People of Michigan v. Crystal L Shelton-Randolph ( 2023 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision
until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
February 16, 2023
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 360679
Genesee Circuit Court
CRYSTAL L. SHELTON-RANDOLPH, LC No. 14-035996-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and K. F. KELLY and LETICA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted1 the trial court’s judgment of sentence requiring her to register
as a tier I sex offender. Finding no errors warranting reversal, we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from the death of defendant’s two-year-old son on November 22, 2013. At
approximately 4:30 p.m., paramedics were dispatched to defendant’s apartment where defendant’s son
was observed lying naked on a towel on the floor. Defendant was kneeling over the child performing
CPR. Once inside the ambulance, paramedics noticed bleeding around the child’s rectum, small bruises
on the left side of his body up to his temple and left arm, and three to five “fresh scratches” across his
forehead. Defendant told paramedics that the child was in the bath, started choking, and stopped breathing.
After the child arrived at the hospital, a doctor pronounced him dead.
Rhonda Ruterbusch, a registered nurse and sexual assault nurse examiner, testified that she
examined the child’s body at the hospital and collected samples. Ruterbusch saw that the child had
bruising on his left side, including his temple, chest, and left arm, and a circular shape on the left side of
his chest that looked like a bite mark. His belly was distended. There was dried blood at the opening of
his penis, and dried blood around his anal area. Ruterbusch opened his anal opening and the rectal area
1
People v Shelton-Randolph, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 23, 2022 (Docket
No. 360679).
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was “severely lacerated, just pocketed with blood. Pure blood was in there, bright red.” Ruterbusch also
testified that the child’s anal opening had no muscle tone, and it was open “about the size of a half a
dollar.”
On the basis of the autopsy, Dr. Patrick Cho of the Genesee County Medical Examiner’s Office
testified that the child had abrasions and contusions on his head and face, skin missing on the bridge of
his nose, abrasions behind his left ear, a torn upper lip, and a torn bottom frenulum. The child had
“lacerations about the perianal area as well as rectum internally,” and these injuries were most likely
caused by a foreign object because they were not linear tears. The child had hemorrhages on the back of
his rib cage and around his sigmoid colon caused by blunt force or pressure to the abdomen. Dr. Cho
concluded that the cause of death was “multiple blunt force injuries,” and the manner of death was
homicide because the child could not have caused these injuries to himself.
Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to an amended charge of second-degree murder, MCL
750.317,2 for the November 2013 death of her two-year-old son. The trial court entered a judgment of
sentence imposing a prison sentence of 180 to 600 months’ imprisonment and requiring defendant to
register as a tier I sex offender under the “catchall provision,” MCL 28.722(s)(vi), of the Sex Offenders
Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq., as amended by 2011 PA 17.3 Defendant appealed her
sentence contesting the registration requirement, and this Court remanded “for the trial court to follow the
proper procedures to determine whether defendant must register as a sex offender.” People v Shelton-
Randolph, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 28, 2017 (Docket
No. 335044), p 1.
On remand, the trial court held a hearing in which it again determined that defendant was subject
to registration. The court noted that while testimony from the preliminary examination indicated that there
could have been other explanations for the lacerations on the skin of the anus and the internal hemorrhage,
Dr. Cho believed “it was a blunt object or blunt force[,] most likely a foreign object.” The trial court
further noted that “a foreign object suggests sexual activity in the rectum or in the anus.” Therefore, the
trial court concluded that “while the name of the charge by its nature does not constitute a sexual offense,
the activity underlying the charge does.” This appeal followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The interpretation and application of SORA is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.
People v Anderson, 284 Mich App 11, 13; 772 NW2d 792 (2009). The trial court’s underlying factual
2
Defendant was originally charged with felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a), and first-degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(2). In exchange for
defendant’s plea, the prosecutor agreed to refrain from reissuing charges from the death of the child’s twin
two months earlier. Defendant further agreed to give the children’s ashes to their paternal grandmother
and register as applicable.
3
We apply the version of SORA that was in effect at the time of the offense. See People v Milton, 186
Mich App 574, 582; 465 NW2d 371 (1990) (“Amendments of criminal statutes concerning sentences or
punishment are not retroactive.”). The language of the subject catchall provision remains the same, but
the provision has been renumbered as MCL 28.722(r)(vii). See 2020 PA 295, effective March 24, 2021.
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findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. Clear error exists when this Court is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.III. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering her to register as a sex offender under the
catchall provision of the SORA because her criminal activity did not, by its nature, constitute a sexual
offense. Defendant contends that she did not admit to or make any statements regarding sexual assault or
sexual activity, and there is no indication that there was a history of sexual abuse or sexual assault.
