People of Michigan v. Christian William Hillman ( 2023 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
January 19, 2023
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 355529
Kent Circuit Court
CHRISTIAN WILLIAM HILLMAN, LC No. 16-010254-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and MARKEY and REDFORD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted1 the trial court’s order denying his motion for
relief from judgment. A jury found defendant guilty of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317. On
appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him under its personal policy of
issuing minimum sentences for second-degree murder convictions at the high end of the guidelines
range, rather than fashioning an individualized sentence as required by law. We disagree and
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 29, 2016, defendant, 18 years old at the time, engaged in a road rage incident
in which he fought with another motorist, 64-year-old William McFarlan, in a church parking lot.
After defendant knocked McFarlan to the ground unconscious, defendant kicked him in the head
repeatedly with steel-toed boots. McFarlan never recovered and died in the hospital just over one
month later.
The trial court sentenced defendant to 270 months to 100 years’ imprisonment. The trial
court stated the following regarding its imposition of the 270-month minimum sentence:
1
People v Hillman, ___ Mich ___; 967 NW2d 611 (2022).
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The undisputed facts of this case verify that the defendant kicked the victim,
Mr. McFarlan, in the head with steel-toed boots, while Mr. McFarlan was
unconscious, laying on the ground. It is also undisputed that Mr. McFarlan died as
a result of the head injuries inflicted by Mr. Hillman.
By perpetrating this heinous and vicious attack, the defendant deprived
Mr. McFarlan’s family of a husband, father, and grandfather. The defendant’s
actions merit a significant sentence under the advisory sentencing guidelines. The
guidelines call for a minimum sentence between 162 months and 270 months in the
Michigan Department of Corrections.
Therefore, the [c]ourt will impose a minimum sentence of 270 months,
which is 22-and-a-half years, to 100 years in the Michigan Department of
Corrections. Defendant is entitled to 267 days that he has served in the Kent County
Jail as jail credit.
Defendant appealed and this Court affirmed his conviction.2 Our Supreme Court denied
leave to appeal3 and denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration.4 After defendant exhausted
his appellate options, information emerged regarding the same trial court’s statements in another
case regarding its sentencing practices, specifically when sentencing defendants convicted of
second-degree murder. See People v Gonzalez, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of
Appeals, issued February 25, 2020 (Docket No. 344076).5 In Gonzalez, a panel of this Court
vacated the defendant’s sentence because the same trial court, while inquiring whether the
defendant intended to enter a plea agreement, informed him that it “would likely go to the high
end of the guidelines because that’s what I have done traditionally in other second-degree murder
cases.” Id. at 7.
In light of the panel’s Gonzalez decision, defendant moved for relief from judgment and to
be resentenced before a different judge. The trial court denied defendant’s motion in a written
opinion and order in which it noted that
in hindsight . . . the statements made to Defendant Gonzalez, that he would receive
a sentence at the top of the sentencing guidelines if convicted of second-degree
murder, were improper. The [c]ourt made such statements based on its erroneous
2
People v Hillman, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 17,
2019 (Docket No. 339917).
3
People v Hillman, 504 Mich 903; 929 NW2d 355 (2019).
4
People v Hillman, 504 Mich 974; 933 NW2d 291 (2019).
5
Gonzalez is cited throughout this opinion primarily for its factual content. To the degree this
unpublished case is cited for its legal analysis and conclusion, it is not binding precedent. See
MCR 7.215(C)(1).
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assumption that any sentence imposed within the sentencing guidelines would be
considered reasonable.
The trial court, however, explained that at the time it sentenced defendant it did not do so according
to a sentencing policy but had based the prior record variables and offense variables featured in
the presentence investigation report and defendant’s egregious behavior toward his 64-year-old
victim in this case. The trial court quoted its own statement from the sentencing hearing, that
“defendant’s actions merit a significant sentence under the advisory sentencing guidelines.” The
record indicates that the court analyzed its previous sentencing decision-making and concluded
that defendant suffered no actual prejudice, and therefore, denied defendant’s motion. Defendant
appealed. This Court denied leave to appeal.6 Defendant sought leave to appeal the denial to our
Supreme Court which in lieu of granting leave remanded the case to this Court to consider this one
issue as on leave granted. Hillman, ___ Mich ___.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of
discretion and its findings of facts supporting its decision for clear error.” People v Swain, 288
Mich App 609, 628; 794 NW2d 92 (2010). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court chooses
an outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Unger,
278 Mich App 210, 217; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). A trial court also abuses its discretion when it
commits an error of law. People v Giovannini, 271 Mich App 409, 417; 722 NW2d 237 (2006).
