People of Michigan v. Anthony Francis Wilson ( 2023 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
January 19, 2023
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 356825
Emmet Circuit Court
ANTHONY FRANCIS WILSON, LC No. 20-005093-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and K. F. KELLY and LETICA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted Anthony Francis Wilson of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(2)(b), for sexually assaulting his girlfriend’s six-year-old
daughter. In a motion for a new trial, Wilson challenged his trial counsel’s performance, the trial
prosecutor’s conduct, the admissibility of expert testimony regarding characteristics of child
sexual abuse victims and an aspect his ex-girlfriend’s testimony and contended that COVID-19
masking requirements violated his rights. Although defense counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance, there is no reasonable probability that his errors affected the outcome of the
trial. And the remainder of Wilson’s challenges are without merit. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Wilson dated RH from approximately 2007 through 2011. RH’s daughter, AB, was six
years old when the relationship began. Approximately 10 years later, AB revealed to her mother
that Wilson had sexually assaulted her on one occasion when RH left AB in Wilson’s care
overnight. At trial, then 17-year-old AB testified that she was alone and attempting to fall asleep
on the bottom bunk of a bunk bed at Wilson’s apartment. Wilson entered the room and instructed
AB to lay on her back. AB recalled that Wilson pulled down her pants and kneeled over her. He
then slid “his flaccid penis through the folds of AB’s vagina, like a hot dog in a hot dog bun” until
it became erect. Wilson then inserted his penis into AB’s vagina. AB remembered feeling pain
and saying, “Ow.” Wilson stopped, placed his penis back into his pants, and left the room.
AB did not report the assault at the time because she did not understand what had happened.
She also did not report the incident immediately after realizing it was a sexual assault. AB testified
-1-
that she “did not want to be traumatized by the system,” did not know if anyone would believe her,
and was concerned that her father would blame her mother for allowing the assault to happen. AB
struggled with depression, anxiety, and behavioral and anger management issues for years, for
which her parents secured counseling. AB did not report Wilson’s assault to her counselor because
she was afraid the counselor would tell her parents. During an argument with her mother in March
2020, AB finally broke down and told her of the assault. RH contacted AB’s father and the family
reported the assault to the police.
At trial, RH supported AB’s description of the assault by testifying that while they were
dating, Wilson had difficulty reaching erection if he had been drinking. On those occasions,
Wilson would rub his penis against her vagina to reach erection in the same manner described by
AB.
The prosecution also presented the testimony of Thomas Cottrell, an expert in the field of
child sexual abuse. Cottrell had never met AB, had not read the police report detailing the assault,
and maintained that he could not testify whether Wilson sexually assaulted AB; his testimony was
more general in nature. Cottrell described that children who delay disclosure of sexual abuse fall
into three categories: (1) those who do not understand what has happened to them, (2) those who
are so terrified or traumatized that they cannot “generate the words to talk about it,” and (3) those
who “use their own cost/benefit analysis” and determine that the risks or consequences of
disclosing sexual abuse are greater than the benefits. The costs of disclosure from a child’s point
of view may include rejection by loved ones or upsetting his or her caregivers. These children are
“perpetually considering” whether it is safer to disclose their past abuse or keep it a secret. Cottrell
further testified that children who initially do not understand what occurred may continue to hide
the assault after realizing its import because they are traumatized or because they deem the costs
of disclosure to be too high. Cottrell testified that “it is not at all atypical for children to wait until
adulthood in order to disclose abuse for the very first time.” Cottrell also stated that a child may
disclose sexual abuse during a heated discussion or an argument with a parent because “[c]hildren
tend to drop their barriers” during these interactions. In addition, he opined that the way in which
a child recounts sexual abuse “is very dependent on the child, based on their comfort level.”
After one question from Wilson’s trial counsel, Robert Mendham, Cottrell answered
questions submitted by the jury. The court posed the first question from the jury to Cottrell as
follows:
Q. Sir, one of the jurors asked, would there be any perceived or legitimate
reward for children to make allegations of this kind if they are not true?
* * *
A. I could certainly envision that potentially, I know, as an example, we’ve
had one family here where there were false allegations made on the part of the teen,
and her agenda was to get the assailant, who was also a domestic violence assailant
towards her mother, out of the home.
-2-
The mother was not acting to protect herself, so the child made an allegation
of sexual abuse in order to protect the mother, so that wouldn’t be a gain in this
case that a child would get from falsely disclosing.
I would not say it’s impossible to have a gain for a false allegation. I can
tell you in my years of experience, it is an extremely rare occurrence. [Emphasis
added.]