Additionally, defendant argues that the trial court focused solely on the injuries to the victim’s rectal area
but did not look at the rest of the facts giving rise to the conviction. Because an admission by the defendant
was not required, and the testimony from the preliminary examination established by a preponderance of
the evidence that the violation, by its nature, constituted a sexual offense, we affirm defendant’s
conviction.4
“SORA requires an individual who is convicted of a listed offense after October 1, 1995, to register
as a sex offender.” People v Golba, 273 Mich App 603, 605; 729 NW2d 916 (2007); see also MCL
28.723(1)(a). A “listed offense” includes “a tier I, tier II, or tier III offense.” MCL 28.722(k), as amended
by 2011 PA 17. A tier I offense includes violations of specific statutes and, under a catchall provision,
also includes “[a]ny other violation of a law of this state or a local ordinance of a municipality, other than
a tier II or tier III offense, that by its nature constitutes a sexual offense against an individual who is a
minor.” MCL 28.722(s)(vi). The language of the catchall provision requires that three conditions be
satisfied before “a person must register as a sex offender: (1) the defendant must have been convicted of
a state-law violation or a municipal-ordinance violation, (2) the violation must, by its nature, constitute a
sexual offense, and (3) the victim of the violation must be under 18 years of age.” Golba, 273 Mich App
at 607 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Only the second condition is at issue in this case.
The condition that the violation must, by its nature, constitute a sexual offense “is not to be
determined solely by reference to the legal elements of the offense of which the defendant was convicted.”
Anderson, 284 Mich App at 14. Instead, “the particular facts of a violation are to be considered in
determining whether the violation by its nature constitutes a sexual offense against an individual who is
less than 18 years of age.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also MCL 769.1(13) (stating
that if a court sentences a defendant under the catchall provision, “the court shall include the basis for that
determination on the record and include the determination in the judgment of sentence”). When a
sentencing court decides whether a defendant must register under SORA, the court may consider all record
4
During defendant’s sentencing, the trial court explained to defendant that if she pleaded no contest, she
would have to “be registered on the sex registry.” When asked if she understood, defendant responded,
“Yes, sir.” In addition, in defendant’s written plea agreement, signed by defendant November 30, 2015,
it states defendant will submit to “CSC registration requirements as applicable.” Because defendant
agreed to SORA registration “as applicable” and did not attempt to withdraw her plea, defendant arguably
has waived the argument of whether SORA registration was proper. See People v Ward, 206 Mich App
38, 43-44; 520 NW2d 363 (1994) (“[A] defendant who pleads guilty and is sentenced in accordance with
a plea bargain and sentencing agreement waives the right to challenge the sentence unless there is also an
attempt to withdraw the plea for a sound legal reason.”). But even if not waived, defendant’s arguments
are unconvincing.
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evidence, including evidence presented during a preliminary examination, “as long as the defendant has
the opportunity to challenge relevant factual assertions and any challenged facts are substantiated by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Anderson, 284 Mich App at 14-15 (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
The evidence introduced during the preliminary examination supported the trial court’s
determination that although defendant pleaded nolo contendere to second-degree murder, the activity
underlying the charge constituted a sexual offense. The court relied on the testimony of Dr. Cho, who
performed the victim’s autopsy and testified as an expert in forensic pathology. Dr. Cho testified that the
victim had “lacerations about the perianal area as well as rectum internally,” and these injuries were most
likely caused by a foreign object because they were not linear tears. Furthermore, Dr. Cho stated that the
nonlinear-type tears “indicated blunt force,” and “[t]he hemorrhage internally also was . . . most probably
blunt force or some pressure applied to the abdomen.”
The trial court’s conclusion is further supported by the preliminary examination testimony of
paramedic Michael Galajda, Flint Police Department Officer Steven Howe and Sergeant Alfino
Donastorg, and Ruterbusch. Galajda testified that he saw bleeding around the victim’s rectum during the
ambulance transport to the hospital. Officer Howe testified that after the victim was pronounced dead at
the hospital, the officer went to the room where the victim was located and saw blood around the victim’s
rectum, which “was open the size of a large coin.” Ruterbusch, who performed a sexual assault
examination on the victim’s body, testified that the victim’s anal opening had no muscle tone, and it was
open “about the size of a half a dollar.” Ruterbusch described the victim’s rectal area as “severely
lacerated,” “pocketed with blood,” and “shredded,” likening its appearance to meat ground “through a
meat grinder.” Furthermore, Sergeant Donastorg testified that when he questioned defendant, she told
him that “nobody else was home at the time” of the incident.
The witness testimony from the preliminary examination established by a preponderance of the
evidence that the violation, by its nature, constituted a sexual offense. The lack of an admission by
defendant that she committed a sexual offense and the existence of other injuries to the victim’s body do
not alter the weight of the evidence that demonstrates a sexual offense occurred. See Anderson, 284 Mich
App at 15 (holding that although “[t]he victim’s mother testified that the victim had recanted on three
occasions,” “the evidence showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravated assault, by its
nature, constituted a sexual offense”). Therefore, the trial court did not err when it ordered defendant to
register as a tier I sex offender under MCL 28.722(s)(vi).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Anica Letica
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