We may defer to the trial court’s judgment if it constitutes a reasonable or principled outcome.
People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). Regarding the clear-error standard,
a “trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous if, after we have reviewed the entire record, we are
definitely and firmly convinced that it made a mistake.” People v Armstrong, 305 Mich App 230,
242; 851 NW2d 856 (2014).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider defendant’s young age, science
regarding brain development, and lack of criminal history to determine an individualized,
proportionate sentence, but instead sentenced him under its personal policy. We disagree.
“The premise of our system of criminal justice is that, everything else being equal, the more
egregious the offense, and the more recidivist the criminal, the greater the punishment.” Babcock,
469 Mich at 263. “[T]he key test is whether the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the
matter, not whether it departs from or adheres to the guidelines’ recommended range.” People v
Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 475; 902 NW2d 327 (2017), quoting People v Milbourn, 435 Mich
630, 661; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). When applying the proportionality standard, several factors may
be considered, including:
6
People v Hillman, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 23, 2021 (Docket
No. 355529).
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(1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) factors that were inadequately considered by
the guidelines; and (3) factors not considered by the guidelines, such as the
relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the defendant’s misconduct
while in custody, the defendant’s expressions of remorse, and the defendant’s
potential for rehabilitation. [People v Lawhorn, 320 Mich App 194, 207; 907
NW2d 832 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]
Other factors for determining whether a sentence is proportionate to the offense and the offender’s
conduct include: “whether the guidelines accurately reflect the seriousness of the crime” and
“factors considered by the guidelines but given inadequate weight.” People v Dixon-Bey, 321
Mich App 490, 525; 909 NW2d 458 (2017) (citations omitted).
Subchapter 6.500 of the Michigan Court Rules provides “the exclusive means to challenge
a conviction in Michigan once a defendant has exhausted the normal appellate process.” People v
Watroba, 193 Mich App 124, 126; 483 NW2d 441 (1992). When seeking relief from judgment, a
defendant carries the burden of establishing that he is entitled to the relief requested.
MCR 6.508(D). Under MCR 6.508(D)(3), a trial court may not grant relief from an issue that
could have been raised in his direct appeal unless the defendant can show:
(a) good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in the prior
motion, and
(b) actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that support the claim for
relief. As used in this subrule, “actual prejudice” means that,
* * *
(iv) in the case of a challenge to the sentence, the sentence is invalid.
[MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a) and (b).]
As the rule indicates, “to be entitled to relief under MCR 6.508(D)(3), both ‘good cause’ and
‘actual prejudice’ must be established.” People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 313-314; 684 NW2d 669(2004).
In this case, the parties agree that good cause was established when the opinion released
by the Gonzalez panel indicated that the trial court followed a policy or habit of sentencing those
convicted of second-degree murder to the maximum recommended under the minimum sentencing
guidelines range. The parties differ, however, on whether defendant established actual prejudice
regarding his own sentencing, which took place almost a year before the sentencing in Gonzalez.
As MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iv) states, when a sentence is in question, actual prejudice is
shown when the sentence imposed is invalid. A sentence may be invalid for any number of
reasons. Our Supreme Court explained:
Clearly a sentence beyond statutory limits is invalid. A sentence within statutory
limits may also be invalid on a number of grounds. It is invalid if the sentencing
court relies on constitutionally impermissible considerations, such as the
defendant’s constitutionally infirm prior convictions, or improperly assumes a
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defendant’s guilt of a charge which has not yet come to trial, or the court fails to
exercise its discretion because it is laboring under a misconception of the law, or
conforms the sentence to a local sentencing policy rather than imposing an
individualized sentence. More recently, this Court has held invalid sentences which
do not comply with essential procedural requirements such as failure to utilize a
“reasonably updated” presentence report or to provide the defendant and his
counsel with the opportunity to address the court before sentence is imposed.
