. 121938, 121939
WAYNE COUNTY CLERK, WAYNE COUNTY
ELECTION COMMISSION, and THE
DETROIT ELECTION COMMISSION,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In 2002 PA 432, the Legislature directed the city of
Detroit to place on the August 6, 2002, ballot a proposal to
change from the current at-large system of electing the city
council to a single-member district plan. However, the
Detroit Election Commission declined to certify the measure
for inclusion on the ballot. The plaintiffs brought this
action in circuit court seeking mandamus, and the circuit
court ordered the proposition placed on the ballot. Claims of
appeal were filed by the Election Commission and by the
Detroit City Council and its incumbent members, who had been
permitted to intervene. After the Court of Appeals denied
motions for expedited consideration, they filed applications
for leave to appeal to this Court before decision by the Court
of Appeals.
We conclude that the statute does not validly direct
placement of the proposition on the ballot because it was not
passed by a two-thirds vote in each house of the Legislature,
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as required by Const 1963, art 4, § 29. We therefore reverse
the judgment of the circuit court.
Act 432 amends the Home Rule City Act by adding
MCL 117.3a, which includes the following provision:
(1) A city that has a population of not less
than 750,000 as determined by the most recent
federal decennial census and that has a city
council composed of 9 at-large council members
shall place a question in substantially the
following form on the ballot at the general primary
election held on Tuesday, August 6, 2002:
“Shall the existing 9-member at-large council
be abolished, shall the city be reapportioned into
9 single-member election districts, and shall
district residency requirements be imposed on
candidates for the city council?
“Yes (_____)
“No (_____).”
One of the challenges raised by the appellants is a claim
that the act violates art 4, § 29, which provides:
The legislature shall pass no local or special
act in any case where a general act can be made
applicable and whether a general act can be made
applicable shall be a judicial question. No local
or special act shall take effect until approved by
two-thirds of the members elected to and serving in
each house and by a majority of the electors voting
thereon in the district affected.
The statute does not refer by name to the city of
Detroit, but rather purports to apply to any city with a
population of more than 750,000 that has a nine-member
at-large elected city council. However, at present, only the
city of Detroit meets that population criterion. Such
population-based statutes have been upheld against claims that
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they constitute local acts where it is possible that other
municipalities or counties can qualify for inclusion if their
populations change. Dearborn v Wayne Co Bd of Supervisors,
275 Mich. 151, 155-157; 266 N.W. 304 (1936); Irishman’s Lot, Inc
v Secretary of State, 338 Mich. 662, 666-668; 62 NW2d 668
(1954). However, where the statute cannot apply to other
units of government, that is fatal to its status as a general
act. See Mulloy v Wayne Co Bd of Supervisors, 246 Mich. 632,
637-640; 225 N.W. 615 (1929); Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc v
City of Romulus, 400 Mich. 337, 345; 254 NW2d 555 (1977).
In this case, the statute plainly fails to qualify as a
general act. Even if another city reaches a population of
750,000, and has a nine-member at-large council, Act 432 would
not apply because of its requirement that the proposition
appear on the ballot at the August 6, 2002, election. No
other city can meet that requirement because there will be no
new census before that date.
The plaintiffs argue that the art 4, § 29 claim is a
substantive challenge to the proposed law, and thus not ripe
for review until after the law is enacted, citing Hamilton v
Secretary of State, 212 Mich. 31; 179 N.W. 553 (1920), Ferency v
Bd of State Canvassers, 198 Mich. App. 271; 497 NW2d 233 (1993),
and Beechnau v Secretary of State, 42 Mich. App. 328; 201 NW2d
699 (1972). However, unlike the situations in those cases,
the appellants are not claiming that, if enacted, the statute
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proposed by the Legislature would be unconstitutional.
Rather, the challenge is that Act 432 is a local act, which
requires a two-thirds vote in both houses of the Legislature.
It did not receive such a vote in the House of
Representatives.1 Thus, the act does not satisfy the
requirements for placing the proposition on the ballot.2
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Wayne Circuit
Court, and order that the plaintiffs’ complaint for mandamus
be dismissed. The defendants shall take whatever steps they
deem appropriate to inform prospective voters that the
1
The measure did receive a two-thirds vote in the
Senate. 2002 Journal of the Senate 1501 (No. 53, June 5,
2002). However, it was approved by only a 67 to 37 vote in
the House. 2002 Journal of the House 1776 (No. 51, May 29,
2002).
2
In response to the order to show cause that we issued
on July 12, 2002, the plaintiffs essentially concede that Act
432 is a local act. They maintain, however, that Const 1963,
art 4, § 29 does not require that the approval by two-thirds
majorities in each house of the Legislature occur before the
vote of the electors in the affected district. However, we
read art 4, § 29 as requiring a two-thirds vote of each house
of the Legislature to approve the local act for placement on
the ballot in the community affected.
In addition, the state’s interpretation of the
constitution is flawed in at least the following respects: (a)
it would alter the sequence by which local or special acts
take effect under art 4, § 29, a sequence that is expressly
set forth in that provision,(b) it would transform the two­
step process specified in art 4, § 29 into an apparently
three-step process, and (c) it would create an open-ended and
indefinite process under art 4, § 29 by which the Legislature
could “ratify” a local vote many years after the local vote
had occurred within the affected district.
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proposition has been removed from the ballot by court order
and that votes on it will not be counted.
Pursuant to MCR 7.317(C)(4), the clerk is directed to
issue the judgment order in this case forthwith.
CORRIGAN , C.J., and CAVANAGH , WEAVER , KELLY , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and
MARKMAN , JJ., concurred.
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