People v. Corbin ( 2015 )


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  •                           STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                   FOR PUBLICATION
    September 22, 2015
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                                 9:05 a.m.
    v                                                                  No. 319122
    Leelanau Trial Court
    JEFFRY LEWIS CORBIN,                                               LC No. 11-001747-FH
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and SERVITTO, JJ.
    GLEICHER, J.
    The prosecution charged that defendant sexually abused two young brothers. Both
    victims are now adults; we refer to them pseudonymously as Shane and Austin. Defendant
    pleaded guilty to the charged conduct involving Shane. The prosecutor dismissed a single count
    involving Austin. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison and ordered him to pay $276,800
    in restitution to Austin, and $276,985 to Shane. Defendant challenges only the restitution order.
    We conclude that the restitution awards cannot stand. Because defendant’s illegal acts
    involving Austin did not give rise to defendant’s convictions, Austin is not entitled to any
    restitution. Shane’s restitution award, too, must be vacated, as the evidence provided no
    reasonable factual basis for substantial components of the total. Accordingly, we vacate most of
    the restitution order and remand for further proceedings.
    I.
    Austin and Shane were born in 1989 and 1991, respectively. They resided in Kansas City
    with their mother and father until 1992, when the parents separated. The parents’ divorce
    finalized in 1994, and the brothers moved with their mother to Traverse City. Their father
    relocated to Belgium a year later and remained overseas until 2000, when he returned to Kansas
    City.
    Defendant and his wife lived in Traverse City and were close friends of the brothers’
    mother. Shane described defendant as a quasi-father figure. As boys, the brothers frequently
    visited defendant’s home. Defendant repeatedly assaulted them there, and on cross-country
    skiing trips in Canada, between 1995 and 2005. Shane disclosed the abuse in January 2011.
    When interviewed by the police, defendant admitted to having engaged in sexual contact with
    both brothers.
    -1-
    The felony information set forth three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct
    (CSC) involving Shane, and one count involving Austin. At defendant’s guilty plea hearing, the
    prosecutor conceded that the statute of limitations had run on the allegations concerning Austin
    and voluntarily dismissed that charge. When tendering his guilty plea, defendant nevertheless
    admitted to having engaged in criminal sexual conduct with Austin.
    The trial court imposed an upward departure sentence of 9 to 15 years’ imprisonment and
    subsequently convened a restitution hearing. At the hearing, the victims’ father conceded that he
    had been physically separated from his sons during an approximately six-year period, but denied
    that he had been meaningfully absent from their lives. He detailed the expenditures he attributed
    to their sexual abuse. The father recounted that he incurred “roughly $4000” in therapy charges
    for both victims, and provided an “estimate” of the costs incurred for their medications as “about
    a thousand dollars.” Shane had failed his first year of college due to the trauma of the abuse, the
    father asserted, resulting in a separate financial loss of “[a]pproximately $20,000.” Both sons
    lost income, the father claimed, because the pending court proceedings rendered them unable to
    accept job offers at two affiliated ice cream shops that would have paid each $400 weekly. The
    father elucidated: “They were really in no condition to take on a role of management in a time
    consuming process we were going through at the time with this.”
    The victims described the psychological trauma caused by the assaults and the difficulties
    they have endured in trying to lead normal lives. Shane explained that he has been diagnosed
    with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which causes flashbacks and nightmares. He agreed
    with the prosecutor that the PTSD “affected” his ability to be successful in college, and
    “interfered with” his ability to obtain gainful employment. Austin, too, suffers from PTSD. He
    completed only one year of college before deciding that he was emotionally unable to continue
    attending classes.
    Beginning in 2011, both victims have engaged in psychological counseling with Mark
    McGonigle, a licensed clinical social worker in Missouri. McGonigle has an undergraduate
    degree in psychology from the University of Dallas, a master’s degree in “social welfare” from
    the University of Kansas, and a master’s degree in “applied spirituality” from the University of
    San Francisco. Defendant’s counsel stipulated to McGonigle’s qualifications to testify as an
    expert witness in “the area of PTSD.” McGonigle served as the prosecution’s sole witness
    regarding the victims’ need for therapy and the projected costs of their care.