Cottrell then testified in response to further jury questions that it was typical for a child to be unable
to recall the specific events related to the abuse because memories degrade over time. Finally,
Cottrell stated that after a child is abused, that child may exhibit many changes in behavior,
including changes in hygiene, substance abuse, night terrors, and depression.
The jury convicted Wilson as charged and the court sentenced him to concurrent terms of
25 to 40 years’ imprisonment. Wilson filed a motion for new trial raising the same claims he cites
on appeal, including that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Cottrell’s testimony
regarding “gain,” 1 and RH’s testimony about Wilson’s sexual conduct. The court conducted a
hearing pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973), and heard testimony
from Mendham regarding his trial preparation and strategy. Mendham admitted that he had not
researched whether expert testimony about delayed reporting of child sexual abuse amounted to
improper vouching for the witness. Indeed, had Mendham conducted a simple search of Cottrell’s
name, these cases would have been apparent. However, Mendham indicated that he did not object
to RH’s description of Wilson’s sexual habits as he believed the testimony to be admissible.
The court rejected all of Wilson’s challenged errors but one—that Mendham should have
objected during Cottrell’s testimony. The court agreed that Mendham’s trial preparation was
“concerning” and found that his lack of familiarity with relevant caselaw “fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness for an attorney representing a client under these circumstances.” But
the failure to object was harmless, in the court’s estimation, as Cottrell’s testimony was not actually
improper and given the strength of AB’s testimony against Wilson. Accordingly, the court denied
Wilson’s request for a new trial.
Wilson appeals.
II. VOUCHING FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Wilson contends that the court improperly permitted Cottrell to bolster AB’s credibility by
testifying that it would be an “extremely rare occurrence” for a child “to have a gain” for a false
allegation of sexual abuse. Wilson failed to preserve this challenge through contemporaneous
objection, People v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 252; 934 NW2d 693 (2019), limiting our review to
1
Wilson mischaracterized Cottrell’s testimony in his motion and continues to do so on appeal.
Cottrell did not testify that it would be an “extremely rare occurrence” for a child to make a false
allegation of sexual abuse, but rather that it would be an “extremely rare occurrence” for a child
to gain from a false allegation of sexual abuse.
-3-
plain error affecting Wilson’s substantial rights. People v Burkett, 337 Mich App 631, 643-644;
976 NW2d 864 (2021).
MRE 702 permits litigants to present expert testimony at trial to assist the jury in
understanding the evidence. In a CSC trial, “(1) an expert may not testify that the sexual abuse
occurred, (2) an expert may not vouch for the veracity of a victim, and (3) an expert may not testify
whether the defendant is guilty.” People v Peterson, 450 Mich 349, 352; 537 NW2d 857 (1995).
“An expert may testify regarding typical symptoms of child sexual abuse for the sole purpose of
explaining a victim’s specific behavior that might be incorrectly construed by the jury as
inconsistent with that of an abuse victim or to rebut an attack on the victim’s credibility.” Id. at
373 (emphasis omitted). However, a statistical assessment indicating that children almost never
lie about abuse constitutes improper vouching for the victim. Thorpe, 504 Mich at 259-260.
The issue in Thorpe was whether Cottrell improperly vouched for the complainant’s
credibility when he testified “that only 2% to 4% of children lie about sexual abuse” and identified
two scenarios in which children “might lie”—when the child’s sibling has been sexually abused
or when there is other domestic violence in the home. Id. at 239-240, 259. Neither of those
scenarios existed in Thorpe. The Supreme Court concluded, “although he did not actually say it,
one might reasonably conclude on the basis of Cottrell’s testimony that there was a 0% chance
[the victim] had lied about sexual abuse. In so doing, Cottrell for all intents and purposes vouched
for [the complainant’s] credibility.” Id.
In the consolidated matter of People v Harbison, the Supreme Court found prejudicial error
where the medical doctor who examined the complainant testified that she diagnosed the child
with “probable pediatric sexual abuse.” Id. at 243-244, 260-261. The Supreme Court noted that
“an examining physician cannot give an opinion on whether a complainant had been sexually
assaulted if the conclusion is nothing more than the doctor’s opinion that the victim had told the
truth.” Id. at 262 (cleaned up).
Following Thorpe, this Court again considered whether Cottrell had improperly vouched
for the credibility of a child sexual abuse complainant in People v Ruiz, unpublished per curiam
opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 21, 2021 (Docket No. 352431). In that case,
Cottrell testified that false disclosures of sexual assault “rarely” happen, but do occur. Id. at 3.