[People v Whalen, 412 Mich 166, 169-170; 312 NW2d 638 (1981) (citations
omitted).]
This Court has also expressed that a sentence is generally invalid when it is based on a
misconception of the law. People v Thomas, 223 Mich App 9, 11; 566 NW2d 13 (1997), citing
Whalen, 412 Mich at 169-170.
In this case, the trial court acknowledged in its opinion that in the Gonzalez case it made
improper statements “based on its erroneous assumption that any sentence imposed within the
sentencing guidelines would be considered reasonable.” Whether the trial court acted under that
“erroneous assumption” almost a year earlier when it sentenced defendant, however, has not been
established and such lacks relevance because MCL 769.34(10) requires this Court to affirm a
minimum sentence that falls within a properly calculated sentencing guidelines range unless the
trial court relied on inaccurate information. See People v Schrauben, 314 Mich App 181, 196; 886
NW2d 173 (2016). Nevertheless, this Court has recognized that a sentence may be invalidated
because “a policy of sentencing all defendants who go to trial to the top of the sentencing
guidelines range is fundamentally inconsistent with the principle of individualized sentences.”
People v Pennington, 323 Mich App 452, 466; 917 NW2d 720 (2018). In Pennington, a trial
court’s acknowledged policy of automatically imposing the upper end of the minimum sentencing
guidelines range, “sometimes higher,” on those who were convicted by a jury, violated those
defendants’ due-process rights and “ignore[d] the requirement of individualized sentencing.” Id.
at 467-468.
Although the Gonzalez panel focused on the trial court’s statement that it traditionally
sentenced those convicted of second-degree murder on the high end of the minimum guidelines
range, a critical distinction pertinent to this case exists between Pennington and the trial court’s
handling of the defendant in the Gonzalez case. Although the trial court in Gonzalez indicated its
inclination to impose the maximum, it did not express that such outcome would be a certainty, nor
did it express that it would do so automatically.7 Moreover, the trial court also intimated in
Gonzalez that it considered deviating downward from the maximum minimum if merited by the
individual case, saying, “I don’t think I’d deviate from your case—in your case.” (Emphasis
added.)
A key aspect further distinguishes this case from both Pennington and Gonzalez. This case
involved the trial court’s sentencing, not an earlier attempt to discourage defendant from
proceeding to jury trial and accept a plea. Further, sentencing in this case took place almost a year
7
Notably, the defendant in Gonzalez also faced the possibility of being convicted of the more
severe charge, first-degree murder.
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before the trial court sentenced the defendant in Gonzalez, making it more plausible that the trial
court imposed defendant’s sentence before it realized it was habitually sentencing convicted
second-degree murderers to the high end of the minimum guidelines range. The trial court
confirmed in its order denying defendant’s motion that it had not established any sentencing policy
at the time of defendant’s sentencing hearing. Defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court
had a set policy and practice at the time of his sentencing.
Regardless, even if the trial court did not adequately explain at sentencing that defendant’s
sentence was independently determined without resort to a fixed policy, the trial court expressed
satisfactory grounds in its opinion and order when ruling on defendant’s motion for relief for its
sentencing decision. The record reflects that the trial court considered defendant’s request to look
further into the aspects of defendant’s age and brain development but found no merit to those
factors which defendant sought to use to excuse his behavior. Further, the trial court considered
other factors such as his age as a teenage adult compared to that of the much older victim he fought
and then brutally continued to beat while unconscious. The trial court did not err in concluding
that defendant’s actions were “egregious” in the “heinous and vicious attack” and “merit[ed] a
significant sentence.” Evidence established defendant’s vicious attack on his victim and continued
violent aggression even after the victim lay unconscious on the ground.
The trial court’s explanation for its imposition of the maximum sentence within the
minimum sentencing guidelines range followed due consideration of the seriousness of the offense
and the offender in this case. Defendant has failed to establish that the trial court imposed an
invalid sentence under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it found that defendant suffered no actual prejudice and denied defendant’s motion
for relief from judgment.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ James Robert Redford
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