    McGonigle characterized PTSD as “an anxiety disorder” that produces “a chronic
    reaction to traumatic events that kind of creates its own syndrome of emotional, mental and
    behavioral problems.” To qualify for the diagnosis, an individual must “have a significant
    impairment in functioning both inner [sic] personal, social, occupational or other important areas
    of functioning.” In McGonigle’s view, Shane “had both major depression that was recurrent in
    his life and post-traumatic stress disorder.” McGonigle attributed the cause of Shane’s PTSD to
    “the sexual abuse he experienced from [defendant], and that was also a major factor in his
    depression.” Austin shares the PTSD diagnosis and its cause with Shane; McGonigle did not
    diagnose him as suffering from major depression “because he hasn’t shown those symptoms.”
    McGonigle testified that although his contact with Shane had been “somewhat sporadic,”
    they “developed a treatment plan for treatment of PTSD. . . . I was expecting kind of a long
    -2-
    course of treatment with possible referral to in-patient intensive therapy as needed.” In a written
    report admitted as evidence during the hearing, McGonigle expressed that the brothers “will
    likely need therapy for a period of many years and likely intermittently over the course of their
    lives, especially as they mature into men of marital age.” The cost of that therapy, he elaborated,
    would depend “on the individual therapist’s fee structure, [and] will likely cost approximately
    $14,000-18,000 per year.” “To be secure,” he continued, “and given their young ages, I think
    they should plan to receive at least 8-10 years of such treatment.”
    McGonigle explained that the “intensive inpatient treatment” he recommended could
    occur at a facility such as The Meadows in Arizona, which charges “approximately $42,000” for
    a stay of four to six weeks. The brothers’ projected future “psychiatric care” and medication
    costs, McGonigle predicted, would range from $3,000 to $5,000 each year. McGonigle’s report,
    admitted as an exhibit by the trial court, indicates that Shane had paid $1,785 “[t]o date” for his
    therapy.1
    In a bench opinion, the trial court awarded both victims $15,000 a year in outpatient
    therapy costs for eight years, totaling $120,000 per person. The trial court found that both
    victims were also entitled to the costs of inpatient admissions at The Meadows, which the court
    estimated as $42,000 each. The court adopted McGonigle’s cost estimates for medication and
    psychiatric services of $40,000 for each victim, and further granted each brother $31,200 in “lost
    wages,” yielding a total of $275,200 each. The court then added to that sum the amounts already
    paid for treatment: $1,600 for Austin, and $1,785 for Shane.
    Defendant sought delayed leave to appeal the restitution order. This Court denied the
    application “for lack of merit in the grounds presented.” People v Corbin, unpublished order of
    the Court of Appeals, entered April 25, 2014 (Docket No. 319122). Defendant then sought leave
    to appeal in the Supreme Court, and moved to add issues for that Court’s consideration. The
    Supreme Court granted the motion to add issues and, in lieu of granting leave to appeal,
    remanded the case to this Court for consideration as on leave granted. People v Corbin, 
    497 Mich. 886
    ; 854 NW2d 881 (2014).
    II.
    The William Van Regenmorter Crime Victim’s Rights Act (CVRA), MCL 780.751 et
    seq., mandates that a sentencing court order convicted defendants to make “full restitution to any
    victim of defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the conviction[.]” MCL 780.766(2). A
    “victim” is “an individual who suffers direct or threatened physical, financial, or emotional harm
    as a result of the commission of a crime.” MCL 780.766(1). Under the CVRA, restitution is
    1
    McGonigle’s treatment records, admitted as an exhibit at the restitution hearing, reflect 12
    visits with Shane in 2011, and none in 2012. McGonigle testified that he had approximately four
    sessions with Shane in 2013 that he had not yet documented. Assuming that he had also not
    billed for the 2013 sessions, we calculate that McGonigle charged $148.75 for each session. At a
    similar rate, $15,000 a year would yield approximately 100 therapy visits.
