Nieboer v. Detroit Electric Railway , 128 Mich. 486 ( 1901 )

Grant, J.

(after stating the facts). Plaintiff was not invited to ride upon the deadwood. No custom was shown permitting him to ride there. The company had instructed its employés not to permit it. It was not intended or sanctioned for the use of passengers. It needs no, argument to demonstrate that the position was a dangerous one, and never intended as a place for passengers to ride. The place was so dangerous that the plaintiff considered it necessary to hold on with both hands. According to his own theory, then, it was a place where it would be next to impossible for him to pay fare. There was danger in rounding curves, from sudden stoppage and starting, and from collisions both’ in front and from the rear, which are not of uncommon occurrence. The two passengers who were standing with plaintiff jumped from the car, which was then standing still, and escaped injury. Plaintiff testified that he did not have time to jump. There was neither an express nor implied assent for the plaintiff to ride in this dangerous position. The conductor advised him not to ride there, by telling him that he better get off and wait, or get inside. This language cannot be construed into an invitation. It was a busy time, when people were returning from their work apd business to their homes. The conductor was not called upon to stop and put the plaintiff off. He had done all that was required in warning, if, indeed, he needed any warning. Plaintiff knew that, if the car was crowded, others were coming within two or three min•utes, which he could have taken, and the testimony shows that there was room on the next car. Plaintiff voluntarily, and without invitation or permission, chose to ride in a dangerous place, rather than attempt to get inside or to wait a few minutes for another car. His negligent act was a continuing one, and directly contributed to the injury. When a place is one not provided or intended for passengers to ride upon, and is in itself dangerous, the •employe who assumes to permit a passenger to ride in such a place acts without authority, unless such authority be shown expressly or by common custom. The case comes within the principle established by the following authorities: Chamberlain v. Railroad Co., 11 Wis. 238; Jackson v. Crilly, 16 Colo. 103 (26 Pac. 331); L. R. & Ft. S. Ry. v. Miles, 40 Ark. 298 (48 Am. Rep. 10); Carroll v. Transit Co., 107 Mo. 653 (17 S. W. 889); Railroad Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439; Bard v. Traction Co., 176 Pa. St. 97 (34 Atl. 953, 53 Am. St. Rep. 672). The last case is the parallel of this in its facts, except that the conductor in that case did not know that the plaintiff was standing upon the bumper. We have examined all the cases cited in support of the plaintiff’s contention, and we think they are not applicable to this case.

Judgment reversed, and no new trial ordered.

Hooker and Long, JJ., concurred with Grant, J.