People of Michigan v. Terry Lee Ceasor ( 2021 )


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  • Order                                                                     Michigan Supreme Court
    Lansing, Michigan
    March 5, 2021                                                                Bridget M. McCormack,
    Chief Justice
    159948                                                                                Brian K. Zahra
    David F. Viviano
    Richard H. Bernstein
    Elizabeth T. Clement
    Megan K. Cavanagh
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                                 Elizabeth M. Welch,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                                                                  Justices
    v                                                     SC: 159948
    COA: 338431
    St. Clair CC: 05-000220-FH
    TERRY LEE CEASOR,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________________________/
    On January 7, 2021, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to
    appeal the May 23, 2019 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the
    application is again considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal,
    we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals, VACATE the defendant’s
    conviction and sentence, and REMAND this case to the St. Clair Circuit Court for further
    proceedings not inconsistent with this order. By failing to request public funds for an
    expert based on a mistaken belief that the defendant did not qualify for those funds
    because he had retained counsel, counsel performed deficiently. See Hinton v Alabama,
    
    571 US 263
    , 273 (2014) (“[I]t was unreasonable for [the defendant’s lawyer] to fail to
    seek additional funds to hire an expert where that failure was based not on any strategic
    choice but on a mistaken belief that available funding was capped at
    $1,000.”). Moreover, for the reasons set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for
    the Sixth Circuit in Ceasor v Ocwieja, 655 F Appx 263, 286 (CA 6, 2016), we conclude
    that the defendant can show prejudice. See 
    id.
     (“[N]o amount of cross-examination or lay
    witness testimony could have rebutted Dr. Gilmer-Hill’s medical opinions that these
    injuries were medically consistent with abuse and inconsistent with an accidental fall.
    Thus, we acknowledge, as the Ackley court did, that in many [shaken baby syndrome]
    cases ‘where there is no victim who can provide an account, no eyewitness, no
    corroborative physical evidence and no apparent motive to [harm], the expert is the
    case.’ ”), quoting People v Ackley, 
    497 Mich 381
    , 397 (2015) (quotation marks and
    citation omitted).
    CLEMENT, J. (concurring).
    I concur in the order reversing the Court of Appeals because I agree that counsel
    was ineffective. Namely, I do not believe it would have been a novel argument for
    2
    counsel to contend that defendant qualified for public funds for an expert under MCL
    775.15, the statute in use at the time, when the statutory language clearly applies to him.
    It is true, as Justice WELCH recounts, that “defense counsel’s performance cannot
    be deemed deficient for failing to advance a novel legal argument.” People v Reed, 
    453 Mich 685
    , 695 (1996). Here, counsel failed to request public funds for an expert because
    he believed that defendant did not qualify for those funds since he had retained his own
    counsel. MCL 775.15, the statute that governed requests for public funds for an expert at
    the time, reads:
    If any person accused of any crime or misdemeanor, and about to be
    tried therefor in any court of record in this state, shall make it appear to the
    satisfaction of the judge presiding over the court wherein such trial is to be
    had, by his own oath, or otherwise, that there is a material witness in his
    favor within the jurisdiction of the court, without whose testimony he
    cannot safely proceed to a trial, giving the name and place of residence of
    such witness, and that such accused person is poor and has not and cannot
    obtain the means to procure the attendance of such witness at the place of
    trial, the judge in his discretion may, at a time when the prosecuting officer
    of the county is present, make an order that a subpoena be issued from such
    court for such witness in his favor, and that it be served by the proper
    officer of the court. And it shall be the duty of such officer to serve such
    subpoena, and of the witness or witnesses named therein to attend the trial,
    and the officer serving such subpoena shall be paid therefor, and the
    witness therein named shall be paid for attending such trial, in the same
    manner as if such witness or witnesses had been subpoenaed in behalf of
    the people.
    Clearly, the statutory language says nothing about an individual with retained counsel
    being ineligible for public funds to retain an expert.
    There is no reason to doubt that counsel testified truthfully when he said he had
    never seen a court award public funds for an expert when a defendant had retained his or
    her own attorney. It is unsurprising that, generally, a defendant who can pay to retain