    -3-
    available to compensate victims for losses associated with either physical or psychological
    injury. An order of restitution may compel a defendant to:
    (a) Pay an amount equal to the reasonably determined cost of medical and related
    professional services and devices actually incurred and reasonably expected to be
    incurred relating to physical and psychological care.
    ***
    (c) Reimburse the victim or the victim’s estate for after-tax income loss suffered
    by the victim as a result of the crime. [MCL 780.766(4).]
    Michigan’s general restitution statute, MCL 769.1a, defines “victim” in essentially the
    same fashion, clarifying that the term reaches individuals harmed “as a result of the commission
    of a felony, misdemeanor, or ordinance violation.” MCL 769.1a(1)(b). Like the CVRA, the
    general restitution statute demands that a sentencing court order restitution when appropriate.
    MCL 769.1a(2). The language differs, however, regarding restitution for the costs of medical or
    psychological care:
    (4) If a felony, misdemeanor, or ordinance violation results in physical or
    psychological injury to a victim, the order of restitution may require that the
    defendant do 1 or more of the following, as applicable:
    (a) Pay an amount equal to the cost of actual medical and related
    professional services and devices relating to physical and psychological
    care. [MCL 769.1a.]
    Unlike the CVRA, the general restitution statute permits restitution only for “actual medical and
    related professional services.” (Emphasis added.) Both statutes allow a victim to recover “after-
    tax income loss suffered . . . as a result of” the “crime,” MCL 780.766(4)(c), or the “felony,”
    MCL 769.1a(4)(c).
    The CVRA provides that the prosecution has the burden of proving by a preponderance
    of the evidence the amount of the victim’s loss. MCL 780.767(4). “MCL 780.766(2) requires a
    direct, causal relationship between the conduct underlying the convicted offense and the amount
    of restitution to be awarded.” People v McKinley, 
    496 Mich. 410
    , 421; 852 NW2d 770 (2014).
    This Court has held that court-ordered restitution is not a substitute for civil damages. People v
    Tyler, 
    188 Mich. App. 83
    , 89-90; 468 NW2d 537 (1991). Nor is restitution properly awarded for
    losses paid by insurance. People v Dimoski, 
    286 Mich. App. 474
    , 480-481; 780 NW2d 896
    (2009).
    “The proper application of . . . statutes authorizing the assessment of restitution at
    sentencing is a matter of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.” 
    McKinley, 496 Mich. at 414-415
    . We review a court’s calculation of a restitution amount for an abuse of
    discretion, People v Gubachy, 
    272 Mich. App. 706
    , 708-709; 728 NW2d 891 (2006), and its
    factual findings for clear error, People v Fawaz, 
    299 Mich. App. 55
    , 64; 829 NW2d 259 (2012).
    A trial court may abuse its discretion by blurring the distinction between a civil remedy for
    -4-
    damages and the criminal penalty of restitution. People v Orweller, 
    197 Mich. App. 136
    , 140;
    494 NW2d 753 (1992).
    III.
    We first address a question raised in defendant’s “motion to add issues,” which the
    Supreme Court granted in the order remanding the case to this Court for consideration as on
    leave granted. In that motion, defendant adopted the issues presented by the defendant in
    McKinley, 
    496 Mich. 410
    , which included that Michigan’s statutory restitution scheme cannot
    withstand constitutional scrutiny because it permits restitution based on uncharged conduct never
    submitted to a jury. In McKinley, the Supreme Court declined to reach this constitutional
    question, invoking the “venerable rule of constitutional avoidance.” 
    Id. at 415-416.
    Rather, the
    Court focused on the plain language of MCL 780.766(2), which provides that “full restitution”
    may be authorized only for “any victim of the defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the
    conviction . . . . ” 
    Id. at 419
    (emphasis and ellipsis in original). By consulting a dictionary, the
    Supreme Court determined that the phrase “gives rise to” means “to produce or cause.” 