This Court reasoned that “[t]he differences between Cottrell’s statements in Thorpe and in this
case are significant and should not be overlooked.” Id. at 5. Specifically, use of the word “rarely”
to indicate the frequency with which false allegations are made is “far less precise” than the
percentages used in Thorpe. Id. This Court stated that Cottrell also “provided a concrete indicator
of false disclosure that was relevant to this case” when he stated that it would be a “red flag” for a
victim to repeat the same allegation “word-for-word.” Id. at 3, 5. This Court stated that “Cottrell’s
remark was vague, isolated, and never mentioned again” and therefore ultimately harmless. Id. at
6.
The language employed in this case is much more similar to Ruiz than Thorpe or Harbison.
Indeed, Cottrell did not comment on the frequency with which complainants falsely report child
sexual abuse in any manner. Rather, Cottrell testified that child sexual abuse victims rarely have
a gain from making a false report. Accordingly, the case for affirmance is even stronger here than
in Ruiz. We further note that Cottrell’s allegedly objectionable testimony was provided in response
-4-
to a juror’s question, and was not elicited by the prosecution like in Ruiz, Thorpe, and Harbison.
The prosecutor did not attempt to elicit testimony that AB was truthful and Cottrell did not vouch
for AB’s credibility.
III. OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE
Wilson further contends that the trial court improperly admitted testimony from RH
describing that Wilson would rub his flaccid penis against her vagina to cause an erection. Wilson
characterizes this testimony as improper other-acts evidence. As Wilson failed to raise a
contemporaneous objection to the admission of this evidence, our review is again limited to plain
error affecting Wilson’s substantial rights.
Under the rules of evidence, relevant evidence (that is evidence with “any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence”) is admissible unless otherwise excluded
“by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Michigan, these rules, or
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court.” MRE 401; MRE 402. RH’s testimony was certainly
relevant. However, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
MRE 403. Here, the evidence was prejudicial only because it was powerful, and not because it
was in any sense unfair.
Wilson cites MRE 404(b)(1) to support that RH’s testimony was inadmissible despite its
relevance. MRE 404(b)(1) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.
MRE 404(b)(1) prohibits the introduction of character evidence offered to prove conduct in
conformity therewith. A MRE 404(b) analysis focuses on whether the challenged evidence
supplies a non-character inference both probative of and material to an issue of consequence in the
case, such as motive or opportunity.
Wilson’s “act” of rubbing his penis against RH is not indicative of a character trait and
MRE 404(b)(1) does not apply to limit its admissibility. Even when examined through a 404(b)(1)
lens, however, the evidence passes muster. Wilson’s sexual technique for gaining an erection
establishes an inference of a “system in doing an act.” MRE 404(b)(1). That Wilson used a
specific method for gaining an erection when intoxicated made it more probable that he employed
the same system when sexually abusing AB. RH’s testimony was therefore admissible.
Wilson complains that he did not receive the 14-day notice required by MRE 404(b)(2)
before the prosecutor presented other-act evidence at trial. As RH’s testimony did not fall within
-5-
the parameters of MRE 404(b)(1), the prosecution was not required to comply with the notice
requirement of subsection (b)(2). In any event, defense counsel was not taken by surprise as RH’s
statement was included in discovery materials.
Wilson further challenges the prosecution’s use of this “propensity evidence” in closing
argument without any limiting instruction being provided by the court. Wilson mischaracterizes
the prosecutor’s argument. The prosecutor did not make an improper character inference. Rather,
the prosecution’s argument demonstrated that AB had age-inappropriate knowledge of Wilson’s
sexual habits. The prosecution used this admissible evidence to argue that Wilson was the
individual who assaulted AB.
IV. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Wilson contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor improperly used
inadmissible evidence to vouch for AB’s credibility during closing argument. Specifically, the
prosecutor argued:
[T]he Judge . . . at the end of this trial – he’s going to tell you that it may be helpful
to think about whether the witnesses you’ve heard from have any special reason to
tell the truth, or any special reason to lie; and [AB] has absolutely no reason to lie
about this; no reason whatsoever to fabricate this. She gains nothing by lying about
this. All she’s gotten after disclosing this is being put in a bunch of stressful,
anxiety-inducing situations.
I think it was a question from one of the jurors to Mr. Cottrell, where he
talked about – you know, he’s seen hundreds if not thousands of child victims of
sexual abuse, and he said, you know, the one situation he can think of where a false
accusation was made, it was because the girl wanted to get the guy out of the house
who was beating her mother.
Kids lie to get out of trouble, right; not into trouble. They lie to get out of
trouble; not into situations that cause them pain and discomfort.
In the situation Mr. Cottrell talked about, that kid was lying to get away
from trouble; to get away from this guy who was beating on her mother. That’s not
this case, right? [Wilson] had been out of [AB’s] life for a decade, for years. he
hadn’t had any interaction with [AB] or her family. He wasn’t talked about. His
name wasn’t mentioned around the house.
Again, as Wilson failed to raise a contemporaneous objection in the trial court, our review
is limited to plain error affecting Wilson’s substantial rights. “The test of prosecutorial misconduct
is whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v Brown, 279 Mich App
116, 134; 755 NW2d 664 (2008). In reviewing a challenge to a prosecutor’s remarks, we must
consider the record as a whole and be cognizant of the context in which the statements were made.
People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 330; 662 NW2d 513 (2003). Relevant to the issue before us,
“a prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of his witnesses by implying that he has some
special knowledge of their truthfulness,” but “may comment on his own witnesses’ credibility
during closing argument, especially when there is conflicting evidence and the question of the
-6-
defendant’s guilt depends on which witnesses the jury believes.” People v Thomas, 260 Mich App
450, 455; 678 NW2d 631 (2004).
Wilson argues that the prosecution improperly argued that AB had nothing to gain from
fabricating allegations against him and vouched for AB’s credibility by highlighting Cottrell’s
testimony that children do not lie “to get into situations that cause them pain and discomfort.”
AB testified that she waited to report the sexual assault because she was afraid no one
would believe her, her mother would be distressed, and her father would blame her mother.
Because AB did not report the assault until approximately 10 years after it occurred and long after
Wilson and her mother broke up, a juror could reasonably infer that AB would receive no gain
from falsely accusing Wilson. Cottrell’s expert testimony offered professional insight into the
reasons that children are reluctant to disclose sexual abuse. The prosecutor’s argument connected
Cottrell’s testimony to AB’s. This was not improper vouching.
The prosecutor did mischaracterize Cottrell’s testimony to an extent by arguing that he had
testified that children lie to “get out of trouble . . . not into trouble.” Cottrell did not testify
regarding children’s general propensity for truthfulness. Any error in this regard was cured by the
court’s jury instructions that “you may only use the evidence that was properly admitted in this
case” and that the evidence included sworn testimony of witnesses at trial, but not the lawyers’
statements and arguments. Because jurors are presumed to follow their instructions and the
prosecution’s statements regarding AB’s potential gains for false allegations could be inferred
from her testimony, the prosecution’s statements did not deny Wilson a fair and impartial trial.
Wilson also contends that the prosecution vouched for AB’s credibility by stating that she
“did the good, right and brave thing, and she is worthy of your belief.” This was not vouching,
either. Rather, the statements that AB was “brave” and “worthy of [the jury’s] belief” were
reasonable inferences from the record and support the prosecution’s theory that AB was afraid to
report the assault for the reasons stated above.
Wilson further argues that the prosecution committed misconduct when it used RH’s
testimony regarding her past sexual acts with Wilson in its closing arguments to bolster AB’s
credibility. Specifically, the prosecutor argued that RH’s testimony regarding Wilson’s past sexual
acts were “one of the most important facts in this trial . . . .” The prosecution also stated that AB
could not have known that Wilson had a habit of pulling out his flaccid penis and rubbing it on a
woman’s vagina until he became erect unless it had happened to her. As noted above, however,
RH’s testimony was not inadmissible character evidence. Therefore, the prosecution’s reliance on
this evidence was not problematic.
V. ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Wilson continues to argue that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, warranting
a new trial. To establish the right to a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must satisfy two components: “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d
674 (1984). To establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, a defendant must show that
-7-
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms. People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663; 683 NW2d 761 (2004). To
establish prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, the result of the proceedings would have differed. Id. at 663-664.
Following the Ginther hearing, the trial court determined that counsel’s performance was
constitutionally deficient, but that the errors did not affect the outcome of the trial. We discern no
error in the trial court’s conclusion.
Wilson has demonstrated that Mendham’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. A counsel’s “strategic choices made after
less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that professional judgments
support the limitations on investigation.” Strickland, 466 US at 690-691. “[R]easonably effective
assistance must be based on professional decisions and informed legal choices can be made only
after investigation of options.” Id. at 680. “An attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is
fundamental to his case combined with his failure to perform basic research on that point is a
quintessential example of unreasonable performance under Strickland.” Hinton v Alabama, 571
US 263, 274; 134 S Ct 1081; 188 L Ed 2d 1 (2014).