    counsel would not be able to show that he or she is “poor and has not and cannot obtain
    the means to procure the attendance of [a material] witness,” as the statute requires.
    However, that is not the case when the defendant can afford to retain counsel only
    because a third party has offered to pay for him or her to do so. I recognize that counsel
    in the instant case took considerable steps to help defendant, even forgoing his own fee to
    help defendant raise the needed funds for an expert. However, I cannot conclude that
    holding a mistaken belief regarding the application of a statute—a belief wholly
    unsupported by the statutory text—is anything but deficient performance. Therefore, I
    3
    concur in the Court’s order reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
    remanding to the trial court for further proceedings.
    WELCH, J. (dissenting).
    I agree with the majority that the prejudice in this matter is undisputed given the
    nature of the case and the evidence presented. The issue in this case is whether trial
    counsel in 2005 rendered ineffective assistance to defendant in violation of the Sixth
    Amendment to the United States Constitution when he did not request funds from the
    circuit court under MCL 775.15 for the purpose of hiring an expert witness. 1 I
    respectfully dissent because in 2005, the time that the trial occurred in this matter, the law
    was not clear that defense counsel could, let alone was obligated to, request expert-
    witness funds for clients who were not appointed counsel by the state. The only
    information available from the record is that during that time, St. Clair County defense
    attorneys generally understood that public funding for expert-witness fees was not
    available to clients who had not been declared indigent and who were represented by a
    retained attorney.
    In People v Arquette, 
    202 Mich App 227
    , 230 (1993), the primary case cited by
    the defendant as the reason defense counsel should have known to request expert-witness
    fees for his client, the Court of Appeals noted that “[this] would be a different case if
    defendant had retained an attorney and then declared indigence.”2 Therefore, that case
    could not have put trial counsel on notice that retained clients, such as the defendant in
    1
    Trial counsel’s assistance is constitutionally ineffective only if counsel engaged in
    deficient performance that resulted in prejudice. Strickland v Washington, 
    466 US 668
    ,
    687-688 (1984). Deficient performance is assessed “on the facts of the particular case,
    viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” 
    Id. at 690
     (emphasis added). I dissent
    because counsel’s performance was not deficient.
    2
    In Arquette, the defendant was declared indigent but then retained an appellate attorney
    (paid for by a relative) who replaced his court-appointed appellate attorney. The court
    administrator refused to provide the defendant trial transcripts at public expense because
    he had, at that time, a retained attorney. The Court of Appeals concluded that, given his
    previously declared indigent status, the defendant could receive the transcript at public
    expense—but it also observed that the analysis would be different if the defendant had
    first retained an attorney and later been declared indigent (i.e., the public funds would not
    have been available in that situation). In the instant case, defendant was represented by
    his own retained trial attorney and was never declared indigent—exactly the scenario in
    which the Court of Appeals in Arquette indicated that public funds would not have been
    available to a defendant.
    4
    this case, were eligible to receive funding from the state to cover expert-witness fees.3
    As the Court of Appeals noted in this case, such a request would have been a novel idea
    at that time. People v Ceasor, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,
    issued May 23, 2019 (Docket No. 338431), p 10; see also People v Reed, 
    453 Mich 685
    ,
    695 (1996) (holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to advance a
    novel legal argument).
    Thus, I do not believe counsel’s performance in failing to request public funds
    from a St. Clair County trial court for an expert witness in 2005 fell below the then-
    applicable “objective standard of reasonableness.” See People v Trakhtenberg, 
    493 Mich 38
    , 51 (2012).
    ZAHRA, J., joins the statement of WELCH, J.
    MCCORMACK, C.J., did not participate because of her prior involvement in this
    case as counsel for a party.
    3
    The three main precedents that governed this area of law in 2005—this Court’s
    decisions in People v Jacobsen, 
    448 Mich 639
     (1995), and People v Tanner, 
    469 Mich 437
     (2003), and the Court of Appeals’ decision in People v Miller, 
    165 Mich App 32
    (1987)—all were cases applying MCL 775.15 to indigent defendants with court-
    appointed counsel.
    I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
    foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
    March 5, 2021
    t0302
    Clerk
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 159948

Filed Date: 3/5/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/6/2021