    Id. The Court
    concluded: “Only crimes for which a defendant is charged ‘cause’ or ‘give rise to’ the
    conviction. Thus, the statute ties ‘the defendant’s course of conduct’ to the convicted offenses
    and requires as causal link between them.” 
    Id. In reaching
    this result, the Court overruled its
    prior decision in People v Gahan, 
    456 Mich. 264
    ; 571 NW2d 503 (1997), which had governed
    the trial court’s restitution decision in this case.
    Given the Supreme Court’s order that we consider the issues raised in defendant’s
    motion, we must address whether the trial court appropriately awarded restitution to Austin.
    Defendant was not convicted of CSC involving Austin. Accordingly, McKinley dictates that his
    abuse of Austin “may not be relied on as a basis for assessing restitution[.]” 
    Id. at 419
    . Because
    the trial court lacked any authority to award restitution for defendant’s uncharged conduct, we
    vacate the entirety of Austin’s restitution award. In the remainder of this opinion, we therefore
    need only address the restitution awarded to Shane.
    IV.
    Defendant contends that the restitution amounts allocated for Shane’s future medical and
    psychological treatment and “lost wages” were not authorized by MCL 780.766. The evidence
    supporting these awards, defendant asserts, was entirely speculative, and did not represent
    “easily ascertainable” or “measurable” losses.
    Throughout the last four decades, this Court has repeatedly declared that restitution may
    encompass only those losses that are “easily ascertained and . . . a direct result of a defendant’s
    criminal conduct.” 
    Gubacy, 272 Mich. App. at 708
    ; see also 
    Tyler, 188 Mich. App. at 89
    ; People v
    Pettit, 
    88 Mich. App. 203
    ; 276 NW2d 878 (1979). This oft-invoked rule was first established in
    People v Heil, 
    79 Mich. App. 739
    ; 262 NW2d 895 (1977), which involved the propriety of a
    restitution order imposed as a condition of the defendant’s probation. In Heil, a jury convicted
    the defendant of manslaughter arising from a car accident. The trial court imposed a probation
    sentence conditioned on “payment within 90 days of $3,000 to the victim’s wife, and,
    additionally, payment of one half of defendant’s after-tax income throughout the probation
    -5-
    period.” 
    Id. at 741.
    When the defendant failed to make the payments, the trial court revoked his
    probation. 
    Id. On appeal,
    the defendant argued that the damages encompassed by the restitution award
    “have never been measured” and that the record lacked a factual basis for the computation of the
    sum. 
    Id. at 748.
    This Court agreed, characterizing the “reparational amounts ordered paid” as
    “essentially arbitrary.” 
    Id. Moreover, the
    Court reasoned,
    [t]he probation statute does not create a substitute for an action for civil damages.
    Criminal and civil liability are not synonymous. A criminal conviction does not
    necessarily establish the existence of civil liability. Civil liability need not be
    established as a prerequisite to the requirement of restitution as a probation
    condition; such restitution for personal injury, therefore, generally should be more
    limited in scope than civil damages. In the instant case we believe that restitution
    should encompass only those losses which are easily ascertained and measured,
    and which are a direct result of the defendant’s criminal acts. [Id. at 748-749.]
    Because the record failed to elucidate the “purpose of the payments” and “the manner in which
    they were determined,” this Court reversed the order of probation revocation. 
    Id. at 749.
    Post-
    Heil, this Court has frequently echoed that restitution awards must be rooted in damages that are
    “easily ascertained and measured, and which are a direct result of the defendant’s criminal acts.”
    We discern no rational basis for continuing to embrace Heil’s “easily ascertained and
    measured” formulation, as the Heil court operated in an entirely different (and no longer
    pertinent) statutory milieu. The probation statute then in effect, MCL 771.3, permitted the
    sentencing court to “impose such other lawful conditions of probation, including restitution in
    whole or in part to the person or persons injured or defrauded, as the circumstances of the case
    may require or warrant, or as in its judgment may be meet and proper.” In Heil, the Court
    constructed a policy-driven limitation on the breadth of restitution orders imposed as conditions
    of probation. Here, however, we confront specific statutory language that displaces any need for
    policy analysis.
    First enacted in 1985, the CVRA incorporates several highly specific provisions
    addressing restitution. Its central, “extensive” restitution section, MCL 780.766, permits
    recovery of “the costs of physical and occupational therapy, as well as the cost of psychological
    care for the victim and the victim’s family, which at the time was not an ordinary part of
    restitution.”    Van Regenmorter, Crime Victims’ Rights—A Legislative Perspective, 17
    Pepperdine L Rev 59, 67 (1989). The statute’s current version authorizes sentencing courts to
    order payment of “an amount equal to the reasonably determined cost of medical and related
    professional services and devices actually incurred and reasonably expected to be incurred
    relating to physical and psychological care.” MCL 780.766(4)(a).
    Thus, the plain language of the CVRA instructs sentencing courts that the standard to be
    applied when calculating a restitution amount is simply one of reasonableness. “Reasonably
    determined” future losses (including the cost of future medical and psychological care) are
    subject to restitution, provided that the court finds that such losses are “reasonably expected to be
    incurred.” This language does not suggest the need for absolute precision, mathematical
    -6-
    certainty, or a crystal ball. On the other hand, speculative or conjectural losses are not
    “reasonably expected to be incurred.” Where the evidence provides a reasonably certain factual
    foundation for a restitution amount, the statutory standard is met.2
    The general restitution statute, MCL 769.1a, was also enacted in 1985. As we have
    noted, it sets forth a different standard for recovery of the costs of psychological care. Under
    MCL 769.1a(4)(a), an order of restitution may require a defendant to “[p]ay an amount equal to
    the cost of actual medical and related professional services . . . relating to . . . psychological
    care.” (Emphasis added.) Our Supreme Court has defined the word “actual” as “existing in act,
    fact, or reality; real.” Omdahl v West Iron Co Bd of Ed, 
    478 Mich. 423
    , 428; 733 NW2d 380
    (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
    The trial court properly awarded restitution for the costs of the “actual” professional
    services rendered to Shane in the amount of $1,785. The more difficult question is whether the
    CVRA authorizes the award rendered by the trial court for Shane’s future psychological care
    expenses. While future (not yet incurred) psychological expenses indisputably fall within the
    ambit of MCL 780.766(4)(a), the prosecution must demonstrate by an evidentiary preponderance
    that the claimed expenses are “reasonably expected to be incurred.” Here, we find the requisite
    proof sorely lacking.
    In his direct testimony, McGonigle hedged as to the specifics of the therapy he proposed:
    “I was expecting kind of a long course of treatment with possible referral to in-patient intensive
    therapy as needed.” He was even less certain regarding the amount of money needed to address
    Shane’s future psychological therapy needs. McGonigle admitted that the numbers he provided
    the court were conjectural:
    Q. . . . [Y]ou say they both likely have a long way to go with various
    modes of therapy before they are capable of following through with their goals.
    When you say they are both likely, you can’t provide opinions as to what they
    need, and in terms of actually following through with their goals though?
    A. Yeah.
    Q. That’s correct?
    A. And, I would like to comment on that if I could?
    2
    Although tort law principles are not necessarily controlling in the interpretation and application
    of the CVRA, we find them instructive. “In Michigan, in order to recover damages on the basis
    of future consequences, it is necessary for a plaintiff to demonstrate with ‘reasonable certainty’
    that the future consequences will occur.” Larson v Johns-Manville Sales Corp, 
    427 Mich. 301
    ,
    317; 399 NW2d 1 (1986), citing Prince v Lott, 
    369 Mich. 606
    , 609; 120 NW2d 780 (1963). See
    also King v Neller, 
    228 Mich. 15
    , 22; 
    199 N.W. 674
    (1924) (“[O]nly such future damages can be
    recovered as the evidence makes reasonably certain will necessarily result from the injury
    sustained.”).
    -7-
    Q. Absolutely.
    A. I’m actually prohibited in my practice from giving people any solid
    figures about how much treatment it will take to get over their problem. And,
    treatment is very - - it’s really hard to get an exact amount as a prescription.
