Faircloth v. Family Independence Agency ( 1999 )

Cavanagh, J.

{concurring in part and dissenting in part). I join in parts n and in of the majority opinion. I dissent from part iv, however, because I believe that defendants’ interpretation of 1991 PA 111, subsection 805(l)(b) resulted in an unjustifiably restrictive standard of eligibility for disability benefits that was contrary to the intent of the Legislature.

Subsection 805(l)(b) provides that persons eligible for the state disability program include “[a] person who is medically diagnosed as incapacitated and unavailable for work for at least 90 days.” To determine eligibility under this provision, the Department of Social Services (dss) developed the following policy:

Clients are medically eligible for State Disability Assistance if they are medically eligible for ma [medical assistance] based on disability or blindness or if they have a physical and/or mental impairment or combination of impairments which prevents the performance of any remunerative work for 90 days or more.

Defendants defined the term “work” as “[a]ny work or work activity usually done for remuneration.”

General rules of statutory construction provide that if the plain and ordinary language of a statute is clear, judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Meyer Jewelry Co v Johnson, 229 Mich App 177, 180; 581 NW2d 734 (1998). However, if a literal construction of a statute would produce unreasonable and unjust results inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, the court may depart from a literal construction. Rowell v Security Steel Processing Co, 445 Mich 347, 354; 518 NW2d 409 (1994).

I believe that defendants’ interpretation of subsection 805(l)(b) leads to unreasonable and unjust results. Defendants contend that the terms “work,” “employment,” and “job” are not limited by such factors as the number of days and hours worked, the amount of wages received, or an individual’s education and training. Hence, a person who is available to work one hour at a job that pays one dollar an hour during a ninety-day period is not entitled to benefits. Such a standard for entitlement can be met by few, if any, other than those who are hospitalized or suffer from a severe disability for the entire three- to twelvemonth period.

Thus, according to defendants, the Legislature intended the following anomaly. Pursuant to 1991 PA 111, subsection 805(l)(a), a recipient of supplemental security income (ssi) is eligible for benefits. A person is disabled for ssi purposes if he is unable to engage in “substantial gainful activity” because of an impairment that lasts for one year or more. 42 USC 1382c(a)(3)(A). However, under 1991 PA 111, subsection 805(l)(b), a person who is disabled for more than ninety days but less than one year can receive benefits only if he is completely unable to perform any amount of work for any amount of compensation.

Furthermore, statutory provisions should be construed in light of other related provisions to carry out the purpose of the Legislature. Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 209; 501 NW2d 76 (1993). The remaining subsections of subsection 805(1) support a broader reading of the disability standard contained in subsection 805(l)(b). 1991 PA 111 authorized benefits for people receiving thirty-day substance-abuse treatment, AIDS sufferers, recipients of special education services, pregnant women, and caretakers of disabled persons. See subsections 805(1) (d)-(h). Undoubtedly some people in each of these categories can engage in some remunerative work, but may not be able to maintain sufficient employment to support themselves. Only those who are disabled for more than ninety days but less than one year are subject to the Draconian standard adopted by defendants.

In approving defendants’ interpretation of the statute, the majority relies on the fact that the Legislature reenacted § 805 for the 1992-93 fiscal year, 1992 PA 168, despite the fact that the Legislature adopted the SSI standard for the 1993-94 fiscal year, 1993 PA 186. The rules of statutory construction provide that a longstanding, consistent administrative interpretation of a statute by those charged with its execution is entitled to considerable weight and ought not be overruled without cogent reasons. Ludington Service Corp v Acting Comm’r of Ins, 444 Mich 481, 490; 511 NW2d 661 (1994). However, defendants’ interpretation of the legislative provision at issue is not longstanding and is therefore entitled to less weight. Given the realties of the legislative process, I do not find the single reenactment of subsection 805(l)(b) to be a dispositive indicator of the Legislature’s intent.

I would affirm the trial court’s grant of plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition.