Afscme Council 25 Local 3317 v. Charter County of Wayne ( 2017 )


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  •                          STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    AFSCME COUNCIL 25 LOCAL 3317,                                     UNPUBLISHED
    December 28, 2017
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v                                                                 No. 334638
    Wayne Circuit Court
    CHARTER COUNTY OF WAYNE and WAYNE                                 LC No. 15-011774-CK
    COUNTY EXECUTIVE,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: MURRAY, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and FORT HOOD, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Plaintiff, AFSCME Council 25 Local 3317, appeals by delayed leave granted1 an opinion
    and order granting summary disposition to defendants, Charter County of Wayne and the Wayne
    County Executive, on the basis of res judicata, in this labor law case. We dismiss the appeal as
    moot.
    I. BACKGROUND
    This case arises out of an alleged agreement between the Union and the County to engage
    in binding arbitration under the Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes in Police and Fire
    Departments Act, 
    1969 PA 312
    , MCL 423.231 et seq., otherwise commonly known as Act 312
    arbitration. The Union originally filed a petition with the Michigan Employment Relations
    Commission for Act 312 arbitration. The parties later entered into a “memorandum of
    agreement” (MOA), which provided, among other things, that the Union would dismiss the
    petition for Act 312 arbitration and that the petition could be refiled later. In a series of
    amendments to the MOA, the Union and the County repeatedly agreed to extend the date on
    which the Union could refile its petition.
    After the Union refiled the petition, a local governmental financial emergency was
    declared to exist in the County. The County entered into a consent agreement with the state to
    1
    AFSCME Council 25 Local 3317 v Charter Co of Wayne, unpublished order of the Court of
    Appeals, entered January 24, 2017 (Docket No. 334638).
    -1-
    address the financial crisis. Beginning 30 days after the effective date of the consent agreement,
    the County was no longer under a duty to engage in collective bargaining, and the Wayne
    County Executive assumed certain powers prescribed for emergency managers under the Local
    Financial Stability and Choice Act, 
    2012 PA 436
    , MCL 141.1541 et seq. (Act 436). In
    exercising these powers, the Wayne County Executive decided not to participate in Act 312
    arbitration in this matter. After the County moved in the MERC to dismiss the Act 312
    proceedings, the Union commenced the present action in circuit court for breach of contract,
    alleging that the MOA and its amendments comprised a written contract requiring the County to
    participate in Act 312 arbitration.2 The MERC dismissed the Act 312 proceedings. The Union
    filed a petition in this Court to review the MERC decision, but the Union subsequently moved to
    withdraw its appeal, and this Court, therefore, dismissed the appeal. Wayne Co v AFSCME
    Local 3317, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 8, 2016 (Docket No.
    329998). The circuit court later dismissed the instant action, concluding, in relevant part, that
    the doctrine of res judicata barred the Union’s breach of contract claim given the MERC’s
    dismissal of the Act 312 proceedings. This appeal ensued.
    II. ANALYSIS
    An appellate court should, “on its own motion, decline to consider cases that it does not
    have the power to determine, including those that are moot.” In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 
    460 Mich 396
    , 434-435 n 13; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). Whether a case is moot constitutes a threshold
    issue that a court should address before reaching the substantive issues of the case. 
    Id.
    It is well established that a court will not decide moot issues. This is
    because it is the principal duty of this Court to decide actual cases and
    controversies. That is, the judicial power is the right to determine actual
    controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper
    jurisdiction. As a result, this Court does not reach moot questions or declare
    principles or rules of law that have no practical legal effect in the case before it.
    Although an issue is moot, however, it is nevertheless justiciable if the issue is
    one of public significance that is likely to recur, yet evade judicial review. It is
    universally understood that a moot case is one which seeks to get a judgment on a
    pretended controversy, when in reality there is none, or a judgment upon some
    matter which, when rendered, for any reason, cannot have any practical legal
    effect upon a then existing controversy. Accordingly, a case is moot when it
    presents nothing but abstract questions of law which do not rest upon existing
    facts or rights. [People v Richmond, 
    486 Mich 29
    , 34-35; 782 NW2d 187 (2010),
    reh gtd in part on other grounds 
    486 Mich 1041
     (2010), amended by 784 NW2d
    204 (Mich, 2010) (quotation marks, brackets, ellipses, and citations omitted).]
    See also Garrett v Washington, 
    314 Mich App 436
    , 450; 886 NW2d 762 (2016). (“On appeal,
    the litigant must demonstrate that he or she is affected by the decision of the trial court. An issue
    2
    The Union also alleged a count seeking a writ of mandamus, but that count is not at issue in this
    appeal.
    -2-
    becomes moot when a subsequent event renders it impossible for the appellate court to fashion a
    remedy.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); B P 7 v Bureau of State Lottery, 
    231 Mich App 356
    , 359; 586 NW2d 117 (1998) (“As a general rule, an appellate court will not decide
    moot issues. A case is moot when it presents only abstract questions of law that do not rest upon
    existing facts or rights. An issue is deemed moot when an event occurs that renders it impossible
    for a reviewing court to grant relief.”) (citations omitted).
    The Union challenges the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition to defendants, a
    decision based on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata precludes the Union’s breach of
    contract claim. In its breach of contract claim, the Union alleged that the MOA and its
    amendments comprised a written contract requiring the County to participate in the Act 312
    arbitration process. Therefore, the Union essentially asks that this Court reinstate the breach of
    contract claim in which the Union is seeking to enforce a contract requiring the County to
    participate in the Act 312 arbitration process. For the reasons explained below, however, even if
    the County did make a contractual promise to participate in Act 312 proceedings, it is impossible
    to enforce any such promise because the MERC has dismissed the Act 312 proceedings and the
    Union has voluntarily withdrawn its appeal of the MERC decision.
    An Act 312 arbitration proceeding occurs under the auspices of the MERC. See Jackson
    Fire Fighters Ass’n v City of Jackson (On Remand), 
    227 Mich App 520
    , 525; 575 NW2d 823
    (1998). Here, following the reinstatement of the Union’s petition for Act 312 arbitration
    proceedings in accordance with the MOA, the MERC dismissed the Act 312 proceedings. The
    Union filed a petition in this Court to review the MERC decision. 3 But the Union later moved to
    withdraw its appeal, which this Court then dismissed. Wayne Co v AFSCME Local 3317,
    unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 8, 2016 (Docket No. 329998). By
    voluntarily withdrawing its appeal of the MERC decision, the Union waived its right to
    challenge that decision, thereby foreclosing any review of the MERC decision. See Monat v
    State Farm Ins Co, 
    469 Mich 679
    , 685; 677 NW2d 843 (2004) (a party who voluntarily
    surrenders the opportunity for appellate review to which the party was entitled has thereby
    waived any appeal); Quality Prod & Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 
    469 Mich 362
    , 374;
    666 NW2d 251 (2003) (“[A] waiver is a voluntary and intentional abandonment of a known
    right.”); Cadle Co v City of Kentwood, 
    285 Mich App 240
    , 255; 776 NW2d 145 (2009) (noting
    that “waiver eliminates any error”). Therefore, even if the parties had a written contract
    requiring the County to participate in the Act 312 arbitration proceedings, those proceedings
    have now been dismissed by the MERC, and the Union has waived any challenge to the MERC’s
    decision. It is impossible for this Court or the circuit court to order defendants to participate in
    nonexistent proceedings.4
    3
    A MERC decision is subject to appeal directly to this Court. See MCL 423.216(e).
    4
    Although the Union’s complaint asserts that it will suffer damages as a result of the alleged
    breach of contract, the complaint does not request a damages award; it appears the complaint
    only requests injunctive relief. In any event, the Union’s waiver of its appeal of the MERC
    decision is partly responsible for the unavailability of any Act 312 proceedings in which the
    -3-
    Also, to the extent that the Union is asking in this action for the reinstatement of the Act
    312 proceedings, the Union is mounting an improper collateral attack on the MERC’s dismissal
    of those proceedings. See Workers’ Compensation Agency Dir v MacDonald’s Indus Prod, Inc
    (On Reconsideration), 
    305 Mich App 460
    , 478; 853 NW2d 467 (2014) (holding that an
    administrative agency’s erroneous decision was not subject to collateral attack where the agency
    had subject-matter jurisdiction).
    Consequently, the issue on appeal is moot because it is impossible for this Court or the
    circuit court to fashion a remedy or to grant relief to the Union. This case does not fall within
    the exception to the mootness doctrine for issues of public significance that are likely to recur yet
    evade judicial review. Even if the issue could be deemed publicly significant, the Union has
    identified no reason to conclude that the issue is likely to recur but evade judicial review. The
    issue is moot in this case because the MERC dismissed the Act 312 arbitration proceedings and
    the Union then withdrew its appeal of the MERC decision. Hence, the evasion of review here is
    due in part to the Union’s own unexplained choice to withdraw its appeal of the MERC decision.
    Accordingly, we dismiss the present appeal because the issue raised by the Union on
    appeal is moot. See B P 7, 231 Mich App at 360 (dismissing the appeal as moot). We therefore
    do not address the substantive issue raised on appeal.
    Dismissed as moot. No costs to either side.
    /s/ Christopher M. Murray
    /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
    /s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
    parties could participate. The Union fails to explain how it could be entitled to damages or any
    other remedy for an alleged breach of a contract to participate in Act 312 arbitration proceedings
    where the Union itself has waived direct review of the dismissal of those very proceedings. The
    Union cannot leave it to this Court to make an argument for the Union. See Peterson Novelties,
    Inc v City of Berkley, 
    259 Mich App 1
    , 14; 672 NW2d 351 (2003).
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 334638

Filed Date: 12/28/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021