    Q. I’m sorry?
    A. What I think I can do is look at, and that applies to an individual, what
    you can do is there is research that indicates average lengths of time that it takes
    to work out certain severity of problems and how much therapy is needed and
    that’s what I relied on for my report.
    Q. And, that goes to your next sentence, the fourth paragraph, is that what
    you’re basically saying? Well, under the circumstances it’s never proper to
    predict the exact amount of therapy needed for any condition?
    A. Yeah.
    Q. And, so, you don’t know what needs to be reasonably expected to be
    incurred, in terms of dollars?
    A. Well, not in the actual amount, but I think it’s reasonable to say there’s
    an average and this is what you would want available for someone facing this
    particular kind of problem, you would want to shoot in the ballpark and that’s
    what you could expect with the average.
    Q. In your next page of that you indicate in a paragraph it’s likely these
    boys may need psychiatric care. But, do I take it you have not referred them to
    any psychiatrist?
    A. No, I did not. I think partly because they wanted to opt for a more
    therapeutic path, they weren’t really open for that notion. I think as time evolves
    and as they mature and grow that could change. [Emphasis added.]
    On redirect examination, the prosecuting attorney read the relevant statutory language aloud, and
    inquired, “is it your opinion that these amounts you quoted are reasonably expected to be
    incurred as a result of this crime in the future?” McGonigle answered affirmatively.
    The trial court acknowledged that McGonigle had provided only general, one-size-fits-all
    numbers, but resolved the inherent uncertainties of McGonigle’s calculations by fixing on
    averages of McGonigle’s averages:
    His Exhibit 3 recommends ongoing out-patient counseling treatment, that
    they should be seeing a counselor twice per week and he estimates I think it was
    14 to 18,000 a year. We’ll use 15,000 per year, he recommends 8 to 10 years,
    we’ll go with the 8 years then. And, that at, let’s see here I said 15,000 a year
    times 8 years is $120,000, that would be for each of them. We’ll deal with them
    -8-
    separately, $120,000. Also he recommended 2 long-term treatment admissions to
    an in-patient program and he’s got one that’s mentioned here, but I don’t think he
    says that specifically has to be the one, but that’s an idea of what kind of cost it
    would be, and that would be 42,000 approximately per admission, that’s described
    in Exhibit 3.
    McGonigle’s inability to provide the court with cost figures specific to Shane renders the
    court’s estimates fatally uncertain. An informed guess as to a victim’s future psychological
    therapy costs does not equate with an amount “reasonably expected to be incurred.” While we
    recognize an element of uncertainty always lurks in the background when a factfinder predicts
    future damages, see Hannay v Dep’t of Transp, 
    497 Mich. 45
    , 86-88; 860 NW2d 67 (2014), the
    evidence presented here bore only the most tenuous connection to Shane’s needs. McGonigle
    admitted that the numbers he supplied the court did not specifically apply to Shane, and did not
    constitute “solid figures about how much treatment” Shane would reasonably require to heal.
    Instead, McGonigle relied on “average lengths of time” regarding other, undescribed patients,
    found in “research” that he failed to identify. This attenuated evidence did not suffice to
    demonstrate the loss that would “reasonably expected to be incurred” by Shane rather than an
    average PTSD patient.
    Moreover, McGonigle did not provide the court with sufficient grounds for a reasonably
    accurate restitution award predicated on the “direct” harm Shane sustained “as a result of the
    commission of a crime.” MCL 780.766(1). In 
    McKinley, 496 Mich. at 421
    , the Supreme Court
    emphasized that “MCL 780.766(2) requires a direct, causal relationship between the conduct
    underlying the convicted offense and the amount of restitution to be awarded.” As noted by our
    Supreme Court in McKinley, Michigan’s restitution statute instructs a sentencing court to
    consider “the amount of loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense.” 
    Id., quoting MCL
    780.767(1) (emphasis in original). The phrase “as a result of” contemplates factual
    causation. See People v Laidler, 
    491 Mich. 339
    , 344-345; 817 NW2d 517 (2012). “The concept
    of factual causation is relatively straightforward. In determining whether a defendant’s conduct
    is a factual cause of the result, one must ask, ‘but for’ the defendant’s conduct, would the result
    have occurred?” People v Schaefer, 
    473 Mich. 418
    , 435-436; 703 NW2d 774 (2005) (citations
    omitted), overruled in part on other grounds, People v Derror, 
    475 Mich. 316
    ; 715 NW2d 822
    (2006). “Proximate cause”, too, “is a standard aspect of causation in criminal law and the law of
    torts.” Paroline v United States, 572 US__; 
    134 S. Ct. 1710
    , 1720; 
    188 L. Ed. 2d 714
    (2014). “For
    a defendant’s conduct to be regarded as a proximate cause, the victim’s injury must be a ‘direct
    and natural result’ of the defendant’s actions.” 
    Schaefer, 473 Mich. at 436
    (citations omitted).
    The CVRA, we conclude, permits an award only for losses factually and proximately caused by
    the defendant’s offense; nothing in the text or structure of the statute suggests otherwise.
    The record contains no evidence that defendant’s conduct caused the specific future loss
    awarded by the trial court. Perhaps Shane will require precisely the amount of therapy that the
    trial court awarded. On this record, however, we have no basis for drawing a reasonable
    conclusion that likely he will, as the only guidance on that score was provided by McGonigle,
    who admitted that he was “actually prohibited . . . from giving people any solid figures about
    how much treatment it will take to get over their problem.” Thus, we perceive no direct
    relationship between the psychological consequences of defendant’s criminal acts toward Shane
    and the amount of restitution awarded. While Shane is entitled to restitution for future
    -9-
    psychological therapy expenses that he should reasonably expect to incur as a direct result of
    defendant’s criminal acts, “[r]estitution is not intended to provide a windfall for crime victims
    but rather to ensure that victims, to the greatest extend possible, are made whole for their losses.”
    United States v Huff, 609 F3d 1240, 1249 (CA 11, 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    McGonigle’s testimony did not inform the trial court what it would take to make Shane (as
    opposed to any average sexual abuse victim) whole. His “ballpark” estimate may have been the
    best that he could offer as a licensed social worker, but no evidence suggests that a more certain
    estimate, predicated specifically on Shane’s condition and likely future needs, was otherwise
    impossible to procure.
    Even less evidence substantiated the trial court’s $31,200 award for Shane’s “lost
    wages.” The CVRA provides for restitution of “after-tax income loss suffered by the victim as a
    result of the crime.” The victims’ father testified that both young men had been offered summer
    positions in Traverse City paying $400 per week (we assume pre-tax), which they had been
    unable to accept due to the pending court proceedings. The trial court assumed that $400
    represented “the amount they could have made in the market,” and that they would have worked
    continuously throughout the summer and for the next 78 weeks, when both obtained work in
    Kansas City. But lost earning capacity is not the same as “income loss.”
    Unfortunately, the CVRA does not provide a definition of the term “income loss.” In
    filling in this gap, we look to definitions of the relevant terms. “Income” is “[t]he return in
    money from one’s business, labor, or capital invested; gains, profits, salary, wages, etc.” Black’s
    Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 763. Here, Shane never had an “income” that defendant’s conduct
    caused him to lose. Even assuming that Shane’s loss of the ability to earn income at the ice
    cream store correlates to “income loss,” the court made no effort to calculate after-tax income
    loss, as required by the statute. Furthermore, no evidence suggested that the brothers lacked the
    ability to earn wages for a full 78 weeks.
    In summary, we vacate the trial court’s order awarding Shane restitution for future
    therapy costs, future medication expenses, future psychiatric services, and “lost wages.” The
    sums awarded for these categories of loss were not “reasonably determined,” and do not
    correspond to the amounts “reasonably expected to be incurred” by Shane relating to future
    psychological care or after-tax income loss. We remand for correction of the order to reflect the
    amount paid for psychological therapy, $1,785. Should the prosecution elect to present
    additional testimony, the court may conduct a new restitution hearing.