Mendham developed his defense theory after reviewing the police report and interviewing
Wilson. Mendham stated that he did not object to Cottrell’s testimony regarding the rarity of
achieving a gain from false allegations because he did not “have the luxury of sitting at a desk and
reviewing the rules of evidence and the court rules, and I’m running through the rules of evidence
in my mind, and the court rules in my mind, trying to decide whether or not this was an
inappropriate response.” While he had researched caselaw concerning the admissibility of
delayed-reporting evidence, he had not researched caselaw addressing whether testimony
regarding delayed reporting amounted to vouching for the witness. In addition, Mendham
admitted that his familiarity with caselaw regarding mental health expert testimony was limited.
Significantly, Mendham further admitted that he was not familiar with a number of relevant cases,
including Thorpe.2 It is not difficult to conclude that Mendham deficiently prepared for trial,
which prevented him from making an informed choice regarding possible objections.
Mendham’s deficient performance did not alter the outcome of these proceedings,
however. Unlike in Thorpe, Cottrell did not vouch for AB’s credibility, and no error occurred in
the admission of his testimony. Nor did Mendham’s lack of preparation affect the introduction of
RH’s testimony. The evidence was admissible as Mendham surmised and there was no ground to
object. Mendham’s evidentiary analysis was flawed, but his conclusion was correct. Absent
prejudice, Wilson cannot establish entitlement to a new trial.
2
Mendham’s lack of familiarity with Thorpe is remarkable given that Cottrell was also the expert
witness in that case, and his testimony was similar to the testimony he provided here.
-8-
VI. MASKING REQUIREMENT
Wilson contends that the trial court improperly required only him to wear a mask
throughout the trial, violating his rights to a fair trial and to confront the witnesses against him.
First and foremost, we note that Wilson mischaracterizes the events at trial. Everyone was
required to wear masks pursuant to the court’s COVID-19 protocols. When a witness took the
stand to testify, the court instructed him or her to remove the mask. The judge removed his mask
when seated behind the bench. The attorneys were also instructed to remove their masks when
addressing the court and when standing at the podium. This process did not deny Wilson his right
to a fair trial. Everyone understood why Wilson was wearing a mask and no one could have
possibly held it against him.
The masking requirement also did not interfere with Wilson’s right to confront the
witnesses against him. Indeed, the “preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial” under the
Confrontation Clause “must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case . . . .” Maryland v Craig, 497 US 836, 849; 110 S Ct 3157; 111 L Ed 2d
666 (1990) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
In this regard, we find instructive Collins v Nizzi, unpublished per curiam opinion of the
Court of Appeals, issued January 20, 2022 (Docket Nos. 354510 and 354871), in which this Court
adopted the reasoning in United States v Crittenden, unpublished order of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia, issued August 21, 2020 (Docket No. 4:20-CR-7),
regarding the impact of COVID-19 masking protocols on the right of criminal defendants to
confront the witnesses against them. This Court found persuasive the reasoning that face masks
do not prohibit a criminal defendant and the witnesses “from looking upon each other in person.”
Collins, unpub op at 8 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “There is no reason to believe that
it is any less difficult to tell a lie to a person’s face just because the liar’s nose and mouth are
covered.” Id. (cleaned up). This Court also found persuasive the Crittenden Court’s reasoning
that
“[t]he Confrontation Clause does not guarantee the right to see the witness’s lips
move or nose sniff, any more than it requires the jurors to subject the back of a
witness’s neck to a magnifying glass to see if the hair raised during particularly
probative questioning. Just as appropriate clothing will cover other parts of
witnesses’ bodies and potentially cover certain muscle twitches in those areas, the
jury will not be able to see the masked witness’s entire facial expressions. The
masks, however, will not prevent observation of other aspects of their body
language.” [Id., quoting Crittenden, unpub op at 9 (emphasis omitted).]
Like in Collins, Wilson received “a full trial, during which he was provided with the
opportunity to present evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and respond to the
evidence presented by the defense.” And as noted by Collins, “any perceived prejudice was shared
equally by the parties.” Collins, unpub op at 10. Specifically, all persons in the courtroom, with
the exception of the judge on the bench, witnesses while testifying on the stand, and counsel when
addressing the judge or at the podium, were required to wear a mask. Had Wilson opted to take
the stand, he too would have been instructed to remove his mask. There simply is no ground to
-9-
believe that the jury held Wilson’s mask against him or that Wilson could not adequately confront
the witnesses with his mouth and nose covered to prevent viral spread.
VI. CUMULATIVE ERROR
Finally, Wilson contends that he is entitled to a new trial based on the effect of cumulative
errors committed at his trial. No prejudicial error occurred at trial to support Wilson’s claim.
Accordingly, Wilson cannot establish the right to a new trial. See People v Dobek, 274 Mich App
58, 106; 732 NW2d 546 (2007).
We affirm.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Anica Letica
-10-