    V.
    We now turn to the remaining issue that the Supreme Court ordered added for
    consideration when it remanded the case to this Court. Citing Apprendi v New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    ; 
    120 S. Ct. 2348
    ; 
    147 L. Ed. 2d 435
    (2000), Southern Union Co v United States, __ US __; 
    132 S. Ct. 2344
    ; 
    183 L. Ed. 2d 318
    (2012), and Alleyne v United States, __ US __; 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
    ; 
    186 L. Ed. 2d 314
    (2013), defendant contends that because restitution is a form of punishment, the
    Sixth Amendment requires that a jury rather than a sentencing court determine the amount owed.
    Many other courts have considered the same argument. None have resolved this challenge in the
    manner defendant urges. We decline the opportunity to break new legal ground.
    -10-
    In Southern 
    Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2348-2349
    , the United States Supreme Court held that the
    amount of a criminal fine imposed as part of a defendant’s sentence must be determined by a
    jury. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Apprendi dictated this result, the Court explained, as
    “Apprendi’s ‘core concern’ is to reserve to the jury ‘the determination of facts that warrant
    punishment for a specific statutory offense.’” 
    Id. at 2350.
    A criminal fine and restitution are not
    synonymous, however. A plethora of federal circuit courts of appeal have held that “judicial
    factfinding to determine the appropriate amount of restitution under a statute that does not
    prescribe a maximum does not implicate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.” United States
    v Bengis, 783 F3d 407, 413 (CA 2, 2015) (citing cases from three other circuits). A few other
    circuits have rejected defendant’s argument based on a conclusion that restitution is a civil rather
    than a criminal penalty, negating Apprendi’s relevance. United States v Kieffer, 596 Fed Appx
    653, 664 (CA 10, 2014) (citing additional cases). Still other courts consider restitution a criminal
    penalty but have nonetheless concluded that the Sixth Amendment erects no obstacle to judicial
    fact-finding as to the amount owed:
    Restitution is, at its essence, a restorative remedy that compensates victims
    for economic losses suffered as a result of a defendant’s criminal conduct. In this
    sense, even though restitution is a criminal punishment, it does not transform a
    defendant’s punishment into something more severe than that authorized by
    pleading to, or being convicted of, the crime charged. Rather, restitution
    constitutes a return to the status quo, a fiscal realignment whereby a criminal’s ill-
    gotten gains are returned to their rightful owner. In these circumstances, we do
    not believe that ordering a convicted defendant to return ill-gotten gains should be
    construed as increasing the sentence authorized by a conviction pursuant to
    Booker.[3] [United States v Leahy, 438 F3d 328, 338 (CA 3, 2006).]
    We are unaware of any state or federal courts that have adopted defendant’s constitutional
    argument, and find it unavailing.4
    We vacate the order of restitution entered by the trial court. On remand, the prosecution
    may seek leave from the trial court to conduct a second restitution hearing. Regardless of the
    result of that hearing, no restitution shall be awarded to Austin. Should the prosecution elect
    3
    In United States v Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    ; 
    125 S. Ct. 738
    ; 160 L Ed2d 621 (2005), the United
    States Supreme Court struck down the mandatory application of the federal sentencing
    guidelines as violative of the Sixth Amendment.
    4
    We acknowledge that our Supreme Court recently decided in People v Lockridge, ___ Mich
    ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 149073, decided July 29, 2015), that Apprendi as extended by
    Alleyne renders Michigan’s sentencing guidelines “constitutionally deficient” to the extent they
    “require judicial fact-finding beyond facts admitted by the defendant or found by the jury” to
    score variables that mandate an increased floor for the minimum sentencing guidelines range.
    Slip op at 1-2. Nothing in Lockridge suggests that its reasoning encompasses restitution orders
    entered in conjunction with sentencing.
    -11-
    against convening another hearing, the trial court shall enter an order of restitution awarding
    Shane $1,785. We do not retain jurisdiction.
    /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
    /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
    /s/ Deborah A. Servitto
    -12-